Into the past : nationalism and heritage in the neoliberal age by Gledhill, James
INTO THE PAST:                                           
NATIONALISM AND HERITAGE IN THE NEOLIBERAL AGE 
James Gledhill 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
at the 
University of St Andrews 
 
  
2017 
Full metadata for this item is available in                                     
St Andrews Research Repository 
at: 
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12114  
 
 
 
 
This item is protected by original copyright 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Into	the	Past:	
Nationalism	and	Heritage	in	the	Neoliberal	Age						James	Gledhill	
 
 
 
 This	thesis	is	submitted	in	partial	fulfilment	for	the	degree	of	PhD		at	the	University	of	St	Andrews	
 
 
 23	June	2017	
1. Candidate’s declarations: 
 
I, James Gledhill, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 95, 000 
words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried 
out by me, or principally by myself in collaboration with others as 
acknowledged, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application 
for a higher degree.  
 
I was admitted as a research student and as a candidate for the degree of PhD 
in September 2013; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in 
the University of St Andrews between 2013 and 2017.  
 
Date:    Signature of candidate:  
 
2. Supervisor’s declaration: 
 
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution 
and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St 
Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application 
for that degree.  
 
Date:     Signature of supervisor: 
 
3. Permission for publication:  
 
In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am 
giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the 
regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any 
copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby.  I also understand that 
the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be 
made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis 
will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by 
award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to 
migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued 
access to the thesis. I have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that 
may be required in order to allow such access and migration, or have requested 
the appropriate embargo below.  
 
The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the 
publication of this thesis: 
 
PRINTED COPY 
 
a) No embargo on print copy 
 
ELECTRONIC COPY 
 
a) No embargo on electronic copy 
 
ABSTRACT AND TITLE EMBARGOES 
An embargo on the full text copy of your thesis in the electronic and printed 
formats will be granted automatically in the first instance.  This embargo 
includes the abstract and title except that the title will be used in the graduation 
booklet. 
 
If you have selected an embargo option indicate below if you wish to allow the 
thesis abstract and/or title to be published.  If you do not complete the section 
below the title and abstract will remain embargoed along with the text of the 
thesis. 
 
a)  I agree to the title and abstract being published     YES/NO 
b)  I require an embargo on abstract                         YES/NO 
c)  I require an embargo on title                                YES/NO 
 
 
Date:     Signature of candidate:    
 
 
Date:     Signature of supervisor: 
 
 
Please note initial embargos can be requested for a maximum of five years. An 
embargo on a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Science or Medicine is rarely 
granted for more than two years in the first instance, without good justification.  
The Library will not lift an embargo before confirming with the student and 
supervisor that they do not intend to request a continuation. In the absence of 
an agreed response from both student and supervisor, the Head of School will 
be consulted. Please note that the total period of an embargo, including any 
continuation, is not expected to exceed ten years.   
Where part of a thesis is to be embargoed, please specify the part and the 
reason.  
 
	 1	
Contents		
List	of	Photographs		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				2	
Abstract		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				6	
Acknowledgements		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				8	
Introduction		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				9	
	
Part	One	
	
One	Days	of	Glory:	National	Heritage	and	the	Production	of	Modernity		 		38		
Two	Dark	Matter:	Activist	Heritage	and	Irrational	Nationalism	 		 		 		61	
	
Part	Two	
	
Three	 Strange	 Land:	 Jewish	 Nationalism	 and	 Fundamentalism	 in	 Israeli	Modernity	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													117		
Four	Dead	Generations:	Elegy	and	Authenticity	in	Irish	Republicanism													214		
Five	 Immortal	Memories:	Loyalism,	Nostalgia	and	Identity	Politics	 in	 the	North	of	Ireland	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													 													282	
	
Conclusion	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													395	
References	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													407	
Maps	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													434	
Appendices:	
Appendix	I	 Ethical	Application	Form	
Appendix	II	 Ethical	Amendment	Approval	
	 2	
List	of	Photographs		All	photographs	were	taken	by	the	author	unless	otherwise	stated.		2.1	Decorative	swastikas	on	the	façade	of	the	Ottens	Hof,	Wewelsburg	village.		2.2	Caretaker’s	house	with	völkisch	decoration,	Wewelsburg	village.		2.3	Sigrunen	on	the	sentry	box	outside	the	former	SS	guardhouse.	2.4	Museum	display	case	containing	SS	uniform	obscured	by	frosted	glass.		2.5	Tar	on	the	wall	of	the	castle’s	east	wing	marking	the	outline	of	the	temporary	shed	used	by	prisoners	during	the	reconstruction.			2.6	Interior	of	the	Gruft	in	the	North	Tower.	2.7	Interior	of	the	Obergruppenführersaal	in	the	North	Tower.	2.8	Sun	wheel	symbol	in	the	centre	of	the	Obergruppenführersaal.	2.9	 Neofascist	 demonstrators	 carrying	 riot	 shields	 painted	with	 the	 Black	 Sun	and	 runic	 symbols	 in	 the	 Maidan,	 Kiev,	 circa	 2014	 (source:	 http://www.	pravyysektor.info).	2.10	 Azov	 Battalion	 internet	 propaganda	 displaying	 its	 emblem	 (right)	 of	 the	combined	Black	Sun	and	Wolfsangel	symbols,	2015	(source:	http://www.vk.	com/azovinternational).	2.11	Black	Sun,	2017	(source:	http://www.azov.press).	2.12	Excavated	structure	of	the	former	SS	shooting	range	in	Oberhagen	forest.	2.13	Niederhagen’s	former	kitchen,	now	the	Wewelsburg	fire	station.	2.14	 Niederhagen’s	 former	 gatehouse,	 now	 a	 private	 residence,	 with	 stones	marking	the	outline	of	the	camp’s	main	road.		2.15	Niederhagen	memorial	on	the	site	of	the	former	Appelplatz.	2.16	 Hermann	 Bartels’	 former	 villa,	 “Führerhaus	 I”,	 now	 converted	 into	 an	evangelical	church	and	renamed	the	Paul	Schneider	Haus.	3.1	An	IDF	tour	group	listening	to	a	guide	in	the	Independence	Hall,	Tel	Aviv.	3.2	 Statue	 of	 Mordechai	 Anielewicz	 by	 Nathan	 Rapoport	 in	 front	 of	 the	 water	tower	destroyed	by	Egyptian	forces	in	1948.	3.3	 Children’s	 houses	with	 reinforced	 concrete	walls	 (painted	 blue)	 to	 protect	them	from	Palestinian	rocket	fire.	3.4	Introductory	gallery	of	the	From	Holocaust	to	Revival	Museum.	3.5	Museum	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 Jewish	 Fighting	Organisation’s	 bunker	 at	 18	Mila	Street	in	the	Warsaw	Ghetto.	3.6	 The	 Brothers’	 Grave:	 headstones	 of	 those	 killed	 defending	 the	 kibbutz	 in	1948.	3.7	Portrait	of	a	soldier	from	Yad	Mordechai	killed	in	the	2006	Lebanon	War.	3.8	IDF	soldiers	posing	for	a	photograph	outside	the	Ibrahimi	Mosque	in	the	Old	City.	3.9	Palestinian	shop	fronts	on	al-Shuhada	Street	with	their	doors	welded	shut.	3.10	Observers	from	the	Temporary	International	Presence	in	Hebron	(left)	and	an	Israeli	Border	Policeman	(right)	near	the	Ibrahimi	Mosque.	3.11	Concrete	barriers	on	“Tarpat	Street”	covered	with	pro	and	anti-occupation	graffiti.	3.12	Frontage	of	the	Beit	Hadassah,	off	al-Shuhada	Street.	3.13	Jacob	on	his	deathbed	in	a	scene	from	Embracing	Eternity	 (source:	http://	www.en.hebron.org.il).	
	 3	
3.14	An	Arab	gunman	(played	by	an	Israeli)	in	a	scene	from	Embracing	Eternity	(source:	http://www.en.hebron.org.il).	3.15	The	1929	Massacre	display:	 fragments	of	gravestones	and	photographs	of	the	dead.			3.16	Ruins	of	 the	Mosque	of	 the	 Sixty	 at	 the	 site	where	 the	 cornerstone	of	 the	Shiloh	settlement	was	laid	in	1978.	3.17	The	guide	welcoming	the	tour	group	to	“Ancient	Shiloh”.	3.18	Site	of	 the	Byzantine	basilica	excavated	by	Danish	archaeologists	between	1926	and	1932.	3.19	The	former	al-Yatim	mosque	built	on	the	remains	of	a	Byzantine	church.	3.20	 Christian	 pilgrims	 dancing	 on	 what	 they	 believe	 to	 be	 the	 site	 of	 the	Tabernacle.	3.21	Tour	group	waiting	to	enter	the	Visionary	Tower.	3.22	The	Mishkan	Shiloh	synagogue	modelled	on	the	Tabernacle.	3.23	Outside	the	synagogue	at	Ganei	Tal.	3.24	Monument	at	the	Katif	Centre,	Nitzan,	symbolising	the	destroyed	yeshivah	at	Neve	Dekalim	in	Gush	Katif.	3.25	Make-believe:	sand	pit	at	the	Katif	Centre,	Nitzan.	3.26	 Menorah	 from	 the	 synagogue	 at	 Netzarim	 on	 display	 in	 the	 Gush	 Katif	Museum,	Jerusalem.	3.27	“Mortar	menorah”	made	from	an	unexploded	Palestinian	rocket,	Gush	Katif	Museum,	Jerusalem.	3.28	Photograph	of	a	child	offering	biscuits	to	IDF	soldiers	during	the	evacuation	in	2005,	Gush	Katif	Museum,	Jerusalem.	3.29	Perimeter	 fence	of	Zikim	near	the	Gaza	border,	 the	Palestinian	city	of	Beit	Hanoun	on	the	skyline.	3.30	Zikim’s	new	visitors	centre	under	construction	in	an	old	Palestinian	house.	3.31	Greenhouses	belonging	to	ex-Gush	Katif	settlers	on	land	sold	to	the	Israeli	government	by	Zikim.	3.32	Photographs	of	kibbutz	members	in	Zikim’s	museum.	4.1	 Marchers	 stop	 symbolically	 outside	 the	 Department	 of	 the	 Taoiseach,	Merrion	Street.	4.2	 Actors	 playing	 (left	 to	 right):	 Constance	 Markievicz,	 Michael	 Mallin	 and	Christy	Poole.	4.3	“Living	history”:	actor	demonstrating	how	a	Mauser	rifle	works.	4.4	D	Company	flag	and	Sinn	Féin	1918	election	replica	poster,	Divis	Street.	4.5	and	4.6	Firearms	exhibits	featuring	a	range	of	weapons	used	by	Republicans	from	the	early	nineteenth	to	the	late	twentieth	centuries.	4.7	Museum	reconstruction	of	Eileen	Hickey’s	cell	at	Armagh	Gaol.	4.8	Memorial	to	Republican	women	with	a	Roll	of	Honour	1971-1992.	4.9	Irish	tricolour	flag	draped	over	Joe	McKelvey’s	coffin,	1922.	4.10	Mural	 depicting	 Eileen	Hickey	 (right)	 and	 Joe	McKelvey	 (centre),	 Conway	Street.	4.11	 Special	 exhibition	 held	 for	 the	 Easter	 Rising	 centenary	 at	 the	 Irish	Republican	History	Museum.	4.12	 Na	 Fianna	 Éireann	 (Soldiers	 of	 Ireland)/Cumann	 na	 mBan	 Easter	 Rising	centenary	mural,	off	the	Falls	Road.	4.13	Easter	Sunday	parade,	Falls	Road,	2016:	 the	woman	on	 the	 far	 right-hand	side	is	carrying	a	portrait	of	a	dead	relative.	
	 4	
4.14	 Colour	 party	 standing	 to	 attention	 at	 the	 New	 Republican	 Plot,	 Milltown	Cemetery.	4.15	 Visitor	 posing	 for	 a	 photograph	 on	 the	 chair	 in	 the	mock	 Stonebreakers’	Yard.	4.16	 Crossley	 car	 that	 the	 exhibition’s	 curators	 claimed	 was	 used	 by	 Michael	Collins.	4.17	Patrick	Pearse	and	Proclamation	t-shirts	on	sale	in	the	Revolution	1916	gift	shop.	4.18	An	actor	in	the	role	of	Patrick	Pearse	reading	the	Proclamation	on	O’Connell	Street,	Easter	Monday	2016.	4.19	 Freshly	 sanitised	 hoarding	 over	 the	 National	 Monument	 at	 14-17	 Moore	Street,	Good	Friday	2016.	4.20	Save	Moore	Street	From	Demolition	protest,	Easter	Monday	2016.	4.21	 Protestor	 holding	 a	 “Citizen’s	 Injunction”	 prohibiting	 further	work	 on	 the	Moore	Street	terrace,	Easter	Monday	2016.	4.22	Volunteers	 collecting	 for	 Irish	 soup	 kitchens	 (left),	O’Connell	 Street,	 Good	Friday	2016.	4.23	Patrick	Pearse	placard,	Falls	Road,	Belfast,	Easter	2016.	4.24	 1916	 centenary	 banner	 on	 the	 Bank	 of	 Ireland	 building	 in	 College	 Green,	Dublin,	Easter	2016.	5.1	Cosy	Somme	Association	panel	painting,	Ogilvie	Street,	East	Belfast.	5.2	Zionist	 imagery	 in	 the	 John	Patterson	exhibit,	Northumberland	Street,	West	Belfast.	5.3	 Dissident	 Republican	mural	 expressing	 solidarity	 with	 Palestinian	 political	prisoners,	Northumberland	Street.	5.4	 Arson	 damage	 to	 the	 Patterson	 display	 on	 Northumberland	 Street	 with	 a	statement	 from	 the	West	 Belfast	 Athletic	 and	 Cultural	 Society	 condemning	the	action	(top	left).	5.5	A	re-enactivist	playing	Major-General	Powell	(right),	outside	Belfast	City	Hall,	Donegall	Square.	5.6	 Austin	 motorcar	 with	 replica	 Vickers	 machine	 gun	 in	 the	 rear	 and	dismounted	period	UVF	cyclists	in	the	road	behind	(left).	5.7	Period-costumed	UVF	Regimental	Band	with	bass	drum	emblazoned	 “U.V.F	1912”.	5.8	 Flute	 band	 of	 the	Monkstown	 Young	 Citizen	 Volunteers	 whose	 bannerette	records	that	they	were	established	in	1974.	5.9	 Apprentice	 Boys	 of	 Derry	 contingent	 carrying	 the	 General	 Committee’s	banner.	5.10	Union	flags	and	Loyalist	banners	on	the	gates	of	Belfast	City	Hall.	5.11	Rising	 Sons	Flute	Band	 lowering	 their	banners	 as	 they	pass	 the	Cenotaph	(the	Union	flag	is	kept	raised).	5.12	 UVF	 memorial	 to	 the	 dead	 of	 No.	 4	 Platoon,	 A	 Company,	 1st	 Battalion,	Glenwood	Street.	5.13	 Unofficial	 cenotaph	 in	 the	 1st	 Shankill	 Somme	 Association’s	 Garden	 of	Reflection.	5.14	 Poppy	 Board	 displayed	 on	 the	 fence	 of	 the	 Garden	 of	 Remembrance,	Shankill	Road.	5.15	Scene	from	the	Battle	of	the	Somme	1916	promotional	film	(source:	http://	www.jw8films.com).	
	 5	
5.16	 The	 death	 of	 Billy	 McFadzean:	 a	 re-enactivist	 pretending	 to	 smother	 a	grenade.	5.17	 Choreographed	 sequence	 in	 which	 the	 Union	 flag	 is	 dropped	 on	 the	battlefield	before	being	symbolically	picked	up	and	carried	forward.	5.18	 Re-enactivists	 and	 spectators	 standing	 for	 God	 Save	 the	 Queen	 after	 the	enemy	bunker	is	captured.	5.19	Re-enactivist	wearing	a	sash	(centre)	during	the	assault	on	the	bunker.	5.20	 Female	 re-enactivists	 playing	 nurses,	 munitions	 workers	 and	 Women’s	Land	Army	members	in	the	recreated	Ulster	Division	Base	Depot.				5.21	Surveying	the	battlefield	at	Woodvale	Park:	spectators	taking	photographs	during	God	Save	the	Queen	as	others	bow	their	heads	respectfully.	5.22	 Sloan’s	 Parlour:	 scene	 recreating	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 first	 warrants	 at	 the	original	table.	5.23	Main	gate	of	the	abandoned	PSNI	station	at	Loughgall.	5.24	Mannequin	dressed	as	a	Jacobite	dragoon	at	the	Battle	of	the	Boyne.	5.25	Orange	Young	Britons	lodge	banner	from	Ontario,	Canada.	5.26	Mannequins	 in	 RUC	 and	 UDR	 uniform	 in	 front	 of	 a	 Belfast	 Orange	 lodge	banner	honouring	the	UDR.	5.27	Museum	reconstruction	of	the	interior	of	an	Orange	hall.	5.28	Memorial	stained	glass	window	with	poppy	motif	and	images	of	Ulster:	the	Titanic	Belfast	building	(left)	and	the	Giant’s	Causeway	(right).	5.29	 Temporary	 exhibition	 space	 configured	 for	 children’s	 activities:	 drawing,	dressing	up	and	experimenting	with	interactive	exhibits.	5.30	“Create	your	own	Orange	banner”:	a	visitor	has	written,	“Our	Banner	is	still	at	Drumcree”	on	the	whiteboard	(left).	5.31	Inside	the	Twaddell	Avenue	protest	camp,	April	2016.	5.32	 Loyalist	 banners	 and	 flags	 on	 Twaddell	 Avenue	 at	 the	 Crumlin	 Road	roundabout,	April	2016.	5.33	 Ballysillan	 lodge	 bannerette	 (left)	 stored	 in	 a	 portacabin	 at	 the	 Twaddell	Avenue	protest	camp,	April	2016.	5.34	 Ballysillan	 lodge	 on	 parade	 with	 its	 bannerette	 by	 Woodvale	 Park,	 June	2016.	5.35	The	Cenotaph	(right)	and	the	façade	of	Austins	(left)	in	the	Diamond.	5.36	Effigy	of	“Lundy	the	Traitor”	in	the	Siege	Museum.	5.37	 Lambeg	 exhibited	 beside	 a	 touchscreen	 interactive	 for	 designing	 and	playing	a	drum.	5.38	Film	footage	of	“Lundy	the	Traitor”	being	burned	in	effigy.	5.39	Statue	of	George	Walker	now	on	display	in	the	Siege	Museum.	5.40	Head	of	the	statue	that	previously	stood	atop	Walker’s	Testimonial.	5.41	Plinth	of	Walker’s	Testimonial	on	the	city	wall	spattered	with	paint	(left).	5.42	View	from	the	Bishop’s	Gate:	the	Peace	Wall	and	the	Heritage	Tower.	5.43	 Irish	 tricolour	 flying	 above	 a	 house	 on	 the	 Catholic	 estate	 abutting	 the	Fountain.	5.44	The	Cathedral	Youth	Club,	Fountain	Estate.	5.45	Photograph	of	an	old	grocer’s	shop	on	Aubery	Street	displayed	outside	the	Cathedral	Youth	Club.	5.46	Loyalist	mural	off	Hawkin	Street,	Fountain	Estate.	
	 6	
Abstract		This	thesis	examines	the	ideological	nexus	of	nationalism	and	heritage	under	the	social	 conditions	 of	 neoliberalism.	 The	 investigation	 aims	 to	 demonstrate	 how	neoliberal	 economics	 stimulate	 the	 irrationalism	 manifest	 in	 nationalist	idealisation	 of	 the	 past.	 The	 institutionalisation	 of	 national	 heritage	 was	originally	 a	 rational	 function	 of	 the	modern	 state,	 symbolic	 of	 its	 political	 and	cultural	authority.	With	neoliberal	erosion	of	the	productive	economy	and	public	institutions,	heritage	and	nostalgia	proliferate	today	in	all	areas	of	social	life.	It	is	argued	 that	 this	 represents	 a	 social	 pathology	 linked	 to	 the	 neoliberal	 state’s	inability	 to	 construct	 a	 future-orientated	 national	 project.	 These	 conditions	enhance	the	appeal	of	irrational	nationalist	and	regionalist	ideologies	idealising	the	 past	 as	 a	 source	 of	 cultural	 purity.	 Unable	 to	 achieve	 social	 cohesion,	 the	neoliberal	 state	promotes	multiculturalism,	 encouraging	minorities	 to	 embrace	essentialist	 identity	politics	 that	parallel	 the	nativism	of	 right-wing	nationalists	and	regionalists.	This	phenomenon	is	contextualised	within	the	general	crisis	of	progressive	 modernisation	 in	 Western	 societies	 that	 has	 accompanied	neoliberalisation	and	globalisation.			A	new	theory	of	activist	heritage	is	advanced	to	describe	autonomous,	politicised	heritage	 that	 appropriates	 forms	 and	 practices	 from	 the	 state	 heritage	 sector.	Using	 this	 concept,	 the	 politics	 of	 irrational	 nationalism	 and	 regionalism	 are	explored	 through	 fieldwork,	 including	 participant	 observation,	 interviews	 and	photography.		
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The	 interaction	 of	 state	 and	 activist	 heritage	 is	 considered	 at	 the	Wewelsburg	1933-1945	Memorial	Museum	in	Germany	wherein	neofascists	have	re-signified	Nazi	 material	 culture,	 reactivating	 it	 within	 contemporary	 political	 narratives.	The	activist	heritage	of	Israeli	Zionism,	Irish	Republicanism	and	Ulster	Loyalism	is	 analysed	 through	 studies	 of	museums,	 heritage	 centres,	 archaeological	 sites,	exhibitions,	 monuments	 and	 historical	 re-enactments.	 These	 illustrate	 how	activist	heritage	 represents	a	political	 strategy	within	 irrational	 ideologies	 that	interpret	 the	past	 as	 the	 ethical	model	 for	 the	 future.	This	work	 contends	 that	irrational	nationalism	fundamentally	challenges	the	Enlightenment’s	assertion	of	reason	over	faith,	and	culture	over	nature,	by	superimposing	pre-modern	ideas	upon	 the	 structure	 of	modernity.	 An	 ideological	 product	 of	 the	 Enlightenment,	the	nation	state	remains	the	only	political	unit	within	which	a	rational	command	of	 time	 and	 space	 is	 possible,	 and	 thus	 the	 only	 viable	 basis	 for	 progressive	modernity.	
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Introduction		How	cold	 is	history,	how	 lifeless	all	 imagery,	 compared	 to	 that	which	 the	living	nation	writes,	and	the	uncorrupted	marble	bears!	How	many	pages	of	doubtful	 record	might	we	not	 often	 spare,	 for	 a	 few	 stones	 left	 one	upon	another!	The	ambition	of	the	old	Babel	builders	was	well	directed	for	this	world.	 John	Ruskin,	The	Seven	Lamps	of	Architecture		Nationalism	 has	 bequeathed	 a	 heritage	 in	 word	 and	 stone	 to	 our	 museums,	libraries,	 city	 squares	 and	 cemeteries.	 The	 ideas	 of	 nationalism	 and	 heritage	were	 conjoined	 in	 the	womb	of	 the	modern	world	and	 live	on	 symbiotically	 in	our	 past-obsessed	 present.	 Examining	 the	 political	 interconnection	 between	these	phenomena	promptly	 leads	 the	 investigator	 to	 consider	 the	processes	 of	modernisation.	 Before	 outlining	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 investigation	 I	 will	 briefly	survey	the	intellectual	history	of	nationalism	with	a	view	to	establishing	a	cogent	theory	 of	 it.	 The	 canon	 contains	 contributions	 from	 scholars,	 politicians,	philosophers	 and	 public	 intellectuals.	 Among	 the	 voluminous	 scholarship	 on	nations	and	nationalism,	certain	milestones	have	profoundly	shaped	the	debate.	The	 most	 influential	 commentators	 are	 agreed	 that	 nationalism	 is	 a	 modern	political	 phenomenon	 (see	 Hayes	 1931;	 Kohn	 1944;	 Deutsch	 1953;	 Kedourie	1960;	 Smith	 1971;	 Seton-Watson	 1977;	 Gellner	 1983;	 Anderson	 1983;	Hobsbawm	 1990).	 These	 studies	 also	 concur	 on	 the	 modern	 state	 as	 the	institutional	 locus	 of	 nationalism.	 Where	 they	 diverge	 is	 on	 how	 and	 when	nations	came	into	being.		Kohn	 identifies	 the	 ideological	 roots	 of	 nationalism	 in	 the	 ancient	 world.	 He	isolates	the	idea	of	nationalism	in	the	tribal	confederations	of	Ancient	Greece	and	
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Israel	where	collective	consciousness	was	based	on	a	“cultural	mission”	([1944]	1967,	 28-29).	 Expanding	 Kohn’s	 theory,	 Smith	 argues	 that	 modern	 nations	developed	 from	 the	 “ethnie”	 of	 the	 ancient	 world.	 Larger	 than	 kinship-based	tribes,	 ethnie	 possessed	 “ethnocentric”	 political	 consciousness	 founded	 on	 the	preservation	 of	 their	 collective	 cultural	 identities.	 Smith	 also	 casts	 the	 ancient	Greeks	and	Jews	as	theocratic	proto-nationalists	(1971,	162-163).	The	durability	of	 ethnie	 was	 determined	 by	 the	 strength	 of	 their	 “myth-symbol	 complex”	 in	perpetuating	 the	 culture	 of	 the	 ethnic	 polity	 (Smith	 1986,	 15).	 Ethnie	 became	nations	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 European	 “triple	 revolution”:	 the	 complex	division	 of	 labour,	 bureaucratic	 centralisation	 and	 cultural	 coordination	 under	the	“rational	state”	(131-133).		Smith	does	not	argue	that	nations	existed	in	the	ancient	world.	He	suggests	that	the	 cultural	 systems	 underpinning	 nations	 originate	 in	 antiquity	 and,	 through	their	 endurance,	 the	 political	 doctrine	 of	 nationalism	 emerged	 in	 the	 late	eighteenth	 century.	 By	 contrast	 Gellner	 proposes	 that	 the	 “mobile”	 division	 of	labour	in	industrial	society	meant	that	its	sub-groups	were	no	longer	capable	of	autonomous	 social	 reproduction.	 The	 state	 therefore	 had	 to	 initiate	 “exo-socialization”	under	a	national	education	system	in	order	to	align	itself	politically	with	a	national	culture	([1983]	2006,	33-37).	Nationalism	was	thus	a	principle	of	political	 organisation	 and	 social	 engineering	 to	 meet	 the	 requirements	 of	industrialisation.	 Nations	 were	 created	 using	 the	 “raw	 material”	 of	 “cultural,	historical	 and	 other	 inheritances	 from	 the	 pre-nationalist	 world”	 (48).	Hobsbawm	 follows	 Gellner	 in	 rejecting	 ethnicity	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 nations,	
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identifying	 pre-modern	 “proto-national	 bonds”	 that	 states	 were	 able	 to	collectivise	on	a	macro-political	level	([1990]	1992,	46).		Anderson’s	 theory	 of	 the	 nation	 as	 “an	 imagined	 political	 community”	 also	characterises	nationalism	as	an	 ideological	 child	of	 the	 late	eighteenth	century,	but	criticises	Gellner	for	positing	the	nation	as	a	statist	invention	([1983]	1991,	6).	He	describes	the	integral	dynamic	of	the	Reformation	and	“print-capitalism”,	wherein	the	spread	of	Protestantism	in	Western	Europe	relied	on	a	“vernacular	print-market”.	 The	 diffusion	 of	 vernacular	 language	 through	 print	 culture	 laid	the	basis	for	national	consciousness	because	people	who	spoke	regional	dialects	now	 understood	 one	 another	 (44).	 Anderson	 regards	 the	 process	 of	 linguistic	standardisation	 as	 part	 of	 the	 modernisation	 process,	 as	 Gellner	 does,	 but	interprets	 it	as	a	precondition	 for	 the	emergence	of	nationalism	rather	 than	 its	product.	Hobsbawm	trails	Gellner	in	arguing	that	national	languages	were	quasi-artificial	 constructs	 of	 states	 that	 simply	 nationalised	 the	 languages	 of	 ruling	elites	 through	 bureaucratic	 administration	 and	 the	 public	 education	 system	(1992,	59).	Anderson,	Gellner	and	Hobsbawm	thus	agree	that	national	languages	were	 historically	 determined	 and	 not,	 as	many	 nationalists	 believe,	 the	 innate	properties	 of	 nations.	 Smith	 also	 dismisses	 this	 latter	 notion,	 arguing	 that	nations	cannot	be	defined	by	the	transmission	of	a	language,	but	by	culture	as	a	broader	category	(1971,	143).		Deutsch	 points	 to	 the	 centrality	 of	 social	 communication	 in	 the	 formation	 of	nations	but	emphasises	 that	 they	could	not	be	realised	without	a	modern	state	infrastructure	 to	maintain	 the	 “inner	 source	 of	 political	 power—the	 relatively	coherent	 and	 stable	 structure	 of	 memories,	 habits,	 and	 values”	 ([1953]	 1966,	
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75).	 The	 question	 of	 how	 members	 of	 a	 nation	 comprehend	 their	 collective	identity	 rests	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 investigation,	 and	 is	 distorted	 in	 the	 above	scholarship.	 Although	 these	 authors	 all	 adopt	 a	 developmental	 perspective	 on	nationalism,	 they	 interpret	 it	 from	 an	 idealist	 perspective,	 isolating	 the	 social	processes	of	the	nation	and	national	consciousness	from	one	another.		Kedourie	 portrays	 nationalism	 as	 a	 political	 doctrine	 born	 of	 German	 classical	philosophy.	In	his	view,	Kant’s	concept	of	the	rational	being’s	“autonomy	of	the	will”	 provided	 the	 metaphysical	 basis	 for	 national	 self-determination	 ([1960]	1993,	22).	As	 the	core	principle	of	nationalism,	Kedourie	 regards	national	 self-determination	as	an	irrational	pathology	that	generates	disorder.	He	also	draws	an	intellectual	line	between	Kant’s	theory	and	Fichte’s,	that	individuals	can	only	actualise	 their	 freedom	 as	 part	 of	 a	 state.	When	 individuals	 dissolve	 their	will	into	the	collective	will	of	the	state,	Kedourie	cautions:	“Reason	of	state	begins	to	partake	 of	 sovereign	 Reason”	 (40).	 Into	 this	 German	 philosophical	 continuum,	Kedourie	 places	 Herder,	 whose	 conception	 of	 language	 offered	 a	 natural	rationale	 for	 national	 self-determination.	 Humans	 develop	 language	 through	sensory	experience,	and	in	turn	peoples	acquire	national	consciousness	through	language.	 Consequently	 language	 becomes	 the	 most	 important	 criterion	 for	national	 self-determination	 (58).	 Gellner	 critiques	 Kedourie’s	 thesis	 for	 its	subjectivity,	 arguing	 that	 nationalism	 is	 an	 objective	 historical	 phenomenon	(2006,	 120).	 Kant’s	 rationalism	 was	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 German	 romantic	nationalism	of	the	early	nineteenth	century,	which	Kedourie	sees	as	its	offspring	(127).	Although	correct	 in	 identifying	the	obvious	flaw	in	Kedourie’s	argument,	Gellner’s	 own	 theory	 of	 nationalism	 is	 based	 on	 a	 contradiction.	 Gellner	
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considers	the	advent	of	industrial	society	as	the	decisive	factor	in	the	emergence	of	nationalism.	However,	 in	Gellner’s	and	Hobsbawm’s	work	nationalism	comes	before	 nations,	 a	 conceit	 leading	 to	 the	 latter’s	 erroneous	 conclusion	 that	“nations	 do	 not	 make	 states	 and	 nationalisms	 but	 the	 other	 way	 round”	(Hobsbawm	1992,	10).		Marx	described	the	misapprehension	that	religion	or	politics	(ideas)	determine	the	division	of	 labour	as	the	“illusion	of	 the	epoch”	(1970,	60).	Gellner’s	 theory	therefore	harbours	a	paradox:	in	it	the	division	of	labour	engenders	nationalism,	but	 the	 nation	 itself	 is	 the	 precipitate	 of	 an	 idea.	 The	 liberal	 Gellner	 and	 the	Marxist	Hobsbawm	thus	converge	around	the	misapprehension	that	the	nation	is	the	 reification	 of	 national	 consciousness.	 Gellner	 dismisses	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	Marxist	interpretation	of	nationalism	as	premised	on	a	“Wrong	Address	Theory”	wherein	 the	 “awakening	 message”	 of	 the	 “spirit	 of	 history	 or	 human	consciousness”	was	mistakenly	 delivered	 to	 nations	 rather	 than	 classes	 (2006,	124).	 Gellner’s	 own	 theory	 of	 nationalism	 as	 an	 ideological	 response	 to	 the	complex	 division	 of	 labour	 ironically	 meets	 Marx	 halfway.	 Gellner	 also	 sees	culture	as	supplanting	religious	faith	under	modern	conditions	in	an	echo	of	the	verdict	of	Marx	and	Engels	on	the	industrial	age:	“all	that	is	holy	is	profaned”	(see	1985,	 83).	 Theoretically,	 however,	 Gellner	 owes	 the	 greatest	 debt	 to	 Weber	whose	“spirit	of	capitalism”	he	revisits	 in	claiming	that	Protestantism	prepared	the	 ground	 for	 the	mass	 cultural	mission	 of	 nationalism	 by	 spreading	 literacy	and	ending	the	“monopoly	of	the	sacred”	(2006,	136;	see	also	Weber	1976).		The	miscegenation	of	 liberal	 and	Marxian	 theories	of	nationalism	has	muddied	the	 waters	 of	 critical	 enquiry.	 What	 I	 propose	 is	 a	 theory	 of	 nations	 and	
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nationalism	based	on	historical	materialism.	Smith	and	Gellner	correctly	identify	the	division	of	labour	as	crucial	in	the	consolidation	of	nations,	but	abstract	the	objective	 social	 relations	 that	 occur	 independently	 of	 human	 will	 from	 the	ideological	superstructure	that	these	produce.	In	one	sense	Kohn	and	Smith	are	right	 to	 locate	 the	 origin	 of	 nations	 in	 Ancient	 Greece.	 Engels	 observed	 in	 the	Athenian	 state	a	progression	 from	 tribal	 confederation	 to	a	new	 type	of	polity,	wherein	a	“single	people”	 lived	under	a	“popular	 law”	after	a	division	of	 labour	occurred	between	nobles,	artisans	and	rural	labourers.	Athens	thus	marked	the	beginnings	 of	 a	 class	 structure	 outside	 the	 gens	 (1991a,	 507-508).	 From	 the	Athenian	 case,	 we	 can	 see	 how	 the	 stimulation	 of	 consciousness	 and	 ideas	(religious	 and	 political)	 emanates	 from	 changes	 in	 the	 economic	 structure	 of	society.1	Athenians	did	not	will	themselves	into	forming	a	new	mode	of	collective	existence.	 After	 the	 new	 social	 relations	 came	 into	 being,	 the	 nobility	institutionalised	their	power	in	the	state,	and	their	collective	will	was	expressed	as	 that	of	 the	state	 through	 law.	The	division	of	 labour	and	slave	ownership	 in	the	 ancient	 world	 produced	 antagonistic	 social	 relations,	 resulting	 in	 class	consciousness.	However,	national	consciousness	did	not	exist	in	ancient	societies	because	 their	 economic	 structures	 were	 not	 on	 a	 scale	 to	 generate	 a	 national	market	and	the	need	for	a	new	type	of	state.		Smith’s	 argument	 that	 nations	 represent	 a	 scaling	 up	 of	 pre-existing	 ethnie	requires	 further	 scrutiny	 here.	 His	 concept	 parallels	 that	 of	 the	 Soviet	ethnographer	 Bromley,	 who	 defines	 nations	 as	 “modern	 ethnic	 communities”	evolved	 from	 pre-modern	 “ethnoses”.	 Like	 Smith,	 Bromley	 sees	 cultural																																																									1	I	refer	 to	 the	nexus	of	 the	social	relations	of	production	(the	economic	structure	or	base)	and	the	legal	and	political	superstructure	arising	from	them	(see	Marx	1991,	173-174).	
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distinction	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 common	 origin,	 or	 “historical	 fate”,	 as	 defining	ethnicity	(1974,	65).	Bromley’s	work	in	turn	recalls	two	earlier	Marxist	treatises	on	nationalism	written	by	Bauer	and	Stalin	in	response	to	the	national	question	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	before	World	War	One.	Bauer	defined	the	nation	as	a	“community	of	fate”	(2000,	101).	Speaking	a	common	language	was	crucial	in	 establishing	 such	 a	 community,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 distillation	 of	 a	 distinct	“national	 character”	 (113).	 Stalin	 also	 conceptualised	 a	 “national	 character”	unique	to	each	nation	(1942,	6).	He	defined	the	nation	as	“a	historically	evolved,	stable	community	of	language,	territory,	economic	life,	and	psychological	make-up	 manifested	 in	 a	 community	 of	 culture”	 (7).	 Stalin	 differentiated	 between	language	 and	 culture,	 arguing	 the	 latter	 “changes	 in	 content	 with	 every	 new	period	 in	 the	 development	 of	 society,	 whereas	 language	 remains	 basically	 the	same	through	a	number	of	periods,	equally	serving	both	the	new	culture	and	the	old”	 (1954,	29).	He	proposed	 that	 languages	were	 “instruments	of	production”	outside	a	society’s	economic	structure	and	superstructure	(48).		In	 their	 treatment	of	 the	 relationship	between	economic	 structure	and	culture,	Bauer	 and	 Stalin	 deviate	 substantially	 from	 Marxism	 into	 the	 metaphysical	realm.	 Bauer	 saw	 the	 national	 character	 as	 influencing	 “determinations	 of	 the	will”	 so	 that	 “a	 German	 and	 an	 Englishman	 act	 differently	 under	 the	 same	circumstances”	 (2000,	 99).	 Here	 Bauer’s	 ideation	 veers	 away	 from	 historical	materialism	 towards	 the	 Hegelian	 Volksgeist	 (“spirit	 of	 the	 nation”)	 as	 the	idiosyncratic	 determinant	 of	 national	 consciousness	 and	will	 (see	 Hegel	 1956,	64).	 Stalin’s	 work	 was	 intended	 as	 a	 critique	 of	 Bauer,	 but	 his	 ideas	 contain	analogous	metaphysical	distortions	of	Marxism.	He	abstracted	the	development	
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of	 language	 from	 history,	 making	 it	 a	 cultural	 force	 capable	 of	 acting	independently	of	the	social	relations	that	generate	culture.	In	other	words,	Stalin	fetishised	language	by	detaching	it	from	the	nascent	bourgeoisie’s	consolidation	of	 the	 national	 market	 as	 a	 historical	 phenomenon.	 Language	 as	 the	 primary	medium	of	social	communication	develops	from,	and	in	conjunction	with,	social	relations.	In	this	sense,	the	development	of	language	is	part	of	the	social	process	of	production	and	cannot	therefore	be	historically	independent	of	 it.	Languages	come	 into	 being,	 evolve,	 fall	 out	 of	 use	 and	 are	 sometimes	 revived	 owing	 to	changes	 in	 the	 economic	 structure.	 Under	 Stalin’s	 logic,	 however,	 to	 speak	Russian	is	to	be	Russian	as	an	essential	and	immutable	characteristic.		Bauer	 and	 Stalin	 conceived	 divergent	 but	 equally	 flawed	 doctrines	 of	 national	self-determination.	Both	were	writing	in	vast	multinational	empires,	but	differed	over	 the	 relationship	 between	 nations	 and	 territory.	 Bauer	 rejected	 the	“territorial	 principle”	 owing	 to	 the	 diversity	 of	 national	minorities	within	 each	territory;	 in	his	view	the	linguistic	differences	would	trigger	animosities	(2000,	271).	 Instead	 he	 advocated	 the	 “personality	 principle”	 wherein	 each	 ethno-national	group	would	be	given	cultural	autonomy	within	the	existing	state	(281).	Conversely	 Stalin	 called	 for	 national	 self-determination	 based	 on	 a	 politically	constituted	territorial	community.	His	theory	was	premised	on	the	oppression	of	small	nations	by	ruling	elites	within	the	Austro-Hungarian	and	Russian	empires.	Historical	development	in	Western	Europe	had	followed	a	separate	path	wherein	the	twilight	of	feudalism	and	nation	formation	coincided	with	the	emergence	of	centralised	 states.	 The	 new	nations	 hence	 developed	 culturally	within	modern	states.	 In	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 where	 capitalism	 remained	
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underdeveloped,	 the	 centralisation	 process	 occurred	 more	 rapidly	 than	 the	formation	 of	 nations,	 resulting	 in	multiple	 nationalities	 living	 under	 one	 state	(1942,	 15).	 Multinational	 states	 gave	 rise	 to	 national	 oppression,	 conflict	 and	national	 movements.	 Stalin’s	 principle	 of	 national	 self-determination	 thus	defended	the	universal	right	of	nations	to	it	in	the	face	of	national	oppression.		The	 right	 to	 national	 self-determination	 became	 one	 of	 the	 key	 debates	 in	 the	Second	 International	 and	 the	 source	 of	 polemical	 arguments.	 Luxemburg	challenged	 Lenin	 by	 asserting	 that	 the	 “real	 content	 of	 these	 ‘eternal’	 truths,	rights,	 and	 formulae	 is	 determined	 only	 by	 material	 social	 conditions	 of	 the	environment	in	a	given	historical	epoch”	(1976,	111).	Lenin	replied	that	for	the	bourgeoisie	 to	 control	national	markets	 it	needed	 “politically	united	 territories	with	 a	 population	 speaking	 the	 same	 language”.	 Supplanting	 the	 feudal	aristocracy	 thus	 required	 a	 national	 state	 “under	which	 these	 requirements	 of	modern	capitalism	are	best	satisfied”	(1946,	565).		The	 principle	 of	 national	 self-determination	 has	 its	 ideological	 roots	 in	 the	English	Revolution.	Hill	highlights	the	Levellers’	ideological	advance	beyond	the	idea	 of	 a	 “Norman	 Yoke”	 that	 had	 smothered	 Anglo-Saxon	 liberties,	 to	 the	concept	 of	 “natural	 rights”—the	 “rights	 of	 man”.	 This	 represented	 a	 profound	shift	 from	 the	 “recovery	 of	 rights	 which	 used	 to	 exist	 to	 the	 pursuit	 of	 rights	because	they	ought	to	exist”	(2001,	68).	The	philosophy	of	inalienable	“rights	of	man”	became	central	to	the	American	and	French	revolutions	as	the	ideological	ferment	 of	 insurrectionary	 bourgeois	 nationalism.	 Hill,	 however,	 identifies	 the	ideological	 limitation	of	natural	rights	as	taking	“the	assumptions	and	property	relations	of	that	society	for	granted”	(105).	Herein	lies	the	essence	of	liberalism	
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as	 it	 developed	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 from	 the	 bourgeois	 revolutionary	legacy.		Rousseau	distinguished	between	“natural”	and	“civil”	liberty.	By	entering	into	the	“social	contract”,	man	surrenders	the	liberty	granted	by	the	“state	of	nature”	for	that	 of	 civil	 society	 and	 the	 legal	 right	 to	 own	property.	However,	man’s	 new-found	 “civil”	 liberty	 is	 constrained	 by	 the	 “general	 will”	 of	 the	 people	 as	 an	indivisible	sovereign	body	(1968,	61-65).	Rousseau’s	“civil”	 liberty	contains	the	kernel	of	the	idea	that	the	“general	will”	could	direct	the	state	toward	abolishing	private	property.	Marx	adapted	Rousseau’s	concept	of	civil	society	to	overcome	what	he	saw	as	the	basic	 limitation	of	“political	emancipation”	in	the	bourgeois	revolution.	 Political	 emancipation	 from	 feudal	 social	 relations	 had	 produced	 a	dualism	of	man’s	“species-life”	in	the	political	state	and	his	“material	life”	in	civil	society.	 The	 “rights	 of	 man”	 were	 therefore	 separated	 from	 the	 “rights	 of	 the	citizen”	as	the	former	were	considered	the	natural	rights	of	civil	society	in	which	egoistic	 man	 lived	 separately	 from	 the	 community.	 In	 other	 words	 the	abstraction	of	the	citizen	or	“political	man”	from	the	material	conditions	of	civil	society	generates	the	notion	of	natural	rights	and	citizenship	as	a	“political	lion’s	skin”	 for	their	defence	(1975,	153-154,	161-162).	“Human	emancipation”	could	only	be	achieved	 through	 the	 reconciliation	of	man’s	 “political	power”	with	his	“social	 power”	 in	 the	 state—the	 realisation	 of	 his	 “species-being”	 in	 everyday	existence	 (168).	 Liberals	 came	 to	 view	 Rousseau’s	 “general	 will”	 and	 Marx's	adaptation	of	 it	 as	 tyrannical	 for	 subordinating	 the	 individual	 to	 the	 collective.	Liberalism	maintained	 that	 the	 role	of	 the	 state	was	 to	preserve	natural	 rights	through	the	rule	of	law.	
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In	the	 idea	of	national	self-determination	as	a	natural	right,	 the	convergence	of	Bauer,	 Stalin	 and	 liberal	 theorists	of	 the	nation	becomes	 clear.	Kohn	views	 the	American	 Revolution	 as	 a	 political	 bridgehead	 between	 the	 birth	 of	 English	national	consciousness	in	the	seventeenth	century	and	European	modernisation	in	 the	 eighteenth.	 America	 thus	 became	 the	 birthplace	 of	 a	 “new	man”	whose	ideal	 of	 natural	 rights	 had	 been	 nurtured	 by	 English	 nationalism	 and	 the	Enlightenment	(1967,	275-276).	Under	Kohn’s	theory	“Western”	nationalism	not	only	 delivered	 the	 modern	 state,	 but	 also	 imbued	 it	 with	 liberal	 democratic	characteristics.	Founded	on	the	principle	of	natural	rights,	nation	states	were	the	outcome	of	 the	 linear	progression	of	 “Western”	reason.	Kohn	reiterates	Stalin’s	dichotomy	of	Eastern/Western	nationalism,	deeming	the	former	progressive	and	the	latter	retrograde	for	essentially	the	same	reasons	(329).		Dichotomising	 nationalism	 in	 this	 way	 obscures	 the	 social	 relations	 that	determine	 the	degree	of	national	 consciousness	within	a	state.	Hroch	proposes	that	 “national	 consciousness	 and	 objective	 relations	 between	 members	 of	 a	nation	 form	 an	 indivisible	 unity”	 (1985,	 12).	 National	 consciousness	 is	 thus	responsive	to	tectonic	movement	in	the	economic	structure.	Language	and	other	cultural	 aspects	 of	 nationality	 develop	 reciprocally	 in	 the	 superstructure.	 In	other	words,	the	material	matrix	in	which	nations	are	formed	has	already	come	into	 being	 in	 the	 pre-capitalist	 phase.	 Consequently	 the	 greater	 the	 economic	dynamism	 of	 the	 bourgeoisie	 –	 by	 increasing	 productive	 forces	 in	 relation	 to	market	 expansion	 –	 the	 greater	 the	 ideological	 traction	 of	 nationalism	 for	 the	population	as	a	whole.		
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Structural	 change	 does	 not	 automatically	 bring	 the	 nation	 state	 into	 existence.	Nationalism	 is	 an	 ideological	 response	 to	 the	new	 conditions	 and	provides	 the	political	 impetus	 for	 the	 national	 movement	 and	 its	 struggle	 for	 state	 power.	Nations	can	therefore	exist	in	material	terms	without	their	own	state,	and	states	can	 act	 as	 political	 containers	 for	 diverse	 nationalities	 in	 underdeveloped	conditions.	 It	 is	 upon	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 nation	 state	 by	 the	 classes	 who	 have	united	against	 feudalism,	or	the	nationalisation	of	a	pre-existing	state	under	an	ascendant	bourgeoisie,	that	the	new	social	relations	become	openly	antagonistic.	The	 French	 Revolution	 terminated	 the	 feudal	 system	 of	 dynastic	 government	based	on	provincial	alliances,	a	structural	remnant	of	the	medieval	state	and	an	impediment	 to	 modernisation	 (Lefebvre	 2001,	 69).	 In	 its	 combined	revolutionary	 action	 the	 Third	 Estate	 eliminated	 the	 vestiges	 of	 feudalism	 to	unleash	 the	 full	 productive	 forces	 of	 capitalism.	 At	 the	 point	 of	 revolutionary	rupture	the	Third	Estate	represented	the	nation	as	the	aristocracy	disintegrated.	New	political	consciousness	developed	from	this	juncture	as	the	achievement	of	a	bourgeois	republic	exposed	antagonisms	within	the	Third	Estate.		The	social	relations	underpinning	modern	European	and	North	American	nation	state	 systems	 therefore	existed	 in	embryo	under	 the	pre-capitalist	 social	order	but	 reached	 full	maturity	 under	 bourgeois	 rule.	 Nationalism	 performs	 its	 dual	ideological	 function	 in	 the	 consolidation	 of	 the	 modern	 state	 as	 both	 a	revolutionary	 and	 reactionary	 agent	 in	 the	 process.	 Nationalism	 acts	 as	 the	ideological	motor	of	the	national	movement	in	each	state,	but	also	reinforces	the	process	 of	 cultural	 nationalisation	 once	 capitalist	 social	 relations	 exist	 and	productive	 forces	must	 be	 enhanced.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 the	 triumphant	
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bourgeoisie	institutionalises	its	collective	will	in	the	state	to	consolidate	political	dominance	through	national	cultural	regulation.	The	state’s	actions,	which	are	in	reality	 those	 of	 a	 class,	 occur	 under	 the	 aegis	 of	 nationalism	 not	 to	 engineer	nations,	 which	 already	 exist	 objectively,	 but	 to	 assimilate	 or	 eliminate	 the	cultural	 remnants	 of	 moribund	 social	 relations	 that	 hinder	 the	 advance	 of	productive	 forces.	 Herein	 lies	 the	 rational	 function	 of	 the	 modern	 state	 as	 it	developed	 in	 the	hands	of	 the	bourgeoisie	 in	Europe	and	North	America	 in	 the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries.		Underlying	 the	 false	 dichotomy	 between	 “Eastern”	 and	 “Western”	 in	 liberal	theories	of	nationalism	is	the	presumption	that	a	higher	rationality	generated	a	superior	 type	 of	 state	 in	 the	 West	 to	 embody	 it.	 Kedourie	 differentiates	 the	liberal	idea	of	the	nation	and	the	“Continental”	version	prevailing	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	 the	Middle	East	and	Asia	 (1993,	128).	Wilsonian	national	 self-determination	at	the	Versailles	negotiations	in	1919	was	hence	an	aberration	of	English	 and	 American	 liberals,	 who	 mistakenly	 thought	 that	 they	 could	 apply	their	ideal	to	the	non-Western	world.	In	the	liberal	democratic	episteme,	reason	is	the	product	of	a	unique	Western	history	running	from	Graeco-Roman	antiquity	through	Medieval	Christendom	to	capitalist	modernity.	The	liberal	delusion	is	to	believe	 that	 uneven	 developmental	 conditions	 must	 inevitably	 result	 in	fundamentally	 different	 ideological	 responses	 among	 those	 experiencing	 them.	Consequently,	 for	 those	 living	 outside	 the	 West	 nationalism	 becomes	 an	irrational	chimera.		Liberal	 theories	 of	 nationalism	 typically	 display	 a	 blind	 spot	 in	 relation	 to	 the	global	 processes	 of	 colonialism	 and	 imperialism	 that	 accompanied	 the	
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development	 of	 nations	 (see,	 for	 example,	 the	 refutation	 of	 Worsley’s	 “Third	World”	 thesis	 [1967]	 in	 Kedourie	 1970,	 18,	 and	 Smith	 1971,	 78).	 Hilferding	anticipated	 Lenin’s	 critique	 of	 imperialism	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 bourgeoisie’s	changing	relationship	with	the	state	in	the	nineteenth	century.	In	the	combined	class	struggle	against	absolutism,	the	bourgeoisie	sought	to	wrest	control	of	the	state	 from	 the	 aristocracy.	 Once	 entrenched	 as	 the	 new	 ruling	 class,	 the	bourgeoisie	 abandoned	 its	 ideological	 commitment	 to	 national	 self-determination	 in	 favour	 of	 national	 supremacy.	 With	 the	 growth	 of	protectionism,	it	deployed	state	power	to	advance	the	interests	of	finance	capital	on	 the	 burgeoning	 world	 market	 in	 direct	 competition	 with	 other	 nations.	Imperialism	was	encouraged	by	the	need	to	export	capital	abroad,	which	in	turn	transformed	social	relations	in	the	colonies	and	aroused	national	consciousness	among	the	colonised:		 Capitalism	 itself	 gradually	provides	 the	 subjected	people	with	 the	ways	 and	means	 for	 their	 own	 liberation.	 They	 adopt	 as	 their	 own	 the	 ideal	 that	was	once	the	highest	aspiration	of	the	European	nations;	namely,	the	formation	of	a	 unified	national	 state	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 economic	 and	 cultural	 freedom.	(Hilferding	1981,	322)			Amin	accuses	classical	Marxism	of	Eurocentrism	in	its	treatment	of	the	national	question.	The	Marxist	conception	of	the	nation	presumes	a	centralised	state	and	a	 unified	 national	 market	 under	 the	 capitalist	 mode	 of	 production.	 In	 Amin’s	theory,	ancient	tributary	societies	with	a	high	degree	of	state	centralisation,	such	as	China	and	Egypt,	must	also	be	considered	nations.	European	feudalism	did	not	produce	 powerful	 centralised	 states	 and	 so	 nations	 came	 into	 existence	 only	under	capitalism	(2011,	256).	The	extent	of	state	centralisation	is	therefore	the	decisive	 factor	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 nations.	 Amin	detaches	 the	 process	 of	 state	
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centralisation	 from	 the	 development	 of	 capitalism,	 negating	 the	 reality	 of	 the	state	as	an	instrument	of	class	domination.	The	tributary	systems	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Asia	followed	a	separate	developmental	path	for	historical	reasons.	Under	 the	 feudal	 system,	 political	 power	 was	 fragmented	 and	 city	 merchants	were	unable	to	gain	access	to	it	through	land	ownership.	They	consequently	re-invested	their	profits	in	commodity	production	as	opposed	to	land,	triggering	the	process	 of	 capital	 accumulation,	 which	 explains	 large-scale	 industrialisation	occurring	 first	 in	 Western	 Europe	 (Wolf	 2010,	 268).	 The	 marginalisation	 of	mercantile	 elements	 within	 the	 structures	 of	 state	 power	 also	 sharpened	 the	revolutionary	 conflict	 between	 the	 aristocracy	 and	 the	 bourgeoisie.	 Under	 the	tributary	 mode	 of	 production,	 class	 antagonism	 developed	 between	 the	peasantry	 and	 ruling	 elites,	 but	 the	 former	 was	 incapable	 of	 independent	revolutionary	 action.	 Amin’s	 position	 ironically	 accepts	Hegel’s	 dictum	 that	 “in	the	history	of	 the	World,	 only	 those	peoples	 can	 come	under	our	notice	which	form	 a	 state”	 (1956,	 39).	 For	 Hegel,	 nations	 and	 states	 are	 ontologically	inseparable.	 A	 nation	 cannot	 be	 understood	 as	 such	 without	 a	 state	 to	institutionalise	its	subjective	history	or	“annals”	(61).		Nimni	similarly	charges	the	Marxist	intellectual	tradition	with	Eurocentrism	for	universally	 applying	 European	 developmental	 models	 (1991,	 11).	 He	 accuses	Marx	 and	 Engels	 of	 preserving	 the	 Hegelian	 prejudice	 against	 “historyless	peoples”	 following	 earlier	 Marxist	 critiques	 of	 Engels’	 writings	 on	 the	 1848	Revolution	(27;	see	also	Rosdolsky	1986;	Davis	1967,	27-38).	Engels	condemned	the	 Southern	 Slavs	 and	 the	 Czechs	 for	 siding	with	 the	 Russian	 Empire	 against	Hungarian	and	German	revolutionaries,	declaring	unviable	those	“peoples	which	
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have	 never	 had	 a	 history	 of	 their	 own”	 (1977a,	 367).2	In	 another	 article	 he	invoked	Hegel	in	his	description	of	“residual	fragments	of	peoples”	hindering	the	historical	 development	 from	 feudalism	 to	 capitalism.	Among	 these	 “fragments”	he	 included	 the	Scots,	Bretons	and	Basques,	who	had	 consistently	 stood	 in	 the	way	of	bourgeois	 revolutions	 (1977b,	234-235).	Rosdolsky	criticises	Engels	 for	lapsing	 into	 a	 metaphysical	 conception	 of	 the	 nation	 based	 on	 its	 historically	determined	 “viability”	 (1986,	 128).	 He	 also	 identifies	 the	 primary	 reason	 for	German	revolutionary	failure	that	Engels	had	overlooked—the	lack	of	bourgeois	revolutionary	 dynamism	 in	 uniting	 the	 Third	 Estate	 (151).	 The	 revolutionary	élan	of	the	bourgeoisie	is	the	decisive	factor	in	the	transition	from	feudalism	to	capitalism.	 In	Europe	peasants	 and	urban	workers	 –	 and	 in	 certain	 cases	 even	sections	 of	 the	 nobility	 –	 were	 attracted	 to	 nationalism	 under	 the	 material	conditions	of	national	oppression,	but	were	incapable	of	decisive	political	action	without	the	bourgeoisie.		Understanding	 nationalism	 requires	 an	 examination	 of	 a	 society’s	 economic	structure	 and	 the	 reciprocal	 political	 action	 that	 occurs	 in	 its	 superstructure.	Gramsci	identified	a	major	historical	weakness	in	the	Italian	Risorgimento	as	the	absence	 of	 a	 radical	 petit-bourgeois	 dirigente	 (“leading”)	 force	 to	 unify	 the	nation.	In	France,	the	Jacobins	galvanised	the	bourgeoisie	ideologically	following	the	precedent	of	Cromwell’s	parliamentary	faction	in	England.	They	successfully	rallied	most	provinces	behind	Paris,	 enlisting	peasant	 support	 for	 the	Republic	through	 agrarian	 reform	 (1971,	 77-79).	 Uniting	 France’s	 “subaltern”	 classes	against	 the	aristocracy	was	 therefore	successful	 for	 forging	a	 “national-popular																																																									2	Engels’	term	Geschictslosen	Völker	has	been	variously	translated.	Hereafter	I	use	Wolf’s	wording	“people	without	history”.	
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collective	will”	(131-132).	Mazzini’s	Action	Party	by	contrast	failed	to	unify	city	and	 countryside	 by	 not	 aligning	 itself	with	 the	 southern	 peasantry,	 a	 strategic	error	 that	 resulted	 in	 a	 north-south	 cleavage.	 Gramsci	 made	 a	 theoretical	opposition	between	the	Risorgimento	as	a	“passive	revolution/war	of	position”	that	 failed	 to	 encourage	 mass	 participation	 and	 the	 French	 Revolution	 as	 a	democratic	“popular	initiative/war	of	manoeuvre”	(108).		Following	 Gramsci,	 Chatterjee	 argues	 that	 the	 “passive	 revolution”	 represents	the	 typical	 transitional	model	of	 the	post-colonial	nation	 state	 (1986,	50).	This	would	 apply	 to	 those	 born	 under	 liberal	 nationalist	 stars,	 but	 not	 the	 epochal	anti-imperialist	 revolutions	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 In	 colonial	 societies	 the	mobilising	strategies	employed	by	nationalists	and/or	communists	were	crucial	in	 determining	 revolutionary	 outcomes.	 Gramsci	 observed	 that	 both	 internal	social	 relations	 and	 external	 international	 relations	 influence	 the	 formation	 of	nation	states	(1971,	84).	In	China,	Cuba	and	Vietnam,	for	example,	the	historical	experience	 of	 imperialism	 and	 foreign	 military	 intervention	 proved	 powerful	stimulants	of	national	consciousness.	In	all	three	cases,	the	communists	overtook	nationalist	parties	as	the	dirigente	force	in	wars	of	manoeuvre.		Worsley	considers	it	Eurocentric	to	view	nationalism	in	the	Third	World	as	being	based	 on	 “imitations	 of	 Western	 prototypes	 –	 liberalism,	 socialism	 and	communism”	 (1967,	 65).	 I	 submit	 that	 it	 is	 not	 Eurocentric	 to	 observe	 that	peoples	living	under	Western	colonialism	came	to	adhere	to	the	same	universal	ideologies	 as	 Europeans	 did	 in	 response	 to	 national	 oppression.	 It	 would	 be	Eurocentric	 to	 imply	 that	 they	were	 incapable	of	doing	so,	or	 that	 they	did	not	adapt	 ideologically	 from	 their	 own	 cultural	 specificity.	 Furthermore	 European	
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and	 North	 American	 intellectuals	 frequently	 underestimate	 non-Westerners’	capacity	to	critique	and	repurpose	Western	ideological	innovations	to	their	own	ends.		In	 summary	 a	 nation	 represents	 a	 totality	 of	 social	 relations	 that	 comes	 into	being	 during	 the	 transition	 to	 capitalism	 as	 a	 definite	 stage	 in	 human	 history.	Nations	are	 therefore	 large-scale	social	phenomena	that	could	not	have	existed	in	 the	 pre-modern	 world.	 Nationalism	 is	 the	 political	 articulation	 of	 national	consciousness	arising	from	the	solidarity	of	social	groups	who	find	a	temporary	community	 of	 interest	 in	 rupturing	 the	 old	 social	 order	 and	 forming	 a	 nation	state.	 National	 consciousness	 becomes	 compatible	 with	 class	 consciousness	 at	the	point	of	structural	change,	and	may	remain	so	to	a	degree	even	after	the	new	social	 relations	 become	 openly	 antagonistic.	 The	 elision	 of	 class	 and	 national	consciousness	was	central	to	many	anti-colonial	nationalist	movements	and	has	proved	 more	 durable	 in	 societies	 confronting	 imperial	 legacies	 of	underdevelopment.	 A	 precondition	 of	 nationalism	 is	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 national	market,	 or	 the	 immediate	 prospect	 of	 one,	 following	 the	 complex	 division	 of	labour.	A	unitary	national	state	becomes	the	political	ambition	of	the	bourgeoisie	at	this	juncture,	but	success	is	contingent	on	its	capacity	to	unite	the	core	social	groups	comprising	 the	nation.	As	a	general	 rule	 the	consolidation	of	a	national	market	generates	a	single	national	language,	although	this	is	not	always	the	case	when	 a	 nation	 emerges	 from	 a	 multinational	 state	 or	 territory.	 National	movements	typically	promote	language	and	other	cultural	aspects	of	nationality	as	 the	unifying	 cultural	 logic	 for	 the	nation	 state.	Nationalism	 is	 an	 ideological	response	to	the	embryonic	development	of	capitalist	social	relations,	but	retains	
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its	 traction	 in	 their	maturity	 as	 a	 political	 rationale	 for	maintaining	 bourgeois	control	of	the	national	market	through	the	state	apparatus.		
Irrational	Nationalism	and	the	Heritage	Deluge		Although	 the	 ideological	 genesis	 of	 nationalism	 lies	 in	 human	 reason,	 as	 a	protean	idea	nationalism	can	take	both	rational	and	irrational	forms	in	different	historical	moments.	Whether	 or	 not	 nationalism	 can	 be	 considered	 rational	 is	determined	by	its	relation	to	state	power.	Nationalism	can	perform	the	rational	function	 of	 ideologically	 binding	 a	 national	 culture	 that	 orientates	 a	 society	 in	time	to	be	forward-looking.	The	state’s	cultural	mission	requires	the	existence	of	a	 consolidated	 national	 market	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	 national	 consciousness.	National	 cultures	 therefore	 have	 a	 material	 basis	 and	 an	 explicitly	 political	relationship	with	 the	 state.	What	 I	 propose	 to	 analyse	 below	 is	what	 happens	when	the	economic	structure	underpinning	a	national	culture	degenerates	and	a	superstructural	 crisis	 of	 state	 authority	 ensues.	 Such	 a	 crisis	 will	 inevitably	stimulate	what	I	shall	term	irrational	nationalism—ideologies	which	do	not	view	the	past	as	 the	point	of	departure	 for	a	better	 future,	but	as	 the	model	 for	 that	future.		Irrational	nationalism	 is	 the	 inevitable	outcome	of	 liberalism	old	and	new.	The	decomposition	of	classical	liberalism	in	Europe	gave	rise	to	imperialism	and	then	fascism	 as	 an	 irrational	 ideological	 vector	 in	 the	 gathering	 storm	 of	 global	economic	 crisis.	 Much	 scholarly	 ink	 has	 been	 spilt	 defining	 fascism	 and	neofascism	(see,	for	example,	Griffin	2007,	179-181;	Eatwell	1995,	309).	Specific	ideological	traits	are	common	to	all	variants:	ultranationalism,	anti-communism,	
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anti-liberalism,	 racism	 and	 dictatorship	 based	 on	 a	 cult	 of	 the	 leader.	 All	 such	ideologies	 evince	 a	 political	 strategy	 of	 capturing	 the	 state	 in	 order	 to	 bring	about	national	regeneration	through	cultural	renovation	(Griffin	2007,	181-182).	Fascist	 regimes	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	 harnessed	 the	 power	 of	 the	 state	 to	conduct	 ruthless	 programmes	 of	 national	 cultural	 regulation	 along	 racial	 and	class	 lines,	 using	 terrorist	 methods	 of	 coercion.	 German	 and	 Italian	 fascists	shattered	 their	 respective	 states	 through	 war	 and	 the	 surviving	 Spanish	 and	Portuguese	 regimes	 oversaw	 structural	 economic	 stagnation	 and	 social	ossification	 in	 theirs.	 Fascism	 and	 other	 irrational	 nationalisms	 are	 not	 the	inevitable	 metaphysical	 offspring	 of	 classical	 German	 philosophy,	 but	 of	liberalism	 as	 it	 developed	 politically	 in	 Europe	 after	 the	 1848	 revolutions.	Liberalism	 and	 fascism	 have	 historically	 shared	 ideological	 interstices.	 Both	represent	 ideological	manifestations	 of	 capitalist	modernity	 that	 are	 rooted	 in	the	 existence	 of	 nation	 states.	 Moreover	 both	 ideologies	 are	 simultaneously	dependent	 on	 the	 conditions	 of	 mass	 society	 and	 hostile	 to	 its	 democratic	implications.	The	resolution	of	these	contradictions	in	both	cases	has	been	found	in	supranational	expansionism	and	extolling	the	virtues	of	the	past	as	a	means	of	obscuring	the	mass	democratic	potential	of	the	future.		The	 imperceptible	 or	 inexplicable	 operation	 of	 market	 forces	 in	 neoliberal	societies	generates	 irrationalism	in	which	citizens	 find	 it	difficult	or	 impossible	to	 construct	 a	 coherent	 image	 of	 the	 future.	 Lukács	 described	 a	 fundamental	ideological	 property	 of	 irrationalism,	 that	 it	 “hardens	 the	 limitations	 of	perception	governed	by	understanding	into	perceptional	limitations	as	a	whole”	(1980,	 97-98).	 In	 other	 words,	 irrationalism	 artificially	 fetters	 our	 ability	 to	
	 29	
comprehend	a	complex	material	world	and	resorts	to	irrational	explanations	of	it.	 The	 prophet	 of	 neoliberalism,	 Hayek	 complained	 that	 modern	 society	 was	limited	by	an	“unwillingness	 to	submit	 to	any	rule	or	necessity	 the	rationale	of	which	man	does	not	understand.”	Human	incomprehension	was	thus	necessary	to	 sustain	 civilisation,	 as	 was	 “submission	 to	 the	 impersonal	 forces	 of	 the	market”	that	had	given	rise	to	civilisation	in	the	first	place	(1944,	151-152).		The	international	ascendancy	of	neoliberalism	from	the	1970s	has	provided	the	economic	 backcloth	 to	 the	 growth	of	 irrational	 nationalism.	Neoliberalism	was	first	tested	under	Augusto	Pinochet’s	fascist	dictatorship	in	Chile,	which	acted	as	a	 societal	 laboratory	 for	Milton	 Friedman’s	 Chicago	 School	 economics	 (Harvey	2005,	7-9).	The	compatibility	of	fascism	and	neoliberalism	demonstrates	the	way	in	which	nationalists	can	instrumentalise	the	modern	state	for	both	rational	and	irrational	 ends.	 In	 using	 the	 term	 “neoliberalism”	 I	 emphasise	 the	 discrepancy	between	Hayek’s	 ideal	 of	 liberating	 the	 “spontaneous	 forces	 of	 society”	 (1944,	13)	and	the	political	reality	of	this	theory	in	practice.	Fine	notes	that	as	a	result	of	periodic	financial	crises,	the	neoliberal	state	has	continued	to	intervene	in	the	economy	 throughout,	 “albeit	 under	 the	 ideology	 of	 non-intervention	 or,	paradoxically,	as	intervention	to	free	the	market	or	to	make	it	work”	(2012,	59-60).	Under	neoliberalism	the	state	does	not	forfeit	its	agency,	but	operates	as	the	market’s	 enabler	 and	 guarantor.	 In	 this	 respect,	 markets	 are	 not	 free	 and	neoliberalism	 is	 not	 “liberal”	 in	 Hayek’s	 pure	 sense	 because	 the	 economy	 is	artificially	course-corrected	through	sub	rosa	state	intervention.		Neoliberalism	 in	practice	denies	 the	 state	 a	developmental	 role	 in	 the	national	economy.	In	Western	societies	under	its	sway,	neoliberalism	has	terminated	the	
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post-1945	Keynesian	consensus	of	accepting	a	mixed	economy	and	a	degree	of	governmental	 planning	 (Hobsbawm	 1995,	 281-282).	 Harvey	 describes	 how	 in	the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 1973	 global	 crisis,	 the	 Fordist-Keynesian	 system	transitioned	to	a	model	of	capital	accumulation	driven	by	“flexibility	with	respect	to	 labour	 processes,	 labour	 markets,	 products,	 and	 patterns	 of	 consumption”	(1990,	147).	“Flexible	accumulation”	accelerates	a	socially	disorientating	process	of	“time-space	compression”	where	space	is	compacted	into	a	“global	village”	and	“time	horizons	shorten	to	the	point	where	the	present	is	all	there	is”	(240).	The	greater	 social	 ephemerality	 accompanying	 flexible	 accumulation	 has	 prompted	the	 search	 for	 new	 sources	 of	 meaning	 and	 authenticity.	 Nationalism	 and	localism	 have	 enhanced	 appeal	 under	 these	 conditions	 as	 “eternal	 truth”	 in	 a	rapidly	changing	world	(292).		Flexible	 accumulation	 is	 synonymous	 with	 the	 age	 of	 globalisation	 which	influences	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 humans	 perceive	 time	 and	 space.	 Guibernau	proposes	 that	 contemporary	 proliferation	 of	 sub-state	 nationalism	 is	 a	 direct	consequence	of	globalisation’s	weakening	of	the	nation	state	(1999,	19).	It	is	not	globalisation	 per	 se	 that	 has	 undermined	 the	 nation	 state,	 but	 the	 structural	impact	 of	 neoliberalism	 at	 a	 national	 level.	Whereas	 flexible	 accumulation	 and	the	communications	revolution	associated	with	globalisation	are	eroding	certain	national	 cultural	 distinctions,	 each	 society’s	 economic	 structure	 continually	reproduces	 a	 national	 superstructure.	 Neoliberalism	 destabilises	 the	 structure,	often	exacerbating	pre-existing	developmental	problems,	which	has	 ideological	repercussions	 within	 the	 superstructure.	 Facing	 the	 entropic	 effects	 of	neoliberalism,	 national	 minorities	 are	 drawn	 to	 separatism	 because	 they	 no	
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longer	 perceive	 the	 existing	 state	 as	 a	 viable	 political	 space	 or	 accept	 its	historicity.	 Neoliberalism’s	 social	 coefficient	 of	 future-blindness	 means	 that	popular	reactions	against	it	now	frequently	manifest	as	irrational	nationalism	or	regionalism.	Where	neoliberalism	has	been	embraced	outside	Europe	and	North	America	–	India,	Turkey	and	Iran	offer	good	contemporary	examples	–	irrational	nationalism	 also	 prevails,	 but	 frequently	 at	 the	 state	 level	 owing	 to	 a	 national	chauvinism	that	demands	competing	with	the	West	on	its	own	economic	terms.		In	 this	 thesis	 I	 examine	 irrational	 nationalism	 and	 heritage	 as	 a	phenomenological	unity	in	the	neoliberal	age.	Here	I	operate	a	broad	definition	of	 heritage,	 the	 social	 proportions	 of	 which	 have	 swelled	 into	 a	 deluge	 under	neoliberalism.	 Heritage	may	 now	 include	 a	 variety	 of	 distinct	 and	 overlapping	social	and	biological	categories,	ranging	from	museums	to	 landscapes,	minority	languages	 to	 folk	 traditions	 and	 even	 “innate”	 properties	 determined	by	 blood	and	genes	(Lowenthal	1998,	202-206).	The	United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific	and	 Cultural	 Organization	 (UNESCO)	 officially	 recognises	 “intangible	 cultural	heritage”,	stating	 that	 it	 is	 “constantly	recreated	by	communities	and	groups	 in	response	 to	 their	 environment,	 their	 interaction	with	nature	 and	 their	 history,	and	provides	 them	with	a	sense	of	 identity	and	continuity”	 (2003,	2).	Harrison	and	 Rose	 consider	 UNESCO’s	 definition	 problematic	 and	 question	 whether	 it	permits	 the	classification	of	 “any	 identity-forming	practices”	as	heritage	 (2010,	247).	 On	 a	 basic	 level,	 heritage	 is	 a	 contemporary	 construct	 of	 that	 which	 is	inherited	 from	 the	 past	 and	 considered	 to	 be	 of	 value	 by	 a	 social	 group	 that	perceives	 a	 common	 history.	 The	 group	 in	 question	 may	 genuinely	 possess	 a	common	history	 rooted	 in	 real	material	 conditions	 that	have	generated	 shared	
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experiences	 and	 a	 collective	 desire	 to	 preserve	 cultural	 artefacts.	 Conversely,	heritage	may	 be	 socially	 constructed	 from	 idealised	 experiences	 that	were	 not	necessarily	shared	by	the	whole	group	and	may	not	have	happened	at	all.	I	stress	the	idealistic	potential	of	heritage	as	being	central	to	its	political	construction.		National	 heritage	 is	 a	 universal	 feature	 of	 modern	 societies	 and	 therefore	indicative	 of	 a	 definite	 developmental	 stage.	 However,	 I	 will	 demonstrate	 that	the	 political	 meaning	 of	 heritage	 has	 a	 dialectical	 relationship	 to	 national	development,	and	the	level	of	productive	forces	particularly.	In	this	work	I	follow	the	intellectual	trajectory	of	earlier	commentaries	that	examined	the	complex	of	heritage,	 modernity	 and	 national	 identity	 (see	 Lowenthal	 1985,	 1998;	 Wright	1985;	 Hewison	 1987;	 Samuel	 1994,	 1998).	 I	 focus	 on	 heritage	 as	 a	 social	pathology	 that,	 along	 with	 nostalgia,	 has	 become	 symptomatic	 of	 industrial	decline.	 I	 expand	 upon	 the	 theme	 of	 a	 national	 obsession	 with	 the	 past	 to	interpret	nationalism	in	the	neoliberal	age.		In	 part	 one	 of	 my	 thesis	 I	 approach	 the	 historical	 relationship	 between	nationalism	and	heritage	 from	a	 theoretical	perspective.	 In	 chapter	one	 I	 trace	the	 political	 construction	 of	 national	 heritage	 as	 a	 rational	 function	 of	 the	modern	state	under	the	ideological	warp	of	nationalism.	I	consider	this	in	terms	of	 the	 processes	 of	 modernisation	 that	 have	 ultimately	 produced	 an	interconnected	global	order	in	the	twenty-first	century.	I	proceed	in	chapter	two	to	 examine	 how	 under	 the	 impact	 of	 globalisation	 and	 neoliberalism,	 state	heritage	 representations	 are	 now	 being	 challenged	 by	 politicised	 grassroots	forms	 of	 heritage—what	 I	 term	 activist	 heritage.	 Originating	 among	 left-wing	activists,	 this	social	phenomenon	has	been	embraced	by	right-wing	nationalists	
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of	 various	 ideological	 bents.	 I	 include	 a	 case	 study	 describing	 how	 neofascists	have	 appropriated	 material	 culture	 of	 the	 Third	 Reich	 from	 state	 heritage	institutions	 and	 retrofitted	 it	 ideologically	 for	 use	 in	 contemporary	 far-right	subcultural	activism.	I	will	illustrate	the	political	interaction	of	state	and	activist	heritage	as	the	latter	aims	to	subvert	official	narratives.		In	 part	 two	 I	 undertake	 two	 case	 studies	 of	 specific	 species	 of	 nationalism	 as	articulated	 through	 activist	 heritage.	 In	 chapter	 three	 I	 examine	 Jewish	nationalism	 (Zionism)	within	 Israel	 and	 the	 Occupied	 Territories	 of	 Palestine3	through	 fieldwork	 conducted	 at	museums,	 heritage	 centres	 and	 archaeological	sites.	 I	compare	the	heritage	of	secular	Labour	Zionist	settlement	 in	Israel	with	that	 of	 fundamentalist	 Religious	 Zionists,	who	 are	 now	 politically	 dominant	 in	the	 Occupied	 Territories.	 I	 focus	 on	 Religious	 Zionism	 as	 an	 irrational	nationalism	premised	on	Jewish	fundamentalism	to	test	the	veracity	of	Gellner’s	argument	 that	nationalism	ended	 the	 “monopoly	of	 the	 sacred”	 in	modernity.	 I	interrogate	 the	 political	 dynamics	 of	 state	 and	 activist	 heritage	 to	 ascertain	whether	the	latter	represents	an	ideological	challenge	to	the	Israeli	state	itself.		In	chapter	four	I	look	at	activist	heritage	within	Irish	Republicanism	through	the	lens	of	the	1916	Easter	Rising	centennial	commemorations.	I	analyse	Sinn	Féin’s	adoption	 of	 amateur	 and	 state	 heritage	 practices	 in	 its	 national	 programme	of	activities	 commemorating	 the	 Rising.	 These	 included	 historical	 re-enactments	and	 public	 exhibitions,	 which	 I	 contextualise	 within	 the	 tradition	 of	 Irish	Republican	 elegiac	 performance.	 I	 probe	 the	 question	 of	 authenticity	 in	 Sinn	
																																																								3	I	 use	 the	 term	 “Palestine”	 both	 in	 reference	 to	 the	 historical	 entity	 and	 the	 state	 officially	recognised	by	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly	in	2012.	
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Féin’s	platform	and	consider	 this	 in	relation	 to	 the	party’s	contestation	of	 Irish	national	heritage	and	the	rival	claims	of	“dissident”	Republicans.	Here	I	refer	to	authenticity	 in	 terms	 of	 Republicanism’s	 own	 internal	 logic.	 I	 also	 see	 the	authentic	in	Harvey’s	sense	as	that	which	is	idealised	under	conditions	of	greater	social	ephemerality,	and	not	an	objective	measure	of	historical	authenticity.		In	 chapter	 five	 I	 survey	 the	 activist	 heritage	 of	 Ulster	 Loyalism	 as	 politics	 of	nostalgia	 and	 identity	 within	 the	 context	 of	 multiculturalism	 in	 the	 United	Kingdom.	 I	 focus	 on	 parading	 as	 a	 traditional	 Loyalist	 ritual	 performance	 to	explore	 its	 intersection	 with	 contemporary	 heritage	 practices:	 historical	 re-enactments	and	museums.	To	the	reader	Loyalism	may	seem	an	unusual	choice	of	 ideology,	 and	 my	 rationale	 requires	 further	 explanation.	 Protestant	particularism	 in	 the	 north	 of	 Ireland	 does	 not	 equate	 to	 Ulster	 nationalism.4	There	is	a	wealth	of	academic	debate	on	the	theoretical	distinction	between	sub-state	 or	 minority	 nationalism,	 and	 regionalism	 in	 Europe	 (see,	 for	 example,	Lynch	 1996;	 Keating	 2001;	 Hepburn	 2011).	 Lynch	 highlights	 the	 blurring	 of	minority	nationalism	and	regionalism	in	the	European	Union.	European	minority	nationalists	 are	 now	 pragmatic	 vis-à-vis	 national	 sovereignty,	 economic	 policy	and	 membership	 of	 the	 single	 currency,	 while	 regionalists	 deploy	 nationalist	positions	to	advance	their	local	interests	(1996,	196-197).	Hence	nationalism	is	ideologically	 versatile	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 state,	 meaning	 it	 can	 be	 constitutive,	restorative	 or	 transformative.	 Contemporary	 Loyalism	 represents	 a	 form	 of	regionalism,	 but	 any	 such	 ideology	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 become	nationalism	 in																																																									4	Loyalism	has	been	treated	as	Ulster	nationalism	by	several	commentators	(see	Ignatieff	1994,	chapter	6;	 Finlayson	1996).	Gibbon	problematically	defines	 it	 as	 “quasi-nationalist”.	He	asserts	that	British	colonialism	structurally	cleft	 Irish	society,	producing	 industrial	development	 in	 the	north	and	a	backward	agricultural	system	in	the	south	(1975,	19-20).	
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the	event	of	economic	structural	change.	In	this	respect	Loyalism	and	Sinn	Féin’s	Republicanism	 modulate	 the	 same	 ideological	 waveform	 in	 a	 supranational	political	 bloc	 under	 neoliberal	 propulsion.	 I	 therefore	 dichotomise	 these	 two	ideologies	to	explicate	the	basic	precepts	of	the	nation	I	have	outlined	above.		
A	Note	on	Methodology		My	 case	 studies	 in	 part	 two	 discuss	 societies	 that	 have	 certain	 historical	similarities,	 specifically	 a	 common	 legacy	 of	 British	 imperial	 domination	 that	produced	violent	insurrection	and	ethnic	division.	My	work	has	been	influenced	by	comparative	studies	of	the	sort	pioneered	by	Wright	(1987;	see	also	Akenson	1992;	Wilson	2010).	However,	I	have	chosen	not	to	offer	a	comparative	study	of	Israel	 and	 Ireland.	 Although	 this	 approach	 has	 produced	 highly	 valuable	scholarship,	I	do	not	consider	it	appropriate	to	these	contexts.	As	former	colonial	settler	societies	they	may	present	analogies,	but	are	in	fact	historically	different	in	a	number	of	vital	respects.	Zionism	and	Loyalism	represent	unique	ideological	phenomena	with	the	former	premised	on	breaking	with	British	colonial	power	in	Palestine	and	the	latter	defined	by	a	social	contract	with	it	in	Ireland.	Moreover	whereas	 I	 present	 the	 variants	 of	 Zionism,	 Republicanism	 and	 Loyalism	 that	 I	have	 studied	 as	 irrational	 ideologies,	 they	 differ	 in	 their	 approaches	 to	 state	power.	Religious	Zionism	has	a	radical	transformative	plan	for	the	Israeli	state;	Republicanism	 and	 Loyalism	 have	 no	 comparable	 project	 in	 relation	 to	 the	British	 and	 Irish	 states.	 My	 intention	 is	 to	 use	 the	 respective	 case	 studies	 to	derive	universally	applicable	knowledge.		
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I	 remain	 convinced	 that	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 conduct	 effective	 research	 on	nationalism	without	taking	a	multi-disciplinary	tack.	Much	of	my	fieldwork	was	undertaken	 at	 heritage	 institutions,	 and	 museums	 in	 particular.	 However,	 the	nature	of	my	research	meant	that	I	had	to	look	beyond	Museum	Studies,	owing	to	the	tendency	in	much	of	the	scholarship	to	privilege	the	museum’s	institutional	status	over	its	characteristics	as	a	social	arena.	In	light	of	this	I	consider	the	work	of	 social	 anthropologists	 to	 be	 of	 vital	 importance.	 Handler’s	 and	 Gable’s	pioneering	study	of	Colonial	Williamsburg	offers	the	insight	that	“most	research	on	museums	has	proceeded	by	ignoring	much	of	what	happens	in	them”	(1997,	9).	I	would	venture	that	most	research	on	museums	also	ignores	what	happens	
outside	them.	Candlin’s	work	has	proved	invaluable	through	combining	the	social	anthropological	 method	 of	 participant	 observation	 with	 a	 “higher	 degree	 of	emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 of	 artefacts	 in	 constructing	 meaning	 and	 forms	 of	interaction”	(2016,	19).	To	augment	my	own	participant	observation	I	employed	a	 perambulatory	 technique	 to	 explore	 places	 associated	 with	 nationalism.	Furthermore	 I	 adopted	 Benjamin’s	 modus	 in	 the	 Parisian	 arcades	 (see	 1999,	871-872)	 that	 has	 subsequently	 inspired	 Sebald’s	 literary	 wanderings	 (2001,	2002)	and	latterly	social	anthropological	 investigation	(Rapport	2008,	39-49).	 I	found	 this	 to	 be	 a	 fruitful	 means	 of	 encountering	 contemporary	 social	phenomena	whilst	recording	physical	traces	of	the	past.	It	was	also	germane	to	experiencing	 the	 immediacy	 and	 inter-subjectivity	 of	 political	 activism—something	I	accentuate	by	writing	in	the	first	person,	using	the	present	tense.		My	work	has	therefore	combined	methodologies	used	in	the	social	sciences	with	those	 of	 my	 own	 academic	 background	 in	 Modern	 and	 Contemporary	 History	
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and	professional	experience	as	a	museum	curator.	I	draw	on	my	experience	as	a	historian	to	interrogate	some	of	the	claims	made	by	activists	to	determine	their	political	 motives	 for	 making	 them.	 Researching	 nationalism	 also	 compels	 the	scholar	 to	 give	 appropriate	 consideration	 to	 the	 ethical	 issues	 arising	 from	engagement	with	people	whose	views	may	be	racist	or	otherwise	reactionary.	As	someone	of	left-wing	political	convictions	I	was	bound	within	certain	parameters	of	action,	and	forced	to	take	them	into	account	when	planning	my	fieldwork.	For	example,	whereas	I	 joined	a	tour	with	a	right-wing	Zionist	group	inside	Israel’s	borders,	I	opted	not	to	participate	in	similar	expeditions	to	the	West	Bank	where	I	 feared	 becoming	 complicit	 in	 the	 occupation	 itself.	 In	 preparing	 for	 my	fieldwork	 I	 deliberated	 extensively	 over	 ethical	 boundaries	 and	 this	 ultimately	shaped	my	research.		To	 the	 reader	 I	 must	 also	 offer	 a	mea	 culpa	 that	 in	 analysing	 contemporary	societies	 I	 run	 the	 risk	 of	 my	 findings	 being	 overtaken	 by	 unforeseen	 events.	Moreover	in	attempting	to	describe	nationalism	in	its	near-infinite	complexity	I	have	 doubtless	 made	 misrepresentations	 and	 oversimplified	 certain	 aspects.	 I	believe	this	to	be	the	unavoidable	consequence	of	trying	to	grasp	a	phenomenon	that	 is	 in	 so	 many	 ways	 synonymous	 with	 modernity	 as	 we	 have	 known	 it.
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Part	One	
	
One	
	
Days	of	Glory:	National	Heritage	and	the	Production	of	Modernity		In	the	period	between	the	Renaissance	and	the	zenith	of	imperialism	in	the	late	nineteenth	 century,	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 national	 heritage	 evolved	 as	 a	 basic	function	of	 the	modern	 state.	To	 represent	nations	 as	historical	 entities,	 states	needed	to	identify	and	preserve	heritage	as	evidence	of	their	origins	and	social	development.	 Codifying	 national	 heritage	 required	 the	 inauguration	 of	 official	institutions.	 As	 the	 principal	 repositories	 for	 heritage,	 museums,	 libraries	 and	archives	became	institutional	symbols	of	national	identity.	National	heritage	was	thus	 integrated	 into	 the	 official	 culture	 and	 maintained	 through	 the	 political	authority	of	the	state.		Modern	states	 in	Europe	and	the	Americas	constructed	a	national	heritage	as	a	sub-routine	 of	 the	 national	 cultural	 regulation	 that	 became	 an	 economic	imperative	of	the	bourgeoisie	in	its	ascendancy.	The	efficacy	of	national	cultural	regulation	was	determined	both	by	the	 level	of	economic	development	and	the	degree	 of	 state	 centralisation.	 In	 federal	 systems,	 the	 national	 culture	 was	subject	to	political	filtration	through	devolved	power	structures	which	continued	to	 promote	 regional	 particularism.	 In	 centralised	 states,	 the	 consolidation	 of	 a	hegemonic	 national	 culture	 demanded	 the	 subordination,	 assimilation	 or	eradication	of	 pre-existing	 regional	 cultures.	 For	Gellner,	 a	 primary	 ideological	
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goal	 of	 nationalism	was	making	 the	 polity	 coextensive	with	 a	 national	 culture	“cultivated”	by	the	state	 from	earlier	“wild”	cultures.	The	elite	“high”	culture	of	the	agrarian	age	thereafter	became	universal	in	industrial	society	(2006,	48-49).		A	 distinction	 must	 be	 made	 between	 what	 feudal	 absolutist	 and	 modern	bourgeois	states	have	designated	the	“high”	culture	and	that	which	is	organically	formed	within	the	different	strata	of	class	society	in	particular	historical	epochs.	Classes	evolve	their	own	distinctive	cultures,	which	are	in	turn	shaped	by	other	variables,	 such	 as	 geography	 and	 climate.	 Cultures	 develop	 from	 the	 economic	structure	 of	 society	with	 certain	 elements,	 such	 as	 language,	 becoming	 shared	across	 strata	 in	 modern	 states.	 In	 the	 process	 of	 modernisation,	 it	 became	necessary	 for	 the	 bourgeois	 state	 to	 standardise	 specific	 aspects	 of	 culture	through	 bureaucratic	 and	 educational	 mechanisms	 in	 order	 to	 drive	 national	economic	development.	Nations	are	not	the	product	of	a	common	culture—their	material	 existence	 generates	 cultural	 intercourse	 and	 national	 consciousness.	Furthermore	 culture	 that	 develops	 from	 the	 structure	 does	 not	 remain	 static	within	the	superstructure.	National	cultures	are	shaped	by	social	forces	and	are	recalibrated	 by	 states	 in	 response	 to	 internal	 challenges.	 “Residual”	 cultural	elements	from	earlier	sodalities	can	also	survive	outside	the	dominant	national	culture	 (Williams	 1980,	 40).	 National	 heritage	 as	 a	 component	 of	 the	 national	culture	 is	 therefore	 of	 political	 design	 and	 the	 object	 of	 continuous	reconfiguration.	 The	 political	 aim	 of	 national	 cultural	 regulation	 and	 national	heritage	 as	 an	 associated	 mode	 of	 historicism	 thus	 represent	 nationalist	principles	born	of	the	material	conditions	of	capitalist	development.		
	 40	
In	 the	 social	 context	 of	 European	 modernisation,	 a	 national	 heritage	 was	evidence	of	progress.	The	age	of	industry	was	propelled	by	the	logical	correlation	of	 economic	 and	 social	 advance	 as	 a	 central	 tenet	 of	 classical	 liberalism.	Accompanying	 the	 expansion	 of	 productive	 forces	 were	 urbanisation,	demographic	 growth	 and	 insatiable	 resource	 consumption.	 The	 turbulence	 of	industrialisation	 generated	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	mutability	 of	 modern	 society,	but	also	its	transience.	A	combination	of	rationalism	and	romanticism	drove	the	preservation	of	the	physical	remains	of	a	past	rapidly	receding	from	view.	As	the	cultural	 offspring	 of	 nationalism,	 heritage	 thereby	 followed	 its	 divergent	ideological	currents.		Following	 the	 ideological	 mutation	 of	 nationalism,	 national	 heritage	 in	 the	European	nation	state	was	configured	initially	by	the	ideal	of	universal	progress	before	 being	 integrated	 into	 the	 global	 system	 of	 imperialism.	 The	 export	 of	museums,	 archaeology	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 heritage	 to	 European	 colonies	stimulated	 anti-colonial	 nationalism	 that	 recognised	 in	 rational	 terms	 the	cultural	value	of	these	practices.	In	analysing	the	formation	of	national	heritage	under	 and	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 imperialist	 domination,	 I	 interpret	 the	construction	 of	 national	 heritage	 in	 post-colonial	 societies	 by	 their	 own	 lights.	These	 societies	 incorporated	 ideas	 and	 practices	 imported	 via	 European	colonialism	that	are	not	the	intellectual	property	of	Europeans,	but	the	outcome	of	the	global	interconnections	accompanying	modernisation.		I	 reiterate	 that	 the	 nation	 has	 a	 material	 basis	 as	 a	 historically	 determined	complex	of	social	relations.	National	heritage	 is	nevertheless	employed	 in	 ideal	representations	of	the	nation	and,	as	such,	can	be	linked	to	national	histories	by	
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artifice.	 Lowenthal	 notes	 the	 inherent	 bias	 in	 both	 history	 and	 heritage	 as	concepts	 (1998,	 112).	Whilst	 acknowledging	 national	 heritage	 to	 be	 politically	biased	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 what	 the	 state	 or	 associated	 elites	 determine	 to	 be	culturally	 important,	 I	 also	 stress	 its	 relation	 to	 the	 material	 conditions	contouring	this	process.	National	heritage	exists	objectively	as	a	set	of	preserved	cultural	 artefacts	 that	 will	 be	 interpreted	 in	 various	 ways	 by	 different	 social	groups.	 National	 heritage	 serves	 the	 social	 needs	 of	 the	 present,	 but	 is	 also	passed	between	states	when	 there	 is	 a	 change	of	political	 system.	 It	 is	 also	 re-interpreted	inter-generationally	and	at	important	moments	in	national	life.		National	 heritage	 is	 therefore	 coloured	 by	 a	 spectrum	 of	 social	 meanings	attached	 to	 it,	which	are	historically	determined.	Heritage,	 like	 the	history	 that	produces	 it,	 has	 dimensions	 of	 the	 universal	 and	 the	 particular.	 All	 modern	societies	 have	 replicated	 the	 pattern	 of	 heritage	 preservation	 to	 reify	 their	national	histories.	A	universal	heritage	now	exists	which	is	theoretically	shared	by	humanity	 and	 governed	by	UNESCO	as	 a	 supranational	 body.	Ownership	 of	some	 parts	 of	 this	 heritage	 is	 the	 cause	 of	 conflict	 between	 nations.	Moreover	UNESCO’s	 categorisation	 of	 World	 Heritage	 Sites	 can	 cause	 “dissonance”	between	 the	 concept	 of	 universal	 heritage	 they	 embody	 and	 the	 national	interests	of	states	wherein	they	are	located	(Graham,	Ashworth,	and	Tunbridge	2000,	 97).	 As	 cultural	 nodes	 within	 a	 globalised	 matrix,	 national	 heritages	illustrate	 the	 constant	 tension	between	 the	universal	 and	 the	particular	within	modernity	itself.		In	 this	 chapter	 I	 consider	 the	 political	 significance	 of	 national	 heritage	 in	 the	modernisation	 process	 and	 its	 ideological	 function	 within	 the	 nation	 state.	 In	
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discussing	 national	 heritage	 in	 this	 context	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 museum	 as	 the	paramount	state	heritage	institution	with	a	caveat.	National	heritage	represents	a	broader	episteme	and	in	using	the	museum	as	an	institutional	example,	I	refer	
inter	 alia	 to	 archaeological	 sites,	 historic	 buildings,	 monuments,	 flags,	 public	rituals	and	historical	personae.	Whereas	I	make	an	explicit	connection	between	national	heritage	and	culture,	I	likewise	acknowledge	that	the	first	category	may	be	 enlarged	 to	 include	 things	 that	 are	 not	 man-made,	 such	 as	 landscapes.	National	 heritage	 can	 also	 absorb	 mythological	 or	 other	 fictive	 elements.	 For	nationalists,	 history	 and	 heritage	 are	 combined	 in	 a	 unique	 narrative	 that	testifies	 to	 the	 nation’s	 historicity.	 The	 origin	 story	 contains	 myths	 and	ideological	 distortions	 of	 actual	 events—sometimes	 by	 rational	 design.	 To	 this	end	 national	 heritage	 may	 be	 manipulated	 or	 even	 fabricated	 to	 mask	contradictions	or	inconsistencies.		
Recorded	Time		The	organisation	of	the	capitalist	mode	of	production	within	nation	states	made	humans	 conscious	of	 history	 as	 a	process,	 but	 also	 their	 own	agency	within	 it.	Societies	could	henceforth	use	the	past	as	a	resource	for	interpreting	the	present	and	designing	the	future	as	a	higher	existential	plain.	Heritage	as	a	rational	idea	originates	 in	 the	Renaissance	and	 the	 intellectual	circles	of	 learned	men	whom	Bacon	called	“Merchants	of	Light”	(1886,	187).	In	the	pre-modern	world,	humans	had	 preserved	 remnants	 of	 the	 past	 in	 various	 unsystematic	 ways,	 but	 the	universal	trinity	of	Renaissance,	Reformation	and	Enlightenment	generated	new	modes	of	thinking	and	rational	systems	of	collecting	and	classifying.	Preserving	that	which	was	 considered	valuable	 from	 the	past	 became	a	 rational	means	of	
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materialising	 human	 free	 will	 and	 historicising	 nations.	 Tangible	 historical	change	 validated	 the	 departure	 from	 past	 models,	 but	 also	 suggested	 that	moderns	 could	 equal	 or	 better	 the	 achievements	 of	 the	 ancients	 (Lowenthal	1985,	79-80).		At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 Renaissance	 “cabinets	 of	 curiosity”	 were	 displayed	 in	European	 aristocratic	 settings.	 Natural	 objects	 on	 display	 were	 conceived	 as	having	 no	 order	 or	 pattern	 subject	 to	 universal	 laws	 (Shelton	 1994,	 184).	Naturalists	 also	 created	 cabinets	 in	 universities	 to	 exhibit	 specimens	 for	scientists	 and	 philosophers	 to	 contemplate.	 During	 the	 Renaissance,	 objects	 of	nature	 were	 not	 formally	 classified;	 cabinets	 were	 thought	 of	 primarily	 as	sensory	stimuli.	During	the	course	of	the	seventeenth	century,	the	classification	of	 animals	 grew	 more	 sophisticated	 as	 mammals,	 birds	 and	 fish	 were	categorised.	 The	 basic	 taxonomy	 of	 animals	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 primitive	classification	 of	 plants	 by	 early	 botanists.	 The	 “cabinets	 of	 curiosity”	 hence	played	a	pivotal	role	in	ordering	the	natural	world	(George	1985,	186-187).		The	progression	 of	 science	 and	philosophy	over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 seventeenth	and	eighteenth	centuries	gradually	eroded	the	ontological	dualisms	of	body	and	soul,	and	mind	and	matter.	This	prompted	a	fundamental	re-examination	of	the	relationship	 between	nature	 and	 society	 that	 overturned	 the	 earlier	 conceit	 of	human	uniqueness	from	animals	(Thomas	1983,	123).	Engels	observed	that	the	metaphysical	 acceptance	 of	material	 things	 as	 being	 immutable	was	 originally	derived	 from	 the	 natural	 sciences	 wherein	 specimens	 were	 studied	 as	 “faits	
accomplis”.	 Collection	 and	 classification	 of	 plants	 and	 animals	meant	 scientists	began	 to	 investigate	 systematically	 change	 within	 nature	 itself.	 This	 principle	
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could	henceforth	be	 applied	 to	human	 societies	 as	 “a	 complex	of	processes”	 in	which	 material	 things	 are	 continually	 “coming	 into	 being	 and	 passing	 away”	(1991b,	283).		Classification	 was	 an	 advent	 of	 the	 Enlightenment	 when	 naturalists	 began	 to	organise	objects	to	reflect	the	precise	order	of	nature	(Findlen	1996,	401-402).	The	Renaissance	 and	 the	 Enlightenment	 together	 produced	 an	 epistemological	shift	 away	 from	 the	display	of	nature	 as	 a	 representation	of	divine	power	 to	 a	rationally	 ordered	 reality	 in	 which	 humans	 could	 comprehend	 nature’s	underlying	 laws.	 Intellectually	 freed	 from	 an	 obscure,	 divinely	 determined	universe,	 humans	 were	 able	 to	 study	 nature	 and	 society	 as	 interrelated	phenomena.	 Logically	 the	past	 followed	nature	 in	becoming	 subject	 to	 rational	enquiry	 in	 museums.	 Material	 culture	 became	 a	 taxonomic	 index	 to	 historical	change	 in	 the	 European	 world	 and	 its	 colonial	 peripheries.	 As	 with	 natural	specimens,	 the	 collection,	 classification	 and	 preservation	 of	 artefacts	 by	museums	interrupted	the	passing	away	of	material	things.	Modernity	thus	made	institutional	preservation	a	social	barrier	to	natural	entropy.		Museums	 represent	 modern	 innovations:	 rational	 systems	 for	 recording	 time.	They	 are	 the	 state’s	 primary	 repositories	 for	 the	 national	 heritage.	 National	museums	are	 founded	as	 “strategic	markers”	within	national	 symbolic	 systems	alongside	 flags,	 anthems,	 festivals,	 commemorations	and	monuments.	They	are	initiated	 at	 key	 junctures	 in	 the	 nation’s	 history,	 such	 as	 the	 declaration	 of	 a	republic	or	national	 independence	(Elgenius	2015,	145-146).	The	development	of	 the	national	museum	was	 synonymous	with	 the	 rise	 of	 European	bourgeois	society	and	its	challenge	to	aristocratic	power.	The	“princely	collections”	of	 the	
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early	modern	 period	were	 social	 status	 symbols	 displayed	 in	 palatial	 galleries	and	halls	(Duncan	1995,	22).	Exhibiting	the	collections	in	this	way	enshrined	the	cultural	legitimacy	of	royal	absolutism.	Enlightened	absolutist	monarchies	began	to	open	 their	 collections	 in	 the	 early	 eighteenth	 century.	 For	 example,	 in	1719	Peter	the	Great	established	a	museum	in	Saint	Petersburg,	admitting	the	public	to	his	private	collections	(see	Neverov	1985).	The	British	Museum	was	opened	to	the	 public	 as	 the	 world’s	 first	 national	 museum	 in	 1759.	 Britain’s	 early	innovation	was	 a	 nationalising	 initiative	 on	 the	 state’s	 part	 in	 the	wake	 of	 the	1745	Jacobite	Rebellion	(Colley	2012,	86).		The	universal	paradigm	of	 the	national	museum	 is	 to	be	 found	 in	 the	Muséum	Français	 established	 by	 the	 National	 Convention	 after	 the	 declaration	 of	 the	French	Republic.	The	museum’s	inauguration	in	1793	accompanied	the	Festival	of	National	Unity,	marking	the	Republic’s	first	anniversary	(McClellan	1994,	94-99).	The	revolutionary	government	housed	the	museum	in	the	Louvre	Palace	to	symbolise	 the	 transition	 from	monarchy	 to	republic.	By	granting	 free	access	 to	all	citizens,	the	National	Convention	demonstrated	the	state’s	commitment	to	the	revolutionary	 ideal	 of	 equality.	Where	 previously	 the	 collections	 had	 been	 the	personal	possessions	of	kings,	the	museum	converted	them	into	the	property	of	the	 nation	 (Duncan	 1995,	 22-24).	 The	 transformation	 of	 the	 Louvre	synchronised	 the	 moment	 of	 rupture	 with	 its	 causation.	 The	 revolution	 was	materialised	as	a	stage	in	France’s	historical	progress	from	antiquity,	through	the	darkness	of	absolutism	into	enlightened	reason	and	liberty.		The	French	revolutionary	construction	of	a	national	heritage	provided	a	focus	for	the	mass	perception	of	historical	change	and	the	need	to	rationalise	it.	Following	
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Lefebvre,	Harvey	writes	that	the	American	and	French	revolutions	addressed	the	“production	 of	 space”	 as	 a	 key	 epistemological	 question	 posed	 by	 the	Enlightenment	 (1990,	 255-257;	 see	 also	 Lefebvre	 1991).	 The	 French	revolutionary	 government	 rationalised	 the	 national	 space	 by	 dividing	 it	 into	regional	 administrative	 departments.	 Fifteen	 museums	 were	 established	 at	departmental	 level	 in	1801,	whilst	collections	of	national	 importance	remained	in	Paris.	Although	intended	as	a	cohesive	measure	by	the	French	state,	the	new	museums	 often	 displayed	 regional	 particularism	 (Berger	 2015,	 25).	 In	making	citizenship	 and	 nationality	 coextensive	 following	 the	 American	 precedent,	 the	French	Revolution	politically	detached	regional	particularism	from	the	definition	of	 the	 nation	 (Hobsbawm	 1992,	 88).	 The	 revolutionaries	 succeeded	 in	engineering	 a	 nation	 state	 and	 initiated	 the	 process	 of	 national	 cultural	regulation	 that	 was	 finally	 completed	 under	 the	 Third	 Republic	 (see	 Weber	1977).		The	 revolutionary	 forging	 of	 national	 cultural	 symbols	 institutionalised	republicanism,	which	contributed	to	its	durability	in	the	nineteenth	century.	As	an	 institutional	expression	of	 the	revolution,	 the	Muséum	Français	 suggested	a	universal	paradigm	for	humanity,	but	one	based	on	the	uniqueness	of	the	French	nation.	 The	museum	 contextualised	 France	 as	 a	world-historical	 civilisation	 in	the	 pantheon	 of	 the	 ancients	 and	 enshrined	 the	 universal	 ideas	 of	 liberty,	fraternity	and	equality	as	the	fruit	of	reason.	Under	Jacobin	leadership	the	nation	and	 humanity	 were	 bound	 together	 as	 a	 universal	 equilibrium	 but	 Napoleon	shifted	this	balance.	During	the	Consulate,	the	museum	was	renamed	the	Musée	Napoleon.	 Under	 the	 aegis	 of	 Napoleonic	 military	 campaigns,	 the	 museum’s	
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collections	 were	 expanded	 through	 plunder.	 The	 international	 prestige	 of	 the	Musée	Napoleon	offered	an	imperialist	paradigm	that	made	European	museums	legitimate	 repositories	 for	 artefacts	 looted	 from	 foreign	 lands	 (Prior	 2002,	 45;	Savoy	2009,	38).		The	rise	of	European	imperialism	encouraged	elites	to	identify	national	cultures	with	 the	 great	 civilisations	 of	 antiquity.	 Under	 imperialist	 logic	 the	 historical	achievements	 of	 the	 ancients	 became	 de	 facto	 those	 of	 modern	 Europeans,	 as	antiquity	 was	 subsumed	 into	 an	 eternal	 cycle	 of	 westernisation.	 European	museums	were	built	in	neoclassical	style,	recalling	the	architecture	of	the	Roman	temple,	for	this	reason	(Duncan	and	Wallach	1980,	449).	Western	supremacy	as	an	 ancient	 legacy	was	 an	 idea	deeply	 rooted	 in	 the	European	 colonialist	mind.	Hellenism	was	woven	into	Western	intellectual	tradition	as	a	historicist	motif	of	linear	progression	 from	 the	ancient	Greek	polis	 to	 the	modern	European	state.	Dussel	 postulates	Eurocentric	Hellenism	as	 an	 ideological	 construct	 of	German	romanticism	 (2000,	 465-467).	 The	 conquest	 of	 Greece	 by	 the	 Egyptians	 and	Phoenicians	was	anathema	to	northern	European	reaction,	German	Romanticism	particularly,	which	required	an	“Aryan	model”	of	Ancient	Greece	 to	validate	 its	racism	and	colonial	enslavement	(see	Bernal	1994).	 In	effect	 the	 false	 idea	of	a	“pure”	 Europe	 descended	 from	 Ancient	 Greece	 obscures	 the	 profound	 African	and	 Semitic	 influences	 on	 the	 latter	 and	 the	 complex	 of	 cultural	 encounters	shaping	the	European	continent	prior	to	its	colonial	expansion	(Shohat	and	Stam	1994,	14).		Museums	 became	 important	 institutional	 nodes	 in	 forging	 European	 empires.	For	example,	the	British	Museum	had	a	strategic	role	as	an	active	imperial	agent,	
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acquiring	 cultural	 artefacts	 and	 gathering	 information.	 The	 museum	 operated	within	 an	 institutional	 matrix	 incorporating	 the	 Royal	 Society,	 India	 Survey,	Royal	Geographical	Society,	Royal	Asiatic	Society	and	universities.	Together	with	these	organisations,	the	museum	acted	as	a	repository	for	knowledge	with	both	civilian	 and	 military	 applications	 (Richards	 1993,	 15-16).	 Museums	 also	performed	the	 ideological	 function	of	culturally	differentiating	 imperial	nations	from	 colonial	 peoples,	 who	 were	 typically	 classified	 into	 taxonomies	 of	 race,	religion	and	tribe.		During	the	nineteenth	century	the	European	museum	model	was	exported	to	the	colonies	as	part	of	an	imperial	mission	to	impose	order	and	“civilisation”	through	cultural	 amelioration.	 Under	 colonial	 regimes,	 official	 heritage	 infrastructures	were	 developed,	 including	 museums	 and	 archaeological	 surveys.	 The	 first	museum	 to	 be	 founded	 in	 colonial	 India	 was	 set	 up	 by	 the	 Asiatic	 Society	 of	Bengal	 in	Calcutta	 in	1814	and	became	 the	 Indian	Museum	 in	1866,	under	 the	imperial	government.	Calcutta’s	Indian	Museum	was	part	of	an	imperial	heritage	complex	 that	 connected	 among	 others,	 the	 British	 Museum	 and	 the	 India	Museum	in	London.	The	expansion	of	British	archaeology	and	the	creation	of	a	government	 department	 for	 the	 conservation	 of	 ancient	monuments	 produced	internal	 tensions	 between	 preserving	 monuments	 in	 situ	 as	 an	 “open-air	museum”	and	the	collecting	ambitions	of	British	museums	(Guha-Thakurta	2015,	61-62).		Internal	conflicts	were	also	apparent	in	museums	under	colonial	administration.	During	 the	 inter-war	 years,	 Iraqi	 nationalists	 within	 the	 British	 colonial	 civil	service	 viewed	 museums	 as	 important	 ideological	 battlegrounds.	 In	 the	 latter	
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half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 European	 archaeologists	 re-invented	Mesopotamia	as	the	origin	of	the	West;	in	their	minds	Mesopotamian	civilisation	had	 given	 rise	 to	Graeco-Roman	antiquity	 (Bahrani	 1998,	 162).	Artefacts	were	shipped	 to	 the	 British	 Museum	 to	 underwrite	 an	 imperial	 mythology	 that	 re-imagined	Mesopotamia	as	a	stage	 in	 the	evolution	of	Western	modernity	(165-166).	 The	 Iraq	Museum	was	 founded	 in	 1923	 under	 the	 direction	 of	 Gertrude	Bell,	oriental	secretary	to	the	British	high	commissioner,	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Iraqi	national	uprising.	Installed	by	the	British	in	1920,	the	Hashemite	regime’s	interest	 in	 Mesopotamian	 heritage	 paralleled	 the	 upsurge	 in	 nationalist	sentiment.	Nationalists	within	 the	Ministry	 of	 Education	 used	 their	 position	 to	preserve	Iraq’s	national	heritage	 in	public	museums,	 thereby	resisting	Western	archaeological	 plunder	 of	Mesopotamian	 artefacts	 and	 orientalist	 treatment	 of	their	culture.	Their	aim	was	to	confront	Western	colonialism	with	a	“living”	Iraqi	culture	 rather	 than	 a	 “dead”	 one	 that	 would	 serve	 to	 legitimise	 British	domination	(Davis	1994,	94).		In	post-colonial	societies,	museums	typically	retained	their	cultural	 imprimatur	as	modern	 institutions	and	have	been	 instrumentalised	as	such	by	nationalists.	Marschall	identifies	two	grand	narratives	in	post-colonial	national	museums.	The	first	 celebrates	 the	 heroism	 of	 anti-colonial	 struggle	 and	 the	 moment	 of	liberation;	 the	second	rediscovers	 the	humanity	of	 the	colonised	by	recovering	pre-colonial	 heritage	 hitherto	 officially	marginalised	 or	misrepresented	 (2008,	353).	 Nationalists	 have	 often	 consciously	 sought	 to	 avoid	 the	 social	fragmentation	they	perceived	 in	Western	countries	by	establishing	the	nation’s	continuity	 with	 an	 authentic	 pre-colonial	 past	 (Rowlands	 1994,	 135).	 For	
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example,	 Chinese	 nationalists	 looked	 to	 the	 imperial	 past	 as	 a	 source	 of	authenticity	 after	 the	 1911	 Xinhai	 Revolution.	 In	 1925	 the	 former	 Imperial	Palace	complex	 in	Beijing’s	Forbidden	City	was	opened	as	a	public	museum	on	National	 Day—the	 anniversary	 of	 the	 founding	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 China	(Shambaugh	Elliott	 and	Shambaugh	2005,	71-72).	Re-inventing	 the	palace	as	 a	museum	 signified	 the	 republican	 state’s	 inheritance	 of	 the	 imperial	 collections	and	 the	 political	 authority	 they	 symbolised	 (Hamlish	 2000,	 150).	 The	 Palace	Museum	 followed	 the	 ideological	 precedent	 of	 the	 Muséum	 Français	 in	symbolising	 the	 transition	between	old	and	new	social	orders.	 In	keeping	with	the	 revolutionary	 transformation	of	 the	Louvre,	 the	 conversion	of	 the	 Imperial	Palace	 into	 a	 museum	 consigned	 the	 hereditary	 ideal	 within	 its	 walls	 to	 a	moribund	past.		
The	Origin	Story	
	Nationalist	 ideologies	 require	 the	 nation	 to	 be	 situated	 in	 time	 and	 space,	 and	must	formulate	an	origin	story	for	this	purpose.	The	origin	story	represents	the	historical	 genesis	 of	 the	 nation	 and	 source	 code	 of	 its	 modern	 culture.	 Origin	stories	 are	 designed	 by	 modern	 states	 or	 by	 national	 movements	 seeking	 to	found	them.	The	origin	story	is	an	ancillary	narrative	within	the	official	history	but	may	also	 incorporate	mythological	or	 semi-mythological	 elements.	Modern	mythmaking	does	not	necessarily	 indicate	 irrationalism	in	 the	author.	Mapping	the	 national	 past	 was	 at	 first	 a	 rational	 function	 of	 modernisation,	 but	subsequent	mythologisation	can	also	be	a	rational	response	to	the	complexities	of	 national	 cultural	 regulation.	 Origin	 stories	 must	 contain	 lacunae	 and	 are	
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continually	 subject	 to	 reinvention.	 National	 heritage	 supports	 the	 intellectual	architecture	of	the	origin	story	and	is	pivotal	in	the	nationalist	articulation	of	it.		Moderns	 have	 a	 social	 obligation	 to	 the	 past	 that	 the	 ancients	 could	 abjure.	Where	 modern	 states	 are	 founded	 in	 revolutionary	 circumstances	 a	 radical	break	 with	 the	 past	 occurs,	 which	 is	 irreversible	 but	 never	 instantaneous.	Revolutions	 sunder	 the	 present	 from	 the	 immediate	 past	 to	 reveal	 a	 limitless	future.	They	nonetheless	beget	rational	re-evaluation	of	the	deeper	past	because	an	infinite	future	cannot	be	contemplated	without	recourse	to	a	point	of	origin.	Even	 the	 revolutionary	 birth	 of	 the	 “new	 American	 Adam”	 was	 followed	 by	ambivalence	 towards	 the	 past	 that	 gave	 way	 to	 reverence	 for	 the	 Founding	Fathers	(Lowenthal	1985,	112,	117).	The	United	States	differed	from	many	post-colonial	 societies	 in	 having	 no	 antique	 heritage	 from	 which	 to	 recover	antecedents.	American	revolutionaries	as	descendants	of	colonial	settlers	could	not	 appropriate	 the	 heritage	 of	 the	 indigenous	 people	 they	 had	 dispossessed.	The	origin	story	of	modern	America	henceforth	became	trapped	in	the	historical	confines	of	British	colonialism	as	an	existential	state	of	grace.		National	cultural	regulation	in	post-colonial	states	has	often	been	complicated	by	the	 administrative	 legacy	 of	 colonisation.	 New	 nation	 states	 were	 frequently	formed	 within	 territorial	 boundaries	 arbitrarily	 defined	 by	 colonial	 powers	(Worsley	1967,	74).	In	some	colonies,	powerful	national	movements	emerged	to	demand	 independence,	 whereas	 in	 others	 economic	 underdevelopment	 made	this	 impossible.	 For	example,	Peruvian	 independence	occurred	by	default	 after	the	withdrawal	 of	 the	 Spanish	Empire	 in	 the	1820s.	The	 formation	of	 a	nation	state	was	not	attempted	until	the	1850s,	when	the	liberal	nationalist	bourgeoisie	
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mounted	 statist	 efforts	 from	Lima	 (Gootenberg	 2002,	 265).	 In	 some	 instances,	the	ethno-cultural	categories	imposed	by	colonial	authorities	were	mobilised	by	nationalists,	resulting	in	the	exclusion	of	minorities	from	the	national	culture.	In	other	 cases,	 the	 new	 authorities	 looked	 further	 back	 to	 establish	 a	 shared	heritage	 without	 divisive	 ethnic	 associations.	 Following	 the	 1958	 Iraqi	Revolution,	Abdel	Karim	Qasim’s	nationalist	government	attempted	to	realise	a	unitary	state	of	Arabs,	Kurds,	Turkomen	and	other	ethnic	groups	by	drawing	on	Mesopotamian	 heritage.	 The	 need	 to	 short-circuit	 pan-Arab	 and	 Islamic	narratives	motivated	the	choice	of	the	Akkadian	sun	for	the	new	republican	flag.	Identifying	the	national	heritage	with	Mesopotamia	framed	Iraq	as	the	cradle	of	human	rather	than	Arab	civilisation	(Davis	2005,	111).		Dealing	 with	 the	 cultural	 legacies	 of	 colonialism	 prompts	 modern	 states	 to	super-impose	 contemporary	 ideas	 and	 categories	 onto	 pre-modern	 societies.	Nationalists	may	use	the	origin	story	to	establish	continuity	with	a	national	past	interrupted	by	colonialism.	After	Iceland	declared	independence	from	Denmark	in	1944,	the	new	republic	sought	the	restitution	of	 literary	manuscripts	held	in	Copenhagen.	 When	 the	 manuscripts	 arrived	 in	 Reykjavík	 in	 1971,	 their	ceremonial	 transfer	 was	 broadcast	 live	 on	 Icelandic	 television.	 However,	whereas	 nationalists	 used	 one	 of	 the	 manuscripts,	 the	 Elder	 Edda,	 to	 reify	Icelandic	national	identity,	it	was	also	of	cultural	importance	to	Norway	and	the	rest	of	Scandinavia	as	the	most	significant	extant	example	of	Norse	mythological	and	heroic	poetry	(Greenfield	1996,	16-18).	Although	nationalists	considered	the	manuscripts	the	“cultural	essence”	of	being	Icelandic,	they	had	been	produced	in	an	 area	 that	was	not	 clearly	demarcated	 along	national	 territorial	 and	 cultural	
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lines	 during	 the	 Middle	 Ages	 (Hálfdanarson	 2011,	 67-68).	 The	 manuscripts’	return	 was	 nonetheless	 imperative	 to	 validate	 the	 nation’s	 origin	 story	 as	 a	historical	entity,	culturally	distinct	from	other	Nordic	nations.	In	nationalist	eyes	the	republic	was	not	a	new	state	but	the	reconstitution	of	the	medieval	one	that	had	 existed	 before	 Icelandic	 chieftains	 recognised	 Norwegian	 sovereignty	 in	1262	(Hálfdanarson	2012,	266).		The	 origin	 story	 was	 a	 characteristic	 feature	 of	 nineteenth	 century	 European	nationalisms	 that	 sought	 historical	 continuity	 between	 modernising	 schemes	and	 past	 glories.	 In	 the	 past	 were	 heroic	 figures	 and	 deeds	 that	 could	 be	 re-summoned	 as	 semi-fictional	 dramatis	 personae	 or	 outright	 fabrications.	Nationalism	often	evokes	a	“golden	age”	of	heroes	who	act	as	exemplars	of	past	greatness	 (Smith	 1986,	 192).	 The	 nationalist	 verve	 for	 resurrecting	 ancient	protagonists	has	been	particularly	pronounced	in	states	with	access	to	histories	of	 universal	 significance	 for	 humanity.	 During	 his	White	 Revolution,	 the	 Shah	incorporated	 the	 Persian	 king	 Cyrus	 the	 Great	 into	 Iran’s	 origin	 story	 as	 an	enlightened	 moderniser.	 Analogising	 his	 own	 modernisation	 programme,	 the	Shah	 re-signified	 the	 Persian	 imperial	 conquest	 of	 Babylon	 in	 539	 BC	 and	 the	proclamations	 recorded	on	 the	Cyrus	Cylinder.5	For	 the	 Shah,	 Cyrus	was	 a	 key	historical	 figure	 in	 the	 culture	 of	 pre-Islamic	 Persia	 from	 which	 the	 Pahlavi	dynasty	derived	its	legitimacy.	The	Cylinder	is	the	only	surviving	communication	by	Cyrus.	His	history	was	partially	forgotten	in	Persia,	with	much	of	the	modern	knowledge	about	his	rule	taken	from	Jewish	and	Greek	sources	(Lewis	1985,	6-7).	In	1971,	to	mark	the	two-and-a-half	thousandth	anniversary	of	the	founding																																																									5	The	 Cylinder	 was	 discovered	 in	 1879	 during	 a	 British	 Museum	 excavation	 at	 Nineveh	 (see	Curtis	2013a).	
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of	the	Persian	Empire,	the	Cylinder	was	borrowed	from	the	British	Museum	and	displayed	 in	 the	 new	 Shahyad	 Tower	 in	 Tehran.	 It	 was	 also	 featured	 on	commemorative	 stamps,	 coins	 and	 banknotes.	 	 There	 were	 elaborate	 state	ceremonies	 at	 Pasargadae	 and	 Persepolis,	 with	 Iranian	 soldiers	 attired	 in	Achaemenid	period	costume.		In	 2010	 under	 the	 presidency	 of	 Mahmoud	 Ahmadinejad,	 the	 Cylinder	 was	borrowed	 by	 the	National	Museum	 of	 Iran.	 At	 the	 exhibition’s	 official	 opening	Ahmadinejad	 echoed	 contemporary	political	 themes	by	 referring	 to	Cyrus	 as	 a	“protector	 of	 monotheism”	 who	 defended	 Persia	 against	 foreign	 aggression	(quoted	in	Curtis	2013b,	99).	Theatrical	performers	wore	original	costumes	from	the	1971	celebrations.	One	actor	dressed	as	an	Achaemenid	soldier	to	represent	Cyrus’s	kingship;	another	wore	the	uniform	of	a	modern	Basij	militiaman.	During	the	 performance,	 the	 latter	 draped	 a	 Basij	 scarf	 around	 the	 Persian	 warrior’s	neck.	The	Iranian	press	agency	Fars	reported	that	Cyrus	had	become	“a	member	of	the	Basij”	(Sanadjian	2011,	469).	The	historical	Cyrus	was	thus	reinvented	by	the	leadership	of	the	Islamic	Republic	as	a	sentinel	of	the	Iranian	Revolution.	In	undertaking	 the	 loan,	 the	 state	 endorsed	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 Cyrus’s	 place	 in	Iranian	 history.	 Islamic	 leaders	 acknowledged	 a	 non-Muslim	monarch	 as	 their	progenitor,	 a	 symbolic	move	 authorising	 a	 shared	 Iranian	heritage	 inclusive	of	the	pre-Islamic	period	(473).		In	 the	 Ba’th	 era,	 Iraq’s	 Mesopotamian	 and	 Arab	 Islamic	 heritage	 was	manipulated	 by	 the	 ruling	 clique	 to	maintain	 its	 grip	 on	 power.	 After	 Saddam	Hussein	 became	 president	 in	 1979,	 the	 Ba’thist	 state	 enlisted	 a	 range	 of	historical	 figures	 to	 confer	 legitimacy	 on	 his	 cult	 of	 personality.	 As	 part	 of	 a	
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project	to	reconstruct	ancient	Babylon,	the	Ishtar	Gate	was	rebuilt	with	Saddam’s	name	inscribed	on	each	brick.	The	reconstruction	of	Babylon	was	accompanied	by	 imagery	 depicting	 Saddam	 alongside	 Nebuchadnezzar	 as	 his	 modern	 heir	(Davis	 2005,	 168).	 Through	 the	 1980s,	 Iraqi	 Ba’thism	 began	 to	 conflate	 Arab	identity	with	Islam	by	treating	the	Koran	as	a	historical	source	text.	For	instance	the	 1988	 Anfal	 campaign	 against	 the	 Kurds	 was	 a	 Koranic	 reference	 to	 “the	spoils”	 of	 the	 Battle	 of	 Badr	 in	 AD	 624.	 The	 synthesis	 of	 Islam	 and	 Arab	nationalist	historicism	was	materialised	in	the	Baghdad	Victory	Arch	built	by	the	Ba’thist	 regime	 in	 1989	 to	 commemorate	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Iran-Iraq	 War.	 The	crossed	swords	symbolise	Arab	victory	over	the	Persian	Empire	at	the	Battle	of	Qadisiya	in	AD	637.	The	swords	represented	those	of	the	Arab	commander,	Sa’d	Ibn	 Abi	 al-Waqqas.	 During	 the	 war	 with	 Iran,	 Ba’thist	 propaganda	 portrayed	Saddam	 as	 a	 modern	 successor	 to	 al-Waqqas,	 Muhammad’s	 companion	 and	general	(183).		The	Unknown	Soldier	monument	in	Baghdad	was	also	erected	in	this	period.	Its	design	was	based	on	a	traditional	Iraqi	shield	and	incorporated	an	underground	museum	 depicting	 Saddam’s	 life	 as	 analogous	 to	 Muhammad’s	 own	 (al-Khalil	1991,	15).	By	portraying	himself	as	heir	to	Muhammad	and	al-Waqqas,	Saddam	was	 identified	not	only	with	 Iraqi	destiny,	but	also	with	 that	of	 the	wider	Arab	world.	 Monuments,	 museums	 and	 archaeological	 sites	 were	 crucial	 in	 the	articulation	 of	 the	 origin	 story.	 Political	 exigencies	 forced	 the	 Ba’thist	 state	 to	redesign	 Iraq’s	 origin	 story	 at	 various	 junctures.	The	 symbolism	of	 the	Victory	Arch	 reflected	 the	 regime’s	 pragmatism.	 At	 the	 opening,	 Saddam	 rode	 a	white	horse	under	the	arch	to	symbolise	Hussein,	son	of	Ali,	who	was	martyred	riding	a	
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white	horse	on	 the	plains	of	Karbala	 in	AD	680.	The	symbolism	 identified	Shi’i	religious	 culture	 with	 Saddam,	 who	 also	 claimed	 lineage	 to	 Muhammad	 as	 a	descendant	 of	 Ali	 (10-11).	 Saddam	 hence	 pursued	 a	 twin-track	 policy	 of	repressing	 Shi’i	 leaders,	whilst	 co-opting	 the	 religious	 tradition	 of	 Shi’ism	 into	Iraqi	nationalism.	Pursuing	a	“carrot	and	stick”	policy	toward	Shi’ism,	 the	state	funded	the	restoration	of	Shi’i	holy	sites	at	Karbala	and	Najaf	(Davis	2005,	191).		Ba’thist	national	cultural	regulation	was	based	on	a	complex	meta-narrative	that	ultimately	 lacked	 internal	 cohesion.	 In	 its	 cultural	 policies,	 the	 Ba’thist	leadership	followed	the	earlier	pattern	of	the	Hashemite	monarchy.	Under	Faisal	I,	 Iraq	undertook	 a	modernisation	programme	 through	 expanding	 the	 national	education	system	(Batatu	1978,	23-25).	Foreshadowing	the	Ba’thist	regime,	the	Hashemite	 education	 system	 developed	 a	 pan-Arab	 outlook,	 emphasising	 an	Islamic	 golden	 age	 that	 excluded	 Shi’i	 and	 Kurdish	 heritage	 (Davis	 2005,	 57).	After	seizing	power	in	1968,	the	Ba’th	Party	replicated	this	pattern	by	combining	modernisation	with	 increasingly	 ethnocentric	 nationalist	 posturing.	 This	 trend	became	terminal	after	Saddam	Hussein’s	ascendancy,	when	his	Sunni-dominated	regime	declared	war	on	Iran	and	intensified	repression	of	the	Shi’i	majority	and	Kurdish	minority.	Under	Ba’thist	 rule,	 the	political	 supremacy	of	Arab	national	identity	 meant	 that	 many	 Kurds,	 Turkomen	 and	 other	 minorities	 could	 not	adhere	to	the	Iraqi	state.	In	a	highly	symbolic	act	the	redevelopment	of	Baghdad	in	 the	 1980s	 saw	 the	 reproduction	 of	 the	 original	 statue	 of	 Faisal	 I	 on	 Haifa	Street,	which	had	been	torn	down	in	1958	(al-Khalil	1991,	72).		In	its	death	throes,	Ba’thism	ironically	incubated	the	ideological	conditions	that	have	 given	 rise	 to	 the	 Islamic	 State	 as	 a	 new	 pan-Sunni	 nationalism.	 Pan-	
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nationalist	movements	 circumvent	 established	 state	boundaries	 through	wider	cultural	 affiliations,	with	 the	 aim	of	 creating	 a	 super-state	 (Worsley	1967,	 69).	Between	1990	and	the	collapse	of	the	Ba’thist	state	in	2003,	growing	numbers	of	Iraqi	Sunnis	would	identify	Salafism	as	an	ideological	alternative	to	Ba’thism	and	its	 failed	 secular	 project	 of	 pan-Arabism.	 After	 the	 faltering	 Ba’thist	 vision	 of	Iraqi	 modernity	 was	 obliterated	 by	 the	 Anglo-American	 invasion,	 Salafism	emerged	 as	 the	 ideological	 spur	 for	 insurgency	 against	 foreign	 occupation	 and	the	 new	 Shi’i-dominated	 government	 in	 Baghdad.	 Elements	 within	 the	 Iraqi	military	 first	 gravitated	 toward	 Salafism	 in	 the	wake	 of	 defeat	 in	 the	 first	 Gulf	War	in	1991.	After	2003	as	more	Sunnis	in	the	former	Iraqi	officer	class	looked	to	 Islam	 as	 an	 ideology	 of	 resistance,	 the	 insurgency	 gained	 potency	 from	 its	synthesis	of	nationalist	and	religious	feeling	(Hashim	2006,	118-120).		The	bitter	fruit	of	Ba’thist	cultural	policy	has	been	the	Islamic	State’s	destruction	of	 pre-Islamic	 and	 Shi’i	 heritage	 within	 Iraqi	 and	 Syrian	 territories	 under	 its	control.	 Condemned	 as	 pagan	 and	 apostate	 in	 its	worldview,	 this	 heritage	 has	become	 the	 object	 of	 spectacular	 filmed	 acts	 of	 iconoclasm	 that	 reinforce	 the	Caliphate	 as	 a	 new	 origin	 story.	 The	 Caliphate	 represents	 a	 modern	 Islamic	utopia	 equipped	 with	 sophisticated	 technology,	 but	 also	 evokes	 a	 golden	 age	when	Iraq	was	united	with	the	Levant.	In	uniting	Iraqi	and	Syrian	territory,	the	Islamic	State	succeeded	where	the	original	pan-nationalist	project	of	the	United	Arab	Republic	failed.	The	Islamic	State’s	iconoclasm	follows	similar	obliteration	of	pre-Islamic	heritage	by	 the	Taliban,	who	blew	up	 two	ancient	 statues	of	 the	Buddha	in	the	Bamiyan	Valley	of	Afghanistan	in	2001.	It	has	strong	parallels	also	with	the	Indian	Hindu	nationalist	demolition	of	the	Mosque	of	Babur	at	Ayodhya	
	 58	
in	 1992.	 The	 nationalists,	 linked	 to	 the	 fascist	 Organisation	 of	 National	Volunteers	 (RSS),	 claimed	 that	 the	mosque	was	 built	 on	 the	 site	 of	 an	 ancient	Hindu	 temple	which	had	been	 the	birthplace	of	 the	god	Rama	 (Banerjee	2006,	240-242;	Allen	2010,	217-228).		Real	 and	 imagined	 people	 and	 places	 co-exist	 within	 origin	 stories	 to	 be	summoned	 at	 moments	 of	 nationalist	 fervour.	 Another	 historical	 figure		resurrected	 for	nationalist	 purposes	was	Emperor	Dom	Pedro	 II,	 Brazil’s	 post-colonial	 ruler	 until	 a	 republic	 was	 declared	 in	 1889.	 The	 Museu	 Histórico	Nacional	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	was	established	in	1922	to	mark	the	centenary	of	the	end	 of	 Portuguese	 rule.	 After	 the	 1930	 Brazilian	 Revolution	 brought	 Getúlio	Vargas	 to	 power,	 the	 Bragança	 monarchy	 was	 publicly	 rehabilitated	 in	 new	galleries	 dedicated	 to	 Pedro	 II	 and	 his	 predecessor,	 Pedro	 I.	 In	 1940	 Vargas	instructed	the	Ministry	of	Education	to	establish	a	new	Museu	Imperial.	Vargas’s	re-invention	 of	 Pedro	 II	 reflected	 his	 desire	 to	 establish	 political	 continuity	between	 the	 republic	 and	 the	 Empire.	 The	 Museu	 Imperial	 complemented	Vargas’s	own	modernisation	programme	by	co-opting	Brazil’s	past	as	a	reservoir	of	glory	(Williams	2001,	176).		Vargas	has	himself	been	re-interpreted	as	a	historical	figure,	although	as	a	direct	consequence	 of	 his	 eclecticism.	 A	 nationalist	 moderniser	 and	 radical	 populist,	Vargas	casts	a	long	and	ambivalent	shadow	over	contemporary	Brazilian	politics	and	society.	Vargas	cemented	good	relations	with	the	Axis	powers	after	leading	a	coup	d’état	in	1937	that	established	the	Estado	Novo	(New	State)	as	a	corporatist	dictatorship.	He	then	suppressed	the	Brazilian	fascist	movement,	declaring	war	on	Germany	and	Italy	in	1942.	After	the	fall	of	the	Estado	Novo	in	1945,	Vargas	
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was	democratically	elected	president	 in	1951	with	 the	support	of	 the	Brazilian	Labour	Party.	His	government	pursued	a	worker-orientated	populist	programme	that	 included	nationalising	 the	 oil	 industry,	 before	 he	 spectacularly	 committed	suicide	 in	the	presidential	palace	 in	1954	to	thwart	a	military	coup	(Dunkerley	1992,	 25-31).	 The	 palace	was	 subsequently	 converted	 into	 the	Museum	of	 the	Republic.	In	the	bedroom	where	Vargas	shot	himself,	his	clothing	and	the	gun	he	used	are	displayed	like	relics	in	a	shrine.		Vargas,	the	ex-dictator	and	former	ally	of	European	fascism,	is	now	regarded	by	many	 on	 the	 Brazilian	 left	 as	 a	 progressive	 patriot	 who	 sacrificed	 himself	 to	defend	 democracy.	 His	 ambivalence	 is	 institutionalised	 in	 a	 museum	immortalising	his	greatest	patriotic	act.	Vargas	understood	the	centrality	of	the	national	 heritage	 to	 his	 modernisation	 programme	 and	 manipulated	 it	accordingly.	He	personally	donated	politicised	artefacts	to	the	Museu	Histórico,	including	 a	 flag	 from	 the	 1930	 revolution	 and	 an	 urn	 containing	 the	 ashes	 of	federal	flags	burned	in	a	symbolic	ceremony	in	1937	(Williams	2001,	177).	In	his	resurrection	of	imperial	ghosts,	Vargas	imagined	a	post-colonial	grand	narrative	wherein	 national	 independence	 and	modernisation	were	 rationally	 sequenced.	Vargas’s	protean	populism	surfaced	over	a	nationalist	substrate	of	consolidating	a	 modern	 industrial	 society	 under	 a	 centralised	 state.	 Brazil	 broke	 free	 of	Portuguese	colonialism	at	a	relatively	early	stage,	but	 the	period	of	 the	Empire	contained	 historical	 contradictions	 mirroring	 those	 of	 Vargas’s	 own	 time.	National	heritage	offered	a	medium	for	synthesis,	whereby	Brazil’s	origin	story	could	 be	 cleansed	 of	 colonialism	 and	 presented	 as	 a	 seamless	 transition	 to	greatness.	
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The	 ideological	 construction	 of	 the	 origin	 story	 demonstrates	 how	 national	heritage	 may	 be	 purposed	 toward	 rational	 or	 irrational	 ends.	 Irrational	nationalism	 thrives	 on	 a	 retrogressive	 fixation	 with	 national	 heritage	 that	negates	any	societal	orientation	toward	the	future.	The	custody	battle	fought	by	rational	 and	 irrational	 nationalists	 over	 the	 national	 heritage	 reveals	 its	 basic	ambivalence	 as	 the	 ideological	 progeny	 of	 enlightened	 reason	 and	 romantic	idealism.	 Tension	 between	 these	 two	 ideological	 fields	 is	 heightened	 by	 the	social	 conditions	 of	 neoliberal	modernity.	 Popular	 belief	 in	 the	 sanctity	 of	 the	past	as	a	refuge	from	the	present	and	a	proxy	for	the	future	has	grown	apace	in	Western	nations	with	the	withering	of	the	rational	state.	
	 61	
Two	
	
Dark	Matter:	Activist	Heritage	and	Irrational	Nationalism	
	Western	neoliberal	societies	are	today	drowning	in	a	heritage	deluge.	At	the	high	tide	of	Thatcherism	 in	Britain,	Hewison	opined	 that	 the	production	of	heritage	was	 fast	 replacing	 real	manufacturing.	Heritage	 centres	 and	 the	 reinvention	 of	former	 industrial	works	 as	museums	 epitomised	 Britain’s	 receding	 future	 and	nostalgia	 boom	 as	 symptoms	 of	 a	 national	 malaise	 (1987,	 24-28).	 Hewison’s	argument	 has	 been	 borne	 out	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 heritage	 industries	 across	Western	 Europe	 and	 North	 America.	 Britain	 as	 the	 prototype	 European	neoliberal	 society	pioneered	 the	use	of	post-industrial	 spaces	as	heritage	 sites.	Industrial	 archaeologists	 adapted	 the	 Scandinavian	 open-air	 folk	 life	 museum	concept	to	interpret	the	artefacts	and	processes	of	discarded	industries.	Folk	life	museums	 were	 late	 nineteenth-century	 nationalist	 projects	 to	 preserve	vernacular	 cultural	 practices	 (Stratton	 1996,	 156-158;	 Macdonald	 2013,	 142-145).	In	France	the	ecomuseum	movement	germinated	from	the	1970s	as	a	post-industrial	 reprise	 of	 the	 folk	 life	 museum.	 The	 reinvention	 of	 post-industrial	spaces	as	ecomuseums	was	seen	as	a	way	of	regenerating	 local	economies	and	community	pride	(Davis	1999,	58-67).6		In	 Britain,	 “working”	museums	 re-animate	 obsolete	machinery	 to	 authenticate	the	 industrial	 experience.	 Samuel	 finds	 irony	 in	 “aestheticizing”	 labour	 by	employing	redundant	workers	to	operate	machines	as	the	“prize	exhibits”	(1994,																																																									6	The	 European	 ecomuseum	 paradigm	 has	 been	 exported	 widely,	 but	 its	 various	 national	manifestations	reflect	divergent	socio-economic	realities.	For	example,	 the	Chinese	ecomuseum	acts	as	a	cultural	mechanism	for	negotiating	the	social	turbulence	of	rapid	industrialisation	(see	Su	2008).	
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303).	 That	 the	 heritage	 industry	 has	 become	 the	 cultural	 analogue	 of	 British	deindustrialisation	is	indeed	ironic	considering	the	origins	of	national	heritage	in	the	 Industrial	 Revolution—a	 time	 when	 the	 country’s	 productivity	 appeared	limitless.	The	industrialisation	of	heritage	in	Britain	paralleled	the	Conservative	government’s	 application	 of	 neoliberal	 theory	 to	 the	 economy.	 As	 Britain’s	productive	forces	withered,	nostalgia	suffused	society	as	a	palliative	for	national	decline	amid	a	shrill	Thatcherite	nationalism	proffered	as	an	ideological	tonic.		Now	in	retreat	from	decaying	public	realms,	the	neoliberal	state	has	opened	the	national	 heritage	 to	 market	 forces.	 In	 recent	 decades,	 heritage	 practices	 have	passed	 from	 traditional	 public	 institutions	 into	 new	 private	 worlds.	 Post-industrial	social	atomisation	has	begotten	a	popular	obsession	with	genealogy	as	the	 heritage	 of	 individualism.	 In	 the	 commercial	 sector,	 businesses	 emphasise	historical	 roots	 as	 betokening	 their	 authenticity.	 Advertising	 utilises	 archival	imagery	and	period-costumed	actors	to	re-enact	company	histories.	Origination	has	become	essential	 to	a	product’s	value	 in	consumer	society.	 In	 lieu	of	heavy	industry,	 small-scale	 “artisan”	 manufacturing	 emphasises	 its	 localism.	 Private	sector	 appropriation	 of	 heritage	 practices	 has	 been	 matched	 by	 reciprocal	adoption	 of	 commercial	 techniques	 by	 the	 public	 sector.	 Under	 pressure	 to	innovate	 in	 a	 climate	 of	 scarce	 resources,	 museums	 and	 other	 state	 heritage	institutions	 have	 diversified	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 collections	 to	 represent	contemporary	social	life.	In	their	thirst	for	societal	relevance,	and	state	funding,	they	are	becoming	unwitting	accomplices	in	“time-space	compression”.		The	idea	of	heritage	has	also	penetrated	the	world	of	political	activism.	I	use	the	term	 activist	 heritage	 to	 denote	 a	 strategic	 use	 of	 the	 external	 forms	 of	 state	
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heritage,	but	 also	heritage	as	 an	autonomous	 cultural	practice	 among	activists.	The	 term	 may	 refer	 to	 activist	 interventions	 made	 in	 relation	 to	 objects,	buildings,	 happenings,	 people	 or	 places.	 Activist	 heritage	 has	 wider	 political	purchase	 as	 a	 means	 of	 reifying	 social	 group	 identities	 and	 legitimising	 them	within	 larger	 historical	 narratives.	 Heritage	 contains	 inherent	 “dissonance”	because	 its	 composition	 disinherits	 certain	 social	 groups	 (Ashworth	 and	Tunbridge	 1996,	 21).	 Activist	 heritage	 is	 the	 consequence	 of	 this	 dissonance	within	 the	 national	 heritage,	 but	 also	 universal	 recognition	 of	 heritage	 as	 a	source	of	cultural	legitimacy	and	political	power.		Activist	 heritage	 is	 an	 expression	of	 cultural	 autonomy	under	neoliberal	 states	that	 have	 abdicated	 their	 responsibility	 for	 national	 cultural	 regulation.	 By	dismantling	public	infrastructure,	the	neoliberal	state	has	degraded	its	capacity	to	 regulate	 the	 national	 culture.	 In	 this	 respect	 there	 are	 overtones	 of	nineteenth-century	 European	 societies	 in	 which	 liberalism	 was	 dominant.	Hobsbawm	 argues	 that	 “in	 consciously	 setting	 itself	 against	 tradition	 and	 for	radical	 innovation,	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 liberal	 ideology	 of	 social	 change	systematically	failed	to	provide	for	the	social	and	authority	ties	taken	for	granted	in	earlier	societies,	and	created	voids	which	might	have	to	be	filled	by	invented	practices”	(1983,	8).	Neoliberalism	has	similarly	provoked	the	invention	of	new	cultural	practices	and	subversion	of	those	previously	regarded	as	the	preserve	of	the	state.	Activist	heritage	is	a	social	phenomenon	transgressing	the	boundaries	separating	official	and	unofficial	culture,	and	public	and	private	realms.		
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Activists	have	always	drawn	on	the	past	to	authenticate	contemporary	political	messages.	Artefacts	of	earlier	activism	have	historically	been	preserved	and	re-invented	 by	 successive	 generations.	 For	 example,	 nineteenth-century	 Scottish	reform	campaigners	displayed	artefacts	of	Covenanters,	 including	weapons	and	bibles,	and	re-inscribed	commemorative	monuments	 to	 them	(Nixon,	Pentland,	and	 Roberts	 2012,	 47).	 Activist	 appropriation	 of	 the	 external	 forms	 of	 state	heritage	 originates	 in	 Western	 Europe	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	century.	 Innovatory	 cultural	 practices	 that	 diverged	 from	 state-defined	 norms	reflected	popular	expressions	of	class	solidarity,	which	over	time	generated	their	own	alternative	heritage.	Most	prominent	in	the	European	context	has	been	the	culture	 of	 organised	 labour.	 The	 political	 apogee	 of	 labour	 movement	 power	after	World	War	Two	meant	the	creation	of	independent	museums	to	represent	the	 history	 of	 working-class	 radicalism	 and	 trade	 unionism.	 The	 1970s	witnessed	the	emergence	of	a	new	identity	politics	seeking	recognition	of	other	hitherto	 marginalised	 social	 groups,	 including	 women	 and	 ethnic	 and	 sexual	minorities.	 The	 growth	 of	 identity-based	 activism	 intensified	 calls	 for	 greater	representation	of	these	groups	in	the	national	heritage,	and	eventually	generated	a	self-organised	heritage.	Although	the	ideational	origins	of	activist	heritage	are	to	be	 found	on	 the	 left	 in	Western	Europe,	 the	concept	 is	now	an	 international	phenomenon	encompassing	the	full	political	spectrum.	In	effect	this	mirrors	the	historical	 course	of	 state	heritage	preservation	with	 its	perennial	advocates	on	both	the	left	and	right	(Samuel	1994,	288).		Activist	heritage	can	be	a	communal	response	to	marginalisation	by	the	state,	but	is	not	restricted	to	challenging	official	representations.	Activists	make	strategic	
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use	of	heritage	as	a	counter-cultural	mechanism	to	resist,	negotiate	or	promote	social	change	at	national	or	local	level.	Alongside	the	heritage	centre,	the	activist	museum	has	emerged	in	this	context.	For	example,	the	District	Six	Museum	was	established	 in	 Cape	 Town	 in	 1994	 as	 the	 fruit	 of	 community	 activism	 against	neighbourhood	gentrification	(Rassool	2006,	286-292).	Activist	heritage	can	also	be	constructed	on	a	transnational	level.	The	Kurdish	diaspora	in	Western	Europe	employs	an	array	of	cultural	media	to	project	its	national	identity	in	exile	(Watts	2004,	 135-136).	 The	 establishment	 of	 activist	 museums	 in	 the	 diaspora	reinforces	the	creation	of	a	national	heritage	in	the	Kurdish	homeland.7		In	 this	 chapter	 I	 consider	 how	 activist	 heritage	 has	 been	 stimulated	 by	 the	growth	 of	 multiculturalism	 and	 identity	 politics	 in	 Western	 societies.	 These	trends	are	linked	to	the	diminution	of	the	state’s	authority	in	the	cultural	sphere	under	neoliberalism,	but	also	the	concomitant	rise	of	irrational	nationalism	and	regionalism.	 I	 examine	 the	 politics	 of	 neofascism	 through	 what	 I	 term	 re-
enactivism	 –	 a	 form	 of	 activist	 heritage	 that	 inserts	 the	 amateur	 practice	 of	historical	 re-enactment	 into	 traditional	 political	 rituals.	 I	 conclude	with	 a	 case	study	 of	 the	 Wewelsburg	 1933-1945	 Memorial	 Museum	 in	 Germany	 which	explores	how	material	culture	contained	within	state	heritage	institutions	can	be	appropriated	 by	 activists,	 embedded	 within	 contemporary	 political	 narratives	and	imbued	with	new	meanings.		Through	the	activist	heritage	of	irrational	nationalists	we	may	perceive	a	deeper	social	 pathology.	 “Time-space	 compression”	 inspires	 continuous	 questing	 for	
																																																								7	For	example,	the	Kurdistan	Museum	in	Erbil,	Iraq,	is	being	developed	under	the	auspices	of	the	Regional	Government	to	a	design	of	Daniel	Libeskind.	
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historical	rootedness	to	counteract	the	transient,	arbitrary	and	dissolute	in	what	many	alienated	citizens	perceive	as	a	perpetual	present.	As	Hewison	put	it:		 The	past	 is	 the	 foundation	of	 individual	and	collective	 identity,	objects	 from	the	past	are	the	source	of	significance	as	cultural	symbols.	Continuity	between	past	and	present	creates	a	sense	of	sequence	out	of	aleatory	chaos	and,	since	change	is	inevitable,	a	stable	system	of	ordered	meanings	enables	us	to	cope	with	both	innovation	and	decay.	The	nostalgic	impulse	is	an	important	agency	in	adjustment	to	crisis,	it	is	a	social	emollient	and	reinforces	national	identity	when	confidence	is	weakened	or	threatened.	(1987,	47)			Heritage	 is	 integral	 to	the	collective	search	for	stable	 identities	and	meaningful	values	in	the	past	to	replace	those	vanished	from	the	present.	The	past	has	crept	up	to	the	gates	of	our	present	and	now	threatens	to	breach	them.	Seen	from	this	perspective,	 heritage	 in	 neoliberal	 societies	 has	 become	 a	 real	 diversion	 from	history	and	who	is	actually	making	it.	
	
Multiculturalism	and	Identity	Politics			The	 cultural	 logic	 of	 neoliberalism	 has	 been	 shaped	 by	 the	 state’s	 gradual	withdrawal	from	public	life.	In	many	Western	countries,	neoliberal	governments	have	 forsaken	 national	 cultural	 regulation	 in	 favour	 of	 laissez-faire	multiculturalist	policies.	Multiculturalism	developed	along	with	neoliberalism	as	a	social	experiment	of	 the	1970s	that	became	endemic	 in	 the	Reagan/Thatcher	era.	As	an	instrument	of	public	policy,	multiculturalism	originates	in	the	United	States.	 Amid	 urban	 unrest	 in	 the	 late	 1960s,	 American	 liberals	 abandoned	 the	“melting	 pot”	 ideal	 for	 one	 of	 “cultural	 pluralism”,	 having	 failed	 to	 reduce	poverty	 and	 black	minority	 resentment	 through	 assimilatory	 policies	 (Rolston	1998,	 257-258).	 In	 Canada,	 multiculturalism	 was	 officially	 introduced	 in	 the	1970s	after	Quebec’s	Quiet	Revolution	heralded	the	rise	of	the	nationalist	Parti	
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Québécois.	 As	 a	 result	 the	 viability	 of	 Canada	 as	 a	 nation	 state	 has	 become	conjoined	 with	 the	 maintenance	 of	 multiculturalism	 (Graham,	 Ashworth,	 and	Tunbridge	2000,	105).	 In	 reality	multiculturalism	heightened	separatist	 feeling	in	 Quebec	 by	 institutionally	 legitimising	 the	 mobilisation	 of	 ethnic	 identity	against	the	integrity	of	the	nation	state.	In	the	state	heritage	sector,	this	resulted	in	 Francophone	 bias	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 other	 histories.	 For	 example,	 the	restoration	 of	 the	 Place	 Royale	 in	 Quebec	 City	 was	 motivated	 by	 nationalist	desires	 to	 recapture	 its	 French	 period	 look	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 its	 Amerindian,	British	and	twentieth	century	Canadian	pasts	(Handler	1988,	148-151).		Friedman	identifies	the	mushrooming	of	sub-national	identities	with	the	advent	of	multiculturalism	as	“an	abandonment	of	the	ideal	of	a	strong	social	project	and	assimilation	to	that	project”	(1997,	72).	In	Western	societies	multiculturalism	is	part	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 state’s	 strategy	 for	 managing	 growing	 inequality	 in	 the	absence	of	a	progressive	social	project.	Multiculturalism	performs	an	ideological	sleight	of	hand	by	substituting	cultural	 representation	 for	social	equality.	Conn	argues	 that	 the	 demand	 for	museums	 to	 address	 social	 inequality	 has	 had	 the	adverse	 effect	 of	 drawing	 “real	 politics”	 into	 the	 cultural	 sphere	 (2010,	 227).	Consequently	the	demand	for	social	equality	can	now	be	circumvented	by	elites	with	the	empty	promise	of	cultural	representation.	The	North	American	trend	of	creating	museums	to	represent	ethnic	minority	groups	illustrates	the	prevalence	of	 identity	 politics	 as	 auto-essentialism.	 Identity-based	 museums,	 such	 as	 the	Arab	American	National	Museum,	establish	the	place	of	minorities	in	the	“story	of	 America”	 (42).	 Although	 state	 institutions,	 like	 the	 National	Museum	 of	 the	
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American	 Indian,	 grew	 out	 of	 1960s	 civil	 rights	 activism,	 their	 social	 status	 is	psychological	rather	than	a	genuine	redress	of	political	grievances	(45).		Message,	 by	 contrast,	 views	 the	 National	 Museum	 of	 the	 American	 Indian	 as	evidence	 of	 a	 renewed	 commitment	 to	 civil	 rights	 in	 American	 political	 life	(2013,	7).	In	her	estimation,	the	civil	rights	movement	galvanised	a	new	type	of	“curatorial	 activism”	 at	 the	 Smithsonian,	 focussed	 on	 the	 material	 culture	 of	social	 movements	 (11).	 By	 collecting	 from	 these	 movements	 and	 operating	externally	 to	 the	 museum,	 curators	 were	 acknowledging	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 the	nation	 is	 contested.	 She	 compares	 museums’	 historical	 role	 as	 “tools	 of	 the	government”	 and	 “handmaidens	 of	 colonialism”	 with	 their	 contemporary	function	 as	 “technologies	 of	 citizenship”	 (233).	 Message’s	 position	 reflects	 the	influence	of	postmodernism,	and	Foucault’s	 ideas	particularly,	on	the	discipline	of	Museum	Studies.	Foucault	rejected	the	state	as	the	primary	 locus	of	political	power	 in	 favour	 of	 “discourses”	 that	 exercise	 control	 in	 localised	 arenas	detached	from	any	systemic	form	of	class	domination	(Harvey	1990,	45;	see	also	Foucault	on	 “technologies	of	power”,	1980,	156-158).	The	National	Museum	of	the	American	Indian	and	the	National	Museum	of	African	American	History	and	Culture	 institutionalise	 the	 state’s	 commitment	 to	multiculturalism	 over	 social	equality.	 Institutional	 segregation	 on	 the	Washington	Mall	 leaves	 the	 National	Museum	of	American	History	 a	place	apart.	 Spatially	 isolated,	 the	 “African”	and	“Indian”	American	are	collected	and	classified	separately	from	fellow	citizens	in	their	own	capital.	In	any	case,	Martin	Luther	King	did	not	march	to	the	Mall	with	thousands	of	compatriots	in	1963	to	dream	of	a	museum.		
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Friedman	considers	the	American	middle-class	gravitation	toward	“hybridity”	or	“hyphenated	 identities”	 as	 an	 essentialist	 identification	 premised	 on	 the	“metaphor	of	purity”	(1997,	82-83).	In	this	irrational	new	“cosmopolitanism”	the	origins	of	ethnic	group	identities	are	located	in	the	pre-colonial	past	as	a	“mosaic	with	 fixed	boundaries,	which	have,	 in	 the	mass	movement	of	everything	 in	 the	age	 of	 globalisation,	 sprung	 innumerable	 leaks”	 (80).	 Friedman	 highlights	 the	falsity	 of	 such	 identifications,	 which	 transpose	 “the	 fact	 of	 geographic	 origins	with	 the	 practice	 of	 cultural	 integration,	 assuming	 that	 the	 former	 rather	 than	the	latter	is	the	defining	characteristic	of	culture”	(81).	In	the	nineteenth	century,	the	American	bourgeois	 state	 sought	 to	 regulate	a	national	 culture	 in	a	 society	founded	 on	 mass	 immigration.	 From	 the	 1970s,	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 Western	“mosaic”	 societies	 has	 by	 contrast	 accepted	 the	 co-existence	 of	 multiple	 sub-national	 cultures	 (Graham,	 Ashworth,	 and	 Tunbridge	 2000,	 107).	 An	unsustainable	 tension	now	exists	within	 the	American	 federal	 system	between	the	 residual	 notion	 of	 a	 “melting	 pot”	 and	 a	 static	 multiculturalism	 that	undermines	it.		The	 confluence	 of	 neoliberalism,	 multiculturalism	 and	 identity	 politics	 has	proven	politically	toxic	in	the	Western	societal	maelstrom	of	deindustrialisation	and	mass	migration.	 Fraser	 calls	 this	 ideological	 convergence	 in	 the	 American	context	“progressive	neoliberalism”	denoting:	
 An	alliance	of	mainstream	currents	of	new	social	movements	(feminism,	anti-racism,	multiculturalism,	 and	 LGBTQ	 rights),	 on	 the	 one	 side,	 and	 high-end	“symbolic”	and	service-based	business	sectors	(Wall	Street,	Silicon	Valley,	and	Hollywood),	 on	 the	 other.	 In	 this	 alliance,	 progressive	 forces	 are	 effectively	joined	 with	 the	 forces	 of	 cognitive	 capitalism,	 especially	 financialization.	However	unwittingly,	the	former	lend	their	charisma	to	the	latter.	Ideals	like	diversity	 and	 empowerment,	 which	 could	 in	 principle	 serve	 different	 ends,	
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now	gloss	policies	 that	have	devastated	manufacturing	 and	what	were	once	middle-class	lives.	(2017)			In	 neoliberal	 societies,	 multiculturalism	 encourages	 the	 nurturing	 of	 sub-national	 ethnic	 identities	whilst	 distancing	 unequal	 subjects	 from	 the	 primary	mechanism	 of	 political	 power:	 the	 state.	 Moreover	 in	 public	 policy	 terms,	economic	 liberalisation	 is	 increasingly	 identified	 with	 social	 liberalisation,	creating	latent	potential	for	popular	hostility	toward	minorities.	The	dénouement	of	 the	 Obama	 era	 in	 the	 election	 of	 Donald	 Trump	 as	 US	 president	 in	 2016	encapsulates	 this	predicament	perfectly.	Trump	stood	on	a	 right-wing	populist	platform	that	conflated	opposition	to	free	trade	with	xenophobia.	Dedicating	the	National	 Museum	 of	 African	 American	 History	 and	 Culture	 in	 2016,	 Obama	unwittingly	 eulogised	 American	 progressive	 modernisation.	 Declaiming	 the	museum’s	 place	 in	 “our	 American	 story”	 he	 endorsed	 the	 progressive	neoliberalism	that	was	a	hallmark	of	his	presidency	in	the	metaphorical	language	of	the	melting	pot:		 The	 story	 told	here	doesn’t	 just	 belong	 to	black	Americans;	 it	 belongs	 to	 all	Americans…	We	are	polyglot,	a	stew…	Black	and	white	and	Latino	and	Native-American	and	Asian-American—see	how	our	stories	are	bound	together.	And	bound	 together	 with	 women	 in	 America,	 and	 workers	 in	 America,	 and	entrepreneurs	 in	 America,	 and	 LGBT	 Americans…	 The	 very	 fact	 of	 this	 day	does	not	prove	 that	America	 is	perfect,	 but	 it	 does	validate	 the	 ideas	of	 our	founding,	 that	 this	 country	 born	 of	 change,	 this	 country	 born	 of	 revolution,	this	country	of	we,	the	people,	this	country	can	get	better.	(2016)			Obama’s	speech	dwelt	long	on	America’s	past	and	alluded	to	the	social	problems	of	 its	present.	Of	the	future	he	could	only	 invoke	the	Old	Testament	allegory	of	the	 colonial	 settler,	 “wandering	 in	 the	 wilderness	 and	 then	 seeing	 out	 on	 the	horizon	 a	 glimmer	 of	 the	 Promised	 Land”	 (ibid.).	 Herein	 lies	 the	 crisis	 of	
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progressive	modernisation	and	its	rational	outlook.	Emboldened	by	the	policies	of	 the	 neoliberal	 state,	 irrational	 nationalists	 and	 regionalists	 have	 reverse-engineered	 multiculturalism	 to	 legitimise	 their	 own	 identity	 politics.	 Activists	now	forage	the	cultural	landscape	to	populate	nativist	narratives	using	heritage	to	authenticate	“pure”	cultural	identities.		
Re-enacting	Fascism			The	 contemporary	 practice	 of	 historical	 re-enactment	 originates	 outside	 the	state	heritage	sector	in	the	private	world	of	amateur	enthusiasm.	It	can	be	traced	back	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 National	Muzzle	 Loading	 Rifle	 Association	 in	 the	United	States	in	1933.	Members	became	interested	in	the	American	Civil	War	in	1949,	holding	shooting	competitions	 for	which	participants	purchased	clothing	and	equipment	 from	antique	shops.	1958	saw	 the	 founding	of	 the	North-South	Skirmish	Association,	comprising	“units”	dedicated	 to	simulating	 the	battlefield	and	military	camp	 life.	Major	battle	 re-enactments	were	organised	 to	mark	 the	Civil	War	centennial	and	the	bicentennial	of	the	American	Revolution	(Anderson	1984,	136-147).	In	Britain	the	Sealed	Knot	Society	was	established	in	1968	to	re-enact	English	Civil	War	battles.	Thereafter	labour	movement	activists	dressed	in	Civil	War	costume	at	 the	 inaugural	Burford	Levellers	Day	 in	1974.	This	 type	of	“living	 history”	 originated	 in	 the	 1960s	 as,	 in	 Samuel’s	words,	 an	 “analogue	 of	that	 decade’s	 cult	 of	 immediacy”	 (1994,	 192).	 After	 they	 first	 appeared	 in	Scandinavia	and	the	United	States,	costumed	actors	were	introduced	into	British	state	 heritage	 settings	 in	 the	 1980s,	 when	 English	 Heritage	 and	 other	organisations	 came	under	pressure	 to	 increase	 revenue	 through	more	 creative	strategies	of	audience	engagement	(Malcolm-Davies	2004,	280).	
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Historical	re-enactments	involving	period-costumed	participants	have	become	a	transnational	cultural	phenomenon,	but	their	content	is	informed	by	the	history	and	 politics	 of	 each	 society.	 They	 are	 typically	 characterised	 by	 significant	attention	to	historical	detail	because	authenticity	is	paramount	in	the	experience.	Re-enactments	 are	 nonetheless	 invented	 practices	 that	 conjure	 the	 past	 in	 the	present.	 Lowenthal	 compares	 re-enactors	 to	 restorers	 who	 “start	 with	 known	elements	 and	 fill	 in	 the	 gaps	 with	 the	 typical,	 the	 probable,	 or	 the	 invented”	(1985,	 295).	 Re-enactments	 can	 also	 blur	 cognitive	 boundaries	 between	 their	representations	 of	 the	 past	 and	 real	 life.	 They	 can	 elicit	 powerful	 emotional	responses,	 such	 as	 the	 hatred	 shown	 by	 spectators	 toward	 English	 soldiers	 at	American	Revolution	battle	re-enactments	(301).		In	their	critique	of	Colonial	Williamsburg,	Handler	and	Gable	expose	the	falsity	of	“mimetic	 realism”	 as	 an	 authentic	 recreation	 of	 time	 and	place.	 Presenting	 the	past	“as	it	really	was”	is	impossible	because	heritage	is	a	product	of	the	present	(1997,	 222-224).	 The	 aim	 of	 recreating	 the	 past	 as	 “living	 history”	 is	problematised	 by	 the	 unwanted	 intrusions	 of	 the	 present	 which	 introduce	continuity	 errors	 in	 the	 form	 of	 sounds,	 smells	 and	 physical	 objects.	 Despite	every	 effort	 being	 made	 to	 dress,	 speak	 and	 conform	 to	 authentic	 modes	 of	behaviour,	 the	 re-enactor	 cannot	 escape	 the	 invasive	 present.	 Re-enactment	 is	reliant	 on	 suspension	of	 disbelief,	 but	 also	 contingent	 on	 envisioning	 alternate	social	 realities—herein	 lies	 its	political	potential.	Re-enactivism	 refers	 to	public	performances	featuring	period	costumes	and	props	(replicas	or	originals),	either	during	 marches	 and	 demonstrations,	 or	 as	 more	 elaborate	 re-enactments	 of	historical	events.	Re-enactivists	differ	from	ordinary	re-enactors	because	they	do	
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not	want	to	escape	the	present	but	rather	to	modulate	an	imagined	past	within	it.	Re-enactivism	 typically	 transgresses	 state	 power	 and	 instrumentalises	 the	techniques	 of	 costumed	performance	 and	 re-enactment	 to	 articulate	 particular	social	identities	in	political	ritual.	It	may	also	form	part	of	state-sponsored	rituals	when	 governments	 endorse,	 tacitly	 or	 explicitly,	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 activists	involved.	 Today	 historical	 re-enactment	 occurs	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 state	 settings	ranging	from	museums	to	military	parades.	For	example,	at	Russia’s	Victory	Day	parade	 in	 2015	 soldiers	 marched	 on	 Red	 Square	 wearing	 period	 Red	 Army	uniforms	to	commemorate	the	seventieth	anniversary	of	 the	end	of	World	War	Two.		At	 commemorations	 major	 historical	 figures	 often	 appear	 in	 choreographed	roles,	their	parts	being	played	by	privileged	actors.	Such	occasions	contain	what	Connerton	 terms	 “mnemonic	 devices”	 referencing	 “prototypical	 persons	 and	events”	 that	 shape	 collective	 memory	 (1989,	 61).	 They	 reinforce	 communal	identities	by	presenting	the	past	as	a	“collective	autobiography”	(70).	On	the	six	hundredth	 anniversary,	 Lithuanian	 and	 Polish	 troops	 re-enacted	 the	 Battle	 of	Grunwald	of	1410,	at	which	 the	Grand	Duchy	of	Lithuania	and	 the	Kingdom	of	Poland	 allied	 to	 defeat	 the	 Prussian	 Teutonic	 Order.	 The	 Lithuanian	 “knights”	were	drawn	from	the	army	and	an	amateur	re-enactment	society.	The	part	of	the	Grand	 Duchy’s	 leader,	 Witold	 the	 Great,	 was	 played	 by	 an	 army	 officer.	 The	history	of	the	Grand	Duchy	was	reactivated	by	nationalists	 in	the	 late	1980s	as	the	 origin	 story	 of	 an	 independent	 Lithuania.	 Organisers	 viewed	 the	 2010	anniversary	 celebrations	 as	 conferring	 historical	 legitimacy	 upon	 Lithuanian	claims	 to	 pre-Soviet	 statehood,	 but	 also	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 European	 integration.	
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Through	 collaboration	with	 Poland	 the	 re-enactment	 became	 an	 expression	 of	European	unity	based	on	historical	precedent.	The	overt	Lithuanian	nationalism	expressed	in	the	anniversary	celebrations	identified	being	European	with	being	modern,	as	opposed	to	backward	and	peripheral	(Klumbyte	2011,	872).		Neoliberal	institutional	retrenchment	weakens	the	state’s	capacity	to	recalibrate	its	rituals	and	iconography	to	reflect	social	change.	Consequently	re-enactivism	can	enter	the	political	arena	to	question	present	realities	and	pose	alternatives.	In	European	neoliberal	societies,	the	rolling	back	of	the	state	has	left	a	void	that	is	 now	 frequently	 filled	 by	 irrational	 nationalism	 of	 right-wing	 populist	 and	neofascist	varieties.	Smith	highlights	the	need	for	national	heroes	and	“messiah-saviours”	as	pure	and	authentic	 figurative	representations	of	 the	nation	 (2003,	41).	Joan	of	Arc	plays	this	role	in	the	Front	National’s	May	1	ritual	in	the	absence	of	 meaningful	 national	 representations	 by	 the	 French	 state.	 Nationalism	 can	draw	 on	 religious	 teleology	 to	 articulate	 the	 national	 destiny.	 Joan	 of	 Arc	 is	summoned	to	the	Place	des	Pyramides	in	Paris	as	a	symbol	of	national	renewal	through	 moral	 purity;	 her	 peasant	 piety	 is	 projected	 against	 corruption	 and	decadence.	Joan’s	white	Christian	imago	symbolises	a	“pure”	cultural	identity	set	against	 the	 pollution	 of	Muslim	 immigration	 from	North	 Africa.	 For	 the	 event,	Front	 National	 politicians	 don	 coloured	 sashes,	 marchers	 wear	 regional	costumes	 and	 an	 actress	 plays	 Joan	 riding	 on	 horseback	 (Holmes	 2000,	 75;	Winock	 1998,	 477-479).	 The	 homage	 paid	 to	 Joan’s	 golden	monument	 by	 the	marchers	materialises	and	authenticates	the	nation	through	its	dead	heroine	in	a	form	of	political	transubstantiation.	The	nation	thus	appears	an	immortal	entity,	awaiting	the	return	of	an	authoritarian	state	to	deliver	it.	
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The	 neofascist	 Movement	 for	 a	 Better	 Hungary	 (Jobbik)	 has	 also	made	 use	 of	national	heroism	in	its	re-enactivism.	In	2013	Jobbik	organised	a	march	and	rally	in	Budapest	to	commemorate	the	failed	national	uprising	led	by	Ferenc	Rákóczi	II	in	1703	against	the	Habsburg	Empire.	Taking	part	in	the	march	was	a	“living”	Rákóczi	on	horseback	who	 later	addressed	 the	crowd	 in	Heroes	Square.	 Jobbik	MPs	 and	 the	 paramilitary	 Hungarian	 Guard	 joined	 marchers	 wearing	 period	costumes	 and	 folk	 dress.	 Both	 the	 paramilitaries	 and	 other	 marchers	prominently	displayed	the	Árpád	flag.	Originating	in	the	medieval	period,	the	flag	was	used	by	 the	 fascist	Arrow	Cross	 regime	during	World	War	Two.	By	 laying	claim	 to	 the	 history	 of	 Rákóczi	 and	 the	 independence	 movement,	 Jobbik	allegorised	 patriotic	 resistance	 to	 imperial	 domination,	 with	 the	 House	 of	Habsburg	as	a	proxy	for	the	European	Union.		The	 collapse	 of	 the	 socialist	 societies	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 between	1989	 and	 1991	 augured	 a	 fascist	 resurgence.	 Recognising	 the	 ideological	currency	of	identity	and	memory	politics	in	the	European	arena,	neofascists	have	engineered	their	own	nativist	version.	In	the	Lviv	province	of	Western	Ukraine,	annual	 commemorations	 are	 held	 to	 mark	 the	 founding	 of	 the	 14th	 Grenadier	Division	of	the	Waffen	SS	(Galicia	Division)	and	its	defeat	by	the	Red	Army	at	the	Battle	of	Brody	in	1944	(on	neofascist	rehabilitation	of	the	Division	see	Rudling	2012,	 2013a).	 On	 the	 seventieth	 anniversary	 of	 the	 Division’s	 foundation	 in	2013,	 the	 exhumed	 remains	 of	 its	 fallen	 combatants	 were	 re-interred	 in	 a	cemetery	near	Brody.	Participating	 in	 the	 ritual	were	 folk-costumed	mourners,	including	a	politician	 from	 the	neofascist	party	Svoboda	 (Freedom),	uniformed	Division	veterans	embodying	“living	history”,	and	re-enactivists	in	period	Waffen	
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SS	battle	dress.	The	 re-enactivists	 carried	 the	 coffins	 and	 fired	 a	 fusillade	over	the	graves,	using	World	War	Two-era	German	rifles.	The	reburial	ceremony	was	accompanied	 by	 a	 re-enactment	 of	 the	 Battle	 of	 Brody.	 By	 re-enacting	 the	Division’s	 battles,	 Ukrainian	 neofascists	 can	 fulfil	 violent	 blood	 sacrificial	fantasies	 with	 contemporary	 Russian	 enemies	 appearing	 in	 allegory.	 Re-enactivism	may	 replay	 historic	 defeats	 as	 “root	 paradigms”,	 wherein	 altruistic	martyrdom	 for	 the	 greater	 good	 of	 the	 group	 becomes	 axiomatic	 for	 future	action	 (Turner	 1974,	 64).	 Sacrificial	 root	 paradigms	 are	 integrated	 into	nationalist	mythology	 to	underpin	collective	 identity	and	memory.	Episodic	 re-enactivism	 re-interprets	 history	 in	 a	 teleological	 way	 so	 that	 past	 heroism	 in	victory	or	defeat	is	held	to	prefigure	future	glory.		Since	 the	 2013-2014	 Maidan 8 	protests	 in	 Kiev	 delivered	 a	 pro-Western	ultranationalist	 government,	 the	 history	 of	 Nazi	 collaboration	 has	 been	subsumed	within	an	official	anti-Russian	narrative	erasing	Ukrainian	complicity	in	the	crimes	of	German	fascism.	The	new	regime	has	pursued	strident	neoliberal	policies	 whilst	 lauding	 the	 national	 heroism	 of	 Ukrainian	 fascists.	 State-sponsored	 historical	 revisionism	 now	 portrays	 the	 Ukrainian	 Insurgent	 Army	(UPA)	 as	 a	 patriotic	 force	 that	 resisted	 German	 occupation.	 The	 UPA	 was	composed	 largely	 of	 former	 auxiliary	 policemen	 who	 collaborated	 with	 the	Germans	 in	 perpetrating	 the	Holocaust.	 Between	 1943	 and	 1945	 the	UPA	was	itself	 responsible	 for	 the	 systematic	murder	of	 Jews	and	Poles	 in	Volhynia	and	Galicia	 (Himka	 2013,	 631).	 Petro	 Poroshenko	 has	 resurrected	 the	 official	recognition	 by	 his	 presidential	 predecessor,	 Viktor	 Yushchenko,	 of	 Ukrainian																																																									8	Independence	 Square,	 popularly	 known	 as	 the	Maidan,	 was	 the	 epicentre	 of	 demonstrations	against	Viktor	Yanukovych’s	government	in	2013.	The	movement	became	known	as	Euromaidan	owing	to	the	pro-EU	political	orientation	of	protestors.		
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fascist	 leaders,	 Stepan	Bandera	 and	Roman	 Shukhevych,	 as	 national	 heroes—a	policy	that	bolstered	the	rise	of	neofascism	in	Western	Ukraine	(Rudling	2013b;	Himka	 2013,	 640;	 Rossoliński-Liebe	 2014,	 476-477,	 506-507).	 Following	 the	armed	 uprising	 in	 the	 east	 of	 the	 country	 against	 Kiev’s	 rule,	 the	 Ukrainian	armed	forces	became	reliant	on	neofascist	militia	to	fight	the	ensuing	civil	war.	State	heritage	representations	now	elide	revisionist	perspectives	on	World	War	Two,	with	official	tolerance	of	neofascism	as	sanguinary	Ukrainian	patriotism.	At	the	 National	 Museum	 of	 the	 History	 of	 Ukraine	 in	 the	 Second	World	War,	 an	exhibition	about	the	2014	battle	for	Donetsk	airport	describes	it	as	a	“Ukrainian	Thermopylae”	 and	praises	 the	 “honor	 and	glory”	 of	 the	Right	 Sector	Volunteer	Corps.9					Re-enactivism	has	underpinned	 the	process	of	Ukrainian	historical	 revisionism	at	 state	 level.	 Neofascist	 groups	 engage	 in	 re-enactivism	 to	 authenticate	 their	portrayal	of	Euromaidan	as	a	national	revitalisation.	In	the	documentary	My	Nazi	
Legacy	(Sands	2015),	the	son	of	Otto	von	Wächter,	the	Nazi	District	Governor	of	Galicia,	met	 veterans	 and	 re-enactivists	 at	 another	 reburial	 ceremony	 in	 2014.	One	of	the	re-enactivists	proudly	showed	his	SS	helmet,	explaining	that	he	wore	it	in	the	Maidan.	The	ideological	interaction	of	state	and	activist	heritage	reached	its	apogee	in	2016	with	the	official	announcement	of	government	support	for	the	Revolution	 of	 Dignity	 Museum.	 Originally	 an	 activist	 heritage	 project,	 the	museum	 was	 conceived	 by	 staff	 working	 in	 the	 state-funded	 Ivan	 Honchar	Museum,	 who	 conducted	 an	 unofficial	 collecting	 project	 during	 the	 Maidan	protests.	Regime	 change	meant	 an	 ideological	 “lustration”	of	 the	 state	heritage																																																									9 	http://www.warmuseum.kiev.ua/_eng/expositions/donetsk/index.html,	 accessed	 December	15,	 2016.	 Right	 Sector	 was	 founded	 in	 2013	 as	 an	 umbrella	 organisation	 uniting	 neofascist	paramilitary	groups	(Sakwa	2015,	84).	
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sector	 that	 saw	Soviet	 vestiges	eradicated	and	a	new	ultranationalist	narrative	imposed.	Objects	collected	from	the	Maidan	were	initially	deposited	in	the	Ivan	Honchar	 Museum	 in	 lieu	 of	 a	 permanent	 exhibition	 space.10	The	 collection	includes	objects	donated	by	Maidan	activists	who	 subsequently	volunteered	 to	fight	 in	 the	 “Anti-Terrorist	Operation”	 in	eastern	Ukraine.	 In	 its	public	activity,	the	 museum	 explicitly	 identifies	 Maidan	 demonstrators	 with	 the	 UPA	 as	 a	patriotic	continuum.11		The	conversion	of	the	Maidan’s	activist	heritage	into	state	heritage	illustrates	its	political	volubility	in	the	context	of	radical	social	transformation.		The	Ukrainian	case	 also	 exemplifies	 how	 the	 ideological	 complex	 associated	 with	 activist	heritage	can	penetrate	state	institutions.	In	Ukraine,	activists	now	operate	inside	state	museums	with	official	sanction.	 I	will	now	consider	how	this	can	be	done	unofficially	as	political	recuperation.		
Wewelsburg	and	the	Political	Power	of	Suggestion	
	
	The	 Federal	 Republic	 of	 Germany	 has	 undergone	 a	 political	 transition	 since	Gerhard	 Schröder’s	 Red-Green	 coalition	 came	 to	 power	 in	 1998.	 The	inauguration	of	the	“Berlin	Republic”	signalled	a	new	politics	based	on	a	strategy																																																									10	Speaking	 at	 the	 University	 of	 St	 Andrews	 in	 2016,	 the	 Director	 of	 the	 Revolution	 of	 Dignity	Museum,	 Ihor	 Poshyvailo,	 claimed	 that	 the	 National	 Museum	 of	 the	 History	 of	 Ukraine	 in	 the	Second	World	War	was	competing	for	the	objects.	At	the	time	of	writing,	however,	the	“Maidan	Museum”	remains	a	“virtual”	project	with	no	permanent	premises.	Much	of	Poshyvailo’s	talk	was	articulated	in	contemporary	museological	language	and	paid	lip	service	to	“multiple	voices”	(see	p.	 86	 below).	 Nonetheless	 the	 academic	 audience	 appeared	 oblivious	 to	 Poshyvailo’s	 palpable	ethnic	nationalism	and	Russophobia	 (also	 clearly	visible	on	his	Facebook	page).	He	 stated	 that	the	museum	is	intended	to	be	a	platform	for	conflict	resolution	and	“reconciliation”	with	Russian-speaking	eastern	Ukrainians,	before	quoting	a	Euromaidan	activist	in	saying,	“the	war	is	not	just	in	the	east,	 it’s	here.”	Poshyvailo	dismissed	Russian	media	reports	of	neofascism	in	the	Maidan,	but	 Svoboda	 and	 Right	 Sector	 activists	 were	 clearly	 visible	 in	 his	 photographs	 and	 in	 the	sophisticated	promotional	film	we	were	shown.	11	This	was	evident	 in	the	museum’s	temporary	exhibition	The	Braves:	Our	Heroes	 staged	at	 the	Ukrainian	parliament	building	in	2016.	
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of	 “normalisation”	 (Pearce	2007,	45-49).	The	 coalition	of	 social	democrats	 and	greens	 contained	 a	 number	 of	 former	 activists	 from	 the	 radical	 generation	 of	1968	who	 had	 campaigned	 for	 a	Vergangenheitsbewältigung	 (coming	 to	 terms	with	 the	 past).	 Post-unification	 Vergangenheitsbewältigung	 is	 at	 once	 a	realisation	 and	 negation	 of	 that	 generation’s	 idealism.	 The	 extinguishing	 of	 its	revolutionary	 aspirations	 has	 in	 part	 been	 responsible	 for	 the	 western	intellectual	“memory	boom”	and	the	flourishing	of	multiculturalism	and	identity	politics	(Rosenfeld	2009,	131).	These	elements	have	now	been	assimilated	into	a	governmental	consensus	resting	on	the	twin	pillars	of	European	integration	and	anti-totalitarianism.	 Addressing	 the	 first	 Bundestag	 in	 Norman	 Foster’s	redesigned	 Reichstag,	 Schröder	 called	 it	 a	 “return	 to	 German	 history”	 and	stressed	the	need	to	confront	Germany’s	past	(quoted	in	Pearce	2007,	49).			Schröder’s	 historicism,	 which	 portrayed	 the	 Federal	 Republic	 as	 heir	 to	 the	Weimar	 liberal	 democratic	 tradition,	 provided	 an	 ideological	 blueprint	 for	 the	German	 state	 heritage	 sector’s	 treatment	 of	 the	 Third	 Reich.	 The	 period	 since	unification	 has	 witnessed	 a	major	 expansion	 of	 state-funded	 heritage	 projects	dealing	with	the	Nazi	legacy.	In	the	Federal	Republic	before	1990,	preserving	the	heritage	of	National	Socialism	was	primarily	an	activist	endeavour.	For	example,	in	 1985	 the	 Active	 Museum	 of	 Fascism	 and	 Resistance	 and	 Berlin	 History	Workshop	 organised	 an	 archaeological	 dig	 on	 the	 site	 of	 the	 former	 Reich	Security	Main	Office	on	Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse.	The	building,	which	had	housed	the	 notorious	 Gestapo	 prison,	 was	 partially	 destroyed	 by	 bombing	 and	 then	razed	by	 the	American	military	 authorities	 in	1949.	During	 the	dig	 the	 activist	archaeologists	 excavated	 the	 cells	 where	 thousands	 of	 prisoners	 were	
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incarcerated.	The	dig	resulted	in	a	temporary	display	Topographie	des	Terrors	in	1987	 that	 eventually	 forced	 the	 West	 Berlin	 authorities	 to	 fund	 a	 permanent	exhibition	(Young	1993,	83-90;	Koshar	2000,	226-227).	A	comprehensive	survey	of	such	activism	lies	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis	so	I	confine	my	investigation	to	a	specific	place	–	Wewelsburg	–	as	an	early	example	that	predicted	the	more	high	profile	 urban	 campaigns.12	Today	 accommodating	 a	 state	museum	and	 an	active	 memorial	 site,	 Wewelsburg	 is	 also	 an	 activist	 heritage	 locale	 for	 both	victims’	groups	and	neofascists.	I	contextualise	this	history	within	the	narrative	of	 the	 state	 museum	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 how	 such	 an	 institutional	 setting	 is	politicised.		
	The	 village	 of	Wewelsburg	 is	 situated	 in	 the	 bucolic	Westphalian	 countryside.	The	area’s	main	attraction	is	its	seventeenth-century	castle,	housing	the	District	Museum	 and	 a	 youth	 hostel.	 The	 District	 Museum	 consists	 of	 the	 Historical	Museum	of	 the	Prince	Bishopric	of	Paderborn	and	 the	Wewelsburg	1933-1945	Memorial	 Museum.	 The	 latter	 hosts	 a	 permanent	 exhibition	 dedicated	 to	 the	history	 of	 the	 SS	 and	 preserves	 the	 most	 internationally	 significant	 collection	related	to	the	organisation.	The	museum’s	original	1982	exhibition	Wewelsburg	
1933-1945:	Kult-	 und	Terrorstätte	 der	 SS	 was	 replaced	 by	 Ideologie	und	Terror	
der	 SS	 in	 2010	 (on	 the	 original	 exhibition	 see	 Pearce	 2010).	 The	 exhibition	begins	in	the	former	SS	guardhouse	and	continues	through	the	dry	moat	into	the	castle’s	North	Tower	where	 two	historic	 rooms	 are	 preserved.	 (In	 the	 original	exhibition,	visitors	could	only	enter	the	North	Tower	in	the	company	of	a	guide.)	The	visitor	then	returns	to	the	guardhouse	for	the	last	two	sections.	The	scope	of																																																									12	The	literature	on	social	memory	of	the	Third	Reich	is	voluminous.	Macdonald	(2008)	focuses	specifically	on	the	heritage	dimension	in	her	study	of	the	Nazi	Party	rally	grounds	at	Nuremberg.		
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the	 exhibition	 includes	 the	 village	 itself,	 which	 the	 visitor	 is	 encouraged	 to	explore	using	a	map	provided	by	the	museum.	The	history	of	the	castle,	museum	and	 village	 is	 in	 the	 words	 of	 the	 exhibition’s	 curators	 “paradigmatic”	 of	
Vergangenheitsbewältigung	(Brebeck	and	John-Stucke	2011,	10).		Heinrich	 Himmler	 visited	 Wewelsburg	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 1933	 and	 shortly	thereafter	 leased	 the	 castle,	which	would	 remain	 under	 SS	 control	 until	 1945.	Originally	 conceived	 as	 an	 elite	 officer-training	 centre	 under	 the	 Race	 and	Settlement	Department,	 the	castle	was	remodelled	to	the	design	of	SS	architect	Hermann	 Bartels	 to	 be	 the	 hub	 of	 a	 much	 larger	 ideological	 complex.	 It	 was	rebuilt	 to	 reflect	 Himmler’s	 interest	 in	 the	 Ottonian	 Empire	 and	 Heinrich	 I’s	conquest	 of	 Slavic	 territories	 (Jaskot	 2000,	 115).	 The	 Wewelsburg	 castle’s	renovation	gave	it	a	medieval-style	façade,	in	keeping	with	Himmler’s	vision,	that	placed	it	at	the	centre	of	a	Germanic	origin	story.		In	 1935	 Himmler	 placed	 the	 castle	 under	 the	 stewardship	 of	 Manfred	 von	Knobelsdorff,	 brother-in-law	 of	 Walther	 Darré.	 Under	 the	 direction	 of	 von	Knobelsdorff,	 an	 Irminist,	 the	 castle	 was	 used	 to	 conduct	 pagan	 wedding	ceremonies	 for	 SS	 officers,	 and	 spring,	 harvest	 and	 summer	 solstice	 festivals.	Another	 influential	 figure	at	Wewelsburg	 in	 this	period	was	Karl	Maria	Wiligut	(alias	Weisthor),	 a	 fellow	 Irminist	 who	 became	 a	 confidant	 of	 Himmler	 in	 the	1930s.	Weisthor	probably	planted	in	Himmler’s	mind	the	notion	of	Wewelsburg	as	 a	 fulcrum	 in	 a	 future	war	between	Europe	 and	Asia	 (Goodrick-Clarke	2004,	186).	He	also	conceived	the	Death’s	Head	ring	that	Himmler	awarded	personally	to	new	recruits	as	a	token	of	their	fidelity.	In	1938	Himmler	decreed	that	all	rings	
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were	 to	 be	 returned	 to	 Wewelsburg	 upon	 the	 owner’s	 death	 and	 placed	 in	 a	shrine	(Hüser	1982,	66).		In	 1936	 the	 castle	 came	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 parastatal	 Society	 for	 the	Promotion	 and	 Preservation	 of	 German	 Cultural	 Monuments.	 Initially	 the	reconstruction	was	 able	 to	 draw	on	 voluntary	workers	 from	 the	Reich	 Labour	Service,	 but	 later	brought	 in	 slave	 labour	 from	 the	 concentration	 camp	 system	and	 materials	 from	 the	 SS’s	 German	 Earth	 and	 Stone	 Works	 in	 1939	 (Jaskot	2000,	125).	Prisoners	were	drafted	in	from	Sachsenhausen	to	form	a	subsidiary	camp	before	the	Niederhagen	camp	was	officially	established	in	1941.		
	
Photo	2.1	Decorative	swastikas	on	the	façade	of	the	Ottens	Hof,	Wewelsburg	village.	
	
	On	my	way	to	the	castle	I	walk	up	to	the	Ottens	Hof,	now	a	public	house.	Between	1935	 and	 1937,	 the	 SS	 architect	Walter	 Franzius	 rebuilt	 the	 village’s	 old	 half-timbered	 houses	 to	 represent	 Darré’s	 “Blood	 and	 Soil”	 theories.	 Originally	 a	farmhouse,	 the	 Ottens	 Hof	 was	 reconstructed	 to	 be	 the	 Dorfgemeinschafthaus	
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(Village	 Community	 House)	 and	 retains	 decorative	 swastikas	 on	 its	 façade	(photo	 2.1).	 Renovation	was	 funded	 by	 the	 Strength	 Through	 Joy	 organisation	with	the	intention	of	immersing	the	local	population	in	the	Nazi	worldview,	but	also	as	a	pragmatic	exchange	for	the	dining	hall	at	the	castle	where	villagers	had	previously	gathered	 for	 festivities	 (Brebeck	and	Hüser	2000,	38).	The	porch	of	the	adjacent	caretaker’s	house	is	decorated	in	a	völkisch	style	with	runes	(photo	2.2).	Both	structures	are	now	officially	preserved	but	remain	inhabited	by	local	people.		
	
																				Photo	2.2	Caretaker’s	house	with	völkisch	decoration,	Wewelsburg	village.	
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																		Photo	2.3	Sigrunen	on	the	sentry	box	outside	the	former	SS	guardhouse.			When	 I	 arrive	 at	 the	 guardhouse,	 I	 pause	 by	 the	 sentry	 box	 where	 partially	obliterated	Sigrunen	are	visible	on	the	outside	(photo	2.3).	The	exhibition	begins	downstairs,	 in	 the	 former	 gymnasium	 and	 fencing	 room,	 with	 1941,	 the	 “key	year”	 when	 in	 June	 senior	 SS	 leaders	 gathered	 at	 Wewelsburg	 days	 before	Germany	invaded	the	Soviet	Union.	Hard	evidence	of	the	meeting	is	displayed	in	the	 form	 of	 two	 informal	 photographs	 of	 the	 attendees	 walking	 between	 the	guardhouse	 and	 the	 castle.	 The	 grainy,	 slightly	 blurred	 photographs	 humanise	the	 architects	 of	 mass	 murder	 who	 are	 captured	 smiling	 and	 chatting.	 Their	facial	expressions	and	body	language	betray	the	confident	look	of	men	convinced	
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that	 tomorrow	 belongs	 to	 them.	 The	 importance	 of	 Wewelsburg	 in	 the	 SS	ideological	firmament	is	thus	explained:		 The	 conference	underscored	 the	 special	 role	 assigned	 to	Wewelsburg	 in	 the	ideological	 preparation	 for	 war…	 Wewelsburg	 was	 not	 to	 be	 a	 place	 for	making	decisions,	but	for	reinforcing	the	political,	racist	and	militaristic	self-conception	 of	 the	 SS	 leadership,	 which	 was	 geared	 to	 terror	 and	extermination.			The	 ideological	 conditioning	 for	 political	 soldiers	 is	 contextualised	 within	 a	worldview	 of	 war,	 cultivation	 and	 procreation	 to	 perpetuate	 the	 Aryan	 race.	Hans	 Lohbeck’s	 triptych	 Krieg	 is	 displayed	 to	 illustrate	 the	 concept	 of	 the	
Wehrbauer	 (“warrior	 farmer”)	 and	 the	 continual	 racial	 struggle	 for	 existence	against	 Slavic	 threats	 from	 the	 east.	 Soldiers	 are	 depicted	 alongside	 farmers,	working	the	land	and	building	new	homesteads.	Wewelsburg	is	visible	on	the	hill	in	 the	 background	 as	 an	 aircraft	 flies	 overhead.	 The	 Nazi	 future	 is	 at	 once	medieval	and	modern,	destructive	and	constructive.	In	their	accompanying	book,	the	curators	portray	 the	SS	as	a	quasi-religion	drawing	an	analogy	between	 its	
Endzeitkämpfer	 (“end	 time	 fighters”)	 and	 Christian	 zealots	 in	 the	 final	 battle	between	good	and	evil	 “for	a	new	and	better	world”.	The	Endzeitkämpfer	were	engaged	 in	 a	 mortal	 struggle	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 “dawning	 of	 a	 new,	 glorious	National	Socialist	world.”	Each	had	an	ideological	duty	to	be	a	“frontline	warrior”	in	a	“world	full	of	enemies”.	Even	those	with	a	“desk	job”	could	be	sent	to	carry	out	policing	duties	or	fight	in	the	Waffen	SS	(Brebeck	et	al.	2011,	8).		Among	Third	Reich	 heritage	 sites,	 the	museum	distinguishes	 itself	 by	 granting	equal	 narrative	weight	 to	perpetrators	 and	victims.	The	 exhibition	 is	 based	on	the	 concept	 of	 multiperspektivität	 (“multiple	 perspectives”).	 The	 District	
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Museum’s	director	Kirsten	 John-Stucke	 frames	 this	 in	post-modernist	 terms	as	the	consequence	of	failed	“grand	narratives”	and	their	supersession	by	“multiple	discourses”	that	render	obsolete	the	“hermetic	meanings”	contained	in	museums	(2011,	22;	see	also	Lyotard	on	the	“delegitimation”	of	grand	narratives,	1984,	37-41).	 The	 concept	 of	 “multiple	 perspectives”	 reflects	 the	 influence	 of	 post-modernist	 museology,	 specifically	 Hooper-Greenhill’s	 “post-museum”	 concept,	which	 advocates	 for	 “many	 voices	 and	 many	 perspectives”	 (2000,	 152).	 The	museum’s	multi-perspectival	approach	is	premised	on	allowing	visitors	to	make	up	their	own	minds	about	what	they	see—the	institutional	ethos	 is	 to	“inform”	rather	than	“indoctrinate”	the	public	(John-Stucke,	interview	2015).		The	 exhibition	 clarifies	 that	 the	 SS	was	 not	 a	 “monolithic	 block”	 and	 provides	detailed	 biographies	 of	 individuals	 associated	 with	 Wewelsburg.	 Biographical	exhibits	contain	documents	and	personal	effects,	including	family	photographs.13	They	 are	 situated	 within	 an	 overall	 discussion	 of	 the	 rigidly	 hierarchical	organisational	 structure.	 The	 logic	 behind	 this	 approach	 –	 to	 illustrate	 the	heterogeneous	membership	and	explore	individual	perspectives	–	reflects	wider	historiographical	 trends.	 For	 example,	 Ingrao	 (2013)	draws	on	 the	Lebensläufe	(“life	 histories”)	 provided	 by	 those	 joining	 the	 SS	 to	 explore	 the	 experiential	basis	 for	 their	 political	 convictions	 and	 deep-seated	 belief	 in	 a	 “world	 of	enemies”.		In	the	exhibition,	this	approach	is	also	taken	in	relation	to	the	prime	movers	at	Wewelsburg.	 Oswald	 Pohl’s	 handwritten	 statement	 from	 1932,	 “Why	 am	 I	 a																																																									13	The	museum	has	 relationships	with	 the	 families	 of	 some	 former	 SS	men,	who	have	donated	objects	 and	 photographs.	 Some	 relatives	 saw	 this	 as	 a	 form	 of	 atonement.	 The	 families	 of	prominent	figures,	including	Bartels	and	the	commandant	of	Niederhagen,	Adolf	Haas,	refused	to	have	any	contact	with	the	museum	(John-Stucke,	interview	2015).	
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National	 Socialist	 and	 an	 S.	 A.	 man?”	 is	 exhibited	 alongside	 evidence	 of	 his	criminality.	The	caption	explains	that	he	was	no	careerist	but	a	committed	Nazi	who	 joined	 the	 Sturmabteilung	 (Storm	 Section)	 before	 1933.	 Despite	 the	inclusion	 of	 Pohl’s	 testimony,	 the	 caption	 concedes	 that	 the	 question	 of	 his	motivation	 for	 joining	 the	 SS	 and	 participating	 in	 its	 crimes	 is	 “difficult	 to	answer.”		
	
Photo	2.4	Museum	display	case	containing	SS	uniform	obscured	by	frosted	glass.				Williams	identifies	the	most	common	motives	for	tourism	at	memorial	museums	as	 “illumination”,	 the	 imbuing	 of	 sacred	 and	 moral	 qualities	 to	 the	 sites,	 and	voyeurism,	based	on	morbid	curiosity	about	 the	taboo	(2007,	142).	Proceeding	into	the	former	canteen	and	officers’	mess,	 the	visitor	 is	confronted	with	a	rich	display	 of	 uniform	 and	 paraphernalia	 alongside	 cultic	 objects.	 The	 section	“Worldview-Mentality-Crimes”	 illustrates	 two	 museological	 principles	 that	 are	consistently	 applied	 to	meet	 the	 ethical	 complexity	 of	 the	 subject	matter.	 The	
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display	 cases	 are	 integrated	 into	 functional	 units,	 with	 pull-out	 drawers	resembling	museum	storage	cabinets.	 In	 this	way,	 the	curators	aimed	 to	dispel	any	 “magical	 mystery”.	 Case	 design	 (photo	 2.4)	 follows	 the	 principle	 of	“obscuring	 but	 not	 concealing”,	 whereby	 frosted	 glass	 partially	 covers	 objects	bearing	swastikas	to	counteract	voyeuristic	“fascination”	(John-Stucke	2011,	24;	on	the	“fascinating”	potential	of	Nazi	regalia,	see	also	Sontag	1975).	John-Stucke	attributes	 this	 methodology	 to	 concerns	 expressed	 by	 historians	 during	 the	current	 exhibition’s	 development,	 and	 mentions	 an	 earlier	 controversy	 in	Munich	 in	 the	 1990s	 over	 the	 display	 of	 Nazi	 artefacts.14	She	 explains	 that	museum	staff	are	nonetheless	committed	to	displaying	original	objects	because	these	are	what	 visitors	want	 to	 see	 and	are	vital	 for	 authenticity	 (John-Stucke,	interview	2015).		Concerns	over	fascination	indicate	a	rationale	that	objects	can	possess	their	own	agency.	 The	 recent	 “ontological	 turn”	 in	 Social	 Anthropology	 rejects	 the	imposition	of	social	context	onto	objects	with	the	proposition	that	meanings	are	not	 “carried”	 by	 “things”	 but	 identical	 to	 them	 (Henare,	Holbraad,	 and	Wastell	2007,	 3-4).	 From	 a	 parallel	 archaeological	 perspective,	 Olsen	 questions	 the	imperative	 of	 seeking	 the	 “Indian	 behind	 the	 artefact”	 (2010,	 37).	 For	 Olsen,	attributing	social	meanings	to	objects	and	treating	them	as	“signs	or	texts	to	be	consciously	read,	is	to	deprive	things	of	their	difference	and	their	ability	to	‘talk																																																									14	In	Germany,	Third	Reich	heritage	is	often	interpreted	using	the	documentation	centre	format:	photographs,	documents	and	film	rather	than	three-dimensional	objects.	For	example,	Munich’s	Documentation	Centre	for	the	History	of	National	Socialism,	which	opened	in	2015,	is	located	in	the	Königsplatz	on	 the	 site	of	 the	 former	Nazi	Party	headquarters.	The	authorities’	 decision	 to	pursue	this	approach	was	influenced	by	a	2002	exhibition	at	the	City	Museum	that	displayed	Nazi	artefacts,	 including	Ernst	Röhm’s	dagger.	Munich’s	mayor	criticised	the	inclusion	of	“devotional	objects”	as	Nazi	kitsch	(Rosenfeld	2008,	176;	Urban	2010,	111-112).	The	Centre’s	director	cites	the	City	Museum’s	1993	exhibition,	München:	Haupstadt	der	Bewegung	 (“Munich:	Capital	of	 the	Movement”),	 as	 an	 example	 of	 how	 such	 objects	 can	 attract	 Nazi	 enthusiasts	 (Nerdinger,	interview	2015;	on	Munich’s	Third	Reich	heritage	see	Rosenfeld	2000).	
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back’	in	their	own	material	way”	(60).	These	arguments	reprise	Latour’s	critique	of	 Durkheimian	 social	 science	 that	 sees	 the	 object	 as	 “only	 a	 surface	 for	 the	projection	of	our	social	needs	and	 interests”	(1993,	52).	The	underlying	 idea	 is	that	 objects	 do	 not	 signify	 social	 relations,	 but	 are	 constitutive	 of	 them.15	This	originates	 in	Heidegger’s	concept	of	das	Zeug	 (“equipment”),	a	 term	he	used	 to	describe	the	objects	of	our	everyday	“being-in-the-world”	(1962,	95).	He	argued	that	equipment	has	“being-in-itself”	and	that	an	object’s	“readiness-to-hand”	can	only	be	encountered	by	interacting	with	it	(98).	The	totality	of	our	equipment,	or	the	inter-subjectivity	of	“things”,	thus	determines	our	reality.	Following	this	line	of	argument	means	inevitably	arriving	at	the	notion	that	objects	have	the	power	to	 influence	 society	 through	 their	 innate	 materiality—hence	 objects	 can	 “talk	back”.		The	social	relations	that	give	objects	meaning	exist	between	human	beings,	not	between	 people	 and	 artefacts	 (Tokarev	 1974,	 176).	 Museums	 are	 social	environments	 where	 older	 meanings	 may	 be	 carried	 by	 objects	 for	 historical	reasons,	 but	 also	 new	 ones	 derived.	Mason	 attributes	 polysemic	 properties	 to	museum	objects,	wherein	 their	meanings	may	be	opposed	or	change	over	 time	(2011,	 20).	 Neofascists	will	 automatically	 classify	Nazi	 artefacts	 to	 correspond	with	 their	 political	 affiliation.	 Classification	 is	 therefore	 to	 reinforce	 their	 pre-existing	 ideological	 worldview.	 Other	 visitors	 will	 likewise	 classify	 objects	 in	relation	 to	 their	 social	 experience,	 but	 will	 also	 relate	 their	 understanding	 of	them	 to	 historical	 contextualisation	 provided	 in	 the	 exhibition.	 The	 neofascist	will	 naturally	 deride	 this	 as	 politically	 biased.	 The	meanings	 attached	 to	 Nazi																																																									15	Durkheim	 and	 Mauss	 argued	 that	 social	 relations	 provide	 the	 logic	 for	 the	 classification	 of	objects	and	not	the	other	way	around	(1963,	82).	
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artefacts	 cannot	 therefore	 influence	 ordinary	 visitors	 who	 have	 no	 prior	ideological	conditioning.		By	 adopting	 the	 principles	 of	 “obscuring	 but	 not	 concealing”	 and	 “responsible	contextualisation”,	the	curators	recognise	the	museum’s	status	as	a	social	arena,	but	not	how	public	space	and	the	material	culture	within	it	are	politicised.	They	are	preoccupied	with	the	 interaction	of	people	and	objects	within	the	museum,	and	hence	fail	to	recognise	that	the	prevailing	external	social	relations	determine	how	we	 interpret	material	 culture.	Candlin	argues	 that	museum	objects	can	be	either	 “live”	 or	 “dead”.	 At	 the	 Museum	 of	 Witchcraft	 in	 Cornwall	 where	 staff	practise	magic	 and	 incorporate	 it	 within	 the	 exhibition,	 objects	 become	 “live”,	not	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 magical	 provenance	 but	 because	 of	 their	 “utility	 and	agency”	 and	 connection	 with	 witches	 as	 a	 group	 (2016,	 65).	 Although	Wewelsburg	is	a	state	museum,	the	presence	of	activists	within	its	space	can	also	make	 objects	 “live”.	 In	 short	 it	 is	 human	 beings,	 and	 not	 objects	 that	 possess	agency.		The	 principle	 of	 “responsible	 contextualisation”	 has	 also	 been	 applied	 to	 the	exhibition	design	(John-Stucke	2011,	24-25).	Curators	have	intentionally	sought	to	“demystify”	the	objects	by	providing	historical	context	to	discourage	fetishism.	Esoteric	 artefacts,	 such	 as	 the	 Death’s	 Head	 ring	 and	 Yule	 lantern,	 are	contextualised	alongside	banal	objects	of	everyday	life	at	Wewelsburg,	to	convey	the	 idea	 that	 all	were	 connected	 to	 SS	 crimes	 and	 falsification	of	 the	past.	 The	ring	is	displayed	without	spotlighting	to	circumvent	the	usual	museum	aesthetic	in	 relation	 to	 silverware.	 The	 artefact	 is	 also	 placed	 alongside	 a	 post-war	reproduction	made	 for	 sale	on	 the	 collectors’	market	 to	deter	 fascination.	Yule	
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lanterns	were	given	to	married	SS	men	as	replicas	of	those	purportedly	used	by	Germanic	tribes	to	celebrate	the	pagan	winter	festival.	In	reality	the	design	of	the	lanterns	 was	 based	 on	 a	 Swedish	 candlestick	 holder	 from	 around	 1800.	 They	were	produced	in	the	SS	porcelain	factory	at	Allach	and	later	by	slave	labour	at	Neuengamme.		
	
Photo	 2.5	Tar	on	 the	wall	of	 the	castle’s	east	wing	marking	 the	outline	of	 the	 temporary	shed	used	by	prisoners	during	the	reconstruction.			Leaving	 the	 galleries	 I	 pass	 the	 former	 wine	 cellar,	 which	 is	 described	 as	 a	“cliché”	of	SS	aristocratic	pretension,	and	enter	the	arcades	hewn	by	slave	labour	from	rock	quarried	at	Flossenbürg.	The	arcades	connect	 the	guardhouse	 to	 the	dry	moat	 surrounding	 the	 castle.	A	 thin	 strip	of	 tar	 can	be	 seen	along	 the	east	wall	marking	the	outline	of	the	roof	of	the	temporary	shed	used	by	the	prisoners	during	 the	 reconstruction	 (photo	 2.5).	 A	 rare	 archival	 photograph	 shows	 a	prisoner	 at	 work	 in	 front	 of	 the	 hut	 as	 a	 guard	 looks	 on.	 The	 anonymous	photographer	was	obviously	documenting	the	work	in	progress	so	the	prisoner	
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is	frozen	in	time	as	a	blurred	motion	image	in	the	foreground.	On	the	edge	of	the	moat,	 the	 site	 interpretation	 directs	 the	 visitor	 to	 look	 down	 into	 the	 valley	below.	 Barely	 visible	 through	 the	 trees	 is	 the	 former	 quarry,	 where	 prisoners	hewed	rock	to	rebuild	the	castle.		From	 the	 dry	 moat	 I	 proceed	 inside	 the	 North	 Tower	 and	 down	 into	 the	basement.	 The	 North	 Tower	 is	 the	 source	 of	 an	 extensive	mythology	 that	 has	grown	up	around	Wewelsburg	since	1945.	Originally	gutted	by	fire	in	1815,	the	tower	 remained	 in	 disrepair	 until	 the	1930s.	 It	was	 rebuilt	 between	1939	 and	1943,	 combining	 poured	 concrete	 and	 stone	 cladding	 to	 give	 it	 a	 medieval	appearance.	The	reconstruction	was	left	incomplete	and	neither	of	the	surviving	rooms	from	the	period	was	ever	used.	In	the	late	1940s	the	castle	was	renovated	by	the	District	of	Büren	to	restore	the	pre-1934	youth	hostel	and	museum.		Virtually	 nothing	 is	 known	 of	 the	 intended	 purpose	 for	 what	 Bartels’	architectural	plans	refer	to	as	the	Gruft	(“Crypt”).	It	was	clearly	designed	to	have	esoteric	 meaning	 in	 Bartels’	 vision	 for	 the	 Wewelsburg	 complex	 which	 he	conceived	 as	 the	Mittelpunkt	der	Welt	 (“centre-point	 of	 the	world”).	 A	 circular	depression	 in	 the	 centre	of	 the	 room	contains	what	may	have	been	a	 gas	 inlet	pipe	 for	an	eternal	 flame.	Twelve	pedestals	are	situated	around	the	wall	of	 the	domed	hall	that	earlier	stood	proud	of	alcoves,	since	bricked	up	(photo	2.6).	At	the	top	of	the	dome	is	a	swastika	containing	four	flues	for	ventilation.		The	 exhibition	 speculates	 that	 the	 Gruft	 may	 have	 been	 designed	 for	“remembrance	 ceremonies”	 and	 alludes	 to	 “Mycenaean	 sepulchres.”	 The	acoustics	of	the	room	give	it	a	tomb-like	feel	and	the	interpretation	amplifies	this	
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ambience.	 A	 dramatic	 piano	 key	 leitmotif	 occasionally	 breaks	 the	 silence.	 My	fellow	 visitors	 speak	 low	 in	 response	 to	 the	 atmospheric	 conditions.	 Both	 the	documentary	evidence	and	physical	appearance	of	the	room	point	to	a	memorial	function	 and	 this	 has	 become	 its	 political	 legacy.	 A	 film	 explores	 “myth	 and	reality”,	 describing	 how	 the	 “ghost	 of	 the	 SS”	 was	 summoned	 covertly	 at	 a	neofascist	ritual	in	1992	when	the	pedestals	were	draped	in	white	cloths	bearing	runes.			
	
Photo	2.6	Interior	of	the	Gruft	in	the	North	Tower.			Around	 the	 walls	 are	 reproductions	 of	 paintings	 by	 the	 Büren	 artist	 Jo	 Glahé	commemorating	 the	 victims	 of	 the	 Nazi	 regime	 and	 the	 war.	 These	 were	originally	displayed	when	the	North	Tower	was	re-opened	to	the	public	in	1950.	The	paintings	were	commissioned	at	the	instigation	of	Dr	Aloys	Vogels,	chairman	of	the	Society	for	the	Preservation	of	the	Wewelsburg,	to	form	its	first	memorial.	In	1973	the	paintings	were	removed	from	the	Crypt	and	placed	in	storage	by	the	
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District	 of	 Büren.	 The	 North	 Tower	 was	 rebuilt	 between	 1973	 and	 1975	 to	incorporate	 an	 expanded	 youth	 hostel	 on	 the	 upper	 level.	 Today	 the	 original	paintings	are	displayed	in	a	purpose-built	gallery	in	the	guardhouse.		Climbing	 upstairs	 from	 the	 crypt,	 I	 enter	 what	 Bartels’	 plans	 describe	 as	 the	
Obergruppenführersaal	 (“Lieutenant	Generals’	Hall”).	The	room	contains	 twelve	pillared	 arches	 framing	 tall	 windows	 (photo	 2.7).	 Although	 no	 extant	 sources	reveal	 the	 intended	 purpose	 of	 this	 room,	 Bartels’	 architectural	 term	 strongly	suggests	its	organisational	function.	The	exhibition	states	that	existing	evidence	strongly	 indicates	 that	 it	 was	 designed	 to	 play	 a	 “central	 role	 in	 the	 SS	Gruppenführer’s	 experience”.	 An	 annual	 meeting	 of	 the	 generals	 would	 take	place	in	Munich	and	Wewelsburg,	where	the	newly	promoted	would	be	sworn	in	(Schulte	2009,	8-9).	Although	 the	 room	remained	unfinished	at	 the	 time	of	 the	1941	meeting,	 it	 seems	highly	probable	 that	 it	would	have	been	used	 for	 such	meetings	 in	 future.	 The	 latest	 research	 has	 revealed	 no	 evidence	 that	 the	 SS	intended	Wewelsburg	to	be	used	for	cultic	rituals,	which	had	previously	been	the	underlying	 assumption	 of	 both	 academic	 and	 popular	 literature	 (see	 Siepe	2015a).	In	the	exhibition	narrative,	Wewelsburg	is	portrayed	as	a	meeting	place	for	 the	 SS	 leadership	 rather	 than	 a	 cult	 site.	 Many	 of	 the	 myths	 attached	 to	Wewelsburg	and	the	North	Tower	are	the	result	of	historical	lacunae,	inevitable	given	the	esotericism	of	 the	SS,	but	also	of	 the	distortions	and	 inventions	of	 its	members	and	their	neofascist	acolytes.16		
																																																								16	For	example,	Walter	Schellenberg	described	how	Himmler	modelled	the	SS	on	the	Jesuit	order	with	Wewelsburg	as	its	“monastery”	(1956,	32-33).	
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Photo	2.7	Interior	of	the	Obergruppenführersaal	in	the	North	Tower.				In	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 room’s	 marble	 floor	 is	 the	 symbol	 which	 has	 become	synonymous	 with	 Wewelsburg	 mythology:	 a	 dark	 green,	 black	 and	 grey	 sun	wheel	with	twelve	spokes	(photo	2.8).	As	the	exhibition	explains,	the	symbol	has	become	 popular	 in	 “right-wing	 and	 esoteric	 circles”	 where	 it	 is	 known	 as	 the	
Schwarze	 Sonne	 (“Black	 Sun”).	 The	 symbol’s	 origin	 and	 meaning	 within	 SS	iconography	are	unknown	and	no	references	to	it	survive	from	the	Third	Reich.	As	Siepe	moots,	a	solar	symbol	would	be	consistent	with	the	SS’s	revival	of	the	pagan	religious	tradition	of	worshipping	nature	(2015b,	148-149).17	In	this	light,	
																																																								17	The	District	Museum’s	former	director,	Wulff	E.	Brebeck,	has	identified	a	possible	inspiration	for	the	Obergruppenführersaal	sun	wheel	in	a	group	of	Alemannic	Zierscheiben	(decorative	discs)	from	 the	 Merovingian	 period.	 The	 perforated	 discs	 feature	 a	 similar	 spoked	 solar	 symbol	signifying	the	pagan	cult	of	the	sun	in	Germanic	tribal	religion,	elements	of	which	endured	after	Christianisation.	 Brebeck	 offers	 a	 convincing	 explanation	 given	 that	 SS	 scholars,	 such	 as	 the	archaeologist	 Wilhelm	 Jordan	 who	 established	 a	 museum	 and	 conducted	 excavations	 at	Wewelsburg,	were	aware	of	 these	artefacts	 from	their	work	(Brebeck	et	al.	2011,	289;	see	also	Renner	1970,	72;	John-Stucke	2015,	31).		
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the	cultic	dimension	of	Wewelsburg	becomes	harder	to	detach	from	its	status	as	the	 ideological	crucible	 for	war	and	extermination.	Neopagan	pantheism	linked	the	 two	 core	 elements	 of	 the	 National	 Socialist	 credo:	 Social	 Darwinism	 and	
völkisch	 anti-Semitism.	 The	 Nazi	 state	 derived	 its	 authority	 from	 nature,	 and	through	eugenics	recast	society	biologically	to	negate	the	Judeo-Christian	belief	in	 God	 as	man’s	 creator	 (Conte	 and	 Essner	 1995,	 348).	 Poewe	 comments	 that	contemporary	 neopaganism	 “sees	 itself	 as	 the	 restorer	 of	 all	 that	 it	 claims	Christianity	removed	from	European	life	and	thought,	 that	 is,	human	godliness,	the	 seamless	 unity	 of	 religion	 and	 science,	 and	 the	 harmony	 of	 human	 beings	with	the	environment”	(2006,	173).	
	
	
Photo	2.8	Sun	wheel	symbol	in	the	centre	of	the	Obergruppenführersaal.			The	Black	Sun	illustrates	Turner’s	theory	of	the	“polysemy	or	multi-vocality”	of	symbols.	 In	 ritual	 environments	 “the	 positional	 meaning	 of	 a	 symbol	 derives	from	 its	 relationship	 to	 other	 symbols	 in	 a	 totality,	 a	Gestalt,	 whose	 elements	
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acquire	 their	 significance	 from	 the	 system	 as	 a	 whole”	 (1967,	 50-51).	 When	integrated	into	contemporary	symbolic	systems,	the	Black	Sun’s	original	esoteric	meaning	 is	 overwritten	 with	 new	 significations.	 Although	 Wewelsburg’s	reputation	as	a	cultic	site	where	the	SS	performed	quasi-religious	rites	explains	the	Black	Sun’s	appeal	for	esoteric	groups,	its	symbolic	power	is	not	confined	to	the	castle	and	its	ritual	environment.	Neofascist,	neopagan	and	satanic18	groups	have	reinterpreted	the	Black	Sun,	imbuing	it	with	their	own	esoteric	meanings	in	distinctive	 ritual	 practices.	 All	 such	 groups	 view	 the	 Black	 Sun	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	human	 divinity,	 but	 Siepe	 has	 made	 a	 crucial	 distinction	 between	 the	neofascist/neopagan	 and	 satanic	 conceptions	 of	 the	 symbol.	 In	 the	 political	culture	 of	 the	 SS,	 Christian	 humility	 toward	 God	 was	 replaced	 by	 the	 idea	 of	human	 divinity.	 In	 Satanism	 the	 individual	 is	 sacrosanct	 and	 assumes	 god-like	qualities	autonomously,	whereas	in	SS	cosmology	men	can	only	acquire	divinity	and	immortality	as	part	of	the	Volk	(2009,	500-501).	The	museological	approach	to	the	Obergruppenführersaal	recognises	the	symbol’s	appeal	to	these	groups	by	applying	the	principle	of	“obscuring	but	not	concealing”	in	relation	to	the	Black	Sun.	The	symbol	 is	partially	 covered	at	all	 times	by	beanbags,	 stools	and	small	desk	 stations.	 The	 visitor	 is	 therefore	 unable	 to	 view	 it	 in	 its	 entirety.	 This	approach	 was	 taken	 following	 observation	 of	 the	 previous	 exhibition	 which	noted	visitors’	tendency	to	gravitate	towards	it	(Brebeck	and	John-Stucke	2011,	17).																																																									18	Michael	 Aquino	 of	 the	 US-based	 Temple	 of	 Set	 performed	 an	 infamous	 ritual	 known	 as	 the	“Wewelsburg	Working”	 in	 1982.	 He	 believed	 that	 the	 practitioner	 should	 stand	 in	 the	 central	depression	of	the	crypt	to	experience	the	room’s	special	acoustic	and	lighting	properties	(which	showed,	in	his	view,	that	it	was	not	intended	for	a	fire).	Siepe	writes	that	Aquino	was	left	alone	in	the	 crypt	 where	 he	 formed	 the	 ancient	 Egyptian	 sign	 of	 Ka	 and	 made	 a	 “spontaneous	verbalization”	of	what	was	in	his	mind.	He	did	not	summon	the	ghost	of	Himmler	or	perform	a	satanic	mass	 as	 has	 been	 rumoured.	Aquino	did,	 however,	 believe	 that	Himmler	was	 a	 satanic	initiate	(2009,	499;	see	also	Goodrick-Clarke	2003,	215).	
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From	the	North	Tower	I	make	way	back	to	the	guardhouse	to	explore	the	 final	galleries	 examining	 Niederhagen	 and	 the	 SS	 legacy.	 The	 subjectivisation	 of	 SS	men	is	paralleled	by	the	humanisation	of	prisoners.	For	example,	the	uniform	of	Max	Schubert,	a	Jehovah’s	Witness,	is	used	to	illustrate	his	story	and	the	human	degradation	 of	 everyday	 camp	 life.19	Identifying	 the	 human	 being	 beneath	 the	uniform	 and	 administrative	 number	 acknowledges	 the	 societal	 struggle	 for	recognition	that	former	prisoners	faced.	Memorial	museums	rely	on	artefacts	to	verify	subjective	experience	but	 the	organised	violence	of	concentration	camps	tends	to	lead	to	their	destruction	(Williams	2007,	25).	The	difficulty	of	acquiring	artefacts	or	associating	them	with	specific	individuals	can	mean	defaulting	to	the	generic	 display	 of	 uniforms	 and	 anonymous	 objects.	 At	 Wewelsburg	 great	emphasis	 is	 placed	 on	 the	 authenticity	 of	 its	 objects,	 but	 also	 their	 humanity.	Clandestine	 personal	 communications	 to	 relatives	 are	 displayed	 alongside	official	 letters	 and	 censored	 postcards.	 The	 disappeared	 camp	 is	 further	materialised	through	a	wall	section	of	the	barracks	that	were	torn	down	after	the	war.	 A	 window	 from	 Bartels’	 villa	 is	 also	 displayed	 with	 a	 recording	 of	 a	communist	 prisoner,	 Otto	 Preuss,	 recounting	 his	 memories	 of	 working	 as	 a	glazer	there.		The	final	section	of	the	exhibition	deals	with	individual	and	collective	memories	of	Wewelsburg:	 a	place	where	 there	was	 “no	 such	 thing	 as	Null	Stunde”	 (“zero	hour”).	Since	the	museum	opened	in	1982,	it	has	conducted	extensive	interviews	with	 Zeitzeugen	 (“contemporary	 witnesses”):	 concentration	 camp	 survivors,	villagers,	 people	 who	 worked	 for	 the	 SS	 and	 descendants	 of	 SS	 members.																																																									19	After	 Soviet	 prisoners	 of	 war,	 Jehovah’s	 Witnesses	 represented	 the	 largest	 social	 group	incarcerated	in	Niederhagen	(see	John-Stucke	2001).	
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Excerpts	from	recordings	with	survivors	and	villagers	are	played	at	sound	points	around	the	galleries.	Unedited	interviews	with	survivors	now	living	in	Germany,	Austria,	Belgium,	Poland,	Russia,	Ukraine	and	the	United	States	are	audible	in	a	discreet,	contemplative	area,	along	with	their	photographic	portraits	in	old	age.	Oral	 history	 recordings	with	 the	 survivors	 compensate	 for	 the	 relative	 lack	 of	three-dimensional	 objects,	 photographs	 and	 documents	 to	 represent	 their	experiences	 and	 for	 distortions	 contained	 within	 official	 material.	 The	prominence	 of	 victims’	 voices	 therefore	 counter-weights	 the	 volume	 of	 SS	material	 culture	 on	 display.	 Archival	 recordings	 of	 speeches	 by	 Himmler	 and	other	senior	figures	in	the	SS	were	deliberately	omitted	by	the	curators	on	moral	grounds	 to	 avoid	 an	 imbalance	 (Kirsten	 John-Stucke,	 personal	 communication,	October	29,	2015).	The	right	to	speak	and	be	heard	 is	reserved	for	victims	and	villagers	only—the	perpetrators	 remain	 silent.	No	 former	 SS	member	has	 ever	been	 prepared	 to	 be	 interviewed	 by	museum	 staff.	 John-Stucke	 herself	 recalls	giving	 guided	 tours	 to	 SS	 veterans	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 original	 exhibition.	 She	reflects	 on	 the	 ethical	 problems	 associated	 with	 interacting	 with	 unrepentant	Nazis:		 I	had	a	problem	when	I	had	to	talk	with	the	widow	of	an	SS	man	and	she	was	still	very	right	[-wing],	an	old	Nazi	woman.	If	you	have	to	talk	to	such	a	woman	it	 is	 very	 difficult	 because	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 you	 don’t	 want	 to	 hear	 those	things…	how	good	the	SS	were	and	how	beautiful	and	so	on…	I	didn’t	want	to	hear	 such	 things,	 but	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 I	 wanted	 to	 know	more	 from	 her	about	 her	 husband…	 I	 had	 to	 be	 silent	 to	 some	 arguments	 of	 hers	 because	when	 I	 said	 something,	 she	wouldn’t	 get	 further	on.	 (John-Stucke,	 interview	2015)			The	exhibition	discusses	the	post-war	trials	of	SS	perpetrators	and	compares	the	lenient	treatment	they	received	to	the	long	and	arduous	battle	for	compensation	
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fought	by	their	victims.	The	continued	solidarity	of	the	perpetrators	is	reflected	in	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 veterans’	 organisation,	 the	 Ex-Waffen	 SS	 Mutual	 Help	Society.	The	post-war	history	of	SS	men	is	linked	to	local	neofascist	attempts	to	honour	them.	An	exhibit	on	Rechtsradikalismus	features	an	embroidered	ribbon	bearing	the	slogan	“Your	sacrifice,	our	obligation”	and	the	Wolfsangel	symbol.	A	photograph	 records	 candles	 left	 as	 a	mark	 of	 respect	 at	 the	 nearby	 Böddeken	military	cemetery	where	Waffen	SS	men	killed	fighting	the	American	advance	are	buried.	 The	 close	 proximity	 of	 neofascist	 activity	 is	 further	 illustrated	 by	 an	image	of	the	meeting	held	by	Michael	Kühnen’s	Free	German	Workers’	Party	at	the	Ottens	Hof	in	1990.		The	 final	 section	 offers	 an	 insight	 into	 how	 the	 memorial	 museum	 and	 site	represent	an	intersection	of	state	and	activist	heritage.	The	museum	would	not	exist	 without	 lengthy	 campaigning	 for	 public	 memorialisation	 and	 several	activist	heritage	 interventions.	Wewelsburg	 is	 therefore	paradigmatic	of	 recent	German	 history	 and	 should	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 “memorial	 site	movement”	 initiated	 by	 the	 social	 and	 political	 upheavals	 of	 the	 late	 1960s	(Brebeck	 2009,	 471).	 The	 dialectic	 of	 Wewelsburg’s	 heritage	 and	 activism	extends	beyond	the	castle	into	the	village	and	ultimately	to	federal	level.		The	exhibition	sets	the	museum’s	history	against	a	backcloth	of	local	indifference	and	denial,	political	opposition	and	determined	campaigning	for	a	memorial.	The	museum	displays	the	controversial	plaque	erected	by	the	Association	of	Victims	of	the	Nazi	Regime	at	the	castle	in	1965,	with	support	from	the	District	of	Büren.	The	Büren	School	and	Culture	Department	later	had	it	removed	on	the	grounds	that	it	referred	to	the	“K.	Z.	Lager	Wewelsburg”	implying	that	the	castle	itself	was	
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a	 concentration	 camp.	 At	 the	 time	 youth	 festivals	were	 being	 organised	 at	 the	castle	with	participants	 from	Europe,	 and	more	 inconveniently	 from	a	political	standpoint,	 Israel.	 The	 plaque	 was	 removed	 in	 1973	 along	 with	 the	 equally	mnemonic	Glahé	paintings,	 leaving	the	SS	period	invisible	except	 for	the	extant	architectural	traces.	At	this	time	the	castle	was	converted	to	house	local	council	offices,	an	enlarged	youth	hostel	and	the	Obergruppenführersaal	was	converted	into	a	chapel.20		A	 leather	 stool	 from	 the	 Paderborn	 district	 council	 chamber	 is	 exhibited	 to	demonstrate	the	“political	dimension	of	memory	in	a	parliamentary	democracy.”	Federal	reorganisation	of	local	government	in	1975	integrated	Wewelsburg	into	the	district	of	Paderborn,	bringing	 it	 into	contact	with	political	 forces	prepared	to	campaign	actively	for	memorialisation.	A	letter	from	the	German	Communist	Party	to	the	Paderborn	Landrat	demanded	the	reinstatement	of	the	plaque	and	a	protest	 was	 held	 in	 July	 1975	 during	 an	 international	 youth	 festival.	 Social	democrats	 in	 the	 Landrat	 proposed	 a	 memorial	 that	 triggered	 the	 Paderborn	
Mahnmalstreit	 (“memorial	 debate”)	 after	 its	 rejection	 by	 the	 Christian	Democratic	Union.	The	social	democrat	Bundestag	member	for	Paderborn,	Klaus	Thüsing,	 played	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 organising	 a	 memorial	 ceremony	 in	 the	Wewelsburg	 courtyard	 on	 November	 9,	 1977	 –	 the	 anniversary	 of	 the	 1938	
Pogromnacht	–	with	two	former	Niederhagen	prisoners	in	attendance.	A	second	plaque	was	placed	on	the	wall,	only	to	be	removed	to	Böddeken	during	the	night	by	 two	 villagers.	 Agreement	 was	 eventually	 reached	 in	 1977	 to	 create	 a																																																									20	This	was	the	room’s	purpose	in	its	earlier	incarnation	before	the	fire	in	1815.	It	was	still	in	use	as	a	chapel	in	the	1980s	after	the	exhibition	opened,	but	this	ceased	after	an	Israeli	visitor	group	encountered	a	wedding	party	 in	the	courtyard	that	 included	uniformed	Luftwaffe	personnel.	 In	the	 sunlight	 the	 airmen’s	 dark	 uniforms	 resembled	 those	 of	 the	 SS,	 outraging	 the	 Israelis	 and	prompting	the	museum’s	director	to	intervene	(John-Stucke,	interview	2015).	
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memorial	 to	 the	 victims	 of	 Niederhagen	 and	 a	 permanent	 exhibition	 at	Wewelsburg	(Brebeck	2009,	475-481).		The	 exhibition	 considers	 Wewelsburg’s	 legacy	 in	 contemporary	
Rechtsradikalismus	through	its	cultural	representation	in	pulp	fiction,	music	and	fashion.	 Goodrick-Clarke	 cites	 the	 role	 of	 fictional	 “Nazi	Mysteries”	 in	 not	 only	propagating	 a	 “pseudo-religious”	 image	 of	 the	 SS,	 but	 also	 in	 diminishing	 its	history	 of	 terror	 and	 extermination. 21 	As	 he	 acknowledged,	 however,	 the	ideological	well	 pool	 from	which	National	 Socialism	 sprung	 contained	 genuine	fantasticality.	The	Thule	mythology	based	on	the	polar	origin	of	the	Aryan	race	was	rooted	in	European	romanticism	and	nineteenth-century	Theosophy	(2003,	126).	The	elaborate	mythology	constructed	around	the	Black	Sun	is	connected	to	the	 Thule	 fantasy	 and	 other	 esoteric	 tendencies	 present	within	 the	 ideological	chemistry	of	National	Socialism	(on	 the	Thule	Society	and	polar	mythology	see	Goodrick-Clarke	2004,	135-152).		In	the	1990s	the	Black	Sun	became	an	esoteric	symbol	on	the	German	neofascist	scene,	under	the	influence	of	cult	fiction	by	Wilhelm	Landig	and	Russell	McCloud.	Unlike	the	swastika,	the	Black	Sun	is	not	a	legally	proscribed	symbol	in	Germany	and	 so	 offers	 semiotic	 freedom	 to	 propagate	 esoteric	 ideas.	 Landig’s	 novels	originate	the	idea	of	the	Black	Sun	as	a	symbol	of	Aryan	revitalisation,	steeped	in	the	fantasy	of	an	undefeated	Third	Reich,	the	hidden	outposts	of	which	concealed	secret	 weapons	 and	military	 bases.	 A	Waffen	 SS	 veteran,	 Landig’s	 apocalyptic	vision	was	informed	by	the	devastation	of	post-war	Vienna	to	which	he	returned	
																																																								21	The	Wewelsburg	mythology	has	also	found	its	way	into	mainstream	fiction.	For	example,	 the	climax	of	a	popular	detective	novel	takes	place	at	the	castle	(see	Kerr	1991,	254-268).	
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(Goodrick-Clarke	2003,	128).	Landig’s	work	makes	no	mention	of	Wewelsburg,	but	it	plays	a	central	role	in	McCloud’s	novel.	Together	with	esoteric	publications	and	neofolk	music	 in	 the	early	1990s,	 these	books	have	 transformed	 the	Black	Sun	into	an	international	symbol	in	far-right	circles.22		There	is	no	available	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	Black	Sun	was	ever	reproduced	outside	 Wewelsburg	 during	 the	 Third	 Reich.	 Since	 the	 1990s,	 however,	 the	symbol	 has	 acquired	 transnational	 recognition	 through	 its	 commodification	within	 popular	 culture	 and	 underground	 neofascist	 subcultures.	Commodification	 exposes	 a	 contradictory	 impulse	 within	 neofascism	 whereby	activists	 opposed	 to	 the	 consumerism	 of	 neoliberal	 society	 are	 ironically	embracing	 its	 technologies.	 The	 Black	 Sun	 appears	 in	 the	 violent	 fantasy	computer	game	franchises	Wolfenstein,	Medal	of	Honor	and	Sniper	Elite.	Kingsepp	draws	a	causal	connection	between	these	games	and	the	cinematic	portrayal	of	Nazi	 occultism	 in	 Steven	 Spielberg’s	 Indiana	 Jones	 films	 (2015,	 256-257).23	Popular	 clothing	 brands	 on	 the	 far-right	 scene,	 such	 as	 Thor	 Steinar,	 have	emulated	the	practice	of	coding	Nazi-era	symbols	common	in	far-right	computer	gaming	culture	by	incorporating	secret	semiotics	into	t-shirts	and	other	products	(Miller-Idriss	2012,	15-16).		The	 Black	 Sun	 was	 displayed	 by	 Ukrainian	 neofascist	 groups	 in	 the	 Maidan	protests	 (photo	2.9)	and	has	 subsequently	been	used	by	 the	paramilitary	Azov	Battalion	 in	 its	 emblem,	which	 combines	 it	with	 the	Wolfsangel	 symbol	 (photo																																																									22	Siepe	 has	 identified	 the	 newspaper	Wolfzeit	 and	 cover	 of	 the	 album	Gothos+Kalanda	 by	 the	band	 Allerseelen	 as	 the	 Black	 Sun’s	 earliest	 known	 appearances	 (2015b,	 155-157;	 see	 also	Goodrick-Clarke	 2003,	 149).	 On	 the	 neopagan	 and	 neofascist	music	 scenes,	 see	 Sünner	 (1999,	185-201).	23	The	 Black	 Sun	mythology	 has	 itself	 been	 exploited	 in	 the	 schlock	 films	 Iron	Sky	 (2012)	 and	
Outpost:	Black	Sun	(2012).	
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2.10).	 Azov’s	 newspaper	 is	 also	 called	 Black	 Sun	 (photo	 2.11).	 After	 its	deployment	as	a	volunteer	battalion	in	Eastern	Ukraine,	Azov	became	a	regiment	of	the	Ukrainian	National	Guard	in	2015	and	established	its	own	political	party,	the	National	 Corps,	 in	 2016.	 The	 organisation	 claims	 that	 the	Wolfsangel	 is	 of	Volhynian	rather	than	German	origin	and	is	unconnected	to	National	Socialism.24	The	 insertion	 of	 the	 Black	 Sun	 into	 Azov’s	 computer	 game-influenced	propaganda	imagery	illustrates	how	the	symbol’s	transmission	from	the	German	underground	 neofascist	 scene	 is	 directly	 linked	 to	 its	 wider	 circulation	 in	mainstream	media.	The	use	of	 the	Black	Sun	by	Ukrainian	neofascist	 groups	 is	authenticated	by	historical	 collaboration	with	Nazi	Germany	and	service	 in	 the	Waffen	 SS.	 The	 Black	 Sun	 has	 thus	 been	 re-signified	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 both	Ukrainian	and	pan-European	identity	to	be	deployed	in	battle	against	the	“world	of	enemies”	in	the	east.		
	
Photo	2.9	Neofascist	demonstrators	carrying	riot	shields	painted	with	the	Black	Sun	and	runic	symbols	in	the	Maidan,	Kiev,	circa	2014	(source:	http://www.pravyysektor.info).																																																									24	http://www.azov.press/en/pro-azov,	 accessed	February	9,	 2016.	 Fritz	 discusses	 the	German	provenance	of	 the	Wolfsangel	and	 its	use	 in	 the	Third	Reich	 (2011,	195).	On	 the	origins	of	 the	Azov	Battalion	and	its	parent	organisation,	the	Social-National	Assembly,	see	Sakwa	(2015,	158).	
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Photo	2.10	Azov	Battalion	internet	propaganda	displaying	its	emblem	(right)	of	the	combined	Black	Sun	and	Wolfsangel	symbols,	2015	(source:	http://www.vk.com/azovinternational).	
	
	
	
															Photo	2.11	Black	Sun,	2017	(source:	http://www.azov.press).	
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The	 Ukrainian	 case	 demonstrates	 the	 way	 in	 which	 activists	 may	 appropriate	state	 heritage	 for	 their	 own	political	 ends.	 The	Black	 Sun	 reflects	 the	 negative	image	 of	 German	 Vergangenheitsbewältigung,	 wherein	 neofascists	 strive	 to	recuperate	the	heritage	of	the	Third	Reich.	It	is	also	axiomatic	of	how	that	which	the	state	defines	as	heritage	can	be	subverted	by	activists	in	situ.	After	incursions	by	 neofascists	 the	 museum	 was	 forced	 to	 introduce	 “house	 rules”	 in	 2006,	drawing	 on	 the	 federal	Grundgesetz	 (Basic	 Law).	 Visitors	 are	 “prohibited	 from	uttering	 [sic]	 spoken,	 written	 or	 gesticulated	 extreme	 right-wing,	 racist,	 anti-Semitic	 and	 sexist	 remarks.”	 They	 may	 not	 “disparage	 in	 speech,	 writing,	 or	gesticular	 form	 human	 freedom	 and	 dignity	 (Art.	 1	 German	 Constitution)”	 or	“use	 markings	 and	 symbols	 that	 are	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 unconstitutional	organisations	 or	 anti-constitutional	 organisations”	 (Wewelsburg	 District	Museum	 2015).	 Far-right	 activity	 in	 the	 museum	 in	 the	 1990s	 was	 itself	 a	catalyst	for	the	principle	of	“responsible	contextualisation”.	Although	neofascists	continue	 to	 visit	 the	 museum,	 and	 are	 not	 prevented	 from	 doing	 so	 if	 they	observe	the	house	rules,	they	are	forbidden	to	display	their	political	allegiance	or	perform	 rituals	 by	 a	 policy	 that	 has	 hitherto	 proven	 largely	 successful	 (John-Stucke,	interview	2015).		The	 exhibition	 concludes	 in	 the	 Air	 Raid	 Protection	 Room	 where	 a	 display	records	 the	 archaeological	 excavation	 of	 the	 former	 SS	 shooting	 range	 in	Oberhagen	 forest	 and	 the	 Niederhagen	 site.	 Visible	 on	 the	 walls	 are	 the	instructions	 to	 “remain	 calm”	 and	 “do	 not	 smoke”.	 The	 preservation	 of	 the	physical	traces	of	the	building’s	previous	life	remind	the	visitor	that	they	are	not	in	 a	 purpose-built	 museum,	 but	 a	 site	 of	 perpetration	 where	 human	 beings	
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suffered	as	slave	 labourers	building	 the	very	surfaces	 they	now	walk	on.	Using	the	map	provided	by	the	museum,	I	take	the	historical	tour	of	Wewelsburg	that	brings	out	the	epistemological	unity	of	the	castle,	the	museum	and	the	village.		
	
Photo	2.12	Excavated	structure	of	the	former	SS	shooting	range	in	Oberhagen	forest.			Walking	up	the	dirt	track	into	the	forest	of	Oberhagen,	I	retrace	the	final	steps	of	fourteen	 Soviet	 prisoners	 of	 war	 and	 a	 Pole	 marched	 into	 the	 woods	 by	 the	Gestapo	 to	 be	 shot	 in	March	 1945.	 In	May	 of	 that	 year	 the	 American	military	ordered	the	bodies	to	be	exhumed	by	local	former	Nazi	Party	members	and	re-interred	 in	Wewelsburg	cemetery.	All	villagers	aged	between	nine	and	seventy	years	old	had	to	attend	the	“atonement	funeral”.	The	murdered	prisoners	were	later	 reburied	 in	 1961:	 the	 Soviet	 citizens	 at	 Stukenbrock	 and	 the	 Pole	 at	Sennelager.	In	1988	the	former	shooting	range	(photo	2.12)	became	the	focus	of	what	 Young	 calls	 “memorial-work”	 (1993,	 59)	when	 an	 international	 group	 of	volunteers	from	the	Action	Reconciliation	Service	for	Peace	cleared	detritus	from	
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the	 site.	 It	 had	 been	used	 as	 a	 rubbish	 dump	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	war.	 This	 is	described	 in	 the	 District	 Museum’s	 on-site	 interpretation,	 which	 also	 re-reproduces	 the	 original	 SS	 schematics.	 As	Wewelsburgers	walk	 their	 dogs	 and	normal	everyday	 life	goes	on	around	me,	 I	grasp	 the	 liminality	of	 such	a	place.	Archival	evidence	and	the	physical	remains	of	victims	and	the	bullets	that	killed	them	 now	 offer	 proof	 of	 death.	When	 the	 combination	 of	 societal	 neglect	 and	natural	encroachment	threatened	to	reclaim	the	stone	structure,	 the	only	thing	standing	 between	 its	 history	 of	 atrocity	 and	 oblivion	 was	 the	 recourse	 to	heritage—an	artificial	creation	of	its	own	time.	There	can	be	a	fine	line	between	history	 and	 rumour	 –	 the	 Nazis	 understood	 this	 –	 but	 what	 remains	 is	 the	imperfection	of	their	designs.		
Photo	2.13	Niederhagen’s	former	kitchen,	now	the	Wewelsburg	fire	station.	
	
	Retracing	my	steps	 from	Oberhagen	 I	make	my	way	 to	 the	Niederhagen	site	 in	the	centre	of	the	village.	The	last	section	of	the	wooden	barracks	was	removed	in	
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1965	but	a	number	of	brick	buildings	remain	standing.	The	camp’s	kitchen	and	gatehouse	are	now	under	an	official	preservation	order,	with	the	former	now	a	fire	station	and	the	latter,	rather	perversely,	a	private	residence	(photos	2.13	and	2.14).	Stones	mark	the	outline	of	the	camp’s	electric	fence.		
	
Photo	2.14	Niederhagen’s	former	gatehouse,	now	a	private	residence,	with	stones	marking	the	outline	of	the	camp’s	main	road.		
	
	In	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 former	 Appelplatz	 (“Roll-Call	 Square”)	 is	 a	 triangular	memorial	imitating	the	categorical	badges	prisoners	were	forced	to	wear	(photo	2.15).	The	campaign	to	build	a	memorial	faced	local	antipathy	to	preserving	the	remains	 of	 Niederhagen	 as	 an	 “open	 air	 museum”	 of	 National	 Socialism.	 The	memorial	 was	 erected	 in	 2000	 after	 a	 process	 of	 Vergangenheitsbewältigung,	initiated	by	the	visit	of	former	prisoners	in	1992.	In	1997	a	group	of	local	youth	came	 together	 to	 design	 a	 memorial	 in	 cooperation	 with	 the	 museum.	 The	creation	 of	 the	memorial	 was	 only	 possible	 through	 political	 sponsorship	 and	community	 support.	 The	 participation	 of	 youngsters	was	 crucial	 as	 they	were	
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able	to	communicate	with	the	survivors	without	carrying	the	weight	of	their	own	past	 (Brebeck	 2009,	 484-487).	 The	 younger	 generation	 took	 responsibility	 for	the	site,	establishing	the	Association	Against	Forgetting	and	For	Democracy	that	has	organised	an	annual	memorial	ceremony	at	the	former	Appelplatz	on	every	April	2	since	1995.	John-Stucke	explains	that	it	was	not	possible	for	the	museum	to	initiate	this	process.	The	impetus	had	to	come	from	within	the	community	and	because	 it	 came	 from	 the	 younger	 generation,	 older	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 village	were	 not	 in	 a	 position	 to	 object.	 During	 the	 1990s,	 ex-Niederhagen	 prisoners	were	 able	 to	 discuss	 their	 experiences	 with	 older	 people	 who	 were	 living	 in	Wewelsburg	at	the	time	(John-Stucke,	interview	2015).	
	
Photo	2.15	Niederhagen	memorial	on	the	site	of	the	former	Appelplatz.			On	my	way	back	to	the	castle	I	pass	Hermann	Bartels’	villa,	now	converted	into	a	Protestant	church	bearing	the	name	of	Paul	Schneider,	a	pastor	who	perished	in	Buchenwald.	 Originally	 known	 as	 Führerhaus	 I,	 the	 decadent	 villa	 was	
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constructed	by	the	raw	hands	of	slave	labourers	between	1939	and	1942	(photo	2.16).		
	
Photo	 2.16	Hermann	 Bartels’	 former	 villa,	 “Führerhaus	 I”,	 now	 converted	 into	 an	 evangelical	church	and	renamed	the	Paul	Schneider	Haus.	
	
	A	 little	 further	 towards	 the	edge	of	 the	village	 I	 come	 to	 the	cluster	of	völkisch	houses,	 built	 for	 SS	 families	 as	 a	 utopian	Waldsiedlung	 (“forest	 settlement”).	Today	 these	 buildings	 are	 private	 residences	 with,	 ironically,	 something	 of	 a	hippy	feel	about	them.	I	approach	from	the	west	as	did	the	advancing	American	troops	 in	 1945.	 The	 castle	 is	 beautified	 by	 the	 golden	 sunlight,	 glowing	resplendent	 above	 the	 treetops.	 I	 pause	 by	 the	 roadside	 to	 observe	 it,	 like	 the	American	soldier	I	had	seen	earlier	 in	a	black	and	white	photograph.	When	the	Americans	arrived	they	discovered	the	castle	a	burnt-out	shell,	ravaged	by	fire.	Acting	 on	Himmler’s	 orders	 an	 SS	unit	 attempted	 to	 blow	 it	 up,	 but	 possessed	insufficient	 explosive	 to	 destroy	 the	 structure;	 its	 seventeenth-century	 walls	proved	more	robust	than	Himmler’s	medieval	fantasy.	
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The	Wewelsburg	1933-1945	Memorial	Museum	represents	a	rational	attempt	to	document	 the	 history	 and	 preserve	 the	 heritage	 of	 the	 SS	 and	 its	 victims.	However,	its	mission	of	rationalising	the	irrational	is	at	times	problematised	by	post-modernist	sensibilities.	These	occasionally	mute	the	museum’s	moral	voice	and	produce	narrative	silences.	The	stated	aim	of	exploring	the	ideology	behind	the	SS’s	crimes	is	hampered	by	a	reductionist	methodology	that	avoids	emphatic	statements	about	its	adherents	or	the	social	conditions	that	produced	them.	The	absence	of	 emotional	manipulation	 is	warranted,	 but	 the	 exhibition’s	 cognitive	approach	is	not	consistently	appropriate	to	the	subject	matter.	The	curators	have	demonstrated	 ethical	 due	 diligence,	 but	 a	 museum	 needs	 a	 strong	 master	narrative	 to	 underpin	 its	moral	messages.	 The	 agency	 of	 activists	within	 state	museums	is	constrained	by	master	narratives	they	cannot	control,	but	only	when	the	museum’s	voice	is	heard	above	all	others.		There’s	 the	 rub:	 the	 master	 narrative	 of	 the	 museum	 is	 that	 of	 the	 Federal	Republic	 itself.	As	a	state-sponsored	organisation,	 the	museum	inevitably	holds	fast	 to	 German	 constitutionalism.	 Liberal	 tolerance	 and	 commitment	 to	democratic	 values	pervade	 the	 institutional	 ethos.	Badges	opposing	 racism	are	conspicuously	on	sale	in	the	museum	shop.	However,	the	social	origins	of	fascism	are	 left	 unexplained	 because	 to	 do	 this	 would	 mean	 revisiting	 the	 grand	narratives	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 Tellingly	 the	museum	omits	Faschismus	 in	favour	 of	 the	 ideologically	 cauterised	 term	 Rechtsradikalismus. 25 	The	 grand	narratives	of	 fascism	and	 communism	revolve	 around	 the	 state	 as	 the	 locus	of																																																									25	The	use	of	this	term	and	the	equally	anodyne	Rechtsextremismus	is	conventional	at	other	state	heritage	sites	 in	Germany.	A	member	of	 staff	 at	one	major	 institution	explained	 to	me	 that	 the	term	Faschismus	is	omitted	owing	 to	 its	 currency	 in	 the	German	Democratic	Republic	and	 left-wing	politics.	
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political	 power,	 which	 neoliberal	 orthodoxy	 holds	 to	 be	 the	 root	 cause	 of	totalitarian	pathologies.	Instead	the	visitor	is	immersed	in	multiple	perspectives	that	 localise	 political	 power.	 Ames	 has	 exposed	 the	 intrinsic	 falsehood	 of	museums	predicated	on	multiple	perspectives	as	 the	“Wizard	of	Oz	 technique”,	whereby	 “exhibits	 present	 the	 anonymous	 voice	 of	 authority,	 while	 in	 reality	texts	are	constructed	by	one	or	more	curators	hiding	behind	the	screens	of	the	institution”	 (2005,	 45).	 The	 staging	 of	 the	 exhibition	 reveals	 how	 the	museum	still	 operates	 according	 to	 a	 master	 narrative	 and	 neofascist	 pilgrims	 to	Wewelsburg	are	perfectly	aware	of	this.	That	Wewelsburg	is	today	a	museum	is	for	 them	an	 irrelevance,	because	 it	will	 always	be	a	 sacred	space	 to	 transgress	what	they	perceive	as	an	illegitimate	state	authority.		Rosenfeld	comments	 that	contemporary	occidental	 interpretations	of	 the	Third	Reich	 are	 governed	 by	 an	 absence	 of	 fear	 because	 society	 has	 “progressively	liberated	itself	from	the	nightmares	and	fantasies	related	to	the	Nazi	era”	(2005,	382).	Although	a	necessary	step	in	making	an	objective	historical	analysis	of	the	SS,	 humanising	 its	 personnel,	 as	 the	 museum	 does,	 carries	 with	 it	 enormous	moral	 responsibility.	 Shifting	 attitudes	 in	 Germany	 and	 on	 the	 European	 stage	have	 seen	 SS	 men	 enter	 a	 new	 cultural	 domain.	 In	 Oliver	 Hirschbiegel’s	 film	
Downfall	(2004),	the	SS	doctor	Ernst	Günther-Schenck	appears	as	an	honourable	and	 compassionate	 soldier,	 who	 displays	 selfless	 concern	 for	 the	 lives	 of	 his	comrades	 and	 Berlin’s	 civilian	 population.	 Paul	 Verhoeven’s	 film	 Black	 Book	(2006)	 plots	 a	 course	 of	 even	 greater	 moral	 uncertainty	 in	 its	 portrayal	 of	 a	fictional	 SS	 officer	 who	 falls	 in	 love	 with	 a	 Jewish	 woman	 and	 seeks	 a	modus	
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vivendi	 with	 the	 Dutch	 resistance.	 The	 “honourable”	 SS	 man	 harbours	 the	potential	for	an	even	more	morally	corrosive	archetype:	the	“good”	SS	man.		At	Wewelsburg	 the	portrayal	of	 the	SS	 is	based	on	a	 contradiction:	on	 the	one	hand	 they	 are	 normalised	 as	 smiling	 family	 men;	 on	 the	 other	 their	 material	culture	 is	 partially	 hidden	 from	 view	 owing	 to	 its	 reputedly	 enigmatic	 power.	Although	 externally	 influenced,	 curatorial	 countermeasures	 against	 fascination	are	 an	 indication	 that	 the	 custodians	 of	Wewelsburg	 are	 not	 fully	 cognisant	 of	how	 the	 symbolism	 of	 objects	 is	 socially	 constructed.	 For	 neofascists,	Wewelsburg	 and	 the	Black	Sun	materialise	 the	political	 power	of	 suggestion—the	potential	of	turning	utopian	fantasy	into	reality.	As	some	of	the	Third	Reich’s	last	 living	 perpetrators	 are	 brought	 to	 trial	 and	 dead	 ones	 immortalised	 in	celluloid,	 it	 is	 worth	 remembering	 that	 fascism	was	 always	 about	 this.	 It	 was	about	man	becoming	his	own	godhead	with	the	past	as	his	only	true	mirror.	This	has	a	particular	poignancy	in	contemporary	Germany	where	the	heritage	deluge	contains	myriad	fascist	eddies.	Schröder’s	historicism	has	become	the	orthodoxy	of	a	neoliberal	society,	where	all	political	discourse	must	be	made	with	reference	to	 the	 past.	 For	 example,	 Patriotic	 Europeans	Against	 the	 Islamicization	 of	 the	West	 (Pegida)	has	appropriated	 the	slogan	of	1989	Wir	Sind	das	Volk	(“We	Are	the	People”)	to	articulate	anti-immigrant	populism	whilst	marching	on	Munich’s	Königsplatz,	 the	 symbolic	 heart	 of	 German	 fascism.	 Far-right	 demonstrators	carry	German	 imperial	 flags	as	 ciphers	 for	 the	 swastika.	 In	 such	circumstances	the	multi-vocality	of	objects	and	symbols	becomes	crucial	in	the	superimposition	of	new	historical	narratives.	The	Black	Sun	is	an	axiom	of	this	polysemy,	having	travelled	through	the	walls	of	Wewelsburg	across	Europe	and	beyond.	
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Wewelsburg	demonstrates	how	fantasy	and	reality	can	co-exist	within	irrational	nationalist	ideologies	as	the	will	to	power.	The	mythology	now	surrounding	the	castle	obscures	the	truth	of	 fascist	modernity,	 that	 it	suggested	the	potential	 to	make	 the	 fantastical	 real.	 Bloch	 attributed	 the	 fascist	 élan	 for	 obscurantist	fantasy	to	the	alienation	of	the	German	bourgeoisie.	For	the	bourgeois,	liberalism	had	brought	 forth	the	“nothingness”	of	a	cold	mechanical	order	 in	which	he	no	longer	had	a	future	(1991,	169-171).	Fascist	chiliasm	offered	a	new	future,	albeit	one	steeped	in	archaic	mythology	and	a	falsified	past:		 The	wish	for	happiness	was	never	painted	into	an	empty	and	completely	new	future.	A	better	past	was	always	to	be	restored	too,	though	not	a	recent	past,	but	 that	 of	 a	 dreamed-after,	more	beautiful	 earlier	 age.	And	 this	 golden	 age	was	 not	 only	 to	 be	 renewed	 but	 also	 surpassed	 by	 an	 as	 yet	 nameless	happiness…	 It	 is	 precisely	 here	 that	 the	 myth	 of	 the	 Thousand-Year	 Reich	begins,	of	a	happy	final	age	towards	which	history	is	striving,	or	rather:	which	history	has	in	store	for	the	“just.”	(128)			In	the	Merkel	era	when	neoliberalism	offers	but	a	darkling	future,	the	undertow	of	the	past	is	intensifying.	That	which	endures	testifies	against	nothingness,	and	the	 tyranny	 of	 a	 perpetual	 present.	 The	 past	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 panacea	 for	 the	alienated	 bourgeois	 alone,	 but	 increasingly	 for	 the	 worker,	 experiencing	deindustrialisation	 and	 social	 atomisation.	 The	 heritage	 deluge	 in	 Germany	heightens	potential	for	neofascist	recuperation	of	the	Third	Reich,	thus	inverting	the	dynamic	of	earlier	anti-fascist	activism.	As	the	Ukrainian	case	demonstrates,	however,	this	danger	is	not	a	uniquely	German	phenomenon.	Where	the	state	is	incapable	 of	 projecting	 a	 convincing	 vision	 of	 the	 future,	 that	 which	 it	 has	officially	 confined	 to	 the	 past	 will	 cease	 to	 be	 so.	 In	 this	 climate,	 irrational	nationalism	 is	 gaining	 ideological	 traction	 as	 a	 chimeric	 version	 of	 Le	 Goff’s	“Eternal	Return”	(1992,	25).	In	this	cycle	collective	belief	in	linear	social	progress	
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is	 replaced	 by	 a	 new	 faith	 in	 the	 ancient	 as	 the	 human	 zenith.	 In	 this	 sense,	neofascism	 is	 connected	 to	 the	 same	 ideological	 circuit	 as	 religious	fundamentalism.	Both	operate	within	a	chiliastic	cosmology	of	the	“end	times”	as	the	birth	pains	of	a	better	world.	 In	 the	neoliberal	context	 these	 ideologies	are	the	 dark	 matter	 in	 a	 social	 space	 illuminated	 only	 by	 identity	 politics.	 The	absence	 of	 a	 progressive	 social	 project	 bringing	 light	 to	 the	 dark	 places	 will	inevitably	produce	popular	gravitation	towards	them.	
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Part	Two		
Three	
	
Strange	Land:		
Jewish	Nationalism	and	Fundamentalism	in	Israeli	Modernity	
	On	 May	 14,	 1948,	 a	 crowd	 gathered	 at	 the	 Tel	 Aviv	 Museum	 on	 Rothschild	Boulevard	to	hear	David	Ben-Gurion	read	Israel’s	Declaration	of	 Independence.		Before	it	became	a	museum	the	building	was	home	to	the	city’s	first	mayor,	Meir	Dizengoff.	In	1910,	residents	held	a	meeting	in	Dizengoff’s	house	that	resolved	to	rename	 their	 settlement	 Tel	 Aviv.	 Having	 undergone	 restoration,	 it	 was	 re-opened	as	the	Independence	Hall	in	1981.	Upon	entering	the	rather	nondescript	building,	 I	 find	 myself	 alone	 in	 the	 modest	 room;	 empty	 chairs	 are	 arranged	around	 the	 platform	 which	 is	 preserved	 as	 it	 was	 on	 that	 day	 in	 1948.	 The	moment	 of	 Israel’s	 birth	 is	 frozen	 in	 time	 as	 national	 heritage	 in	 the	 manner	typical	of	many	post-colonial	societies	in	the	twentieth	century.		Shortly	after	I	arrive	a	group	of	Israel	Defense	Forces	(IDF)	soldiers	file	in	for	a	presentation	by	 a	 guide	 (photo	3.1).	Watching	 the	 young	national	 service	men	and	 women,	 a	 number	 of	 whom	 are	 wearing	 knitted	 kippahs	 (skull-caps)	indicating	 their	 national-religious26	political	 orientation,	 I	 witness	 a	 pattern	 of	heritage	consumption	that	 I	have	observed	throughout	 Israel	and	the	Occupied																																																									26	As	Zionists,	national-religious	 Jews	 serve	 in	 the	armed	 forces	and	do	not	observe	 traditional	
haredi	 (ultra-orthodox)	 strictures	 regarding	 dress.	 The	 terms	 national-religious	 and	 Religious	Zionist	are	used	interchangeably	hereafter.			
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Territories	of	Palestine.	Unlike	the	more	individualistic	ethos	of	Western	Europe	and	North	America,	Israel’s	national	heritage	is	typically	encountered	in	a	guided	group—an	 enduring	 legacy	 of	 the	 country’s	 collectivist	 origins.	 The	 Israeli	heritage	sector	also	projects	nationalist	messages	far	more	overtly.	In	both	Israel	and	the	Occupied	Territories,	the	boundaries	between	state	and	activist	heritage	are	at	times	indistinct.	Museums	and	other	heritage	organisations	developed	by	Jewish	 settlers	 in	 the	 Occupied	 Territories	 are	 typically	 supported	 by	 local	communal	 bodies,	 which	 are	 funded	 by	 the	 Israeli	 government.	 Following	 the	North	American	model,	private	philanthropy	also	plays	a	significant	role.		
	
Photo	3.1	An	IDF	tour	group	listening	to	a	guide	in	the	Independence	Hall,	Tel	Aviv.			That	 Ben-Gurion	 chose	 a	 museum	 to	 make	 his	 historic	 declaration	 was	 not	superficial	 political	 theatre	 but	 a	 symbolic	 act.	 Zionism	 possesses	 the	characteristic,	 common	 to	 all	 forms	 of	 nationalism,	 of	 being	 episodically	 self-referential.	 Ben-Gurion’s	 speech	 took	 place	 in	 a	 building	 that	 had	 earlier	
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witnessed	 a	 pivotal	 moment	 in	 the	 realisation	 of	 the	 Zionist	 dream.	 Activism,	symbolic	place	and	national	heritage	were	thus	perfectly	aligned	to	demonstrate	the	 destiny	 of	 the	 Jewish	 people	 in	 Eretz	 Israel	 (the	 Land	 of	 Israel).	 This	teleological	 trinity	 is	 key	 to	 understanding	Zionism	and	 the	 functionality	 of	 its	heritage	in	the	ideological	motherboard	of	the	Israeli	state.			Yiftachel	 terms	 Israel	 an	 “ethnocracy”	 that	 “facilitates	 the	 expansion,	ethnicization,	 and	 control	 of	 a	 dominant	 ethnic	 nation”	 (2006,	 11).	 Israel’s	Zionist	engineers	were	aware	of	the	necessity	of	United	Nations	backing	for	their	national	aspirations	and	that	the	world	would	be	watching	Ben-Gurion	speaking	in	 Tel	 Aviv.	 Ben-Gurion’s	 declaration	 was	 therefore	 spoken	 in	 universal	democratic	language,	but	with	a	particularist	qualification.	He	offered	Arabs	“full	and	 equal	 citizenship”	 and	 forbade	 discrimination	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 religion,	race	or	sex,	whilst	contrarily	defining	Israel	as	a	“Jewish	state”.	The	construction	of	Israel’s	national	heritage	must	therefore	be	seen	as	ethnocratic,	although	the	state’s	latter-day	multiculturalism	in	respect	to	the	country’s	Arab	minority	is	a	legacy	of	the	declaration’s	ambiguity.	Consequently	Arab	and	Jewish	Israelis	may	learn	 Arabic	 at	 school	 but	 a	 visit	 to	 the	 Israel	 Museum	 confirms	 the	 latter’s	ancient	biblical	claim	to	the	land.	When	referring	to	the	Israeli	“nation”	hereafter,	I	 add	 the	 caveat	 that	 this	 term	does	not	necessarily	 include	 the	 country’s	non-Zionist	Jewish	population	nor	its	Arab,	Druze	and	other	minority	citizens.					Visitors	 to	 the	 Independence	Hall	 learn	 that	 the	 signing	of	 the	declaration	was	preceded	 by	 a	 blessing	 from	Rabbi	 Yehuda	 Leib	 Laimon,	 leader	 of	 the	Merkaz	Ruhani	(Spiritual	Centre).	 Judaism	was	thus	centred	ontologically	within	Israeli	nationalism	 at	 the	 state’s	 inception.	 Although	 predominantly	 secularist,	 the	
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Labour	Zionist	leadership	rationalised	the	Bible	as	the	“first	history	book”	(Sand	2014,	204).	Having	previously	possessed	other	nationalities,	Jewish	immigrants	to	 Palestine	 needed	 a	 common	 origin	 story	 to	 solidify	 the	 “Jewish	 state”	 as	 a	legitimate	 historical	 entity.	 As	 fresh	waves	 of	 Jewish	 immigrants	 have	 arrived	from	elsewhere	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	(Mizrahi	or	Eastern	Jews)	as	well	 as	 the	United	 States,	 and	 latterly	 the	 former	 Soviet	Union,	 the	 ideological	potency	of	Israel’s	ontological	bonding	agent	has	increased.			National	cultural	regulation	has	proven	problematic	for	the	Israeli	state	on	two	counts.	 Firstly,	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 nation	 itself	 has	 been	 constantly	 fluid	owing	 to	migratory	 fluctuations.	Secondly,	 the	de	facto	 consolidation	of	 Israel’s	borders	as	the	1949	armistice	“Green	Line”	was	only	a	temporary	achievement	that	was	quickly	disrupted	by	the	Arab-Israeli	wars	of	1956,	1967	and	1973.	The	formation	of	Israel’s	national	heritage	and	the	challenges	to	it	by	radical	Jewish	settlers	have	been	inextricably	linked	to	the	question	of	the	border	and	its	lack	of	permanent	 definition.	 The	 penetration	 of	 Israeli	 settlements	 into	 former	Jordanian	 and	 Egyptian	 territories	 after	 1967	 has	 been	 accompanied	 by	 the	development	of	public	services	and	infrastructure	in	these	areas.	Zionist	rhetoric	notwithstanding,	 successive	 Israeli	 governments	 have	 fought	 shy	 of	 delivering	the	 coup	 de	 grâce	 to	 Palestinian	 statehood	 by	 annexing	 these	 territories.	 The	Israeli	state	has	therefore	been	exposed	to	a	crisis	of	authority	among	the	settler	population	which	has	produced	a	contradiction:	the	settlements	cannot	survive	without	the	protection	of	the	IDF	and	yet	other	manifestations	of	state	power,	in	the	cultural	sphere	for	example,	are	significantly	absent	or	devolved	sotto	voce.	
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Under	 these	 conditions,	 activist	 heritage	 has	 emerged	 as	 a	 grassroots	 agent	 of	occupation.						The	activist	heritage	of	the	Jewish	settler	movement	in	the	Occupied	Territories	of	the	West	Bank	and	Gaza	is	the	primary	focus	of	this	chapter.	The	discussion	is	centred	on	the	Jewish	fundamentalism	of	Religious	Zionist	settlers.	I	emphasise,	however,	 that	 the	 demographic	 composition	 of	 the	 settlements	 also	 includes	 a	strong	 secular	 component,	 non-ideological	 Jews,	 and	 non-Jewish	 Israelis	 from	the	 former	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 elsewhere.	 The	 study	 of	 Zionism	 is	 often	accompanied	 by	 categorical	 binaries:	 secular/religious,	 socialist/capitalist	 and	Ashkenazi/Mizrahi.	By	 considering	 the	post-1967	 settler	movement	within	 the	longer	 ideological	 trajectory	of	Zionism,	 I	shall	demonstrate	 that	 these	binaries	obscure	 a	 common	 ideological	 node	 that	 is	 clearly	 visible	 in	 both	 state	 and	activist	heritage	representations	of	Israel.		I	begin	my	discussion	with	the	activist	heritage	of	a	secular	kibbutz,	because	the	history	 of	 Jewish	 settlement	 in	 the	Occupied	Territories	 cannot	 be	 understood	without	recourse	 to	 the	Labour	Zionist	pioneering	tradition.	The	 Jewish	Yishuv	(Settlement)	in	Palestine	took	shape	under	the	ideological	hegemony	of	Labour	Zionism	 following	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 kibbutz	movement	 during	 the	 Second	Aliyah27	(1910-14).	The	kibbutz	acquired	 its	distinctive	 ideological	 aura	during	the	Third	Aliyah	(1918-23),	when	it	became	the	nucleus	of	the	future	Israeli	state	with	the	support	of	the	Jewish	National	Fund	(Shafir	1996,	185-186).	In	the	late	1930s,	the	“tower	and	stockade”	settlement	strategy	was	implemented.	This	has	
																																																								27	Aliyah	literally	means	“ascent”	in	the	religious	sense	but	in	this	context	I	translate	it	as	“wave	of	immigration”.			
	 122	
become	 an	 Israeli	 “foundation	 myth”,	 perpetuated	 through	 education	 and	commemoration	in	museums	and	Zionist	youth	movements	(Katriel	and	Shenhar	1990,	361).					The	 kibbutzim	 of	 the	 pre-state	 period	 were	 established	 by	 pioneering	 Zionist	youth	movements,	 mostly	 comprised	 of	 Jews	 originating	 in	 the	 Habsburg	 and	Russian	 empires.	 The	 primacy	 of	 youth,	 working	 the	 land	 and	 returning	 to	nature,	formed	the	basic	tenets	of	the	pioneering	ethos	as	espoused	by	its	early	ideologues	 Aaron	 David	 Gordon	 and	 Ber	 Borokhov.	 From	 this	milieu	 emerged	the	totemic	figure	of	the	“New	Hebrew”	born	on	Palestinian	soil	(Biale	1986,	146;	Zerubavel	1995,	27-28).	As	the	ideological	hegemony	of	Labour	Zionism	waned	after	its	apogee	in	the	Six	Day	War,	kibbutz	heritage	museums	were	developed	as	communal	 projects	 to	 preserve	 the	 values	 of	 pioneering	 in	 Jewish	 collective	memory	 (see	 Katriel	 1997).	 Veterans	 of	 the	 paramilitary	 Haganah,	 and	 its	Revisionist	 Zionist	 foil,	 the	 Irgun,	 also	 established	 museums	 to	 commemorate	their	struggle	in	the	War	of	Independence	(see	Boord	2016).	Pioneering	and	self-sacrifice	 for	 the	 homeland	 have	 become	 central	 to	 the	 Zionist	 meta-narrative	underpinning	the	heritage	of	Jewish	settlement.			
The	Holy	Ones			The	 sacrifices	 of	 the	 pre-state	 pioneers	 are	 now	 encoded	 as	 “root	 paradigms”	within	Israeli	national	heritage.	Yad	Mordechai	was	founded	in	1943	by	a	Polish	contingent	of	the	Labour	Zionist	youth	movement,	Hashomer	Hatzair	(The	Young	Guard).28	The	 kibbutz	was	named	 in	 honour	 of	 the	 commander	 of	 the	Warsaw	
																																																								28	Hashomer	Hatzair	was	founded	in	Galicia	in	1913	(see	Margalit	1969).	
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Ghetto	 Uprising,	 Mordechai	 Anielewicz.	 Located	 in	 the	 southern	 Negev,	 the	kibbutz	was	on	the	frontline	during	the	War	of	Independence	and	faced	attack	by	the	 Egyptian	 army	 in	 May	 1948.	 In	 the	 teeth	 of	 the	 Egyptian	 onslaught,	 the	defenders	held	out	for	five	days	and	suffered	heavy	casualties	before	retreating	eastwards.	Yad	Mordechai	was	then	retaken	by	the	IDF	in	November.	Assisted	by	IDF	engineers,	in	1965	the	kibbutz	created	a	reconstruction	of	the	battle	site.	The	From	Holocaust	 to	Revival	Museum	opened	 in	 1968	 in	 a	 building	 designed	 by	Arieh	 Sharon.	 Its	 narrative	 was	 conceptualised	 by	 Abba	 Kovner,	 a	 former	Hashomer	 Hatzair	 activist	 in	 the	 Vilna	 Ghetto	 Underground,	 who	 thereafter	became	 an	 ideologue	 in	 the	 Palmach29	and	 the	 IDF’s	 Givati	 Brigade	 (see	 Porat	2010).	Kovner	made	the	teleological	connection	between	the	heroism	of	ghetto	resistance	fighters	and	the	combative	bravery	of	pioneers	in	Palestine.	Today	the	kibbutz	 retains	 its	 original	 communal	 ethos	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 numerous	concrete	 bunkers	 to	 protect	 residents	 against	 Kassam	 rocket	 fire	 from	 Gaza	testifies	 to	 its	 continuing	 frontline	 status.	 Arriving	 by	 bus,	 I	 pass	 through	 the	kibbutz	gate	and	stroll	its	quiet	streets	with	their	modest	single-story	dwellings	before	 ascending	 to	 view	 the	 monument	 to	 Mordechai	 Anielewicz,	 erected	 in	1951	(photo	3.2).			The	statue	was	sculpted	by	Nathan	Rapoport,	the	Polish	artist	responsible	for	the	Warsaw	Ghetto	Monument,	and	a	member	of	Hashomer	Hatzair	in	his	youth	(see	Young	1989).	The	defiant	ghetto	fighter,	grenade	in	hand	and	primed	for	death,	stands	 next	 to	 the	 shell-holed	 wreckage	 of	 the	 water	 tower	 destroyed	 by	 the	Egyptians	in	1948.	Like	its	Warsaw	counterpart,	the	monument	is	in	the	style	of																																																									29	The	Palmach	was	 the	Haganah’s	elite	unit	with	strong	 ideological	 connections	 to	 the	kibbutz	movement.		
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Socialist	Realism.	At	 the	 time	of	 its	unveiling,	Hashomer	Hatzair	was	politically	aligned	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	what	 it	 heralded	 as	 the	 communist	 “forces	 of	tomorrow”	 (Beinin	 1990,	 27).	 Handelman	 places	 the	 monument	 within	 the	canon	of	Israeli	military	memorialism	wherein	the	“land	is	sign-posted	in	space	and	 time,	 in	 coordinates	 of	 national	 sacred	 geography,	 history,	 myth”	 (2004,	158).	 The	 juxtaposition	 of	 the	 sculptural	 memorial	 with	 the	 water	 tower	materialises	the	heritage	of	Jewish	resistance	in	the	sacred	landscape	through	an	authentic	artefact	of	the	battle.	The	authentication	of	the	place	through	physical	traces	of	war	 is	 vital	 to	 the	 transmission	of	 the	 core	Zionist	message.	 Feldman	has	 observed	 significant	 indifference	 among	 contemporary	 Israeli	 youth	 at	 the	site	of	 the	Warsaw	Ghetto	 itself,	 owing	 to	 the	 lack	of	 extant	materiality	 (2008,	105).		
	
Photo	 3.2	 Statue	 of	 Mordechai	 Anielewicz	 by	 Nathan	 Rapoport	 in	 front	 of	 the	 water	 tower	destroyed	by	Egyptian	forces	in	1948.	
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The	New	Hebrew	was	 the	 fruit	 of	 the	 Zionist	 concept	 of	 the	Negation	of	 Exile.	Many	young	Jews	born	in	Palestine	and	nurtured	by	Zionist	idealism	to	reject	life	in	 the	 European	 diaspora	 thereby	 lacked	 empathy	 with	 Holocaust	 victims.	Kovner	 himself	 had	 called	 on	 the	 Jews	 of	 the	 Vilna	 Ghetto	 to	 resist	 Nazi	persecution	 and	 refuse	 to	 go	 like	 “sheep	 to	 the	 slaughter”	 (Shapira	1999,	 330-331).	 After	 the	 early	 prevalence	 of	 the	 New	 Hebrew	 archetype	 and	 negative	societal	attitudes	towards	the	perceived	capitulation	of	European	Jewry,	 Israeli	Holocaust	memorials	form	a	teleological	bridge	between	those	who	resisted	the	Nazis	 and	 kibbutz	 fighters	 who	 defended	 the	 Yishuv	 against	 Arab	 invasion	(Handelman	2004,	160).	The	monument	 and	museum	at	Yad	Mordechai	hence	perform	 a	 reciprocal	 ideological	 function,	 occupying	 elevated	 positions	 on	 the	kibbutz	from	which	the	collective	achievement	of	Zionist	endeavour	can	be	seen	panoramically.	At	various	points	 in	 the	museum	there	are	viewing	points	 from	which	the	monument	and	other	landmarks	can	be	seen.		When	I	meet	the	guide	outside	the	museum	for	a	pre-arranged	tour,	she	remarks	on	 the	 large	 reinforced	 concrete	walls	 that	 protect	 the	 children’s	 houses	 from	Palestinian	 rockets	 (photo	 3.3).	 The	 museum	 has	 recently	 undergone	refurbishment	 with	 funding	 from	 the	 Israeli	 Ministry	 of	 Culture	 and	 the	Conference	 on	 Jewish	 Material	 Claims	 Against	 Germany.	 Kovner’s	 original	concept	 remains	 largely	 intact	 but	 new	 displays	 employ	 the	 techniques	 of	contemporary	museum	design.	The	narrative	is	conceived	as	the	Jewish	journey	from	 exile	 through	 the	 Holocaust	 to	 redemption	 in	 the	 Land	 of	 Israel.	 The	historical	 significance	 of	 Yad	 Mordechai	 is	 represented	 through	 the	 battle	 of	1948	as	a	key	moment	in	the	struggle	for	Jewish	statehood.		
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Upon	entering	 the	visitor	 is	confronted	with	a	dramatic	wall	of	protruding	gun	barrels,	 signifying	 the	Egyptian	attack	 (photo	3.4).	A	 staircase	 leads	down	 to	 a	subterranean	 gallery	 illustrating	 Jewish	 life	 in	 Poland	 before	 the	 Holocaust,	 a	world	which	 the	guide	compares	with	 that	of	Fiddler	on	the	Roof.	The	visitor	 is	given	 the	 instruction:	 “In	 this	 place	 try	 to	 see	 what	 cannot	 be	 seen	 again”	 as	definitive	confirmation	of	the	Negation	of	Exile.	A	mock-up	of	a	typical	bourgeois	Jewish	 home	 expresses	 the	 futility	 of	 attempts	 to	 assimilate	 and	 the	 empty	promise	 of	 prosperity	 outside	 Israel.	 As	we	 proceed,	 the	 guide	 lifts	 screens	 to	reveal	photographic	scenes	of	Jewish	life	in	Warsaw.	This	produces	the	effect	of	a	portal	 through	which	 the	visitor	 views	a	distant	European	past	 from	 the	 time-space	 of	 Israel’s	 present.	 Agents	 of	 redemption	 are	 also	 visible	 within	 this	doomed	community	as	youthful	Zionists	appear	vigorous	and	determined	in	the	world	of	yesterday.			
	
Photo	3.3	Children’s	houses	with	reinforced	concrete	walls	(painted	blue)	to	protect	them	from	Palestinian	rocket	fire.		
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Photo	3.4	Introductory	gallery	of	the	From	Holocaust	to	Revival	Museum.			The	old	land	is	evoked	by	the	ambient	soundtrack	of	Yiddish	songs,	recorded	by	the	 Israeli	 singer	 Chava	 Alberstein.	 When	 I	 ask	 the	 guide	 who	 is	 singing,	 the	question	 prompts	 a	 discussion	 of	 how	 different	 visitor	 groups	 respond	 to	 the	exhibition.	She	points	to	the	pedagogic	challenges	of	engaging	children	from	non-European	 Jewish	 backgrounds,	 principally	 those	 from	Mizrahi	 communities	 in	the	 surrounding	 area	 who	 have	 no	 familial	 connection	 with	 Yiddish-speaking	Ashkenazi	 culture.	Arabic	or	Ladino-speaking	Mizrahis	mostly	 arrived	 in	 Israel	during	the	1950s	and	1960s	and	are	thus	absent	from	museum	representations	of	 Ashkenazi-dominated	 pioneering	 history	 (Katriel	 1997,	 104-110).	 They	 are	also	excluded	from	the	story	of	the	Holocaust	itself	as	an	event	that	took	place	in	Europe.	Middle	Eastern	Jewish	immigrants	largely	arrived	in	the	early	1950s	and	were	settled	in	central	towns	and	villages	after	their	Arab	residents	fled.	North	African	Jews	mostly	came	in	the	late	1950s	and	1960s	to	be	settled	in	peripheral	
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development	 towns	 (Shafir	 and	 Peled	 2002,	 78).	 The	 museum’s	 narrative	 is	therefore	 exclusionary	because	 a	 significant	 portion	 of	 its	 Jewish	 audience	has	not	participated	in	the	redemptive	journey.		Emerging	 from	 pre-Holocaust	 Poland,	 the	 visitor	 proceeds	 through	 the	experience	 of	 Nazi	 persecution	 and	 Jewish	 resistance.	 This	 section	 of	 the	exhibition	also	contains	interactive	features	that	proved	controversial	when	the	new	 displays	 were	 unveiled	 in	 2011.	 One	 interactive	 device	 in	 particular	 was	subject	 to	 media	 scrutiny	 even	 prior	 to	 the	 museum’s	 re-opening.	 Before	reaching	 the	main	exhibit	on	 the	Warsaw	Ghetto,	 the	visitor	passes	a	projector	intended	to	project	a	yellow	star	onto	his	or	her	clothing	to	simulate	those	that	Jews	 were	 forced	 to	 wear	 in	 the	 ghetto.	 The	 new	 exhibition’s	 interactive	approach	 was	 conceived	 by	 its	 designer	 as	 a	 means	 of	 engaging	 younger	audiences	 but	 the	 appropriation	 of	 immersive	 techniques	 from	 the	 leisure	industry	 generated	 media	 criticism	 of	 the	 museum	 as	 a	 Warsaw	 Ghetto	“Disneyland”	 (Saar	 2011).	 Presumably	 in	 response	 to	 this	 criticism,	 the	interactive	has	been	deactivated	when	I	visit.		The	exhibition	does	not	deal	with	the	perpetration	of	the	Holocaust	directly,	but	before	visitors	reach	the	Ghetto	they	experience	a	reproduction	cattle-wagon	of	the	 type	 that	 transported	 Jews	 to	 the	 extermination	 camps.	 This	 was	 also	designed	 to	 simulate	 the	 experience	 of	 being	 transported,	 using	 sound	 effects	and	 imagery	 of	 landscapes	 seen	 passing	 from	 the	 barbwire-covered	windows.	Inside	 the	 wagon,	 a	 clip	 from	 the	 American	 television	 film	Uprising	 (2001)	 is	being	shown.	The	guide	concedes	that	the	celluloid	representation	lacks	realism	
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and	contains	 factual	 inaccuracies,	but	 is	nonetheless	useful	 for	engaging	young	visitors.		
	
Photo	 3.5	 Museum	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 Jewish	 Fighting	 Organisation’s	 bunker	 at	 18	 Mila	Street	in	the	Warsaw	Ghetto.			From	the	cattle	wagon	the	visitor	proceeds	across	a	bridge	overlooking	a	scale	model	 of	 the	Warsaw	 Ghetto,	 before	 entering	 a	 life-size	 reconstruction	 of	 the	bunker	 at	 18	 Mila	 Street,	 where	 Anielewicz	 and	 comrades	 from	 the	 Jewish	Fighting	Organisation	made	 their	 last	 stand	 (photo	 3.5).	 Inside	 the	 bunker	 are	
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interactive	 features,	 such	 as	 a	 hidden	 cache	 of	 Molotov	 cocktails	 to	 be	discovered.	The	 text	describes	 the	uprising	as	 the	 “first	and	 the	greatest	urban	revolt	against	the	Nazis	in	all	occupied	Europe.”	There	is	no	mention,	however,	of	the	 diverse	 political	 currents	 among	 the	 Jewish	 resistance,	 in	 particular	 the	prominence	 of	 non-Zionists	 among	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 Jewish	 Fighting	Organisation.	 The	 prominence	 of	 Anielewicz,	 and	 the	 Labour	 Zionism	 of	Hashomer	Hatzair	by	association,	 is	 essential	 to	 legitimise	 the	museum’s	other	core	narrative	element:	pioneering.	Anielewicz’s	alleged	 last	words	are	quoted:	“My	greatest	dream	has	become	a	reality;	I	have	seen	Jewish	self-defense	in	all	its	greatness	and	glory.”		The	 narrative	 centrality	 of	 Anielewicz’s	 personality	 positions	 him	 as	 the	 ideal	Zionist	hero	whose	blood	sacrifice	reverberates	 through	 time.	Anielewicz’s	 last	words	recall	those	of	the	prototypical	soldier-pioneer	Yosef	Trumpeldor	–	“It	is	good	 to	 die	 for	 our	 country”	 –	 reputedly	 spoken	 after	 he	 fell	 defending	 the	settlement	of	Tel	Hai	 in	1920.	A	witness	 to	Trumpeldor’s	death	after	 the	battle	called	the	fallen	kedoshim	(holy	ones).	Although	the	authenticity	of	Trumpeldor’s	dying	words	 is	questionable,	 they	have	acquired	enormous	posthumous	power	as	Zionist	 legend	 (Zerubavel	1995,	159-160).	At	 the	annual	 commemoration	of	Tel	 Hai	 in	 1943,	 Ben-Gurion	 drew	 a	 comparison	 with	 the	 Warsaw	 Ghetto	resisters,	 describing	 Trumpeldor’s	 self-sacrifice	 as	 a	 “heroic	 death”.	 In	 Zertal’s	words	 the	 “beautiful	 death”	 of	 the	 ghetto	 fighters	 saw	 them	 retrospectively	“conscripted”	 into	 the	 Palmach	 and	 thus	 elevated	 above	 the	 feeble	 diaspora	(2005,	26).		
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Photo	3.6	The	Brothers’	Grave:	headstones	of	those	killed	defending	the	kibbutz	in	1948.				The	 ghetto	 fighters’	 conscription	 is	 confirmed	 when	 the	 visitor	 views	 the	gravesite	of	 the	1948	dead	 through	a	window.	At	 this	 stage	 the	 tour	continues	outside	as	we	walk	around	the	Brothers’	Grave:	a	communal	plot	symbolising	the	defenders’	 heroic	 deaths	 (photo	 3.6).	 The	 grave	 is	 constructed	 according	 to	military	 regulation,	with	 each	 headstone	 proudly	 bearing	 an	 IDF	 emblem.	 The	guide	 explains	 that	 the	 dead	 were	 retrospectively	 conscripted	 into	 the	 IDF	 in	order	 for	 their	 families	 to	 receive	 post-mortem	 benefits.	 I	 ask	 whether	 IDF	groups	 regularly	 visit	 the	 museum;	 she	 says	 soldiers	 are	 “our	 best	 audience”	because	they	are	on	the	“frontline”	and	can	therefore	identify	with	the	story.	At	the	graveside,	the	memorialisation	of	the	holy	ones	of	1948	comes	full	circle	into	Israel’s	 present;	 among	 the	 dead	 is	 the	 grave	 of	 a	 young	 soldier	 from	 Yad	Mordechai	 killed	 during	 the	 2006	 Lebanon	 War.	 He	 is	 buried	 with	 his	grandfather,	who	died	defending	the	kibbutz	in	1948.	The	guide	comments	that	sadness	 over	 the	 death	 of	 kibbutz	 members	 is	 expressed	 collectively	 and	
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describes	how	each	year	on	Israeli	Remembrance	Day,	objects	from	the	museum	are	 symbolically	 carried	 through	 the	 gravesite	 down	 a	 path	 to	 the	 kibbutz’s	dining	hall	for	display.		The	final	section	of	the	museum	completes	the	narrative	journey	from	the	Polish	diaspora	 to	 Jewish	 national	 revival	 in	 Israel.	 Yad	 Mordechai	 is	 placed	 in	 the	wider	historical	context	of	illegal	Jewish	immigration	to	Palestine	and	pioneering	that	 saw	 the	 establishment	of	 eleven	new	kibbutzim	across	 the	Negev	on	Yom	Kippur	in	1946.	The	exhibition	reaches	its	conclusion	in	a	display	on	the	history	of	 Yad	Mordechai	 documenting	 its	 early	 development,	 the	Egyptian	 attack	 and	the	 subsequent	 recapture	 of	 the	 kibbutz	 in	 1948.	 Yad	 Mordechai’s	 strategic	importance	and	overall	contribution	to	the	war	effort	are	captured	in	a	black	and	white	photograph	of	the	IDF	commander,	Yigal	Allon,	in	discussion	with	a	group	of	 kibbutzniks.	 The	 shattered	 water	 tower	 is	 visible	 in	 the	 background	 in	 a	barren	 landscape.	 The	 image	 represents	 the	 ideological	 synergy	 of	 soldier	 and	pioneer	 in	 forging	 Israel	 and	 transforming	 an	 arid	 land	 into	 the	 verdant	community	outside.		
	Before	 they	 leave,	 visitors	 are	 reminded	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 both	 state	 and	kibbutz	remain	contingent	on	military	force	and	self-sacrifice.	The	final	stage	on	the	journey	is	the	memorial	room,	where	a	photograph	of	every	kibbutz	member	killed	 in	 Israel’s	 wars	 is	 displayed	 alongside	 the	 holy	 ones	 of	 1948.	 The	 final	portrait	is	that	of	the	young	soldier	killed	in	Lebanon	(photo	3.7).	The	shrine-like	annex	divulges	the	museum’s	dual	purpose.	On	the	one	hand	it	is	a	state	heritage	institution	in	which	an	annual	succession	of	IDF	and	student	groups	is	instructed	in	the	core	values	of	Zionism	and	its	continuing	relevance.	On	the	other	it	is	a	site	
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of	collective	memory	and	mourning	for	the	kibbutz	itself	that	problematises	the	Zionist	mission	by	 counting	 its	human	cost.	Anielewicz	 is	 cast	 as	 a	 role	model,	but	 is	 nonetheless	 a	 distant	 historical	 figure,	 an	 abstract	 icon	 nobody	 on	 the	kibbutz	ever	met.	The	faces	that	stare	back	from	the	walls	of	the	memorial	room	are	not	strangers;	they	were	family,	friends	and	comrades.	Connecting	the	fallen	of	1948	and	2006	suggests	a	collective	imperative	to	sanctify	the	dead	in	order	to	validate	the	kibbutz	as	a	historical	enterprise	and	a	cause	that	are	still	worth	fighting	for.			
	
Photo	3.7	Portrait	of	a	soldier	from	Yad	Mordechai	killed	in	the	2006	Lebanon	War.	
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The	Labour	Zionism	of	Yad	Mordechai’s	pioneers	was	rooted	in	the	notion	that	Jews	could	rejuvenate	their	national	life	by	working	the	land	as	a	commune.	They	believed	redemption	could	only	be	achieved	by	uniting	 the	 Jewish	subject	with	the	object	of	the	land.	For	Hashomer	Hatzair	the	ideological	goal	was	collective	ownership	 of	 the	 means	 of	 production.	 However,	 the	 movement’s	 ideological	analogue	of	Jewish	nationalism	produced	a	conflicting	trend	toward	idealisation	of	 the	 land.	 Pioneers	 sacralised	 the	 land,	 imbuing	 it	 with	 transformative	properties	that	can	only	be	activated	by	a	Jewish	physical	presence.	When	land	is	idealised	 this	creates	 the	 imperative	of	 return	when	a	community	 is	dislocated	from	 it,	 because	 social	 relations	 are	perceived	 to	 exist	 only	 through	 a	 physical	place.	 The	 seed	 of	 this	 idea,	which	 has	 driven	 all	 post-1967	 Jewish	 settlement	outside	 the	Green	 Line,	was	 sown	by	 Labour	 Zionist	 hands	 and	 planted	 in	 the	kibbutzim	of	the	pre-state	era.		
City	of	the	Dead			The	West	Bank	city	of	Hebron	is	sacred	to	all	three	major	monotheistic	religions	as	the	final	resting	place	of	the	Patriarchs.	The	Tomb	of	the	Patriarchs	(referred	to	by	settlers	as	the	Cave	of	Machpelah)	inside	the	Ibrahimi	Mosque	is	the	second	most	 sacred	 site	 in	 Judaism	 after	 the	 Temple	 Mount	 in	 Jerusalem.	 Hebron	symbolises	the	Jewish	“right	to	return”	more	than	any	other	site	in	the	historical	geography	 of	 Palestine.	 In	 August	 1929,	 an	 Arab	 pogrom	 targeted	 the	 city’s	Jewish	population	in	what	Jews	now	refer	to	as	the	Tarpat	Massacre.30	Following	
																																																								30	Tarpat	 is	the	Hebrew	acronym	for	the	Jewish	calendar	year	5689.	The	unrest	was	sparked	in	Jerusalem	 by	 a	 Zionist	 youth	march	 to	 the	Western	Wall	 in	 protest	 against	 Arab	 inhibition	 of	Jewish	worship	at	 the	site.	After	a	Muslim	counter-demonstration	 the	 following	day,	 the	Grand	Mufti	of	Palestine,	Haj	Amin	al-Husseini,	exploited	the	tensions,	inspiring	a	wave	of	violence	that	spread	to	Hebron	and	Safed	(Shindler	2015,	88-89).		
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the	 capture	 of	 Hebron	 from	 Jordan	 in	 the	 Six	 Day	War,	 Jewish	 settlers	 led	 by	Rabbi	Moshe	Levinger	occupied	the	Park	Hotel,	at	Passover	in	1968.	After	a	visit	by	 Israel’s	 deputy	 prime	 minister,	 Yigal	 Allon,	 the	 settlers	 moved	 to	 the	 IDF	compound	 overlooking	 the	 city.	 In	 1970	 the	 Knesset	 voted	 to	 establish	 the	settlement	 of	 Kiryat	 Arba	 on	 the	 hilltop.	 In	 essence	 Levinger’s	 group	 had	resurrected	the	tower	and	stockade	strategy	of	the	1930s	(Zertal	and	Eldar	2009,	23).			Levinger	 had	 studied	 under	 Rabbi	 Zvi	 Yehudah	 Kook	 at	 the	 Merkaz	 HaRav	Yeshivah31	in	 Jerusalem,	 founded	 by	 the	 latter’s	 father,	 Avraham.	 Immediately	prior	 to	 the	Six	Day	War,	Kook	challenged	 the	 ideological	hegemony	of	Labour	Zionism	on	 Independence	Day	when	he	 asked,	 “Where	 is	 our	Hebron—are	we	forgetting	it?”	This	question	cut	to	the	heart	of	the	territorial	ambiguity	of	Israel	itself	 and	 spoke	 to	 the	 growing	 fissures	within	 Labour	 Zionism.	 Kook	 held	 an	idealistic	 view	 of	 the	 state	 as	 being	 intrinsically	 holy	 and	 pure.	 His	 statism	rejected	 the	 traditional	 Jewish	 orthodox	 conception	 of	 the	 Zionist	 state	 as	 an	idolatrous	 abomination	 containing	 the	 seeds	 of	 its	 own	 destruction.	 Kook’s	Zionist	determinism	interpreted	the	creation	of	the	state	as	enacting	the	process	of	redemption	(Ravitsky	1996,	136-138).	His	ideas	were	a	major	influence	on	the	religious	 pioneering	 youth	 movement,	 Bnei	 Akiva	 (Sons	 of	 Akiva),	 and	 young	activists	within	the	National	Religious	Party.	These	youngsters	went	on	to	form	the	ideological	core	of	the	fundamentalist	social	movement	Gush	Emunim	(Bloc	of	the	Faithful).	Gush	Emunim	was	founded	in	1974	on	the	religious	kibbutz	Kfar	Etzion	 in	the	Hebron	hills.	Kfar	Etzion	was	destroyed	by	the	 Jordanian	army	in	
																																																								31	A	yeshivah	is	a	religious	college	where	students	receive	Talmudic	instruction.	
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1947,	 but	 re-established	 after	 the	 territory	was	 regained	 in	 1967	 to	 become	 a	symbol	of	the	Jewish	“right	to	return”	(see	Ohana	2002;	Greenblum	2016).			Aran	has	isolated	the	origins	of	Gush	Emunim’s	ideologically	renovated	Zionism	in	 Bnei	 Akiva’s	 1950s	 Pioneer	 Torah	 Scholars	 Groups,	 known	 as	 Gahelet	(Embers).	 Under	 the	 influence	 of	 Kookism,	 these	 youngsters	 were	 filled	 with	religious	 fervour	 but	 also	 driven	 by	 an	 inferiority	 complex	 because	 of	 their	political	marginalisation	in	secular	society	(1991,	270).	Originally	Bnei	Akiva	and	its	parent	party,	Hapoel	HaMizrahi	(The	Mizrahi	Worker),	embodied	the	utopian	“Torah	and	Labour”	ideal,	but	shifted	rightwards	under	the	sway	of	the	younger	activists	 (274-275). 32 	They	 increasingly	 advocated	 religious	 instruction	 in	
yeshivot	 over	 the	 kibbutz	 ideal	 and	 developed	 the	 hesder	 yeshivah	 model,	combining	Torah	study	with	military	service.	The	nuclei	of	young	activists	in	the	National	Religious	Party	 rejected	 the	 idea	of	Zionism	as	a	 rational	extension	of	European	nationalism,	 arguing	 that	 the	 Jewish	nation	 could	not	 be	 normalised	(Shindler	2015,	289).		Although	the	Six	Day	War	opened	the	door	to	settlement	of	the	West	Bank,	Aran	sees	the	Yom	Kippur	War	as	decisive	in	the	formation	of	Gush	Emunim.	The	war	provoked	a	climate	of	national	dysphoria,	prompting	protests	against	the	Labour	government	 that	 brought	 the	 predominantly	 secular	 Land	 of	 Israel	Movement	into	contact	with	Religious	Zionist	activists.	The	former,	which	included	left-wing	Labour	 Zionists	 and	 right-wing	 Revisionists,	 had	 earlier	 supported	 the	settlement	of	Hebron	in	1968.	Following	Kook,	Religious	Zionists	recognised	the	
																																																								32	Merkaz	 Ruhani	 and	Hapoel	HaMizrahi	merged	 to	 form	 the	National	 Religious	 Party	 in	 1956	(Shelef	2010,	6-7).	
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compatibility	 of	 secular	 activism	 with	 their	 own	 messianic	 plan.	 The	 kibbutz	movement’s	 pioneering	 ethos	 could	 be	 adapted	 to	 service	 a	 new	 wave	 of	territorial	 expansion,	 redefining	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 Israeli	 state.	 Gush	Emunim’s	 ideology	 would	 therefore	 synthesise	 secular	 Zionism	 and	 orthodox	Judaism	as	“religious	national-revolutionary	nationalism”	(1991,	275).			Feige	 posits	 two	 core	 principles	 in	 Gush	Emunim’s	 activism,	 the	 first	 of	which	sanctified	the	land	“by	virtue	of	the	divine	promise	to	the	people	of	Israel”,	while	the	second	held	that	“specific	places	are	more	sacred	than	others	because	of	their	mythohistorical	role	in	the	Jewish	past”	(2009,	41).	Gush	Emunim	targeted	sites	of	biblical	significance	in	the	West	Bank.	Early	attempts	to	settle	around	Nablus,	which	its	activists	believed	to	be	the	site	of	the	ancient	city	of	Shechem,	brought	Gush	 Emunim	 into	 conflict	 with	 Yitzhak	 Rabin’s	 government.	 After	 Labour	Zionism	was	politically	discredited	by	the	Yom	Kippur	War,	the	arch	Revisionist	Menachem	 Begin	 formed	 a	 tactical	 alliance	 with	 Gush	 Emunim.	 Massive	 state	support	 for	 settlement	 expansion	 followed	 his	 Likud	 coalition’s	 victory	 in	 the	1977	 General	 Election.	 Despite	 official	 backing,	 Gush	 Emunim	 continued	 to	pursue	the	spontaneous	tower	and	stockade	strategy.	In	1979,	a	group	of	women	from	 Kiryat	 Arba	 led	 by	 Levinger’s	 wife,	 Miriam,	 occupied	 the	 Beit	 Hadassah	building	 in	 Hebron’s	 old	 Jewish	 quarter.	 After	 initial	 prevarication,	 the	government	 used	 Palestinian	 attacks	 on	 the	 settlers	 as	 a	 pretext	 for	 officially	approving	the	settlement.			As	the	only	city	in	the	Occupied	Territories	where	settlers	live	amongst	the	local	Palestinian	population,	Hebron	is	the	most	volatile	place	in	the	West	Bank.	It	is	a	locus	 of	 continual	 political	 protest	 and	 violent	 clashes	 between	 Palestinians,	
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settlers	and	 Israeli	 security	 forces	occur	regularly.	Hebron’s	 febrile	climate	has	ironically	made	the	city	a	popular	destination	for	dark	tourism.	(When	I	arrive	in	Jerusalem,	my	hostel	is	operating	a	“Dual	Narrative”	tour	on	which	groups	travel	to	Hebron	and	spend	the	day	in	the	company	of	both	a	Palestinian	and	a	settler.)	Since	the	1997	Hebron	Protocol,	the	city	has	been	divided	between	the	New	City	(H-1),	administered	by	 the	Palestinian	Authority,	and	 the	Old	City	 (H-2),	under	the	military	control	of	the	IDF.	Palestinian	Heritage	in	the	Old	City	falls	under	the	remit	 of	 a	 non-governmental	 organisation	 (NGO),	 the	 Hebron	 Rehabilitation	Committee	(see	De	Cesari	2010).			My	trip	to	Hebron	coincided	with	a	major	spike	in	Palestinian	unrest	in	the	West	Bank	 and	Gaza.	Hebron	 is	 the	 epicentre	 of	 the	 violence	 on	 the	West	Bank	 and	consequently	tourist	traffic	to	the	city	is	greatly	reduced.	Travelling	to	Hebron	by	bus	on	Route	60,	the	passengers	are	mostly	settlers	and	soldiers	returning	from	leave.	The	bus	passes	 through	Kiryat	Arba	before	 continuing	 into	 the	Old	City.	The	 fortified	 settlement	 is	 sizeable	 and	 has	 obviously	 benefitted	 from	 state	provision	 of	 housing	 and	 services	 to	 accommodate	 new	 immigrants	 from	 the	former	Soviet	Union.	Although	the	Israeli	government	initiated	the	settlement	of	Kiryat	 Arba	 in	 1970,	 public	 enthusiasm	 for	 it	was	 initially	muted	 owing	 to	 its	isolation	and	harsh	frontier	conditions	(Zertal	and	Eldar	2009,	28).	Consequently	the	 settlement	 was	 built	 by	 deeply	 committed,	 highly	 militant	 activists	 and	became	a	seedbed	of	far-right	Zionism.			After	 1975	 Kiryat	 Arba	 became	 the	 heartland	 of	 the	 neofascist	 Kach	 (Thus)	movement	 when	 its	 leader,	 Meir	 Kahane,	 moved	 there	 from	 New	 York	 to	instigate	 violent	 confrontation	 with	 the	 Palestinians.	 In	 1972	 Kahane’s	 Jewish	
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Defence	League	distributed	leaflets	in	Hebron,	summoning	its	Palestinian	mayor	for	 trial	 over	 the	 1929	 Massacre	 (Sprinzak	 1991,	 55-56).	 Kahane’s	 presence	further	 inflamed	 inter-communal	 tensions	 over	 the	 Tomb	 of	 the	 Patriarchs.	Today	 the	 tomb	 and	 the	 1929	 Massacre	 are	 the	 two	 existential	 motifs	 of	 the	Jewish	 settlers	 in	Hebron.	 After	 their	 “return”	 in	 1968,	 the	 Israeli	 government	supported	 the	settlers’	demand	 for	 the	partial	conversion	of	 the	mosque	 into	a	synagogue	 (Falah	 1985,	 250-251).	 In	 1994,	 the	 Kach	 activist	 Baruch	Goldstein	entered	the	mosque	wearing	his	IDF	reservist’s	uniform	and	shot	dead	twenty-nine	Muslim	worshippers	before	being	killed.			In	2010	 Israel’s	prime	minister	Benjamin	Netanyahu	 included	 the	Tomb	of	 the	Patriarchs	 in	 the	 national	 heritage	 list,	 provoking	 international	 condemnation	and	 Palestinian	 protests	 across	 the	 West	 Bank. 33 	The	 settlers’	 struggle	 to	maintain	a	presence	at	the	Tomb	of	the	Patriarchs	is	driven	by	religious	fervour,	but	 also	 by	 its	 status	 as	 an	 ethnic	 boundary	 marker.	 Ethnicity	 is	 constructed	around	boundaries	that	are	social,	but	they	may	also	be	territorial	(Barth	1969,	15).	The	 location	of	 the	 tomb	at	 the	end	of	al-Shuhada	Street	 situates	 it	within	Arab	 territory	 where	 Jews	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 attack.	 The	 street	 has	 now	 been	renamed	 David	 HaMelech	 (King	 David	 Street)	 by	 the	 Jewish	 Community	 of	Hebron	 (the	 settlement’s	 municipal	 government)	 with	 blue	 signs	 proclaiming:	“David	 founded	 his	 kingdom	 in	 Hebron	 and	 ruled	 there	 for	 seven	 years.”	Hebron’s	street	signs	and	other	site	 interpretation	mirror	contemporary	urban	heritage	practices	in	European	and	North	American	cities.	In	the	political	context	of	 Hebron	 the	 renaming	 of	 Arab	 streets	 enacts	 what	 Sivan	 terms	 a																																																									33	UNESCO	called	upon	the	 Israeli	government	 to	remove	the	site	 from	the	 list	as	a	violation	of	international	law	(2010,	17).	
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fundamentalist	 “enclave	 culture”,	 wherein	 the	 Jewish	 street	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	“defensive	perimeter”	and	a	“religious	duty”	(2004,	25).			
	
Photo	3.8	IDF	soldiers	posing	for	a	photograph	outside	the	Ibrahimi	Mosque	in	the	Old	City.				State	 designation	 of	 the	 tomb	 as	 national	 heritage	 and	 the	 settler-run	 visitors’	centre	next	door	officially	connect	it	to	the	settlement,	creating	the	potential	for	annexation.34	The	 bus	 from	 Jerusalem	 drops	 passengers	 outside	 the	 mosque	where	an	IDF	group	is	posing	for	a	photograph	(photo	3.8).	Soldiers	and	border	police	 patrol	 the	 environs,	 where	 the	 atmosphere	 is	 tense	 following	 recent	Palestinian	 knife	 attacks.	 Peled	 remarks	 that	 since	 1967,	 the	 IDF	 has	 been	 the	“sovereign	 power”	 in	 the	 Occupied	 Territories	 (2006,	 50).	 Hebron	 is	 the	most	heavily	 militarised	 area	 of	 the	 West	 Bank	 with	 thousands	 of	 soldiers	concentrated	 in	 and	 around	 the	 city.	 As	 I	make	my	way	 up	 al-Shuhada	 Street	
																																																								34	In	 January	2016	settlers	occupied	 two	buildings	at	 the	end	of	al-Shuhada	Street,	 close	 to	 the	tomb,	but	were	evicted	by	 the	 IDF.	One	of	 the	buildings	 is	visible	on	 the	right-hand	side	of	 the	street	in	photo	3.10.	
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toward	 the	 Beit	 Hadassah	 I	 am	 immediately	 challenged	 by	 two	 soldiers	 at	 a	checkpoint	and	asked	to	present	my	passport.	After	the	Goldstein	massacre,	al-Shuhada	Street	was	closed	to	Palestinian	vehicles	and	its	shops	were	shuttered	by	 the	 IDF	 (photo	3.9).	 Following	 the	outbreak	of	 the	Second	 Intifada	 in	2000,	further	restrictions	were	placed	on	pedestrian	movement	in	the	area	and	today	Palestinians	are	virtually	invisible	on	what	was	once	the	main	thoroughfare.			
	
Photo	3.9	Palestinian	shop	fronts	on	al-Shuhada	Street	with	their	doors	welded	shut.	
	
	I	walk	the	length	of	al-Shuhada	Street	towards	the	settlers’	archaeological	site	at	Tel	 Rumeida.	 The	 shop	 doors,	many	 of	 which	 are	welded	 shut,	 are	 frequently	daubed	with	Stars	of	David	identifying	them	as	Jewish	property.	The	practice	is	ironically	referential	to	1929,	when	sympathetic	 local	Arabs	painted	crosses	on	Jewish	 doors	 to	 discourage	 looters	 (Wilson	 2013,	 62).	 The	 painting	 of	 doors,	renaming	 of	 streets	 and	 flying	 of	 Israeli	 flags	 reflect	 the	 practice	 of	 ethnic	
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boundary	 marking	 by	 the	 settlers	 that	 is	 autonomous	 but	 reinforced	 by	 IDF	checkpoints.			
	
Photo	3.10	Observers	from	the	Temporary	International	Presence	in	Hebron	(left)	and	an	Israeli	Border	Policeman	(right)	near	the	Ibrahimi	Mosque.			In	Hebron	both	state	and	activist	 interventions	occur	in	a	terrain	structured	by	military	authority.	The	pedestrians	on	the	street	include	soldiers,	police,	settlers	(frequently	 armed),	 observers	 from	 the	 inter-governmental	 Temporary	International	 Presence	 in	 Hebron	 (photo	 3.10,	 left)	 and	 the	 few	 remaining	Palestinian	 residents	 permitted	 to	 pass.	 The	 activist	 heritage	 of	 the	 settlers	 is	situated	within	an	artificially	engineered	landscape	in	which	Israeli,	Palestinian	and	 other	 social	 actors	 compete	 for	 topographical	 supremacy.	 As	 I	 turn	 the	corner	onto	“Tarpat	Street”	the	walls	of	buildings,	and	concrete	barriers	erected	by	 the	 IDF	 to	 protect	 the	 settlement,	 have	 been	 spray-painted	with	 graffiti	 by	international	 activists,	 both	 supporting	 and	 opposing	 the	 Israeli	 occupation	(photo	3.11).	When	I	reach	the	top	of	the	hill,	I	am	prevented	from	entering	Tel	
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Rumedia	by	an	aggressive	soldier.	(Days	later	I	read	in	Haaretz	that	the	IDF	were	raiding	Palestinian	houses	in	this	area	looking	for	European	solidarity	activists.)		
	
Photo	3.11	Concrete	barriers	on	“Tarpat	Street”	covered	with	pro	and	anti-occupation	graffiti.			The	 Hebron	 Heritage	 Museum	 is	 located	 within	 the	 Beit	 Hadassah	 as	 the	symbolic	 citadel	 of	 Jewish	 settlement	 (photo	 3.12).	 The	 activist	 museum	 is	funded	 by	 the	 Jewish	 Community	 of	 Hebron	 and	 private	 donors.	 Although	 not	directly	funded	by	the	Israeli	state,	the	museum	has	received	its	patronage.	After	undergoing	 renovation,	 the	 museum	 was	 re-opened	 by	 Israel’s	 president,	Reuven	Rivlin,	 in	 February	 2015.	 Rivlin’s	 visit	 indicated	 an	 official	 recognition	that	 the	museum	 is	 no	mere	 cultural	 side-project	 of	 the	 Jewish	 Community	 of	Hebron.	 The	 museum	 represents	 an	 institutional	 expression	 of	 communal	identity	in	a	building	that	acts	as	the	primary	Jewish	ethnic	boundary	marker	in	Hebron.	 The	 incorporation	 of	 the	 museum	 into	 the	 Beit	 Hadassah	 residential	complex	makes	 it	 an	 emblem	 of	 settlement	 and	 an	 active	 agent	 of	 occupation.	
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The	week	before	my	visit,	Israeli	soldiers	had	shot	dead	a	Palestinian	teenager	in	close	proximity	to	it,	on	al-Shuhada	Street.			
	
Photo	3.12	Frontage	of	the	Beit	Hadassah,	off	al-Shuhada	Street.			Adjacent	to	the	Beit	Hadassah	an	IDF	lookout	surveys	al-Shuhada	Street.	Soldiers	frequently	 cross	 the	 walkway	 above	 the	 courtyard	 where	 the	 entrance	 to	 the	museum	is	located	beside	a	children’s	playground.	From	the	courtyard	the	call	to	prayer	from	the	Ibrahimi	Mosque	can	be	heard	incongruously	on	the	wind.	When	I	enter	the	museum	an	IDF	tour	group	is	just	leaving—many	are	wearing	knitted	
kippahs.	 I	am	shown	into	an	auditorium	by	a	guide	who	politely	asks,	 “Are	you	Jewish?”	When	I	reply	that	I	am	not,	she	warmly	welcomes	me	and	asks	where	I	am	from.	As	part	of	the	refurbishment	project,	the	museum	has	produced	a	new	audio-visual	 presentation	 Embracing	 Eternity.	 The	 visitor	 watches	 the	 film,	locked	 into	 mechanised	 seating	 recalling	 that	 of	 a	 fairground	 ride.	 The	 full	immersive	experience	 features	 sound,	 light,	dry	 ice	and,	 somewhat	bizarrely,	 a	
	 145	
bubble	 machine.	 The	 film	 has	 Hollywood-style	 production	 values	 and	 was	obviously	expensive.	It	begins	with	a	scene	of	pathos:	a	Jewish	nuclear	family	at	the	grave	of	their	recently	deceased	grandfather.	The	son	asks	his	father,	“Where	are	 you	 from?”	 to	 which	 he	 replies,	 “I’m	 not	 really	 sure.”	 The	 family	 is	 then	transported	back	in	time	to	the	age	of	the	Patriarchs,	when	Abraham	purchased	the	Cave	of	Machpelah	as	a	tomb	for	his	wife	and	sons.	Abraham	we	are	told	was	“looking	out	for	the	future.”			
	
Photo	 3.13	 Jacob	 on	 his	 deathbed	 in	 a	 scene	 from	 Embracing	 Eternity	 (source:	 http://	www.en.hebron.org.il).			The	 family	 travels	 forward	 in	 time	 to	 the	 deathbed	 of	 Jacob	 in	 Egypt	 where,	surrounded	by	his	 sons,	he	asks	 to	be	buried	 in	 the	Cave	of	Machpelah	 (photo	3.13).	 In	 a	 computer-generated	 scene,	 the	 family	witnesses	 the	 tomb’s	 original	edifice	being	built	during	the	time	of	Herod	the	Great.35	The	main	theme	is	how	Jews	 were	 forbidden	 to	 worship	 at	 the	 Tomb	 of	 the	 Patriarchs	 under	 Arab,	
																																																								35	Herod	 had	 a	 wall	 constructed	 around	 the	 reputed	 site	 of	 the	 cave	 in	 around	 73	 BC.	 The	structure	became	a	church	after	Hebron	was	captured	by	Crusaders	in	1099	and	then	converted	into	a	mosque	when	Saladin’s	forces	conquered	the	city	in	1187.		
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Ottoman	 and	 British	 rule	 and	 became	 a	 persecuted	 religious	minority	 in	 their	ancestral	home.			
	
Photo	3.14	An	Arab	gunman	(played	by	an	Israeli)	in	a	scene	from	Embracing	Eternity	(source:	http://www.en.hebron.org.il).			In	a	symbolic	act	the	father	of	the	family	is	forced	to	defend	his	son	by	taking	up	arms	against	marauding	Arabs	in	1929	(photo	3.14).	The	film	climaxes	with	Ben-Gurion	 reading	 Israel’s	 Declaration	 of	 Independence,	 the	 glorious	 return	 to	Hebron	and	stirring	nationalist	 imagery	of	 fighter	 jets	and	modern	agriculture.	The	lesson	of	the	film	is,	“If	we	preserve	the	path,	the	path	will	preserve	us”—the	path	of	the	Patriarchs.	Ancient	and	modern	elide	in	Jewish	national	destiny	that	begins	and	ends	 in	Hebron	at	the	Cave	of	Machpelah.	The	family	completes	the	symbolic	 journey	 back	 to	 their	 roots	 by	 finally	 climbing	 the	 steps	 to	 enter.	 In	their	familial	theme,	the	filmmakers	have	recognised	the	rise	of	individualism	in	Israeli	 society	 that	demands	Zionist	collective	history	be	personalised.	Without	question	 this	 was	 also	 calculated	 to	 appeal	 to	 American	 and	 other	 Western	audiences.		
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Incorporating	 the	 Hebron	 story	 into	 the	 cinematic	 medium	 also	 suggests	 an	attempt	to	engage	younger	audiences	reared	on	movies	and	video	games.	It	is	a	plea	 for	 relevance	 in	an	age	of	accelerated	 “time-space	compression”	when	 the	immediacy	of	 visual	 culture	 is	deemed	 the	only	means	of	 attracting	 interest	 in	dramatic	 histories.	 The	 film	 is	 clearly	 intended	 to	 elicit	 powerful	 emotional	responses	 from	 Jewish	 audiences	 by	 evoking	 sadness,	 anger	 and	 elation.	Kapferer	 has	 pointed	 to	 the	 centrality	 of	 “passions”	 within	 the	 ontological	determination	of	nationalist	 ideologies	(1988,	115-117).	The	auditorium	where	the	film	is	shown	is	designed	as	a	crucible	for	Zionist	passions.	Shortly	before	my	visit	 I	 read	 on	 the	museum’s	 Facebook	 page	 about	 a	 settler,	who	 had	 recently	been	stabbed	by	a	Palestinian,	proposing	to	his	girlfriend	inside	the	auditorium.	The	 emotional	 scene	 was	 clearly	 staged	 to	 appeal	 to	 Jewish	 filial	 sentiment	within	settler	support	networks.		The	exhibition	follows	a	similar	teleological	trajectory	from	Hebron’s	Abrahamic	origins	to	the	modern	settlement.	Hebron	is	described	as	the	“oldest	Jewish	city	in	 the	world”.	 The	narrative	 begins	with	Hebron	 as	 the	 “natural	 and	historical	capital	of	 Judah”	and	shows	a	photograph	of	a	seal	bearing	 the	 inscription,	 “To	the	King,	Hebron”	in	reference	to	King	David.	(The	guide	later	tells	me	about	the	excitement	 generated	 within	 the	 settler	 community	 by	 its	 archaeological	excavations	 at	 Tel	 Rumeida.)	 In	 a	 section	 entitled	 “Judea	 or	 Palestine?”	 the	exhibition	records	that	Judea	was	renamed	Palestina	by	Emperor	Hadrian	in	the	wake	of	the	Bar	Kokhba	revolt	(AD	132-135)	and	that	this	became	the	“familiar,	common	name	of	Israel.”	Palestine	is	thus	delegitimised	historically	as	a	Roman	invention.	 The	 elision	 of	 ancient	 and	modern	 recurs	 throughout	 the	 exhibition	
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and	 is	 frequently	 echoed	 in	 the	 emphasis	 placed	 on	 specific	 elements	 by	 the	guide.	My	 attention	 is	 drawn	 to	 a	 photograph	 of	 Hebron’s	 old	 Avraham	Avinu	(Abraham	Our	Father)	synagogue.	The	guide	claims	that	its	doors	were	brought	to	 Hebron	 from	 a	 synagogue	 in	 Gaza	 when	 Jews	 fled	 during	 the	 Napoleonic	campaign.	The	Jewish	return	to	Gaza	and	Hebron	in	the	wake	of	the	Six	Day	War	is	hence	linked	thematically	within	the	exhibition.			
	
Photo	3.15	The	1929	Massacre	display:	fragments	of	gravestones	and	photographs	of	the	dead.			
	
	The	fulcrum	of	the	museum	is	the	room	dedicated	to	the	1929	Massacre	as	the	defining	 moment	 in	 the	 history	 of	 Hebron’s	 Jewish	 community.	 The	 room	 is	
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arranged	 in	 the	 manner	 of	 a	 shrine	 with	 a	 dark,	 sepulchral	 atmosphere.	 The	central	 display	 consists	 of	 shattered	 gravestones	 from	 Hebron’s	 old	 Jewish	cemetery	(photo	3.15).	The	fragments	of	stone	recovered	after	1967	are	piled	up	within	an	alcove	lit	from	beneath,	as	if	on	fire.	Next	to	the	gravestones	are	backlit	photographs	 of	 the	 Jews	murdered	 during	 the	 pogrom.	 Several	 portraits	 have	been	blacked	out	for	religious	reasons.	The	description	of	the	massacre	begins	by	blaming	 the	 demagogy	 of	 the	 Grand	 Mufti	 of	 Palestine,	 who	 “subsequently	became	an	admirer	and	ally	of	Adolf	Hitler.”			The	finger	of	blame	is	also	pointed	at	the	British	authorities	who	did	nothing	to	prevent	 the	 massacre	 until	 the	 colonial	 police	 became	 afraid	 that	 the	 Arabs	would	turn	on	them.	The	exhibition	claims	that	the	British	were	able	to	quell	the	Arab	 rioting	 instantly	when	a	police	 captain	 fired	 two	shots	 in	 the	air	with	his	pistol.	The	only	exception	to	the	inhumanity	shown	by	the	colonial	police	was	a	Jewish	officer,	Chanoch	Brodzetzky,	who	“attempted	to	single	handedly	stop	the	Arab	mob.”	A	range	of	weapons	captured	by	Brodzetzky	is	displayed	to	represent	Jewish	valour	as	a	counterpoise	to	the	overarching	narrative	of	victimhood.	The	description	 of	 the	 violence	 alludes	 to	 the	 dangers	 faced	 by	 contemporary	settlers.	The	killing	in	1929	of	Shmuel	Rosenholtz,	a	yeshivah	student,	recalls	the	pretext	 for	 the	authorisation	of	 the	Beit	Haddasah	 settlement:	 the	murder	of	 a	
yeshivah	student	from	Kiryat	Arba	in	Hebron’s	marketplace	in	1983.			At	 this	 juncture	 a	 tour	 group	 organised	 by	 the	 New	 York-based	 Hebron	 Fund	enters	 the	 room	 guided	 by	 an	 American	 rabbi,	 whom	 I	 recognise	 from	 social	media	as	a	prominent	activist.	Both	the	museum	and	the	settlement	are	heavily	dependent	on	financial	contributions	from	wealthy	American	donors	and	there	is	
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a	 regular	 weekly	 programme	 of	 tour	 groups	 to	 facilitate	 this	 connection.	 The	hermetic	journey	from	Jerusalem	to	Hebron’s	Jewish	enclave	in	an	armoured	bus	is	advertised	as	a	heritage	tour	on	which	participants	can	experience	first-hand	the	 “pioneering	 spirit”	 of	 the	 settlers. 36 	The	 arrival	 of	 the	 tour	 group	demonstrates	 the	 museum’s	 dual	 conception.	 The	 Beit	 Hadassah	 acts	 as	 a	residential	building,	synagogue	and	community	hub.	The	earlier	 IDF	group	and	the	Hebron	Fund	tour	are	complemented	by	a	trickle	of	settler	families	coming	in	and	 out	 of	 the	 museum.	 The	 museum	 has	 clearly	 been	 designed	 with	 both	settlers	and	diaspora	 Jewish	audiences	 in	mind.	The	self-referential	 tone	of	 the	exhibition	is	matched	by	Zionist	appeals	to	Jewish	particularism	in	the	recurring	themes	 of	 religiosity	 and	 persecution,	 destruction	 and	 renewal.	 Although	amateur	 in	 execution,	 the	 museum	 has	 a	 well-presented	 façade,	 English	translation	 for	 all	 exhibits,	 a	 café	 and	 state	 of	 the	 art	 facilities.	 The	 activist	museum	 therefore	 performs	 an	 advocacy	 function	 amongst	 Jews,	 but	 also	 in	relation	 to	 other	 potential	 supporters,	 such	 as	 American	 Christian	 Zionists.	 It	also	 exists	 as	 an	 institutional	 mechanism	 for	 social	 reproduction	 within	 the	settler	 community	 by	 providing	 ethno-historical	 definition	 and	 a	 reason	 to	believe	 in	 the	 potentially	 fatal	 mission	 of	 maintaining	 a	 Jewish	 presence	 in	Hebron.						The	exhibition	explains	how	 Jews	were	 forced	 to	 flee	after	 the	1929	Massacre,	but	says	that	a	group	of	 families	attempted	to	return	in	1931.	They	established	settlements	 next	 to	 the	Beit	Hadassah	 in	 a	 premonition	 of	 the	 events	 of	 1979.	After	 the	 British	 evacuated	 the	 city’s	 remaining	 Jews	 in	 1936,	 the	 exhibition	
																																																								36	http://www.hebronfund.org/tour,	accessed	January	25,	2016.		
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claims	that	the	Arabs	desecrated	the	Jewish	cemetery.	The	moment	of	return	is	represented	 by	 the	 iconic	 photograph	 of	 the	 IDF	 Chief	 Rabbi	 Shlomo	 Goren	raising	the	Israeli	flag	over	the	Ibrahimi	Mosque	after	the	“liberation”	of	Hebron	in	1967.	The	 image	of	 the	warrior-rabbi	 offsets	 the	 catalogue	of	 victimhood	 in	the	 previous	 room.	 The	 renewal	 of	 the	 Jewish	 community	 is	 framed	 as	 the	descendants	 of	 1929	 exercising	 their	 “right	 to	 return”.	 Survivors	 and	 their	families	are	also	summoned	to	legitimise	the	occupation	of	the	Beit	Hadassah	in	1979.	 (At	 various	 points	 in	 the	 tour,	 the	 guide	 emphasises	 her	 own	 familial	connections	to	Hebron	through	her	great-aunt,	who	lived	in	the	city	and	knew	a	Jewish	physician	murdered	by	Arabs.)	In	this	section	the	history	of	the	buildings	which	today	house	the	Jewish	settlements	in	the	Old	City	is	discussed	as	a	device	for	 reinforcing	 the	 collective	memory	 of	 the	 settlers,	 but	 also	 to	 articulate	 the	rationale	 for	 the	 occupation	 to	 outsiders.	 The	Beit	 Romano	 and	Beit	Hadassah	are	shown	to	have	been	Jewish-owned	property	before	1929.	The	Beit	Romano	was	 originally	 a	 yeshivah	 established	 by	 the	 hassidic	 Lubavitcher	 Rebbe37	in	1912	and	was	returned	to	this	purpose	after	being	occupied	by	Jewish	settlers	in	1982.	 The	 settlers’	 actions	 are	 therefore	 morally	 justified	 as	 property	reclamation	after	 the	 trauma	of	 the	massacre	 and	 Jordanian	occupation.	 (After	the	tour	the	guide	invites	me	to	the	museum	café	so	she	can	show	me	documents	proving	Jewish	ownership	of	key	sites	like	Tel	Rumeida.	When	I	cautiously	probe	the	 veracity	 of	 the	museum’s	 claims,	 I	 discover	 that	 they	 are	 taken	 from	 non-academic	secondary	sources.)		
																																																								37	Sholom	Dov	Ber	Schneersohn	(1860-1920)	was	the	fifth	Lubavitcher	Rebbe	(rabbi	in	Yiddish),	originating	in	Byelorussia	(see	n.	56	below).	
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The	murder	of	 the	yeshivah	 student	 in	1983	and	 the	earlier	killing	of	 six	other	Jews	 attending	 a	 Friday	 evening	 meal	 at	 the	 Beit	 Hadassah	 in	 1980	 are	 also	memorialised	 through	 backlit	 photographs.38	The	 exhibition	 closes	 with	 this	representation	 of	 Hebron’s	 eternal	 cycle	 of	 Jewish	 life	 and	 death,	 exile	 and	return.	 The	 defining	moment	 for	 Hebron’s	 settlers	 is	 a	 cataclysmic	 event	 that	resulted	in	exile.	The	euphoria	of	return	was	thus	only	made	possible	by	a	shared	knowledge	of	 the	 earlier	 catastrophe.	 Scholem	 thought	Messianism	historically	flawed	owing	its	anti-existential	logic:		 The	 magnitude	 of	 the	 Messianic	 idea	 corresponds	 to	 the	 endless	powerlessness	in	Jewish	history	during	all	the	centuries	of	exile,	when	it	was	unprepared	 to	 come	 forward	 onto	 the	 plane	 of	 world	 history.	 There’s	something	preliminary,	something	provisional	about	Jewish	history;	hence	its	inability	 to	 give	 of	 itself	 entirely…	 in	 Judaism	 the	 Messianic	 idea	 has	compelled	a	life	lived	in	deferment,	 in	which	nothing	can	be	done	definitively,	nothing	 can	 be	 irrevocably	 accomplished.	 One	 may	 say,	 perhaps,	 the	Messianic	 idea	 is	the	real	anti-existentialist	 idea.	Precisely	understood,	 there	is	 nothing	 concrete	 which	 can	 be	 accomplished	 by	 the	 unredeemed.	 This	makes	 for	 the	 greatness	 of	 Messianism,	 but	 also	 for	 its	 constitutional	weakness.	Jewish	so-called	Existenz	possesses	a	tension	that	never	finds	true	release…	The	blazing	landscape	of	redemption	(as	if	it	were	a	point	of	focus)	has	concentrated	in	itself	the	historical	outlook	of	Judaism.	Little	wonder	that	overtones	of	Messianism	have	accompanied	the	modern	Jewish	readiness	for	irrevocable	action	in	the	concrete	realm,	when	it	set	out	on	the	utopian	return	to	Zion.	(1995,	35)			Scholem	 identified	 a	 compensatory	 “theory	 of	 catastrophe”	 within	 Jewish	Messianism	 that	 “stresses	 the	 revolutionary,	 cataclysmic	 element	 in	 the	transition	 from	 every	 historical	 present	 to	 the	 Messianic	 future”	 (7).	 The	messianic	Zionism	of	Hebron’s	settlers	is	rooted	in	the	theory	of	catastrophe	as	the	 vital	 precondition	 for	 Jewish	 existentialism	 in	 the	West	 Bank.	 Their	 belief																																																									38	Unsurprisingly	 there	 is	 no	mention	 of	 the	 retaliatory	murder	 of	 three	 students	 at	 Hebron’s	Islamic	University	and	attempted	assassination	of	Palestinian	mayors	by	 the	Kahanist	 terrorist	group	 the	 Jewish	 Underground	 (see	 Sprinzak	 1991,	 97-98).	 Among	 the	 1980	 dead	 was	 Eli	Haze’ev,	an	American	convert	to	Judaism	and	follower	of	Kahane.	
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that	 the	 experience	 of	 catastrophe	 has	 forced	 religious	 Jews	 to	 take	 collective	action	 in	 the	 temporal	 world	 to	 bring	 about	 redemption	 reflects	 Zvi	 Yehudah	Kook’s	ideological	influence.	Kook	responded	to	the	Talmudic	injunction	against	“forcing	 the	 End”	 by	 asking,	 “How	 is	 it	 that	 some	 religious	 spokesmen	 even	withheld	 their	 support	 for	 Zionism	and	 the	movement	 for	 redemption?…	They	failed	 to	 recognize	 that	 it	 was	 not	 that	 we	mortals	 were	 forcing	 the	 End,	 but	rather	 that	 the	Master	 of	 the	House,	 the	Lord	of	 the	Universe,	was	 forcing	our	hand”	(Kook	quoted	in	Ravitsky	1996,	79).			Messianic	 Zionism	 holds	 that	 catastrophes	 befall	 Jews	 because	 they	 are	 not	 a	normal	 people,	 but	 one	 possessed	 of	 a	 singular	 destiny	 as	 the	 first	 and	 last	nation.	Biblical	antiquity	not	only	negates	exile	with	a	model	of	Jewish	statehood	and	martial	glory,	but	also	elevates	the	Jewish	people	above	all	other	nations	as	God’s	elect.	In	this	respect,	settler	ideology	fuses	two	historical	forces	in	rabbinic	Judaism,	 identified	 by	 Scholem	 as	 “restorative”	 and	 “utopian”—categories	 he	considered	 to	 be	 at	 times	 contradictory	 but	 dialectically	 related	 in	 the	crystallisation	of	the	messianic	idea:		 The	 restorative	 forces	 are	 directed	 to	 the	 return	 and	 recreation	 of	 a	 past	condition	which	comes	to	be	felt	as	ideal.	More	precisely,	they	are	directed	to	a	condition	pictured	by	the	historical	fantasy	and	the	memory	of	the	nation	as	circumstances	 of	 an	 ideal	 past.	 Here	 hope	 is	 turned	 backwards	 to	 the	 re-establishment	of	an	original	state	of	things	and	to	a	“life	with	the	ancestors”…	there	 are,	 in	 addition,	 forces	 which	 press	 forward	 and	 renew;	 they	 are	nourished	by	a	vision	of	the	future	and	receive	utopian	inspiration.	They	aim	at	a	state	of	things	which	has	never	yet	existed.	(1995,	3)			Settler	 Messianism	 has	 ideologically	 revitalised	 Zionism	 by	 making	 it	simultaneously	 restorative	 and	 utopian.	 Labour	 Zionism	 once	 possessed	messianic	 properties	 in	 its	 restorative-utopian	 project	 of	 returning	 to	 the	 geo-
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historical	 landscape	 of	 the	 Bible	 to	 pioneer	 a	 new	 agrarian	 society.	 As	 Yad	Mordechai	 illustrates,	pioneering	was	also	shaped	by	 the	 theory	of	catastrophe	as	 the	 harbinger	 of	 redemption.	 The	 ideological	 hegemony	 of	 Labour	 Zionism	faltered	when	its	promise	of	an	emancipatory	utopia	failed	to	materialise	and	it	could	 no	 longer	 define	 the	 state	 in	 existential	 terms,	 except	 through	 military	force.	The	settlers	forced	the	state’s	hand	by	re-settling	Hebron	but	also	elevated	the	 Bible	 to	 be	 its	 constitutional	 document.	 That	 the	 actual	 parameters	 of	 the	Land	of	Israel	are	imprecisely	defined	in	the	Bible	increases	the	utopian	potential	of	 Zionism	 whilst	 offering	 modern	 Palestinian	 cities	 like	 Hebron	 as	 fixed	coordinates	upon	which	to	concentrate	restorative	settlement.			Fidelity	to	the	past	within	the	messianic	outlook	is	matched	by	subservience	to	the	State	of	Israel	as	God’s	creation.	Hebron’s	settlers	are	loyal	to	the	state	as	a	pure	 ideal	 that	 exists	 metaphysically	 beyond	 Israel’s	 politically	 determined	borders.	 Under	 these	 conditions	 the	 state	 becomes	 a	 mobile	 framework	 for	activism	subject	to	redefinition	as	an	expansive	construct.	The	ideal	state	cannot	therefore	 be	 compromised	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 settlers	 because	 it	 can	 always	 be	reimagined.	However,	as	Ravitsky	comments,	the	“metaphysical	elevation	of	the	State	of	 Israel	 threatens	 to	undermine	the	authority	of	 the	given,	earthly	state”	and	 therefore	 the	 “wider	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 ideal	 and	 the	 real,	 between	 the	anticipated	perfection	and	the	actual	 implementation,	 the	more	questionable	 is	the	 existing	 state”	 (1996,	 139).	 The	 Hebron	 Heritage	 Museum	 reveals	 this	ambiguity	in	the	settlers’	attitude	to	the	state.	On	the	one	hand	it	is	celebrated	as	the	realisation	of	the	Zionist	dream	without	which	Jews	could	not	have	returned	to	 Hebron.	 President	 Rivlin	 was	 welcomed	 as	 an	 honoured	 guest,	 whose	
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endorsement	 of	 the	 museum	 was	 a	 publicity	 coup.	 On	 the	 other,	 the	 very	existence	 of	Hebron’s	 settlements	 testifies	 to	 the	 radical	 challenge	 to	 the	 state	posed	by	Gush	Emunim	and	the	reactivation	of	the	tower	and	stockade	strategy	by	messianic	radicals.			When	 I	 emerge	 from	 the	 museum,	 the	 atmosphere	 on	 al-Shuhada	 Street	 has	changed	dramatically.	A	helicopter	hovers	overhead	and	the	soldiers	outside	the	Beit	Hadassah	are	visibly	agitated.	Smoke	is	rising	into	the	cloudless	sky	from	a	burning	Palestinian	barricade.	I	make	my	way	past	the	restored	Jewish	cemetery	where	the	victims	of	1929	are	buried	alongside	the	martyrs	of	the	1980s.	Their	close	proximity	to	the	Beit	Hadassah	materialises	the	most	sacred	article	of	faith	for	Hebron’s	settlers:	the	imperative	of	physical	return	to	the	locale	where	Jews	once	 lived—“life	 with	 the	 ancestors”.	 The	 topography	 of	 Hebron’s	 old	 Jewish	quarter	(cemetery,	synagogue,	yeshivah)	has	been	systematically	restored	within	the	 contemporary	 enclave	 in	 which	 the	 heritage	 industry	 provides	 a	 vital	organising	 principle	 as	 a	 source	 of	 authenticity	 and	 a	 mechanism	 for	 social	reproduction.	 The	 Old	 City’s	 Jewish	 heritage	 sites	 now	 function	 as	 engines	 of	occupation	and	bridgeheads	for	territorial	expansion.		
	
Ancient	Moderns			After	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 State	 of	 Israel	 the	 Bible	 provided	 an	 ontological	blueprint	 for	 the	construction	of	 its	national	heritage	as	 the	origin	story	of	 the	Jewish	 people.	 Israel’s	 most	 sacred	 artefacts,	 the	 Dead	 Sea	 Scrolls,	 were	symbolically	 identified	 on	 the	 same	 day	 as	 the	 UN	 voted	 to	 establish	 a	 Jewish	state	 in	 Palestine	 (see	 Broshi	 1994).	 The	 production	 of	 Israeli	 modernity	
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required	 biblical	 claims	 to	 be	 grounded	 in	 a	 rational	 intellectual	 framework.	Labour	Zionist	intellectuals	headed	by	Ben-Gurion	and	Yitzhak	Ben-Zvi	initiated	this	process	in	the	Yishuv.	The	group	originally	sought	to	prove	that	Palestine’s	Arab	 fellaheen	 (peasants)	 were	 descended	 from	 the	 Judean	 peasantry	 and	therefore	converted	to	Islam	after	the	Arabian	conquest	in	the	seventh	century.	Arab	violence	in	1929	and	1936	dispelled	this	notion	and	thereafter	the	fellaheen	were	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 descendants	 of	 Arabian	 immigrants.	 Palestine	 thus	never	belonged	to	the	Arabs,	so	in	Sand’s	phrase	Zionism	connected	“the	people	without	a	 land	to	the	 land	without	a	people”	(2010,	188).	After	1929,	Ben-Zion	Dinur	 and	 a	 school	 of	 Zionist	 historians	 at	 the	 Hebrew	 University	 set	 about	establishing	a	historical	continuity	between	the	ancient	Israelites	and	the	Jews	of	modern	 Palestine.	 The	 introduction	 of	 the	 territorial	 rights	 discourse	 into	Zionism	informed	the	content	of	the	Declaration	of	Independence	and	the	post-state	 work	 of	 historians,	 archaeologists,	 philosophers,	 biblical	 scholars	 and	geographers	(Sand	2014,	210-211).			Among	 the	 academic	 disciplines,	 archaeology	 became	 the	 most	 valuable	 for	proving	the	ancient	Jewish	right	to	the	Land	of	Israel.	After	the	formation	of	the	state	 the	 archaeological	 priority	 was	 to	 unearth	 evidence	 of	 the	 Israelite	conquest	of	Canaan	between	the	late	Bronze	Age	and	the	early	Iron	Age	(El-Haj	2001,	 99).	 Senior	 government	 figures,	 including	 Dinur,	 Israel’s	 education	minister	 between	 1951	 and	 1955,	 Ben-Gurion,	 defence	minister	Moshe	 Dayan	and	 former	 IDF	 chief-of-staff	 Yigael	 Yadin	 played	 leading	 roles	 in	 making	archaeology	 an	 instrument	 of	 state	 power.	 Ben-Gurion	 held	 a	 fortnightly	Bible	study	group,	deconstructing	the	scriptures	with	a	“Protestant”	emphasis	on	the	
	 157	
unmediated	 text	 as	 literal	 truth	 (Piterberg	 2008,	 273-274).	 Following	 the	precedent	 of	 mapping	 activities	 conducted	 in	 Palestine	 by	 the	 British	Geographical	 Committee	 for	Names,	Ben-Gurion	 established	 the	Committee	 for	the	 Designation	 of	 Place	 Names	 in	 the	 Negev	 Region,	 which	 superimposed	ancient	Hebrew	names	onto	 former	Arab	 towns	and	villages	 (Benvenisti	2000,	12-13).			The	 prominence	 of	 archaeological	 exploration	 within	 early	 Zionist	 statecraft	created	the	ideational	basis	for	Gush	Emunim’s	settler	activism	in	the	West	Bank.	Israel’s	territorial	gains	in	1967	suggested	potential	for	excavating	the	highland	areas	where	 fresh	 evidence	of	 the	 ancient	 Israelites	 could	be	discovered.	Gush	Emunim’s	 activist	 archaeology	 formed	 part	 of	 its	 strategy	 to	 normalise	 the	Occupied	Territories	 in	 the	eyes	of	 the	 Israeli	public	by	establishing	a	common	Jewish	 past	 (Feige	 2007,	 282).	 West	 Bank	 settlements	 were	 sited	 at	 their	approximate	locations	in	the	Bible	and	given	their	ancient	Hebrew	names:	Ofra,	Tekoa,	 Beit	 El	 (Bethel)	 and	 Elon	 Moreh.	 For	 the	 settlers	 the	 books	 of	 Joshua,	Judges,	 Samuel	 and	 Kings	 became	 the	 authoritative	 texts	 for	 directing	 their	restorative	efforts.	As	it	was	for	the	original	Labour	Zionist	leaders,	the	Israelite	conquest	of	Canaan	was	the	key	historical	event	connecting	the	ancient	kingdom	of	Israel	to	the	modern	state.		According	to	the	Bible	after	the	conquest	of	Canaan	“the	whole	community	of	the	Israelite	 people	 assembled	 at	 Shiloh,	 and	 set	 up	 the	 Tent	 of	 Meeting	 there”	(Joshua	18.1).	The	modern	settlement	of	Shiloh	is	 located	in	the	northern	West	Bank	 close	 to	 the	 Palestinian	 village	 of	 Qaryut.	 It	 was	 initiated	 by	 an	archaeological	dig	 in	1978,	after	Ariel	Sharon	granted	Gush	Emunim	activists	a	
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permit	to	excavate	near	what	they	believed	to	be	the	site	of	ancient	Shiloh.	The	settlers	 converted	 their	 tents	 into	mobile	 homes	 in	 an	 act	 of	 “optical-political	camouflage”	 (Weizman	2007,	 91).	Tel	 Shiloh39	had	 earlier	been	 excavated	by	 a	team	 of	 Danish	 archaeologists	 between	 1926	 and	 1932	 and	was	 subsequently	the	 focus	 of	 extensive	 work	 by	 the	 religious	 Bar-Ilan	 University,	 under	 the	direction	of	Israel	Finkelstein,	between	1981	and	1984.	A	further	excavation	was	conducted	 in	 2010	 by	 a	 group	 of	 settler	 archaeologists	 from	 the	 University	 of	Ariel	in	cooperation	with	the	Israeli	Civil	Administration’s	archaeology	officer.			Today	 there	 is	 an	 open-air	 heritage	 site	 branded	 “Ancient	 Shiloh:	 City	 of	 the	Tabernacle”,	which	 is	operated	by	 the	Mishkan	Shiloh	Association	–	 the	Center	for	the	Study	and	Development	of	the	Cradle	of	Settlement	in	the	Land	of	Israel	(a	settler-run	not-for-profit	organisation)	–	and	the	Binyamin	Regional	Council.	Archaeological	sites	in	the	Occupied	Territories	fall	under	the	remit	of	the	Nature	and	Parks	Authority;	Tel	Shiloh	therefore	diverges	from	the	model	of	direct	state	management.	 In	2013	 the	new	 tourist-oriented	site	was	opened	 in	a	 ceremony	attended	 by	 government	 ministers	 Naftali	 Bennett	 and	 Uri	 Ariel,	 of	 the	 pro-settler	party,	HaBayit	HaYehudi	 (The	 Jewish	Home),40	and	Ze’ev	Elkin	of	Likud.	The	 archaeological	 NGO	 Emek	 Shaveh	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 “managers	 of	 Tel	Shiloh	 are	 working	 to	 strategically	 position	 the	 site	 as	 a	 politically	 neutral	alternative	 to	 the	 city	 of	Hebron”	 in	 order	 to	 attract	 tourism	 and	 school	 visits	(2014,	 6).	 Tel	 Shiloh	 was	 also	 included	 in	 Israel’s	 national	 heritage	 list	 by																																																									39	The	 site	 is	 referred	 to	 by	 its	 historical	 name	 of	 Khirbet	 Seilun	 by	 the	 local	 Palestinian	population.	It	was	identified	as	the	location	of	Shiloh	by	the	American	Congregationalist	minister	Edward	Robinson,	 during	 his	 expeditions	 between	 1838	 and	 1852	 (Finkelstein	 and	 Silberman	2002,	15).	40	The	Jewish	Home	was	formed	in	2008	from	the	core	of	the	old	National	Religious	Party	and	is	now	a	leading	force	on	the	Israeli	right	and	Likud’s	junior	coalition	partner	(Shindler	2015,	359-365).	
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Benjamin	 Netanyahu	 in	 2012	 and	 received	 a	 major	 tranche	 of	 government	funding	to	develop	the	site.		Shiloh	has	a	very	different	atmosphere	from	Hebron	and	Kiryat	Arba.	There	is	no	perimeter	fence	or	heavy	IDF	presence	around	the	settlement.	I	arrive	by	public	transport,	alighting	from	the	bus	from	Jerusalem	in	the	middle	of	the	settlement.	When	 I	 enter	 the	 supermarket	 to	 ask	 for	 directions,	 the	 person	 behind	 the	checkout	 ignores	me.	 I	 am	 unclear	whether	 this	 is	 because	 he	 does	 not	 speak	English	(unlikely)	or	he	is	hostile	to	outsiders.			
	
Photo	 3.16	 Ruins	 of	 the	Mosque	 of	 the	 Sixty	 at	 the	 site	 where	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 the	 Shiloh	settlement	was	laid	in	1978.			Making	my	way	down	the	hill,	I	encounter	the	“Dome	of	the	Divine	Presence”	by	the	 car	 park	 (photo	 3.16).	 The	 onsite	 interpretation	 describes	 the	 ruins	 as	 a	“structure	 from	 the	 Byzantine	 period”	 which	 was	 “apparently	 used	 as	 a	synagogue”	 before	 becoming	 a	mosque	 in	 the	 fourteenth	 century.	 Later	 in	 the	
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nineteenth	 century	 it	 became	 known	 locally	 as	 the	 Mosque	 of	 the	 Sixty.	According	to	the	text,	pilgrims	over	the	centuries	believed	this	to	be	the	site	of	the	Tabernacle	and	“some	researchers	believe	it	is	the	tomb	site	of	Eli	the	High	Priest.”	The	contemporary	political	significance	of	the	site	is	also	recorded	as	the	place	where	on	January	23,	1978,	the	“cornerstone	laying	ceremony	was	held	for	the	renewed	settlement	of	Shiloh.”	The	act	of	settlement	is	hereby	incorporated	into	the	historical	narrative	as	a	legitimate	reclamation	of	the	area’s	Jewish	past,	authenticated	through	archaeological	science.		When	I	enter	the	visitors’	centre	I	could	be	at	any	heritage	site	in	Israel.	There	is	a	 gift	 shop,	 café	 and	 tourist-friendly	 customer	 service.	 I	 am	able	 to	 join	 a	 tour	organised	 by	 the	 Christian	 evangelical	 group,	 Women	 on	 the	 Frontlines.41	Of	Christian	 Holy	 Land	 tourists	 from	 the	 United	 States,	 Protestant	 evangelicals	account	 for	 thirty-five	 per	 cent	 and	 nearly	 three	 quarters	 of	 an	 average	 tour	group	 are	 women	 (Kaell	 2014,	 7).	 Evangelicals	 prioritise	 Old	 Testament	 sites	during	 their	 visits.	 Pro-Israeli	 Christian	 Zionists	 also	 visit	 sites	 without	 any	biblical	 significance,	 including	 settlements	 in	 the	Occupied	Territories	 (Collins-Kreiner	et	al.	2006,	92-93).		Our	guide,	a	native	of	New	York,	 introduces	himself	as	a	rabbi	from	the	nearby	settlement	of	Eli	(photo	3.17).	His	approach	is	cordial,	engaging	and	humorous,	but	he	differentiates	himself	from	his	Christian	audience	immediately.	He	refers	to	“my	ancestors”,	thus	projecting	Tel	Shiloh	as	a	primarily	Jewish	site.	From	his	fieldwork	 as	 a	 tour	 guide,	 Feldman	 concludes	 that	 for	 Protestant	 pilgrims	 the																																																									41	The	 group	 is	 “committed	 to	 empower,	 equip	 and	 mobilize	 Christian	 women”	 and	 aims	 to	engender	 “radical	 commitment”	 through	 its	 events	 programme	 (http://www.woflglobal.com,	accessed	February	8,	2016).	This	includes	annual	international	trips	organised	under	the	aegis	of	the	XP	Ministries	of	the	Canadian	televangelist,	Patricia	King.	
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Jewish	guide	represents	a	hebraeus	verus	or	“true	biblical	Hebrew”	(2007,	353).	Kaell	 likewise	 observes	 that	 Christian	 pilgrims	 in	 the	 Holy	 Land	 cultivate	relationships	 with	 local	 people	 as	 “living	 stones”	 connecting	 them	 to	 sacred	places	(2014,	202-203).	Both	Feldman’s	and	Kaell’s	studies	refer	to	the	attitudes	displayed	 by	 pilgrims	 at	 holy	 sites	 inside	 Israel,	 but	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 tour	group	I	joined	clearly	validates	these	observations	in	relation	to	the	West	Bank.		
	
Photo	3.17	The	guide	welcoming	the	tour	group	to	“Ancient	Shiloh”.				Our	guide	is	obviously	conscious	of	his	settler	status	and	addresses	the	issue	of	land	rights	during	 the	 tour.	Early	on	he	draws	our	attention	 to	Qaryut	with	 its	mosque,	visible	on	the	hillside.	He	subtly	employs	the	New	Testament	as	a	frame	of	reference	by	claiming	that	Judas	Iscariot	came	from	the	village.	He	then	poses	the	question:	“How	come	Jews	live	on	hills,	Arabs	in	the	valley?”	He	defends	the	legality	of	Jewish	settlement	on	“state	land”	under	the	1858	Ottoman	Land	Code,	which	continued	under	the	British	Mandate.	The	category	of	mawat	(dead	land)	
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combined	Ottoman	and	British	laws,	allowing	the	Israeli	state	to	claim	any	land	without	 documented	 ownership	 (Yiftachel	 2006,	 139).	 The	 guide	 recalls	 how	Jews	settled	 “dead	 land”	on	 the	hilltops	which	had	been	defined	as	such	under	Ottoman	 rule	 when	 it	 was	 more	 than	 a	 “rooster’s	 call	 away	 from	 the	 nearest	house”.	 By	 invoking	 the	 Ottoman	 era,	 the	 guide	 places	 the	modern	 settlement	within	 deeper	 time,	 creating	 the	 false	 impression	 that	 Palestinians	 could	 have	asserted	 their	 claim	 to	 the	 land	 in	 the	 pre-state	 era,	 but	 chose	 not	 to.	When	 a	visitor	asks	where	we	are	in	terms	of	jurisdiction,	the	guide	clarifies	that	we	are	in	Area	B	hence	 “no	 tanks”.42	He	opines	 that	 in	 the	West	Bank	“there	are	more	Jews	under	military	rule	than	Arabs.”	He	also	complains	about	lawsuits	that	have	resulted	in	“more	Jewish	houses	being	destroyed	by	court	order	than	the	other	way	 round.”	 The	 guide	 is	 conscious	 of	 external	 perceptions	 of	 settlers	 and	humorously	 challenges	 the	 stereotype	 of	 the	 gun	 toting	 “wild-eyed	 fascist”.	 In	doing	 so	 he	 is	 performing	 the	 role	 of	 ambassador	 for	 Shiloh	 and	 for	 settlers	generally.	 “Ancient	 Shiloh”	 is	 a	 form	 of	 advocacy	 designed	 as	 a	 catalyst	 for	normalising	the	West	Bank	in	the	eyes	of	the	Israeli	public	and	foreign	visitors.	In	this	context	the	guide	is	an	activist	with	a	political	agenda.		As	an	amateur	enthusiast,	 the	guide’s	routine	combines	appeals	 to	authenticity	and	emotion	 in	equal	measure.	During	 the	 tour	 I	observe	 that	 the	group	 trusts	the	guide	and	treats	him	as	an	authority	on	both	the	archaeology	and	history	of	the	 site.	 The	 immersion	 in	 the	 biblical	 narrative	 produces	 temporal	 confusion	among	 the	group	at	various	 times,	despite	 the	 chronology	provided	 in	 the	 text																																																									42 	Under	 the	 1995	 Oslo	 Interim	 Agreement	 between	 Israel	 and	 the	 Palestine	 Liberation	Organisation,	the	West	Bank	was	divided	into	three	categories:	Area	A	(full	Palestinian	security	control),	 Area	 B	 (joint	 Palestinian-Israel	 security	 control)	 and	 Area	 C	 (full	 Israeli	 security	control).		
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panels.	At	one	point	someone	asks	the	guide,	“Where	are	we	in	time?”	When	we	reach	the	site	of	the	Byzantine-era	basilica	(photo	3.18),	he	draws	our	attention	to	 the	mosaic	 floor	 excavated	by	 the	Danish	 archaeologists.	He	dismisses	 their	reconstruction	 of	 the	 original	 building	 as	 having	 “zero	 significance”	 because	 it	was	built	in	the	1930s,	telling	us	that	“in	archaeology	you	don’t	make	things	up.”	He	then	appeals	to	religious	sentiment	by	explaining,	“When	you	come	to	Shiloh	you	have	to	see	things	through	your	heart	and	your	knowledge	of	the	Bible.”		
	
Photo	3.18	Site	of	the	Byzantine	basilica	excavated	by	Danish	archaeologists	between	1926	and	1932.			The	 most	 significant	 extant	 structure	 is	 the	 former	 al-Yatim	 mosque	 which	stands	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 site	 (photo	 3.19).43	The	 guide	 informs	 us	 that	 the	mosque	was	constructed	on	top	of	an	earlier	Byzantine	church	which	was	built	on	the	site	of	a	synagogue,	but	no	evidence	is	offered	to	support	this	claim.		
																																																								43	According	 to	Emek	Shaveh,	Muslim	worshippers	 from	Qaryut	used	 the	mosque	until	 the	 late	1970s	(2014,	9).		
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Photo	3.19	The	former	al-Yatim	mosque	built	on	the	remains	of	a	Byzantine	church.			We	then	proceed	to	the	“Western	Outlook”	where	the	group	pauses	to	survey	the	landscape.	Feldman	recounts	how	Jewish	guides	working	in	Jerusalem	often	lead	Protestant	 groups	 to	 outlook	points	 so	 they	 can	 gaze	 at	 vistas	 of	 the	 city.	 This	performs	the	function	of	distancing	the	group	from	the	oriental	Arab	landscape,	which	 confirms	 the	 Western	 identity	 of	 the	 Protestant	 pilgrims.	 From	 the	outlook	point	 the	guide	can	explain	what	 the	group	 is	seeing	with	reference	 to	the	 scriptures,	 thus	 drawing	 on	 knowledge	 shared	 by	 Protestants	 and	 Jews	(2007,	363).	Our	guide	points	to	the	modern	highway	in	the	distance	explaining	that	it	is	built	on	top	of	the	ancient	road	referred	to	in	the	Bible.	He	remarks,	on	the	 intersection	 of	 ancient	 and	 modern,	 that	 “there’s	 nothing	 physical	 that	doesn’t	represent	the	spiritual.”		
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The	guide	chooses	this	moment	to	convey	a	more	profound	religious	message	by	recalling	 Hannah’s	 prayer	 at	 Shiloh	 after	 the	 birth	 of	 her	 son,	 Samuel.	 (The	prayer	in	1	Samuel	2.1-10	contains	an	anachronistic	closing	reference	to	the	King	of	Israel,	“His	anointed	one.”)	He	connects	Shiloh	as	the	former	sanctuary	of	the	Tabernacle	to	the	“permanent	kingdom”	of	Israel.	The	guide	says	that	outsiders	can	convert	to	Judaism	and	become	part	of	this.	For	him,	“the	yearning	to	be	part	of	this	nation”	is	embodied	in	the	story	of	Ruth	the	Moabite,	great-grandmother	of	King	David.	After	the	death	of	her	Israelite	husband,	Ruth	dutifully	left	Moab	to	return	to	Judah	with	her	mother-in-law	Naomi,	having	declared	her	loyalty	to	the	God	of	Israel	and	its	people.	Here	the	guide	is	perhaps	addressing	the	paradox	of	Christian	Zionism,	 the	adherents	of	which	are	patriotic	Americans,	who	believe	that	Jews	will	be	redeemed	by	converting	to	Christianity	at	the	End	of	Days.	He	is	thereby	 offering	 a	 Religious	 Zionist	 counter-narrative	 of	 redemption	 through	conversion	to	Judaism.		From	 the	Western	Outlook	 the	guide	 leads	us	 to	 a	 viewing	platform	above	 the	alleged	site	of	the	Tabernacle,	whereupon	a	member	of	the	group	asks	how	the	archaeologists	 knew	 where	 to	 look.	 The	 guide	 explains	 that	 the	 location	 is	“where	 we	 think	 the	 Tabernacle	 was”	 based	 both	 on	 the	 description	 of	 the	setting	in	the	Bible	(see	Exodus	26)	and	on	the	area	being	large	enough	to	have	accommodated	 it. 44 	The	 site	 of	 the	 Tabernacle	 is	 marked	 by	 twelve	 flags	representing	 the	 Israelite	 tribes.	 The	 text	 of	 Hannah’s	 prayer	 is	 reproduced	inside	a	shelter	where	visitors	can	sit	down	to	pray,	meditate	or	 listen	 to	 their	guide.	 The	 area	 has	 clearly	 been	 designed	 to	 act	 as	 a	 ritual	 space.	 Outside	 the																																																									44	Shiloh	is	 located	“north	of	Bethel,	east	of	the	highway	that	runs	from	Bethel	to	Shechem,	and	south	of	Lebonah”	(Judges	21.19).		
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shelter	another	Christian	tour	group	from	China	is	dancing	and	chanting,	waving	Chinese	and	Israeli	flags	(photo	3.20).	For	them	the	religious	significance	of	the	site	 inspires	 spontaneous	 joy	 and	 Christian	 fervour,	 as	 the	 place	 where	 God	Himself	once	appeared	to	Samuel	(see	1	Samuel	3.1-4.1).		
	
Photo	3.20	Christian	pilgrims	dancing	on	what	they	believe	to	be	the	site	of	the	Tabernacle.			The	climax	of	 the	 tour	 takes	place	 in	 the	Visionary	Tower	 (photo	3.21).	Before	we	enter	the	tower	the	guide	says	goodbye,	conceding	that	the	film	we	are	about	to	 see	 is	 “not	 one	 hundred	 per	 cent	 accurate”.	 The	 film	 is	 shown	 in	 three	languages:	Hebrew,	English	and	Russian.	The	availability	of	a	Russian	 language	version	 reflects	 the	 presence	 in	 Shiloh	 of	 immigrants	 from	 the	 former	 Soviet	Union	and	the	high	volume	of	tourists	originating	there.	The	provision	of	Russian	language	 materials	 is	 a	 pragmatic	 measure	 that	 prioritises	 the	 promotion	 of	nationalist	 feeling	 over	 religious	 observance.	 Israel	 faces	 an	 internal	contradiction	 in	 the	 influx	 of	 immigrants	 from	 the	 former	 Soviet	Union,	which	
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has	 created	 large	 numbers	 of	 new	 Israelis	who	 are	 not	 religious	 and,	 in	 some	cases,	not	actually	Jewish	(Ben-Porat	2008,	37;	Shafir	and	Peled	2002,	309-320).		
	
Photo	3.21	Tour	group	waiting	to	enter	the	Visionary	Tower.			Pre-state	pioneers	constructed	mitzpe	(lookout)	settlements	in	the	mountains	as	what	Weizman	calls	“optical	devices”	designed	for	“axial	visibility”	(2007,	131).	The	 Visionary	 Tower	 is	 a	 contemporary	 optical	 device	 for	 surveying	 the	 hills	around	Shiloh.	The	 tower’s	auditorium	has	a	 curved	window,	providing	a	vista	with	 the	 site	 of	 the	 Tabernacle	 as	 its	 centrepiece.	 Visitors	 thus	 observe	 the	surrounding	area	from	on	high;	the	settlement	of	Eli	and	the	village	of	Qaryut	can	be	seen	on	the	hilltops	in	the	distance.	The	film	is	projected	onto	a	transparent	screen	in	front	of	the	window,	producing	the	effect	of	an	ancient	drama	playing	out	 in	 the	 landscape	 before	 us.	 When	 it	 fades	 out	 at	 intervals,	 the	 viewers	glimpse	 the	 topographical	 backdrop	 to	 the	 biblical	 events	 dramatised	 before	
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them.	Employing	costumed	actors	and	computer-generated	 imagery,	 the	 film	 is	designed	to	appeal	to	an	audience	accustomed	to	movies	and	video	games.	The	film	portrays	 the	major	events	at	Shiloh	 from	the	books	of	 Joshua	and	Samuel.	We	see	the	arrival	of	the	Ark	of	the	Covenant	and	the	erection	of	the	Tabernacle	in	animated	scenes.	Joshua’s	division	of	the	land	between	the	Israelite	tribes	by	lot	 is	presented	as	a	metaphor	for	the	national	destiny	of	modern	Israel.	 In	the	Book	 of	 Joshua,	 God	 reminds	 his	 ageing	 warrior	 that	 the	 land	 is	 not	 wholly	possessed	by	his	chosen	people.	Joshua	confronts	the	Israelite	tribes,	challenging	them	to	take	possession	of	 the	 land	to	 fulfil	 their	covenant	with	God.	The	book	forbids	 miscegenation	 with	 the	 remnants	 of	 the	 conquered	 Canaanites.	 The	Israelites	must	preserve	the	purity	of	their	nation	and	its	existential	relationship	with	 the	 land.	 In	 the	 film	 Joshua	counsels,	 “If	you	connect	 to	 the	 land,	 the	 land	will	connect	to	you.”		Hannah’s	prayer	and	the	encounter	of	her	son,	Samuel,	with	God	are	portrayed	as	 pivotal	 moments	 in	 forging	 the	 future	 Israelite	 kingdom.	 Samuel	 plays	 a	decisive	 role	 in	 uniting	 the	 tribes	 to	 defeat	 the	 Philistines	 after	 the	Ark	 of	 the	Covenant	 is	 captured	 and	 taken	 from	 Shiloh.	 With	 the	 minaret	 of	 Qaryut’s	mosque	intermittently	flashing	before	us,	the	Philistines’	descendants	are	clearly	visible	in	the	hills	around	us.	Samuel’s	revelation	is	fulfilled	when	we	see	the	Ark	being	brought	to	Jerusalem.	Shiloh	is	thus	uniquely	placed	in	Israel’s	origin	story	as	the	first	capital	of	the	Israelites	and	the	place	of	divine	revelation	that	made	the	foundation	of	the	kingdom	possible.	The	audience	is	told	that	the	“roots”	of	Israel	 lie	 in	 Shiloh:	 the	 roots	 that	 “made	 us	 all	 grow”.	 Shiloh	 cannot	 be	abandoned	by	the	Jewish	people	or	Jerusalem	itself	will	be	lost.	The	film	draws	
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on	the	Israelite	paradigm	to	issue	a	contemporary	Zionist	clarion	call	for	Jewish	national	unity	and	steadfastness	against	the	modern	Philistines.		Inside	the	tower	is	a	small	museum	containing	a	chronological	exhibition	about	Tel	Shiloh,	using	the	Bible	as	a	primary	source.	The	date	when	Joshua	established	the	Tabernacle	at	Shiloh	is	given	as	1200	BC.45	The	Book	of	Joshua	was	favoured	by	 Zionist	 ruling	 circles	 from	 the	 state’s	 inception	 and	 forms	 the	 basis	 for	historical	 teaching	 of	 this	 period	 in	 Israel’s	 state	 education	 sector	 (Sand	2014,	74;	 Piterberg	 2008,	 273-282).	 The	 exhibition’s	 Bible-centred	 narrative	 is	compatible	 with	 the	 Israeli	 school	 curriculum,	 allowing	 for	 group	 visits	 and	further	 legitimation	 through	 state	 patronage.46	The	 museum	 is	 professionally	presented	with	familiar	features	of	archaeological	exhibitions	in	state	museums.	There	 are	 touch-screen	 interactives,	 objects	 to	 touch	 and	 sophisticated	 sound	and	 lighting	 for	 the	 exhibits.	 The	 displays	 make	 extensive	 use	 of	 three-dimensional	 objects,	 although	 a	 significant	 number	 are	 facsimiles.	 The	exhibition’s	 use	 of	 material	 culture	 to	 verify	 biblical	 truths	 reflects	 its	methodological	 origins	 in	 archaeology	 and	 scholarship	 of	 the	 past.	 Finkelstein	and	Silberman	identify	a	broad	archaeological	consensus	that	the	Bible	could	be	read	as	a	“basically	reliable	historical	document”	until	the	1990s.	They	also	point	to	the	influence	of	the	social	sciences	on	archaeology	during	the	1970s	as	crucial	in	 encouraging	 an	 epistemological	 shift.	 Artefacts	 were	 no	 longer	 simply	regarded	as	a	means	of	illustrating	the	Bible—efforts	were	increasingly	directed																																																									45	Although	the	existence	of	a	group	called	“Israel”	in	Canaan	is	proven	by	the	reference	to	it	on	Pharaoh	Merneptah’s	1207	BC	victory	stele,	professional	archaeological	consensus	has	recently	developed	 against	 the	 theory	 of	 Israelite	 conquest.	 No	 evidence	 has	 been	 found	 for	 the	destruction	of	Canaanite	vassal	cities	by	an	invasion	force	in	what	was	then	an	Egyptian	province	(Finkelstein	and	Silberman	2002,	76-83).		46	In	2012	Israel’s	education	minister	Gideon	Sa’ar	visited	“Ancient	Shiloh”	and	announced	that	it	would	be	included	in	the	state-sponsored	tour	schedule	for	school	groups	(Lis	2012).	
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toward	discovering	the	“human	realities	that	lay	behind	the	text”	(2002,	21).	The	museum	is	still	grounded	in	the	earlier	archaeological	methodology—	doubtless	as	 a	 consequence	 of	 its	 authors’	 religiosity.	Much	 of	 the	 factual	 information	 is	also	 clearly	 derived	 from	 documentation	 produced	 during	 the	 original	 Danish	excavation.			The	synthesis	of	archaeological	practice	and	religious	conviction	is	the	legacy	of	the	 long-term	 scholastic	 reliance	 on	 the	 Bible	 as	 a	 primary	 source.	 As	 El-Haj	relates:			 The	long	history	of	archaeological	practice	in	Palestine/Israel	has	naturalized	the	use	of	the	Bible	 in	scientific	practice	and	empirical	quest,	as	 intuition,	as	historical	 source,	 and	 as	 setting	 the	 range	 of	 plausible	 interpretations	 of	empirical	data.	This	scientific	epistemology	opened	up	the	possibility	that	the	Bible	 and	 belief	 could	 be	 articulated	 with	 scientific	 objects,	 with	 artifacts.	(2001,	236)			Israeli	 professional	 archaeologists	 took	 part	 in	 West	 Bank	 excavations	 to	differentiate	facts	from	myths	but	“fact	collecting	substantiated	the	West	Bank	as	the	 biblical	 heartland,	 materializing	 its	 identity	 as	 Judea	 and	 Samaria	 in	archaeological	 facts”	(236-237).47	The	pursuit	of	 facts	 led	Israel	Finkelstein	and	his	 team	 to	Tel	Shiloh	 to	 conduct	an	excavation	 that	has	 conferred	a	degree	of	archaeological	 legitimacy	on	“Ancient	Shiloh”	and	bolstered	the	settlement	as	a	result.		The	final	part	of	the	exhibition,	covering	the	period	of	the	British	Mandate	to	the	present	 day,	 contains	 a	 detailed	 chronicle	 of	 the	 earlier	 archaeological	endeavours	 beginning	 with	 the	 Danish	 in	 the	 1920s	 and	 concluding	 with																																																									47	Both	settlers	and	the	Israeli	state	use	the	term	“Judea	and	Samaria”	when	referring	to	the	West	Bank.		
	 171	
contemporary	 excavations	 under	 the	 Israeli	 Civil	 Administration.	 This	 section	emphasises	the	professional	pedigree	of	the	archaeology	and	includes	an	original	report	by	the	Danish	Palestine	Expedition	from	1926.	A	photograph	of	one	of	the	Danish	archaeologists	surveying	the	landscape	is	juxtaposed	with	an	image	from	2014	 showing	 the	 same	 process	 at	 work.	 The	 adoption	 of	 archaeological	practices	by	Religious	Zionist	settlers	indicates	their	recognition	of	the	centrality	of	science	and	technology	 in	 the	production	of	 Israeli	modernity.	The	Religious	Zionist	 settlers	 of	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s	 sought	 to	 challenge	 the	 secular	hegemony	 of	 Labour	 Zionism	 on	 its	 own	 terms	 by	 promoting	 a	 new	 radical	settlement	 ethos.	 In	 the	 same	 way	 they	 have	 confronted	 the	 secular	 Zionist	monopoly	over	archaeology	by	appropriating	it	as	an	active	agent	of	occupation	in	 the	West	Bank.	For	secular	Zionists	 like	Yigael	Yadin,	 the	primacy	of	 facts	 in	archaeology	 ultimately	 undermined	 its	 nationalist	 potential	 by	 exposing	inaccuracies	 and	 fallacies	 in	 Israel’s	 origin	 story.	 Archaeology	 revealed	 major	historical	 events,	 such	 as	 the	 collective	 suicide	 of	 the	 Zealots	 at	Masada,	 to	 be	myths	 (Silberman	 1989,	 97-99).	 Empirical	 evidence	 does	 not	 pose	 the	 same	problem	for	Religious	Zionists	because	they	believe	in	supernatural	phenomena	beyond	the	material	world.		The	Shiloh	settlers’	archaeological	interventions	conform	to	the	general	pattern	of	 establishing	 ethnic	 boundary	 markers	 in	 the	 Occupied	 Territories.	Archaeological	 excavation	 has	 redefined	 the	 contours	 of	 the	 West	 Bank	landscape	 in	both	historical	and	strategic	 terms.	By	privileging	 the	 Jewish	over	Christian	 and	 Muslim	 pasts,	 “Ancient	 Shiloh”	 presents	 a	 distorted	 version	 of	history.	The	claim	to	 the	 land	 is	based	on	 the	veracity	of	events	 in	 the	Book	of	
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Joshua	 for	 which	 there	 is	 no	 archaeological	 evidence.	 The	 excavations	 at	 Tel	Shiloh	 and	 creation	 of	 a	 sophisticated	 tourist	 attraction	 further	 illustrate	 the	political	harnessing	of	heritage	practices	by	settler	activists.	The	archaeological	site	has	 expanded	 the	 territory	of	 the	main	 settlement,	 but	 also	normalised	 its	status	by	attracting	coachloads	of	Christians	and	other	tourists.	“Ancient	Shiloh”	has	 reinvented	 the	 tower	 and	 stockade	 strategy	 for	 the	 twenty-first	 century,	wherein	 the	 Visionary	 Tower	 and	 visitors’	 centre	 represent	 a	 new	 type	 of	territoriality.	 The	 development	 of	 the	 site	 as	 a	 tourist	 attraction	 reflects	 the	status	of	heritage	as	both	an	economic	driver	and	an	internationally	recognised	source	of	cultural	 legitimacy.	Shiloh’s	heritage	 industry	 is	strategically	directed	and	 territorially	 demarcated	 within	 the	 settlement.	 Tour	 buses	 arrive	 at	 the	designated	car	park	from	Route	60	and	passengers	do	not	set	foot	in	residential	areas.	Tourists	do	not	 interact	with	 settlers,	other	 than	 those	employed	by	 the	Mishkan	 Shiloh	 Association,	 and	 encounter	 no	 local	 Palestinians	 during	 their	visit.		Leaving	“Ancient	Shiloh”,	I	make	my	way	back	up	to	the	centre	of	the	settlement	through	its	backstreets.	There	is	evidence	of	a	local	construction	boom	fuelled	by	American	 money.	 Some	 areas	 of	 Shiloh	 feel	 more	 like	 the	 Californian	 hills.	Houses	have	the	red	roofs	typical	of	Israeli	settlements	in	the	West	Bank.	Solar	panels	 are	 visible	 on	 a	 number	 of	 buildings.	 Other	 parts	 are	 more	underdeveloped	 and	 ascetic	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 settlement’s	 origins	 as	 a	pioneering	outpost	 (see	Boyarin	1996,	218-223).	Before	 I	 take	 the	bus	back	 to	Jerusalem	I	sit	down	to	observe	daily	life.	There	is	an	obvious	communitarianism	within	Shiloh	as	passing	cars	frequently	stop	to	pick	up	hitchhikers.	The	fact	that	
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settlers	 openly	 do	 this	 suggests	 that	 their	 community	 is	 not	 accustomed	 to	outsiders.	A	teenager	with	a	North	American	accent	asks	me	when	the	next	bus	is	due	and	on	hearing	that	it	 is	not	for	another	hour,	she	proceeds	to	hitchhike	to	Eli.	 A	 group	 of	 young	 people	 in	 IDF	 uniform	 flag	 down	 a	 car	 and	 stow	 their	musical	instruments	in	the	boot	before	driving	off.	Their	sense	of	freedom	seems	incongruous	in	a	settlement	with	a	Palestinian	village	only	a	short	distance	away.	I	 notice	 that	 many	 residents	 are	 religious	 through	 their	 outward	 appearance,	whilst	others	are	visibly	not.	There	is	a	hippy	feel	to	the	casual	clothing	worn	by	many	 settlers.	 Religious	 women	 wear	 long	 skirts	 and	 headscarves,	 but	 not	 in	matching	 colours	 in	 traditional	 haredi	 fashion.	 In	 Shiloh	 there	 are	 visible	contradictions	 between	 the	 religiosity	 at	 the	 core	 of	 its	 identity	 and	 the	unavoidable	acceptance	of	certain	facets	of	Israeli	modernity	without	which	the	settlement	could	not	exist.		Tourism	and	heritage	have	emerged	as	new	civilian	strategies	for	sustaining	the	Israeli	 occupation	 of	 the	 West	 Bank,	 but	 they	 bring	 with	 them	 potentially	corrupting	foreign	influences.	The	tourist-consumer	spectacle	of	“Ancient	Shiloh”	is	emblematic	of	these	tensions.	For	the	settlers,	it	is	an	authentic	representation	of	 the	 Israeli	origin	 story:	 a	paradigm	of	 conquest,	national	unity	and	 religious	fidelity.	God	actually	materialised	at	Shiloh	and	thus	the	ideal	of	settlement	finds	synthesis	with	the	divine.	Such	an	ideal	cannot	remain	pure	and	authentic	when	marketed	 for	 tourist	 purposes.	 Feige	 remarks	 of	West	 Bank	 settlers	 that	 they	have	become	“entangled	within	an	ironic	paradox	of	authenticity:	the	closer	they	get	 to	 the	 authentic,	 the	more	 they	 participate	 in	 ruining	 it	 and	 substituting	 it	with	 the	 contours	 of	 modern	 Israel	 from	 which	 they	 retreated”	 (2009,	 82).	 I	
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contend	 that	 the	 settlers	 recognise	 this	 reality	 and	 are	 hence	 appropriating	heritage	 practices	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 re-shape	 Israeli	 modernity	 in	 national-religious	form.		The	 paradox	 of	 authenticity	 contained	 within	 “Ancient	 Shiloh”	 lays	 bare	 the	contradiction	at	the	heart	of	 the	settlement’s	messianic	origins.	When	the	Gush	Emunim	 activists	 began	 their	 occupation	 in	 1978,	 they	 were	 following	 Kook’s	dictum	 of	 “forcing	 the	 End”.	 The	 Book	 of	 Joshua	 offers	 a	 precedent	 for	 their	actions.	 Just	 as	 Joshua	 asked	 God	 to	make	 the	 sun	 stand	 still	 in	 the	 sky	when	facing	the	Amorites	at	Gibeon	(Joshua	10.12),	so	the	settlers	pre-empted	divine	intercession	 by	 pitching	 their	 tents	 near	 Khirbet	 Seilun.	 The	 absence	 of	 a	perimeter	fence	and	communal	hitchhiking	display	an	enduring	collective	belief	in	Shiloh	as	manifest	destiny.	Although	aided	by	ministerial	patronage,	the	act	of	settlement	 was	 inspired	 by	 the	 pioneering	 ethos.	 The	 goal	 of	 the	 original	pioneers	was	 to	 build	 an	 intimate	 community	 in	which	 to	 achieve	hagshamah	
atzmit	(self-realisation).	Reinventing	this	ideal	has	proven	problematic	for	West	Bank	settlers,	who	 face	an	existential	barrier	 in	 their	perpetual	 reliance	on	 the	state.	 The	modern	 Israelites’	 triumph	 at	 Shiloh	was	 assured	 by	 state	 agencies	without	 which	 they	 could	 not	 maintain	 territorial	 control	 today.	 The	 tension	between	 the	 Religious	 Zionist	 idealisation	 of	 the	 state	 and	 its	 temporal	machinery	 is	 therefore	 exposed	 by	 necessity.	 The	 state-directed	 influx	 of	 non-religious	 settlers	 and	 the	 transformative	 potential	 of	 Shiloh’s	 inclusion	 in	regional	 tourism	 development	 plans	 both	 impinge	 on	 the	 settlement’s	foundational	values	and	on	the	sanctity	of	the	landscape.	Religious	Zionists	 like	my	guide	have	obviously	embraced	the	creation	of	“Ancient	Shiloh”	as	a	strategy	
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for	perpetuating	their	presence	and	preserving	the	site	as	a	Jewish	sacred	space,	but	at	a	cost	of	diminishing	its	moral	purity.		
	
Photo	3.22	The	Mishkan	Shiloh	synagogue	modelled	on	the	Tabernacle.	
	
	Having	been	raised	 in	a	 frontier	society,	some	children	of	 the	settlements	have	followed	 the	 Gush	 Emunim	 tradition	 of	 forging	 new	 outposts	 in	 the	 hills.	 The	militant	Hilltop	Youth	are	the	children	of	Gush	Emunim’s	messianic	Zionism,	but	also	 a	 reaction	 against	 its	 embourgeoisement	 in	 the	 West	 Bank	 settlements.	Although	they	have	 internalised	Gush	Emunim’s	original	quest	 for	authenticity,	they	reject	 its	 institutionalisation	by	eschewing	the	trappings	of	modernity	and	pursuing	 alternative	 new-age	 lifestyles.	 In	 line	 with	 Israel’s	 structural	privatisation,	 outposts	 created	 by	 the	 Hilltop	 Youth	 are	 a	 matter	 of	 personal	choice	rather	than	projects	of	a	social	movement	(Feige	2009,	234-238).	Under	these	 conditions	 the	 goal	 of	 self-realisation	 becomes	 an	 ideal	 of	 individual,	 as	opposed	 to	 collective,	 freedom.	Outposts	 created	by	Hilltop	Youth	have	 sprung	up	in	the	hills	east	of	Shiloh.	Here	is	Scholem’s	“blazing	landscape	of	redemption”	
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as	 a	 promise	 perpetually	 unfulfilled.	 The	 Hilltop	 Youth	 phenomenon	 indicates	disillusionment	with	the	state	and	frequently	triggers	violent	confrontation	with	the	 IDF	 over	 what	 it	 defines	 as	 “illegal”	 outposts.	 Looking	 across	 at	 the	monumental	edifice	of	 the	Mishkan	Shiloh	synagogue	(photo	3.22),	a	 replica	of	the	Tabernacle	described	 in	Exodus,	 I	perceive	 the	precariousness	of	 the	social	life	 around	me	 and	 its	 latent	 potential	 for	 catastrophe.	 The	 simulacrum	 of	 the	Tabernacle	 looms	 large	 on	 the	 skyline,	 a	 messianic	 fantasy	 in	 a	 landscape	 of	dispossession.		
Shifting	Sands			Israeli	history	 is	punctuated	by	a	succession	of	military	advances	and	strategic	withdrawals.	 All	 ideological	 variants	 of	 Zionism	 have	 pronounced	 tendencies	toward	 territorial	 maximalism	 at	 major	 junctures.	 Historically	 both	 the	Revisionist	 and	 Religious	 Zionist	 movements	 advocated	 a	 Greater	 Israel,	spanning	both	banks	of	the	River	Jordan.	Revisionists	abandoned	this	position	in	1967	to	concentrate	on	promoting	Jewish	settlement	in	the	West	Bank	and	Gaza	(Shelef	2010,	90).	After	1977,	Menachem	Begin’s	government	initiated	a	massive	state-sponsored	programme,	culminating	in	the	1981	plan	to	install	one	hundred	thousand	 new	 settlers	 within	 five	 years.	 As	 Revisionist	 Zionism	 had	 no	pioneering	 tradition	 of	 its	 own,	 Likud	 tactically	 accepted	 Gush	 Emunim	 as	 a	partner	 in	 its	 settlement	 project	 (Shafir	 1985,	 161).	 At	 the	 same	 time	 the	government	found	itself	on	a	collision	course	with	Gush	Emunim	over	the	1978	Camp	 David	 Accords	 with	 Egypt,	 in	 which	 it	 agreed	 to	 evacuate	 Israeli	settlements	in	the	Sinai	Peninsula.		
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The	 tension	 between	 Likud	 as	 the	 political	 centre	 of	 the	 Zionist	 camp	 and	 its	activist	periphery	replayed	an	earlier	dynamic	in	the	decade	following	statehood.	In	1956	when	Ben-Gurion’s	government	agreed	to	withdraw	from	the	Sinai	and	Gaza	 under	 international	 pressure,	 his	 left-wing	 coalition	 partner,	 the	 United	Workers’	Party	(Mapam),	opposed	the	move	(Beinin	1990,	176).	Gush	Emunim’s	Movement	to	Halt	the	Retreat	in	Sinai	organised	public	protests	and	mounted	an	unsuccessful	 attempt	 to	 resist	 the	 IDF’s	 evacuation	 of	 Yamit	 in	 1982.	 Ariel	Sharon	as	minister	of	defence	oversaw	the	Sinai	pull-out.	In	the	wake	of	the	Sinai	withdrawal,	 there	 followed	a	settlement	expansion	 in	 the	West	Bank	and	Gaza,	with	generous	government	provision	of	cheap	housing	and	rapid	transport	links	for	 settlers	 to	 commute	 to	 jobs	 inside	 Israel	 (Lustick	 1988,	 62-65).	 Likud’s	subsidisation	 of	 living	 standards	 within	 the	 settlements	 perpetuated	 some	functions	of	the	developmental	state	outside	the	Green	Line.	In	the	Yesha	Council	and	Amana48	the	government	also	had	enthusiastic	NGO	partners	to	work	with.	Much	of	Begin’s	settlement	plan	was	premised	on	offering	economic	 incentives	to	would-be	 settlers,	many	 of	whom	were	motivated	 by	 social	mobility	 rather	than	 pioneering	 zeal.	 Likud	 rationalised	 its	 settlement	 drive	 by	 appealing	 to	socio-economic	aspiration	as	 the	precondition	 for	nurturing	deeper	 ideological	commitment	to	a	Greater	Israel	(156-159).		A	proportion	of	those	evacuated	from	Sinai	were	relocated	to	Gush	Katif,	a	group	of	 settlements	 in	 the	 Gaza	 Strip	 developed	 from	 outposts	 established	 by	 IDF	
																																																								48	Gush	Emunim	formally	ceased	to	exist	in	the	1990s	but	its	logistics	arm,	Amana	(Covenant),	an	NGO	 founded	 in	1978,	 continues	 to	 facilitate	 the	construction	of	 settlements	 in	 the	West	Bank.	The	Yesha	Council	(Yesha	is	the	Hebrew	acronym	of	Judea,	Samaria	and	Gaza),	another	legacy	of	Gush	Emunim,	is	also	still	functional	as	a	municipal	government	umbrella	for	the	settlements.	
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Fighting	 Pioneer	 Youth	 (Nahal)49	units	 after	 the	 Six	 Day	 War.	 In	 2005	 Ariel	Sharon	 as	 prime	 minister	 placed	 Likud	 on	 a	 collision	 course	 with	 the	 settler	movement	once	again	by	announcing	the	evacuation	of	Gush	Katif’s	twenty-one	communities	and	four	Israeli	settlements	in	the	northern	West	Bank.	Over	nine	thousand	 settlers	 were	 removed	 from	 the	 Occupied	 Territories	 under	 a	unilateral	“disengagement	plan”.	With	Gush	Emunim	no	longer	in	existence,	the	settlers	 organised	 themselves	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 government’s	 plans	 with	support	 from	 Yesha	 and	 the	 wider	 national-religious	 community.	 They	 did	 so	using	an	activist	toolkit	formulated	in	response	to	the	Sinai	withdrawal.	Failure	at	Yamit	provoked	divisions	within	Gush	Emunim	over	the	movement’s	political	direction.	 Lustick	 identifies	 the	 emergence	 of	 two	 opposing	 currents	 within	Jewish	 fundamentalism	 as	 a	 consequence:	 terrorist	 direct	 action	 and	 “political	and	cultural	outreach”	(1988,	62).	The	first	manifested	most	dramatically	in	the	Jewish	Underground’s	plot	to	blow	up	the	Dome	of	the	Rock	in	1984.	The	Jewish	Underground	contained	Gush	Emunim	members	radicalised	by	Camp	David	and	driven	 by	 a	 belief	 that	 the	 withdrawal	 from	 Sinai	 halted	 their	 progress	 to	redemption	 (Sprinzak	1991,	 94-99).	The	 second	 current	diffused	 into	 the	non-violent	strategy	of	the	Gush	Katif	settlers,	who	resisted	the	disengagement	plan	by	appealing	directly	to	Israeli	public	opinion.		In	the	aftermath	of	the	evacuation,	when	former	Gush	Katif	settlers	were	moved	to	various	temporary	locations	inside	Israel,	they	embraced	activist	heritage	as	a	means	of	preserving	their	collective	memory,	but	also	as	a	campaigning	tool	for	redressing	their	grievances.	This	follows	the	precedent	of	Yamit,	where	both	an	
																																																								49	Noar	Halutzi	Lohem	units	are	traditionally	recruited	from	the	kibbutzim.	
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annual	 day	 of	 commemoration	 and	 a	 heritage	 centre	 were	 inaugurated.	 Since	2007	 Gush	 Katif	 Day	 has	 been	 marked	 annually	 on	 January	 23	 through	commemorative	 events	 and	 educational	 activities	 in	 schools.	 Two	 activist	heritage	organisations	have	also	been	established	 to	preserve	 the	 legacy	of	 the	Gaza	settlements—the	Gush	Katif	and	Northern	Samaria	Commemoration	Centre	(hereafter	the	Katif	Centre),	and	the	Gush	Katif	Museum.		The	Katif	Centre	was	established	as	a	legal	national	body	by	the	Knesset	in	2008.	At	 present	 the	 heritage	 centre	 exists	 over	 two	 sites—Nitzan	 in	 the	Negev	 and	Avnei	 Eitan	 in	 the	 Golan	 Heights.	 Both	 are	 located	 within	 new	 communities	established	by	ex-settlers	from	Gaza.	My	visit	to	Nitzan	coincides	with	the	tenth	anniversary	 of	 the	 disengagement	 in	 August	 2015.	 The	 International	 Young	Israel	Movement	has	organised	a	bus	tour	under	the	slogan	“Ten	Buses	for	Ten	Years”	to	show	solidarity	with	the	former	settlers	in	their	new	homes.50	The	tour	group	 consists	 of	 predominantly	 North	 American	 Jews;	most	 are	 elderly	 or	 in	middle	age,	but	there	are	several	young	males.	There	are	no	young	women	in	the	group.	 The	men	 are	 all	 visibly	 observant	 and	wearing	 knitted	kippahs;	 several	read	from	the	Torah	at	regular	intervals.		Our	 itinerary	 begins	 in	 Jerusalem,	whence	we	 travel	 to	 Yad	 Binyamin,	 a	 small	religious	 town	 in	central	 Israel.	On	 the	way	our	guide,	 an	American	expatriate,	gives	 us	 some	 historical	 background	 to	 the	 events	 of	 2005.	 She	 begins	 by	describing	the	historical	 Jewish	presence	in	Gaza,	terminated	in	1929.	She	then	situates	 Gush	 Katif	 within	 the	 pioneering	 tradition	 by	 recalling	 the	 eleven																																																									50	The	 IYIM	 is	 the	 Israeli	 branch	 of	 the	 American	 Zionist	 organisation,	 the	 National	 Council	 of	Young	 Israel.	 Founded	 in	 New	 York	 in	 1912,	 the	 synagogue-based	 organisation	 promotes	orthodox	Judaism	in	the	United	States,	but	also	the	Zionist	cause.	One	of	the	principal	activities	of	the	Israeli	satellite	is	Jewish	philanthropy	and	supporting	national-religious	soldiers	in	the	IDF.	
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settlements	established	in	the	Negev	in	1946.	One	of	the	kibbutzim,	Kfar	Darom,	was	destroyed	by	Egyptian	forces	in	1948,	then	re-established	as	a	Nahal	outpost	in	1967.	She	points	out	 that	a	Labour	government	was	 in	power	 in	1970	when	the	Gaza	 settlements	were	 established	and	 settlers	were	 initially	welcomed	by	the	 Palestinians.	 They	 shopped	 in	 the	 Palestinian	 city	 of	 Khan	 Younis	 and	employed	local	Arabs	as	agricultural	labourers.	She	says	that	everything	changed	after	 the	 First	 Intifada	 began	 in	 1987,	 when	 the	 settlers	 became	 targets	 for	Palestinian	terrorism.	Bemoaning	the	socio-economic	plight	of	the	settlers	after	they	returned	to	Israel,	she	explains	that	many	were	unable	to	continue	farming	and	suffered	unemployment.	She	condemns	Israeli	government	bureaucracy	for	failing	to	expedite	their	compensation	claims.		From	Yad	Binyamin,	we	drive	a	short	distance	to	the	moshav51	of	Ganei	Tal.	Our	guide	is	a	resident	who	lived	in	the	settlement	of	the	same	name	in	Gush	Katif.	Ganei	Tal	is	one	of	only	two	settlements	to	keep	its	old	name,	the	rest	refusing	to	renounce	their	right	to	return.	As	we	drive	past	her	new	home	she	tells	us	that	it	is	 just	 a	 quarter	 of	 the	 size	 of	 the	 house	 in	 Gaza.	 (The	 house	 is	 spacious,	suggesting	 that	 former	 living	 standards	 were	 comparatively	 higher.)	 She	 says	that	 most	 of	 Ganei	 Tal’s	 original	 residents	 decided	 to	 re-settle	 in	 the	 new	moshav.	 We	 arrive	 at	 the	 local	 synagogue	 where	 orange	 Gush	 Katif	 flags	 are	flying	outside	(photo	3.23).	Orange	was	adopted	as	the	official	colour	of	protest	during	 the	 campaign	against	withdrawal.	Our	guide	 takes	us	 inside,	where	 she	draws	our	attention	to	the	stained	glass	taken	from	the	original	building	in	Ganei	Tal.	The	act	of	preservation	here	indicates	a	broader	valorisation	of	heritage	as	a																																																									51	Moshavim	 are	 cooperative	 agricultural	 settlements	where	 land	 ownership	 is	 organised	 on	 a	private	rather	than	a	communal	basis.	
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source	 of	 collective	memory	 and	 communal	 renewal.	 Inside	we	 are	 told	 about	the	struggle	Ganei	Tal’s	residents	had	with	the	government	over	their	cemetery.	The	 settlers	 successfully	 petitioned	 the	 government	 to	 have	 the	 remains	disinterred	 and	 reburied	 in	 Israel,	 with	 special	 rabbinical	 dispensation.	 Our	guide	expresses	dismay	at	the	government’s	decision	to	abandon	the	synagogues	of	Gush	Katif	to	be	desecrated	by	the	Palestinians.		
	
Photo	3.23	Outside	the	synagogue	at	Ganei	Tal.			Leaving	Ganei	Tal,	the	bus	proceeds	southwest	to	Nitzan,	a	small	town	situated	between	 Ashdod	 and	 Ashkelon.	 Nitzan	 is	 a	 religious	 community,	 consisting	mainly	 of	 former	 settlers	 from	 Gush	 Katif’s	 largest	 settlement,	 Neve	 Dekalim.	After	the	evacuation	in	2005,	hundreds	of	families	were	housed	in	a	temporary	“caravilla”	 park,	 where	 a	 number	 remain	 today	 awaiting	 permanent	 housing.	Streets	 in	 the	 liminal	 community	 are	 nostalgically	 named	 after	 Gush	 Katif	settlements.	 Concrete	 pipes	 are	 used	 as	 shelters	 to	 protect	 residents	 from	
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Palestinian	 rockets.	 We	 leave	 the	 bus	 outside	 the	 Katif	 Centre	 in	 the	 blazing	Negev	sun.	There	is	a	monument	in	the	shape	of	a	cracked	Star	of	David	with	a	palm	tree	symbolically	growing	out	of	it	(photo	3.24).	The	monument	is	inspired	by	 the	 yeshivah	 at	 Neve	 Dekalim,	 destroyed	 by	 the	 Palestinians	 following	 the	withdrawal.	 In	 the	 grounds	 there	 is	 a	 sand	 pit	 with	 the	 backdrop	 of	 a	Mediterranean	beach	(photo	3.25).	The	idyllic	scene	was	once	a	daily	reality	for	the	 settlers	 of	 the	 coastal	 settlement	 of	 Neve	Dekalim—here	 it	 is	 recreated	 as	make-believe	for	children.	
	
	
Photo	 3.24	Monument	at	 the	Katif	Centre,	Nitzan,	 symbolising	 the	destroyed	yeshivah	 at	Neve	Dekalim	in	Gush	Katif.	
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Photo	3.25	Make-believe:	sand	pit	at	the	Katif	Centre,	Nitzan.			The	Katif	Centre	has	a	makeshift	appearance	and	staff	are	keen	to	emphasise	its	temporary	status,	pending	the	opening	of	a	new	purpose-built	facility	in	the	near	future.	 The	 exhibition	 in	 the	 single-storey	 building	 is	 entirely	 audio-visual	 and	displays	 no	 three-dimensional	 artefacts.	 It	 draws	 on	 the	 methodology	 of	contemporary	 European	 and	 North	 American	 state	 museums	 by	 using	 oral	history	recordings	with	former	settlers.52	The	layout	has	been	designed	for	tour	groups	 rather	 than	 individual	 visitors.	 Given	 the	 centre’s	 location	 and	political	stance,	 casual	 visits	 are	 unlikely.	 The	 tour	 begins	with	 a	 film	portraying	 a	 boy	living	 in	 Nitzan	 who	 is	 making	 a	 film	 with	 a	 video	 recorder.	 His	 mother	 and	brother	(serving	in	the	IDF)	are	sad	and	through	exploring	the	reasons	for	their	unhappiness,	 he	 discovers	 his	 roots	 in	 Gush	 Katif.	 The	 style	 is	 that	 of	 a																																																									52	The	 Katif	 Centre	 contains	 a	 publicly	 accessible	 archive,	 including	 documents,	 newspaper	cuttings,	film	and	photographs.		
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Hollywood	drama	with	a	heavy	dose	of	sentimentality.	The	central	theme	is	the	family’s	trauma	after	being	expelled	from	their	home	and	the	value	of	memory	in	coping	with	loss.		The	exhibition’s	narrative	begins	in	the	age	of	the	Patriarchs,	when	Abraham	and	Isaac	visited	the	ancient	Philistine	city	of	Gerar	in	the	Negev	(see	Genesis	20	and	26).	The	modern	Jewish	settlement	of	Gush	Katif	is	framed	as	the	child	of	Labour	Zionism.	We	see	 imagery	of	 the	Nahal	outposts	established	under	Golda	Meir’s	premiership	as	 the	 “five	 fingers”	of	 settlement	 in	Gaza.	Kfar	Darom’s	rebirth	 in	1970	was	followed	by	an	outpost	at	Netzarim	in	1972;	the	exhibition	informs	us	that	Hashomer	Hatzair	participated	 in	 the	pioneering	process.53	We	are	 shown	film	 footage	 of	 Meir’s	 successor,	 Yitzhak	 Rabin,	 inaugurating	 the	 civilian	settlement	of	Netzer	Hazani	in	1977.	The	history	of	Gush	Katif	is	presented	as	a	continuation	 of	 the	 frontier	 pioneering	 tradition	 of	 the	 kibbutzim.	 The	 role	played	by	two	iconic	Labour	prime	ministers	is	intended	to	confer	legitimacy	on	Gush	Katif	and	amplify	Ariel	Sharon’s	betrayal	of	the	Zionist	cause.	By	elevating	Labour	 leaders	over	 Sharon,	 the	 Israeli	 politician	most	directly	 responsible	 for	sponsoring	the	settlements,	a	difficult	truth	is	submerged:	Gush	Katif,	like	Sinai,	was	a	case	of	Zionist	betrayal.		Grainy	 archive	 footage	 shows	 the	 pioneering	 founders	 of	 Gush	 Katif	 being	warmly	 received	 by	 local	 Palestinians.	 We	 see	 the	 Jewish	 settlers	 interacting	with	Arabs	and	even	socialising	together.	The	pioneers	start	building	a	new	life	in	Gaza’s	 “virgin	 golden	 sand”	 to	 the	disbelief	 of	 their	 new	neighbours.	During	
																																																								53	Netzarim,	an	isolated	outpost	in	northern	Gaza,	was	established	by	a	Nahal	unit	of	Hashomer	Hatzair	(David	Amitai,	personal	communication,	March	3,	2016).		
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her	 fieldwork	 in	Gush	Katif,	Dalsheim	documented	 the	Museum	of	 the	Land	of	the	Torah	at	Kfar	Darom.	She	suggests	 that	 the	use	of	 film	there	was	crucial	 to	the	settlers’	self-representation,	noting	the	similarity	between	the	museum’s	film	
Between	the	Sand	Dunes	and	the	pre-state	Zionist	propaganda	documentary	The	
Land	of	Promise.	Both	films	contained	the	themes	of	discovering	an	“empty	land”	and	 “making	 the	 desert	 bloom”	 (2011,	 55).	 The	 empty	 or	 “virgin”	 land	 was	 a	foundational	 doctrine	 of	 colonial	 settlement	 in	 North	 America	 (Jennings	 1975,	15;	 see	 also	Wolfe	 on	 Australia	 as	 “terra	nullius”,	 1999,	 26-27).	 Another	motif	embedded	 within	 The	 Land	 of	 Promise	 is	 the	 Arab	 primitive.	 The	 film	 depicts	Arabs	 as	 shepherds	 and	 subsistence	 farmers,	 visually	 identifying	 their	 pre-modern	existence	with	the	practice	of	Islam.	They	cannot	establish	a	bond	with	the	 land	because	they	are	uncivilised	and	have	no	covenantal	relationship	with	God:			 Once	while	the	Jews	lived	in	this	land,	it	was	the	centre	of	a	great	civilisation.	When	 the	 Jews	 were	 driven	 out,	 the	 land	 gradually	 declined.	 Primitive	 life	returned.	(Leman	1935)			The	 themes	 of	 an	 empty	 land	 and	 Arab	 primitivism	 are	 echoed	 in	 the	 Katif	Centre’s	 representation	of	Gaza.	Our	guide,	a	 former	settler	now	 in	his	 thirties,	says	that	since	2005,	the	sands	have	returned	to	cover	the	previously	fertile	land	of	Gush	Katif.	He	 encourages	us	 to	 look	 at	Gaza	using	Google	Earth	 to	 see	 this	phenomenon	for	ourselves.	He	also	says	that	the	sites	of	the	three	northernmost	settlements	can	be	seen	from	the	Black	Arrow	monument	near	the	border.54	The	guide,	who	tells	us	that	he	is	imminently	going	to	work	at	the	Ministry	of	Justice,																																																									54	The	monument	is	located	close	to	Kibbutz	Nir	Am.	It	commemorates	Operation	Black	Arrow	in	1955	when	 IDF	paratroopers	under	 the	 command	of	Ariel	 Sharon	attacked	Egyptian	 targets	 in	Gaza.		
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explains	 to	 his	 sympathetic	 Zionist	 audience	 that	 in	 a	 state-sponsored	organisation	 the	 exhibition	 has	 to	 be	 worded	 carefully.	 Here	 the	 inherent	tensions	between	activist	Zionism	and	the	state	surface	briefly,	but	the	powerful	national-religious	 component	 of	 Israel’s	 coalition	 government	 allows	 the	 guide	considerable	rhetorical	 leeway.	Despite	the	note	of	caution,	his	comment	about	the	 sands	 returning	 reveals	 an	 underlying	 racist	 perception	 of	 the	 Arab	primitive.	This	view	holds	that	in	the	absence	of	Jews,	Arabs	are	responsible	for	the	 land	 becoming	 infertile.	 He	 makes	 a	 show	 of	 empathising	 with	 the	Palestinians	by	discussing	the	social	realities	of	life	in	Gaza.	He	decries	the	high	levels	 of	 unemployment	 and	 “brainwashing”	 under	 the	 Hamas	 (Islamic	Resistance	 Movement)	 regime.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 he	 displays	 a	 lack	 of	 any	genuine	 sodality	 by	 suggesting	 that	 Jews	 and	 Arabs	 have	 “different	 values”.	Earlier	 on	 the	 bus,	 our	 guide	 expressed	 similar	 views	 recalling	 how	 the	Palestinians	 had	 destroyed	 greenhouses	 and	 stolen	 farming	 equipment	 to	 sell.	She	 placed	 the	 blame	 for	 their	 actions	 on	 the	 venality	 of	 the	 Palestinian	Authority.	 Like	 the	 guide	 at	 the	 Katif	 Centre,	 she	 regarded	 the	 Palestinians	 as	being	incapable	of	cultivating	the	land	successfully	without	Jewish	guidance,	and	likewise	elicited	empathy	 from	 the	audience	by	 recalling	how	her	Arab	 former	employees	had	been	forced	to	flee	Gaza	or	remain	in	destitution.		The	reality	of	the	Palestinian	presence	is	dealt	with	in	contradictory	ways	in	the	exhibition.	 At	 the	 moment	 of	 Gush	 Katif’s	 inception	 we	 see	 them	 as	 friendly	locals,	who	are	simultaneously	absent	from	the	“virgin	golden	sands”	as	rootless	nomads.	 They	 later	 appear	 as	 an	 existential	 threat	 in	 an	 exhibit	 dedicated	 to	those	 settlers	 killed	 in	 terrorist	 attacks.	 Settler	 martyrdom	 is	 contained	
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discreetly	 so	 as	 not	 to	 compromise	 the	 overall	 depiction	 of	 Gush	 Katif	 as	 a	Mediterranean	idyll.	Sea	and	sun	are	nostalgic	tropes	within	the	exhibition,	along	with	bountiful	agricultural	production	and	religiosity.	In	its	treatment	of	religion,	the	 narrative	 makes	 explicit	 the	 coexistence	 of	 religious	 and	 secular	communities	 in	 Gush	 Katif	 as	 a	 Jewish	 “mosaic”.	 Although	 the	 general	 tone	 is	national-religious,	the	prominence	of	Labour	Zionism	within	its	master	narrative	and	the	pointed	references	to	secularism	show	cognisance	of	their	wider	political	traction	 in	 Israeli	 society.	 Gush	 Katif	 is	 not	 shown	 as	 it	 is	 in	 the	 West	 Bank	settlements	as	a	messianic	return,	but	as	the	product	of	pioneering	labour	in	the	Negev,	initiated	by	the	Israeli	state.		The	crux	of	the	exhibition	is	the	room	dedicated	to	the	events	of	2005.	Visitors	sit	 on	 a	 replica	 of	 the	 boxes	 issued	 to	 each	 settler	 by	 the	 IDF	 for	 their	possessions.	 The	 ceiling	 and	 wall	 are	 deliberately	 damaged	 to	 signify	 the	demolition	of	the	settlements.	We	then	watch	the	drama	unfold	through	excerpts	of	 news	 coverage	 and	 emotionally	 charged	 flashes	 of	 the	 evacuation.	 The	audience	members	are	visibly	moved	by	what	they	see	and	several	people	weep	in	response.	The	portrayal	of	the	IDF	recognises	its	social	status	amongst	settlers	as	 their	guardian	and	object	of	nationalist	devotion.	We	see	 the	 IDF	as	morally	conflicted	and	emotionally	torn,	with	soldiers	crying	and	embracing	the	settlers.	For	 the	 most	 part,	 the	 IDF	 maintained	 unity	 within	 its	 ranks	 during	 the	disengagement.	There	was	no	significant	refusal	by	national-religious	soldiers	to	carry	 out	 their	 duties,	 despite	 rabbinical	 support	 for	 disobeying	 orders	 (Levy	2008,	137;	 Inbari	2012,	132).	We	see	 the	 IDF	as	 the	 state’s	 reluctant	 servants;	what	we	do	not	see	at	any	point	is	the	blood	price	of	defending	Gush	Katif.	The	
	 188	
IDF’s	 nobility	 is	 contrasted	with	 the	 treachery	 of	 Ariel	 Sharon.	 The	 exhibition	concludes	with	a	coda	of	the	boy	from	Nitzan	confronting	the	desecration	of	his	family’s	 old	 home.	 As	 he	 looks	 out	 over	 their	 new	 home,	 we	 are	 left	 with	 an	optimistic	message	 of	 Jewish	 revival	 and	 the	 endurance	 of	 collective	memory.	The	final	images	are	of	children	and	agricultural	renewal.	The	pioneers	of	Gush	Katif	are	reconnecting	with	Israel	as	the	sun	sets	over	the	Mediterranean.		After	 the	tour	we	sit	down	to	 lunch	outside	the	Katif	Centre.	During	the	tour	 it	has	become	clear	to	others	in	the	group	that	I	am	not	Jewish.	(I	removed	my	sun	hat	upon	entering	the	centre	to	reveal	a	bare	head.)	I	chat	to	some	of	the	group	over	 lunch	 and	 discuss	 my	 research.	 One	 woman	 initially	 expresses	incomprehension	 at	 this,	 saying	 that	 she	 thinks	 British	 universities	 are	 anti-Israel.55 	Talking	 to	 others,	 I	 gain	 some	 insight	 into	 diaspora	 Zionism	 as	 a	vicarious	form	of	nationalism.	An	elderly	American	woman	explains	how	she	and	her	 husband	 were	 intending	 to	 move	 to	 Yamit	 in	 the	 1970s	 but	 his	 death	prevented	 them.	 For	 diaspora	 Jews	 like	 this	 woman,	 Israel	 is	 a	 fixed	 point	 of	idealisation	 in	 their	 lives,	 an	 ethnic	polestar	unblemished	by	 the	 experience	of	actually	 living	there.	 Israel	and	 its	settlements	act	as	a	portal	 through	which	to	glimpse	 transcendence	 when	 the	 quotidian	 realities	 of	 the	Western	 world	 fall	short.		From	 Nitzan	 we	 travel	 southeast	 to	 the	 Lachish	 region	 and	 a	 religious	community	 called	 Bnei	 Dekalim,	 formed	 by	 a	 nucleus	 of	 families	 from	 Neve	Dekalim.	 Bnei	 Dekalim	 is	 also	 a	 work	 in	 progress,	 with	 families	 living	 in																																																									55	I	 also	hear	 this	 concern	voiced	 elsewhere	by	 a	 kibbutznik.	Their	 views	may	be	 explained	by	widely	 publicised	 attempts	 within	 the	 University	 and	 College	 Union	 to	 adopt	 a	 policy	 of	boycotting	Israeli	universities.		
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temporary	housing	whilst	permanent	homes	are	built.	As	the	bus	passes	through	the	neighbourhood,	I	see	an	old	Gush	Katif	road	sign	displayed	outside	a	house	and	the	orange	 flag	 is	 flying	outside	others.	The	climactic	visit	 to	Bnei	Dekalim	occasions	 a	 deeper	 emotional	 connection	 to	 Gush	 Katif.	We	 hear	 from	 former	settlers	who	act	as	witnesses,	giving	testimony	of	their	lives	there.	The	first	–	a	native	 of	 Jerusalem	 –	 continues	 the	 theme	 of	 the	 unique	 relationship	 between	Jews	 and	 the	 land.	 He	 says	 that	meteorological	 conditions	 are	 affected	 by	 the	presence	of	Jews	and	subsequent	Arab	attempts	to	cultivate	the	land	have	been	far	less	productive.	Bnei	Dekalim	is	not	far	from	the	border	with	the	West	Bank	in	a	region	where	Bedouin	communities	 live.	The	speaker	assures	his	audience	that	 the	settlement	of	Bnei	Dekalim	will	prevent	any	expansion	of	 the	Bedouin	presence	in	Lachish.	Here	he	is	transposing	the	territorial	rationale	of	Gush	Katif.	Bnei	Dekalim	–	the	sons	of	Dekalim	–	are	now	pioneering	behind	the	Green	Line,	but	still	guarding	against	Arab	encroachment.			Before	returning	to	Jerusalem	we	have	the	opportunity	to	look	around	the	new	play	 facilities	 being	 created	 for	 children	 and	 our	 tour	 organiser	 takes	 the	opportunity	to	deliver	toys.	The	tour	is	a	show	of	moral	support	for	the	uprooted	communities,	 but	 also	 a	 morally	 nourishing	 experience	 for	 participants.	 The	moral	sustenance	of	Gush	Katif	is	derived	from	its	connectivity	to	the	“passions”.	Back	in	Jerusalem	as	I	say	goodbye	to	someone	I	chatted	with	over	lunch,	I	ask	her	 how	 she	 found	 the	 day	 and	 she	 speaks	 of	 her	 sadness.	 An	 American	expatriate	who	lived	briefly	with	friends	in	Neve	Dekalim,	she	was	not	present	in	2005	to	witness	the	fall.	I	wonder	whether	she	is	hoping	to	authenticate	her	own	experience	of	Gush	Katif	through	its	heritage.	It	is	clear	that	the	tour	and	the	visit	
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to	the	Katif	Centre	are	designed	to	bolster	Zionist	convictions.	In	this	process	to	be	 sad	 is	 not	merely	 to	 empathise	with	 those	 displaced,	 but	 to	 be	 at	 one	with	them	 as	 a	 nation.	 Melancholia	 and	 elation	 are	 closely	 intertwined	 in	 the	emotional	performance	of	nationalism.	I	observe	the	full	passionate	spectrum	in	the	course	of	the	day,	as	participants	try	to	make	a	personal	connection	to	Gush	Katif.	 The	 tour’s	 emotional	 content	 reflects	 the	 deeper	 social	 value	 placed	 on	personal	 experience	 in	 Western	 societies,	 where	 consuming	 heritage	 is	 now	deemed	 inauthentic	 when	 not	 experienced	 on	 a	 physical	 and	 emotional	 level.	The	 need	 for	 immediacy	 accounts	 for	 the	 ubiquity	 of	 audio-visual	 stimuli	 and	witness	 testimony	 in	 heritage	 settings.	 The	 architects	 of	 the	 Katif	 Centre	 are	noticeably	 aware	 of	 these	 cultural	 trends	 and	 have	 designed	 the	 visitor	experience	accordingly.		A	few	days	later	I	visit	the	Gush	Katif	Museum	in	a	residential	neighbourhood	of	Jerusalem.	 The	 small,	 privately	 run	 activist	 museum	 was	 opened	 in	 2008.	Although	it	has	no	direct	state	support,	it	has	been	visited	by	senior	government	figures,	including	the	education	minister,	Gideon	Sa’ar,	in	2012	and	the	minister	of	Jerusalem	affairs	and	heritage,	Ze’ev	Elkin,	in	2016.	On	Gush	Katif	Day	in	2015	a	 delegation	 from	 the	 Sephardi	 Torah	 Guardians	 (Shas)	 party,	 headed	 by	 its	chairman	Aryeh	Deri,	visited	the	museum.	The	endorsement	of	Shas	is	significant	in	 relation	 to	 Israeli	 politics	 more	 broadly.	 Since	 emerging	 in	 1984,	 Shas	 has	risen	to	become	a	party	of	government	through	a	combined	electoral	appeal	 to	the	 ultra-orthodox	 t’shuvah	 (return	 to	 religion)	 movement	 and	 socially	marginalised	Mizrahi	 Jews,	whose	 religious	heritage	 is	 Sephardi	 (see	Lehmann	and	Siebzehner	2006).	At	the	forefront	of	the	t’shuvah	movement	is	the	Chabad-
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Lubavitch	sect	 that	calls	 for	 full	observance	of	 the	Halakah	(Jewish	Law).56	The	Gush	Katif	Museum	was	founded	by	SOS	Israel,	an	NGO	dedicated	to	resisting	any	Israeli	 territorial	 concessions	 to	 the	 Palestinians.	 SOS	 Israel	 has	 close	 links	 to	Chabad	 and	 was	 endorsed	 by	 the	 late	 Rabbi	 Ya’akov	 Yosef,	 son	 of	 the	 Shas	spiritual	 leader,	 Ovadia	 Yosef.	 The	 creation	 of	 the	 museum	 was	 therefore	representative	 of	 wider	 interactions	 between	 ultra-orthodox	 Judaism	 and	national-religious	politics	in	Israel	(Zecharya	2016,	479-480).		The	 exhibition	 begins	 with	 a	 detailed	 timeline,	 charting	 the	 Jewish	 history	 of	Gaza	from	the	time	of	the	Patriarchs	to	the	Israeli	withdrawal	in	2005.	It	follows	the	Katif	Centre	 in	presenting	 the	establishment	of	Gush	Katif	 as	 the	historical	achievement	of	Labour	Zionism.	According	to	the	text,	the	settlement	of	Gan	Or	was	 founded	 in	 1983	 as	 a	 “workers’	 settlement”	 embodying	 the	 Torah	 and	Labour	ideal.	It	was	established	by	ex-members	of	Bnei	Akiva	under	the	auspices	of	Hapoel	HaMizrahi,	an	anachronism	given	that	the	latter	was	earlier	subsumed	into	the	National	Religious	Party.	By	resurrecting	the	old	party	for	the	purposes	of	 continuity,	 the	 ideological	 meridian	 between	 Labour	 Zionism	 and	contemporary	national-religious	politics	is	blurred.			The	 museum	 makes	 significant	 use	 of	 three-dimensional	 objects	 and	foregrounds	religious	artefacts.	Following	standard	museum	practice,	objects	are	used	to	illustrate	vignettes	of	the	main	story.	The	visitor	learns	that	the	menorah	
																																																								56	Chabad	 originated	 in	 the	 Russian	 Empire	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 and	 is	 based	 on	 the	teachings	 of	 its	 seven	 spiritual	 leaders,	 the	 Lubavitcher	 Rebbes	 (named	 after	 the	 village	 of	Lubavitch).	The	last	and	most	influential	of	these	figures,	Menachem	Mendel	Schneerson,	died	in	1994.	After	the	sect	relocated	to	the	United	States	 in	1940,	he	oversaw	its	growth	into	a	global	movement	with	political	influence.	Although	opposed	to	the	State	of	Israel,	Schneerson	believed	that	Jews	had	to	control	the	entire	Land	of	Israel	to	prepare	for	the	coming	of	the	Messiah	(Kepel	1994,	183-189).	
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from	 the	 synagogue	 at	 Netzarim	was	 donated	 in	memory	 of	 a	Warsaw	Ghetto	survivor	 (photo	 3.26).	 An	 accompanying	 photograph	 shows	 settlers	 from	Netzarim	carrying	the	menorah	at	the	Western	Wall	in	Jerusalem	during	a	mass	demonstration	against	 the	disengagement.	Nazi	oppression	and	Jewish	survival	are	 hereby	 invoked	 to	 drive	 home	 the	 calamity	 of	 Gush	 Katif’s	 fate.	 Sacred	objects	are	employed	to	tell	stories	of	ethical	salvage	by	conscientious	Jews.	On	prominent	display	 is	 the	Torah	scroll	 from	a	school	 in	Neve	Dekalim,	retrieved	on	 the	 last	day	of	 the	settlement’s	existence.	The	 label	 states	 that	 it	was	 found	“sitting	in	the	Aron	Kodesh	[Holy	Ark]	waiting	to	be	redeemed.”		
	
Photo	 3.26	Menorah	 from	 the	 synagogue	 at	 Netzarim	 on	 display	 in	 the	 Gush	 Katif	 Museum,	Jerusalem.		
	
	The	 keys	 from	 Neve	 Dekalim’s	 “Tunisian”	 synagogue	 are	 displayed	 without	anecdotal	explanation.	Intra-ethnic	distinctions	are	not	made	explicit	within	the	museum.	 The	 secular/religious	 binary	 is	 acknowledged,	 but	 the	Ashkenazi/Mizrahi	 divide	 is	 submerged	 under	 a	 veneer	 of	 Jewish	 communal	
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unity.	 Dalsheim	 has	 criticised	 academic	 and	 media	 silence	 regarding	 the	presence	of	Mizrahim	in	the	Occupied	Territories.	Many	of	Gush	Katif’s	Mizrahi	communities	relocated	to	Gaza	from	deprived	development	towns	in	the	Negev	in	order	to	improve	their	social	position	(2011,	92-94).	After	initially	supporting	Mapai	 and	 the	 Labour	 Party	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s,	 Mizrahim	 increasingly	transferred	their	political	allegiance	to	Likud	in	the	1970s	and	subsequently	Shas	in	the	1980s	(Pappé	2014,	184;	Shafir	and	Peled	2002,	89-94).	The	endorsement	of	Shas	would	suggest	that	the	heritage	of	Gush	Katif	is	an	important	touchstone	for	 Mizrahi	 identity.	 Sacred	 objects	 such	 as	 the	 Torah	 scroll	 have	 universal	Jewish	resonance,	but	the	synagogue	keys	contain	more	complex	meanings.	They	represent	 a	 national-religious	 symbol	 expressing	 the	 right	 to	 redeem	 the	synagogue,	but	also	its	distinctive	status	as	a	Sephardi	place	of	worship.		
	
	
Photo	3.27	“Mortar	menorah”	made	from	an	unexploded	Palestinian	rocket,	Gush	Katif	Museum,	Jerusalem.		
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In	the	corner	of	the	room	there	is	a	small	shrine	to	the	settlers	of	Gush	Katif	who	fell	 victim	 to	 Palestinian	 violence.	 A	 photograph	 of	 each	martyr	 is	 reproduced	next	to	a	burning	candle.	Beneath	the	shrine	is	the	tail	of	a	Kassam	and	a	“mortar	menorah”	 made	 from	 an	 unexploded	 rocket	 that	 landed	 in	 Ganei	 Tal	 (photo	3.27).	 One	 of	 the	 settlers	 manufactured	 the	menorah	 out	 of	 fallen	 rockets	 for	“broadcasting	the	miracle”	of	their	survival.		The	exhibition	also	documents	the	“orange	struggle”	against	the	disengagement	plan.	 There	 are	 photographs	 of	 the	 human	 chain	 of	 more	 than	 one	 hundred	thousand	 people	 between	 Nitzanit	 and	 Jerusalem	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 2004.57	A	timeline	 records	 milestone	 events	 from	 Sharon’s	 initial	 announcement	 of	 the	disengagement	in	2003	to	the	withdrawal	in	2005.	Sharon’s	infamy	is	underlined	alongside	 the	 result	 of	 Likud’s	 internal	 referendum,	 expressing	 majority	opposition	 to	 the	 disengagement.	 The	 reality	 of	 IDF	 loyalty	 to	 the	 state	 is	countered	 by	 the	mention	 of	 the	 “right-wing	 officers’	 letter”,	 signed	 by	 thirty-four	 reservists	 stating	 their	 opposition.	 Amongst	 the	 ephemera	 is	 a	 startling	artefact	that	reflects	a	central	 theme	of	the	movement:	an	orange	Star	of	David	recalling	 the	 yellow	 star	 worn	 by	 Jews	 in	 Nazi-occupied	 Europe.	 The	controversial	adoption	of	the	orange	star	by	the	settlers	asserted	their	sense	of	righteous	victimhood	and	 incomprehension	at	 the	unprecedented	phenomenon	of	 Jews	 evicting	 Jews.	 All	 the	 settlers,	 the	 visitor	 is	 told,	 hung	 a	 sign	 on	 their	doors	stating:	“If	you	knock	on	the	door,	you	will	be	a	direct	partner	in	the	most	terrible	crime	in	the	history	of	the	Jewish	Nation.”	The	massing	of	protestors	at																																																									57	The	 human	 chain	 and	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 colour	 orange	 reflect	 the	 influence	 of	 nationalist	movements	 in	 the	 former	 Soviet	 Union.	 In	 1989	 activists	 in	 the	 Soviet	 republics	 of	 Lithuania,	Latvia	and	Estonia	formed	the	Baltic	Way—a	human	chain	linking	the	capitals	of	Vilnius,	Riga	and	Tallinn.	Ukraine’s	2004	Orange	Revolution	brought	Viktor	Yushchenko	to	power	in	2004.		
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Kfar	 Maimom	 near	 the	 Gaza	 border	 is	 mentioned	 as	 an	 occasion	 when	 the	movement	demonstrated	 its	 peaceful	 character.	Despite	 “unprecedented	 force”	being	 used	 by	 the	 IDF	 and	 border	 police,	 the	 crowd	 dispersed	 peacefully,	following	a	decision	by	Yesha.	 In	reality	 the	move	signified	a	retreat	motivated	by	the	memory	of	Yamit,	but	it	is	presented	as	the	dignified	action	of	a	movement	committed	to	non-violence.		
	
Photo	3.28	Photograph	of	a	child	offering	biscuits	to	IDF	soldiers	during	the	evacuation	in	2005,	Gush	Katif	Museum,	Jerusalem.	
	
	The	visitor	enters	the	room	dedicated	to	the	evacuation	through	a	plastic	curtain.	The	walls	are	painted	black	and	through	an	array	of	stylised	photographs,	events	are	relayed	in	episodic	fragments.	Mounted	policemen	are	ominously	silhouetted	at	Kfar	Maimom.	A	mother	and	child	are	seen	at	the	window	of	a	bus;	the	mother	is	wearing	an	orange	star	on	her	arm.	I	sit	down	to	watch	a	series	of	film	clips	of	the	eviction	of	Neve	Dekalim’s	Sephardic	synagogue,	which	the	label	short-hands	
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as	 “Jew	 expels	 Jew.”	 There	 follow	 successive	 scenes	 in	which	 the	 IDF	 are	 seen	struggling	with	settlers.	At	 this	point	 the	museum’s	guide,	a	 former	resident	of	Neve	Dekalim,	enters.	She	stresses	the	absence	of	conflict	between	the	IDF	and	the	 settlers.	 As	 proof	 of	 Gush	Katif’s	 patriotic	 credentials,	 she	 explains	 that	 its	residents	 served	 in	 elite	 army	 units.	 She	 then	 draws	 my	 attention	 to	 a	photograph	capturing	a	moment	of	pathos	between	a	small	child	and	a	column	of	soldiers	 (photo	 3.28).	 Through	 the	 photograph	 the	 visitor	 sees	 the	 IDF	 in	 a	sympathetic	light,	as	an	army	of	human	beings	doing	their	duty	but	not	without	compassion.	 It	 works	 with	 the	 image	 of	 the	 mother	 and	 child	 in	 the	 bus	 to	provoke	 emotional	 responses.	 I	 observe	 a	 father	 showing	 his	 children	 this	photograph,	with	which	they	clearly	identify	on	an	emotional	level.	The	nobility	of	the	soldiers	is	contrasted	with	the	villainy	of	Ariel	Sharon.	By	focussing	on	the	personality	 of	 Sharon,	 the	 exhibition	 absolves	 the	 IDF	 of	moral	 responsibility,	leaving	the	Zionist	credo	untarnished.		At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 exhibition	 the	 visitor	 watches	 a	 film	 in	 which	 Gush	 Katif	appears	 as	 an	 oasis	 of	 sun,	 sea,	 sand	 and	 bountiful	 agriculture	 amid	 the	 Arab	morass	of	Gaza.	Originally	a	desert	of	“sand,	sand	and	more	sand”,	the	landscape	is	transformed	by	Jewish	husbandry	into	a	centre	of	agricultural	production	for	both	domestic	and	export	markets.	The	film	includes	a	segment	dedicated	to	the	afterlife	 of	 Gush	 Katif.	 In	 this	 part,	 the	 activist	 museum	 returns	 to	 Gaza	 to	discover	 the	 fate	 of	 its	 synagogues.	 The	 museum’s	 investigators	 find	 most	 of	them	in	ruins	after	Arab	desecration.	Gan	Or’s	synagogue	is	now	being	used	as	a	chicken	coop	by	the	local	Palestinians,	who	claim	it	is	their	right	to	do	so.	In	an	unconvincing	display	of	 even-handedness,	 a	 local	Palestinian	 is	 interviewed	on	
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the	former	site	of	Gadid.	Unknowingly	playing	the	part	of	the	“Good	Arab”	for	the	Zionist	audience,	he	says	that	he	thinks	all	holy	places	should	be	respected.	The	visitor	 learns	 how	 the	 Gadid	 synagogue	was	 preserved	 and	 used	 as	 a	mosque	until	 the	 IDF	 launched	 Operation	 Cast	 Lead	 in	 2008.	 The	 fate	 of	 Gush	 Katif’s	synagogues	is	a	recurring	theme	in	the	museum.	In	the	film,	their	destruction	is	described	 as	 “crushing	 Israel’s	 honour”.	 The	 national-religious	 political	orientation	of	the	museum	is	expressed	in	the	film’s	portrayal	of	the	synagogue	as	Israel’s	“heart	and	soul”.			Elsewhere	the	museum	has	a	small	exhibit	dedicated	to	the	“fateful	partnership”	between	Gush	Katif	 and	 the	 settlements	of	 the	 “Northern	Shomron”	 (Samaria),	also	 evacuated	 in	2005.	A	photograph	 shows	protestors	 occupying	 an	 “ancient	fortress”	 at	 Sa-Nur.	 Marking	 the	 tenth	 anniversary	 of	 the	 disengagement,	hundreds	of	former	settlers	and	supporters	returned	to	Sa-Nur	to	re-occupy	an	abandoned	 building	 that	 had	 survived	 the	 withdrawal.	 The	 would-be	 settlers	were	 quickly	 removed	 by	 the	 IDF	 after	 their	 direct	 appeal	 to	 Benjamin	Netanyahu	 went	 unanswered. 58 	When	 laying	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 the	 new	Northern	 Samaria	 Visitors’	 Centre	 at	 Shavei	 Shomron	 the	 following	 month,	Israel’s	immigration	minister,	Ze’ev	Elkin,	called	for	the	2005	disengagement	law	to	be	repealed	(Arutz	Sheva	2015).59			High-level	 political	 patronage	 of	 the	 activist	 heritage	 of	 Gush	 Katif	 and	 the	northern	 West	 Bank	 settlements	 reflects	 the	 political	 purchase	 now	 held	 by	national-religious	 settlers	 within	 the	 Israeli	 state.	 The	 interpenetration	 of	 the																																																									58	A	tent	yeshivah	had	already	been	established	for	some	years	at	Sa-Nur	in	a	tactic	reminiscent	of	Gush	Emunim	in	the	1970s.		59	Shavei	 Shomron	 is	 a	 settlement	 in	 the	 northern	 West	 Bank.	 The	 new	 visitors’	 centre	 is	 a	partnership	between	the	Samaria	Regional	Council	and	the	Katif	Centre.		
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state	 and	 activist	 Zionism	 within	 the	 heritage	 sphere	 has	 attendant	 political	tensions.	 For	 Zionist	 politicians	 of	 all	 stripes,	 heritage	 sites	 represent	 national	
causes	 célèbres.	 Nonetheless	 museums	 and	 heritage	 centres	 can	 also	 act	 as	containers	 for	 radical	 activism,	 exceeding	 the	 governmental	 agenda.	 Activist	attempts	to	breach	boundaries	defined	by	the	state,	such	as	the	thwarted	return	to	Sa-Nur,	must	otherwise	be	contained	by	force.	Activist	heritage	as	conceived	by	 radical	 Religious	 Zionists	 may	 court	 government	 sponsorship,	 but	 its	underlying	rationale	is	the	redefinition	of	the	state	itself.	Heritage	is	triangulated	within	their	activism	between	the	state	and	the	land	as	coextensive	ideals.	It	may	therefore	 derive	 form	 and	 content	 from	 official	 representations,	 but	 with	 the	ultimate	aim	of	transforming	state	mechanisms	for	social	reproduction.		
	 	 	
Strangers	in	a	Strange	Land	
	
	Towards	 the	 end	 of	 my	 time	 in	 Israel	 I	 travel	 to	 the	 southern	 Negev	 to	 visit	Zikim,	 a	 frontline	 kibbutz	 founded	 in	 1949	 by	 a	 Romanian	 contingent	 of	Hashomer	 Hatzair.	 Although	 ideologically	 polar,	 Zikim’s	 history	 after	 1967	became	intertwined	with	that	of	Gush	Katif.	Zikim	now	exists	 in	the	militarised	borderland	of	 Israel	 and	Gaza.	 Standing	on	 the	high	ground	at	Zikim,	 the	mist-muted	 towers	of	Beit	Hanoun	are	visible	 in	 the	distance	 (photo	3.29).	My	host	tells	me	that	during	Operation	Protective	Edge	in	2014,	Hamas	divers	attempted	to	 infiltrate	 Zikim	by	 landing	 on	 the	 beach.	 Soldiers	 from	 the	 nearby	 IDF	 base	killed	 the	 invaders	 as	 they	 came	 ashore.	Walking	 around	 the	 kibbutz,	my	host	shows	me	the	new	visitors	centre	under	construction	in	an	old	pre-state	building	
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(photo	 3.30). 60 	Arab	 labourers	 are	 working	 inside	 as	 my	 host	 shares	 his	memories	of	the	old	house.	Sections	of	the	original	interior	decoration	are	being	preserved	in	the	new	centre.	This	will	offer	the	authenticity	of	a	Levantine	past	as	the	backdrop	to	an	economically	sustainable	present	founded	on	eco-tourism.		
	
Photo	3.29	Perimeter	fence	of	Zikim	near	the	Gaza	border,	the	Palestinian	city	of	Beit	Hanoun	on	the	skyline.	
	
	The	other	economic	motors	of	the	kibbutz	are	its	dairy	and	a	factory	producing	components	for	the	North	American	automotive	market.	Zikim’s	other	products	–	 mattresses	 –	 are	 displayed	 in	 a	 showroom.	 Walking	 around	 inside,	 we	 talk	about	how	the	kibbutz	has	adapted	 to	globalisation.	Zikim	 is	now	as	reliant	on	the	fortunes	of	the	US	economy	as	it	is	on	the	domestic	Israeli	market.	Later	we	drive	 down	 to	 the	 nearby	 greenhouses,	 located	 on	 land	 that	 Zikim	 sold	 to	 the	government	for	use	by	former	settlers	from	Gush	Katif	(photo	3.31).	Unlike	the																																																									60 	The	 Jewish	 National	 Fund	 of	 Australia,	 which	 is	 sponsoring	 the	 building’s	 restoration,	describes	 it	 as	 “an	 Ottoman	 era	 Governor’s	 residence”	 (n.	 d.).	 The	 description	 avoids	 any	reference	to	its	Palestinian	past	during	the	British	Mandate.	
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neighbouring	 kibbutz,	 Carmia,	 Zikim	 took	 a	 collective	 decision	 on	 political	grounds	not	to	allow	ex-Gush	Katif	residents	to	live	on	its	land.	
	
	
Photo	3.30	Zikim’s	new	visitors	centre	under	construction	in	an	old	Palestinian	house.				
	
Photo	 3.31	 Greenhouses	 belonging	 to	 ex-Gush	 Katif	 settlers	 on	 land	 sold	 to	 the	 Israeli	government	by	Zikim.		
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After	dinner	we	pay	a	visit	to	the	kibbutz	museum	and	archive.	The	museum	has	obviously	been	designed	for	 internal	rather	than	public	consumption	and	there	is	 virtually	 no	 interpretation.	 Artefacts,	 documents	 and	 photographs	 form	 the	basis	 of	 a	 collective	 memory.	 On	 the	 wall	 is	 the	 banner	 of	 Zikim’s	 Romanian	founders	 alongside	 photographs	 of	 kibbutz	 members	 across	 the	 years	 (photo	3.32).	 Among	 the	 portraits	 are	my	 host	 and	 his	 son,	who	 had	 driven	me	 from	Ashkelon	 earlier	 in	 the	 day.	 In	 the	 black	 and	 white	 photographs	 we	 see	 the	landscape	of	the	kibbutz	at	its	makeshift	beginnings	in	the	rocky	desert.	In	one	of	the	photographs	I	notice	the	new	visitors	centre	as	 it	was	back	then.	There	are	scenes	of	 young	kibbutzniks	 standing	 to	 attention	 in	 the	uniform	of	Hashomer	Hatzair.	Workers	are	achieving	self-realisation	toiling	in	the	fields	and	the	dairy.	Children	born	on	Israeli	soil	are	smiling	at	the	camera.	Tools	and	other	artefacts	of	 the	 ascetic	 social	 life	 that	 characterised	 the	 kibbutz	 in	 its	 early	 years	 are	displayed	alongside	personal	items,	such	as	a	collection	of	cameras.		
	
Photo	3.32	Photographs	of	kibbutz	members	in	Zikim’s	museum.	
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I	recognise	Zionist	ideological	motifs	from	the	activist	heritage	of	Gush	Katif	and	the	 West	 Bank	 settlers	 –	 pioneering,	 agriculture,	 children	 –	 but	 there	 is	 a	different	 rationale	 underpinning	 this	 museum.	 Intended	 primarily	 for	 internal	use,	 the	 museum	 has	 no	 external	 advocacy	 function	 or	 political	 agenda.	 The	museum	and	 archive	 are	 a	means	 for	 kibbutz	members	 to	 learn	 about	 Zikim’s	history	and	 to	understand	 the	 changes	 taking	place	around	 them.	The	 socialist	origins	 of	 the	 kibbutz	 are	 evident	 in	 the	 museum,	 where	 objects	 and	 images	connect	 the	 viewer	 to	 real	 people	who	 lived	 and	worked	 in	 Zikim.	 Unlike	 the	heritage	projects	of	 the	religious	settlers,	 the	museum	represents	relationships	humans	have	with	one	another	and	not	with	material	things.	The	cameras	have	been	collected	by	the	museum	to	represent	an	individual	who	forms	part	of	the	collective	 memory.	 By	 contrast,	 at	 the	 Gush	 Katif	 Museum	 religious	 artefacts	betoken	places	as	ideas	and	not	the	social	relations	that	exist	behind	them.					At	Zikim	the	process	of	auto-archiving	is	partly	nostalgic,	but	for	activists	whose	political	 culture	 is	 rooted	 in	 collective	 learning,	 it	 is	 also	 a	 means	 of	comprehending	 their	 life	 experiences.	 The	 museum	 mediates	 change	 in	 the	communal	 life	 of	 Zikim	 and	 establishes	 a	 relative	 distance	 between	 its	pioneering	 past	 and	 globalised	 present.	 In	 her	 study	 of	 the	 Old	 Courtyard	Museum	at	Ein	Shemer,	Katriel	comments	on	the	latter-day	precariousness	of	the	kibbutz	 as	 a	 social	 project.61	Ein	 Shemer’s	museum	narrative	 is	 set	 against	 the	backcloth	of	 the	 ideological	crisis	 that	began	 in	 the	1960s.	She	argues	 that	 in	a	society	 where	 capitalist	 free	 enterprise	 and	 individualism	 are	 ascendant,	 the	older	 generation	 has	 failed	 to	 transmit	 collectivist	 ideology	 to	 their	 children																																																									61	Kibbutz	 Ein	 Shemer	 was	 also	 founded	 by	 Hashomer	 Hatzair.	 A	 number	 of	 the	 movement’s	original	kibbutzim	–	Mishmar	Haemek	and	Gal-On,	for	example	–	have	established	museums	and	archives.		
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(1997,	57).	With	this	observation	in	mind,	I	ask	my	hosts	whether	children	from	Zikim	 are	 brought	 here	 and	 I	 am	 told	 that	 they	 visit	 the	museum	 regularly	 to	learn	about	 their	history.	The	 fact	 that	both	parents	and	children	are	visible	 in	the	photographs	also	suggests	a	degree	of	intergenerational	continuity.	As	we	sit	chatting	in	the	archive	we	reflect	on	the	appeal	of	the	kibbutz	for	young	people	today.	 One	 of	 the	 kibbutzniks	 says	 that	 a	 recent	 survey	 found	 young	 Israelis	favoured	 living	 in	private	houses	on	a	kibbutz	over	 the	old	model	of	 collective	ownership.	(My	host	had	told	me	earlier	 that	his	granddaughter	 is	moving	 into	one	of	Zikim’s	new	private	houses.)			Unlike	many	kibbutzim,	Zikim	has	not	pursued	 the	path	of	privatisation	 in	 line	with	the	general	trend	accompanying	Israel’s	neoliberal	turn.	Until	1977	much	of	Israel’s	state-owned	economy	and	welfare	state	was	administered	in	cooperation	with	the	General	Federation	of	 Jewish	Labour	(Histadrut).	Deepening	recession	and	economic	stagnation	beset	the	twilight	years	of	Labour	rule.	Likud	thereafter	embraced	 the	 Chicago	 School,	 initiating	 economic	 liberalisation	 that	 radically	reshaped	 Israeli	 society	 (Ben-Porat	2008,	95-98).	After	1967,	 Israel’s	domestic	economy	 became	 inseparably	 linked	 to	 the	 Occupied	 Territories,	 with	Palestinians	 providing	 a	 source	 of	 cheap	manual	 labour	within	 the	Green	 Line	(Kimmerling	 and	 Migdal	 2003,	 283-286).	 The	 combined	 impact	 of	 economic	liberalisation	and	high	levels	of	immigration	from	the	former	Soviet	Union	were	major	contributing	factors	to	the	outbreak	of	the	First	Intifada	in	1987.	(Earlier	at	Zikim,	 I	was	 told	 that	 the	closure	of	 the	border	prevented	Palestinians	 from	travelling	to	work	in	its	factory.)		After	my	day	in	Zikim,	one	of	the	kibbutzniks	takes	me	to	visit	a	 former	settler	
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from	Gush	Katif	whom	he	knows	in	Ashkelon.	The	kibbutznik,	Rami,	a	Londoner,	came	to	Zikim	in	1957	as	part	of	the	second	generation.	When	we	arrive	at	the	printing	business	of	the	ex-settler,	Yamin,	I	notice	a	large	poster	commemorating	Neve	Dekalim	 on	 the	wall	 alongside	 photographs	 of	 his	 old	 life	 there.	 Yamin’s	family	 came	 to	 Israel	 from	Morocco	 in	 1956.	 He	 and	 his	 wife	 moved	 to	 Neve	Dekalim	 from	the	central	 town	of	Gedera	 in	1985,	after	hearing	about	 the	new	settlement	through	government	publicity.	He	enthuses	about	building	the	young	religious	 community	 in	 its	 formative	 years.	 Much	 of	 what	 he	 says	 echoes	 the	narrative	of	the	Katif	Centre.	He	describes	how	the	settlers	would	visit	Gaza	City,	Rafah	and	Khan	Younis	to	do	their	shopping.	Both	he	and	the	kibbutznik,	Rami,	express	nostalgia	 for	 the	period	before	 the	 Intifada,	which	 they	remember	as	a	time	 of	 relative	 peace	 and	 prosperity.	 Together	 they	 recall	 the	 industrial	 zone	adjacent	 to	 the	 Erez	 border	 crossing,	where	 Palestinian	 and	 Israeli	 businesses	co-existed.	 Israeli	 companies	 employed	 thousands	 of	 Palestinian	 workers	 at	Erez;	 Rami	 explains	 that	 Zikim’s	 Polyron	 mattresses	 were	 made	 there.	 Yamin	remembers	 large	numbers	of	 Israelis	 frequenting	 the	 industrial	park	where	he	bought	 furniture	 from	 the	 Palestinians.	 At	 one	 point	 Rami	 punctures	 this	nostalgia	by	referring	to	a	soldier	from	Zikim	who	was	paralysed	in	a	Palestinian	attack	whilst	 guarding	Netzarim.	 The	 two	men	 jointly	 blame	 the	 First	 Intifada	and	 subsequent	 rise	 of	 Hamas	 for	 ending	 what	 they	 perceive	 as	 a	 mutually	beneficial	 status	quo	between	 Jews	and	Arabs.	Rami	concurs	with	Yamin	when	he	 says	 of	 the	 economic	 cooperation	 at	 Erez,	 “It	 was	 a	 good	 period	 but	 they	ruined	everything”	(Ohayon	and	Billis,	interview	2015).62																																																											62	I	am	grateful	to	Yoav	Galai	for	his	assistance	with	the	Hebrew	translation.		
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When	I	question	Yamin	about	his	attitude	to	the	West	Bank	settlers	he	says,	“We	see	them	as	part	of	us,	we	–	I	at	least	–	am	for	settlement	all	over	Israel.	We	see	it	as	our	 land,	part	of	 the	state.”	He	continues,	 “If	 the	other	side	were	smart	 they	would	 live	 in	 peace	 with	 us.	 Things	 would	 look	 differently.	 They	 would	 do	business	with	us.	It	would	be	better	for	them.”	In	what	he	says,	Yamin	reveals	the	interconnection	 between	 his	 national-religious	 outlook	 and	 the	 political	economy	of	Neve	Dekalim.	As	an	observant	Mizrahi	Jew,	he	led	a	successful	 life	as	a	 small	businessman	 that	 confirmed	his	political	 convictions.	He	 talks	about	Gush	Katif	as	the	merkaz	haim	(“centre	of	life”)	where	he	and	his	wife	were	able	to	raise	children	under	a	religious	educational	system.	He	tells	me	that	he	is	now	living	in	a	permanent	home	in	Nitzan.	I	ask	him	if	he	feels	that	Neve	Dekalim	is	now	 in	 the	past,	 to	which	he	 replies,	 “We	are	 living	 it	 day	 to	day—you	 cannot	
disengage”	(he	pointedly	uses	the	 Israeli	government’s	 term).	He	says	that,	 like	his	 workplace,	 the	 family’s	 house	 in	 Nitzan	 is	 full	 of	 photographs	 of	 Neve	Dekalim	(Ohayon	and	Billis,	interview	2015).		I	discover	that	he	has	visited	both	the	Katif	Centre	and	the	Gush	Katif	Museum	and	 he	 responds	 affirmatively	 to	 my	 question	 about	 the	 accuracy	 of	 their	portrayals	of	Gush	Katif.	His	perception	of	the	activist	heritage	mirrors	his	own	auto-archiving	of	social	 life	 in	Neve	Dekalim.	 It	also	points	 to	a	deeper	 truth	 in	relation	to	heritage	as	a	synthetic	imitation	of	life.	When	people	are	disconnected	from	a	previous	existence,	objects	and	icons	can	become	screen	memories	of	the	social	 relations	 that	 existed	 within	 it.	 Consequently	 these	 substitute	representations	 become	 impediments	 to	 envisioning	 the	 future	 and	 create	 a	sense	 of	 living	 in	 the	 past.	 The	memory	 of	 what	 Yamin	 calls	 “one	 family”	 has	
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therefore	 become	 a	 pneumonic	 totality.	 The	 activist	 heritage	 of	 Gush	 Katif	demonstrates	 ideological	 fidelity	 to	 the	 Likud	 settlement	 strategy	 that	 created	Neve	Dekalim	in	the	first	place.	Individual	motives	notwithstanding,	Gush	Katif’s	heritage	reinforces	in	the	minds	of	former	settlers	the	image	of	a	unified	bloc	of	secular	and	religious	Jews,	 living	a	prosperous	 life	together	as	one	family.	Near	the	end	of	our	discussion,	Yamin	articulates	the	gravity	of	events	in	2005:		 It’s	important	not	only	on	the	personal	level.	It’s	important	to	the	whole	of	the	Israeli	people.	There	was	no	other	such	event.	After	the	Holocaust	let’s	say	–	we’re	 not	 comparing	 –	 but	 after	 the	 Holocaust	 it	 was	 the	 biggest	 event	 –	taking	people	out	and	driving	them	away.	(Ohayon	and	Billis,	interview	2015)			Yamin	 is	 careful	 to	 avoid	a	direct	 comparison	between	 the	disengagement	and	the	Holocaust	but	this	was	a	core	message	of	the	settlers’	campaign.	By	invoking	the	Holocaust	as	the	greatest	catastrophe	to	befall	the	Jewish	people,	the	settlers	of	 Gush	 Katif	 hoped	 to	 elicit	 support	 from	 the	 Israeli	 public.	 Under	 Begin	 the	Holocaust	became	integral	to	the	ethos	of	the	Israeli	state,	but	also	a	touchstone	for	marginalised	Mizrahi	identity.	Begin	attracted	support	from	Mizrahis	because	of	their	general	antipathy	toward	the	Labour	Establishment,	but	also	by	ending	the	 European	 Ashkenazi	 monopoly	 over	 the	 Holocaust	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 Jewish	persecution	 (Biale	 1986,	 160).	 Since	 many	 Gush	 Katif	 settlements	 were	 the	offspring	of	Begin’s	programme,	it	was	logical	that	the	Holocaust	should	become	a	 focal	 point	 for	 their	 resistance	 to	 the	 disengagement	 plan.	 Their	 strategy	backfired,	 however,	 failing	 to	 generate	 any	 popular	 groundswell	 within	 Israel.	Raising	 the	 spectre	 of	 the	Holocaust	 disrupted	 the	 strategy	 of	 normalising	 the	Occupied	Territories,	and	hence	discouraged	public	sympathy.			
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Despite	 their	 political	 differences,	 Rami	 appears	 sympathetic	 to	 Yamin	 when	discussing	the	social	experiences	they	have	in	common.	He	mentions	commerce	between	Zikim	and	Gush	Katif	and	is	nostalgic	 for	the	days	of	 the	open	border.	He	also	recognises	Yamin’s	enthusiasm	for	building	a	tight-knit	community	from	scratch	 as	 something	 akin	 to	 his	 own	 life	 in	 Zikim.	 Earlier	 when	 I	 ask	 Yamin	about	 his	 motivation	 for	 becoming	 a	 settler,	 Rami	 questions	 whether	 it	 was	“pioneering”	(Ohayon	and	Billis,	interview	2015).	Yamin’s	life	would	seem	much	closer	to	that	which	Begin	envisaged	for	settlers.	For	Yamin,	material	prosperity	in	an	“enclave	culture”	reinforced	his	ideological	commitment	to	a	Greater	Israel.			Neve	 Dekalim	 and	 Zikim	were	 both	 founded	 on	 alternative	 concepts	 of	moral	purity.	 Religious	 Zionists	 sought	 to	 build	 a	 new	 Torah-centred	 community;	Labour	Zionists	saw	pioneering	as	overcoming	the	decadence	of	exilic	capitalism.	Both	 types	 of	 settlement	 were	 artificially	 sustained	 in	 their	 nascence	 by	 the	Israeli	 state	 and	 its	 auxiliary	 agencies.	Neve	Dekalim	 fulfilled	Begin’s	 capitalist	vision,	 but	 the	 teleological	 connection	 between	 a	 productive	 economy	 and	religious	observance	could	only	be	maintained	inside	Gush	Katif.	By	contrast	the	gradual	 disintegration	 of	 the	 socialist	 pioneering	 ideal	 forced	 its	 adherents	 to	accept	 capitalist	 realities.	 In	 Zikim’s	 case	 this	meant	 adapting	 to	 globalisation.	The	price	for	abjuring	the	forces	of	tomorrow	has	been	a	collective	confinement	to	the	world	of	the	present,	wherein	the	ethical	sanctity	of	the	kibbutz	has	all	but	dissipated.	 Gaza’s	 settlements	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 retain	 their	 moral	 purity	 as	vanished	utopias	in	which	the	land	is	no	longer	the	object	of	human	endeavour	but	its	subject.	It	thus	appears	to	many	former	settlers	that	their	prosperity	was	not	the	consequence	of	state	intervention,	but	the	bounty	of	the	soil	itself.		
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Although	national-religious	shoots	sprang	from	Gush	Katif’s	fertile	economic	soil,	many	 settlers	 simply	 accepted	 government	 compensation	 and	 relocated.	 The	events	of	2005	are	now	refracted	through	the	politics	of	a	coalition	government	with	a	strong	national-religious	bent,	 so	 the	unanimity	of	purpose	among	Gaza	settlers	appears	absolute.	Doubtless	subsequent	exposure	to	the	machinations	of	a	neoliberal	state	will	have	driven	some	former	settlers	to	retrospective	activism.	The	 evacuation	 of	 Gush	 Katif	 occurred	 amid	 deeper	 liberalisation	 during	Netanyahu’s	tenure	as	finance	minister,	which	produced	higher	levels	of	poverty	and	unemployment	(Ben-Porat	2008,	112-114).	The	settlers	therefore	returned	to	a	 society	 radically	different	 from	 the	one	 that	had	given	birth	 to	Gush	Katif,	and	 like	 kibbutzim	 confronting	 fissiparous	 globalisation,	 they	 now	 find	themselves	unprotected	by	the	state.		Inbari	 has	 written	 that	 the	 Gaza	 disengagement	 plan	 caused	 a	 “fault	 line”	 in	Religious	Zionism,	between	a	 “faith-based”	approach	 that	considers	 the	secular	state	redundant	and	a	“statist”	view	that	sees	the	state	as	reflecting	the	popular	will	 and	 thus	 that	 of	 God	 (2012,	 108).	 Religious	 Zionists	 face	 a	 dilemma	 by	choosing	 to	 stand	 on	 either	 side	 of	 this	 line.	 To	 reject	 the	 State	 of	 Israel	 is	 to	forsake	Zionism’s	historic	achievement.	Activists	on	the	radical	fringes	of	settler	society,	such	as	the	Hilltop	Youth,	are	evidently	prepared	to	elevate	the	ideal	of	the	sacred	 land	above	the	state.	Conversely	the	closer	settlers	gravitate	toward	the	state,	the	more	they	are	drawn	into	temporal	reality	and	exposed	to	its	moral	impurity.	 The	 dilemma	 facing	 the	 settler	 movement	 is	 sharply	 exposed	 in	 its	activist	heritage,	which	can	serve	as	an	engine	of	occupation	or	an	institutional	mechanism	for	subjugating	radical	impulses.		
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In	its	readiness	to	sponsor	the	heritage	of	Gush	Katif,	the	state	is	funding	Zionist	nostalgia;	through	indirect	support	for	heritage	projects	in	Hebron	and	Shiloh,	it	is	enabling	proactive	settlement.	Whereas	Religious	Zionists	evince	nostalgia	for	the	past,	many	are	equally	resolute	in	their	determination	to	use	its	models	and	metaphors	 for	 envisioning	 the	 future.	 The	 adoption	 of	 heritage	 practices	 by	settlers	 indicates	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	 role	 the	 past	 plays	 in	 the	 production	 of	modernity	and	the	enactment	of	the	state.	In	their	activist	heritage	they	tread	a	fine	 line	 between	 accepting	 the	 state	 as	 a	 legitimate	 historical	 entity,	 and	attempting	 to	 redefine	 it	 through	 alternative	 representations.	 Pioneering	 is	framed	 as	 an	 authentic	mode	 of	 enacting	 the	 state	 before	 and	 after	 1967,	 but	Judaism	is	centred	ontologically	as	the	essence	of	Zionism.		Zionism	has	evolved	from	a	predominantly	secular	nationalist	ideology	that	took	on	both	 liberal	 and	 socialist	 complexions	 into	one	 that	draws	 its	 internal	 logic	from	Judaism	alone.	Herzl’s	secular	Zionism	was	hostile	to	traditional	Judaism	as	an	 anti-modern	 phenomenon	 inimical	 to	 the	 nationalist	 project	 (Sand	 2014,	192).	Once	the	decision	to	create	a	Jewish	state	in	Palestine	was	taken,	however,	the	 Bible	 became	 the	 ontological	 node	 around	 which	 all	 Zionism’s	 various	ideological	 streams	 converged.63	The	 Bible	was	 elevated	 as	 the	 codex	 defining	Jewish	 national	 culture,	 but	 also	 the	 primary	 justification	 for	 colonising	Palestine.	Inextricably	linked	to	the	Jewish	right	to	return	is	what	Piterberg	calls	the	“return	to	history”:		 The	nation	is	the	autonomous	historical	subject	par	excellence,	and	the	state	is	the	telos	of	 its	march	towards	self-fulfilment.	According	to	this	 logic,	so	 long																																																									63	The	 location	of	the	Jewish	state	advocated	by	Herzl	was	originally	an	open	question.	 In	1903	the	 British	 made	 the	 offer	 of	 a	 Jewish	 colony	 in	 Uganda,	 ironically	 a	 position	 supported	 by	Religious	Zionists	in	the	World	Zionist	Organisation	at	the	time	(Akenson	1992,	157).	
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as	 they	were	exiles,	 the	 Jews	 remained	a	 community	outside	history,	within	which	all	European	nations	dwelt.	Only	nations	 that	occupy	 the	 soil	 of	 their	homeland,	 and	establish	political	 sovereignty	over	 it,	 are	 capable	of	 shaping	their	own	destiny	and	so	entering	history.	(2008,	95)			Rather	than	seeing	Israel	as	a	historical	nation	in	the	Judeo-Christian	continuum,	Religious	Zionists	have	stepped	outside	this	time-space	into	eternity	in	order	to	redefine	 the	 contours	 of	 the	 state.	 Labour	 Zionists	 had	 already	 breached	 the	ontological	cordon	between	ancient	and	modern,	 leaving	a	paradigm	that	could	be	ideologically	adapted.	Their	recourse	to	the	Bible	was	motivated	by	the	need	for	a	historical	precedent	for	Jewish	state	power.	Labour	Zionists	and	Religious	Zionists	 jointly	 idealised	 the	 State	 of	 Israel	 as	 bringing	 about	 the	 Negation	 of	Exile.	 Like	 other	 post-colonial	 societies,	 the	 new	 state	 constructed	 a	 national	heritage	 to	 complete	 its	 return	 to	 history.	 Israel	 followed	 other	 nations	 in	asserting	the	distinctiveness	of	its	national	heritage	by	establishing	a	connection	between	 the	modern	 state	 and	 an	 ancient	 civilisation.	 Demonstrating	 national	uniqueness	meant	defaulting	to	the	Bible	 in	which	the	Jewish	origin	story	is	an	exclusive	covenant	with	God.	The	modern	Israeli	nation	was	therefore	conceived	as	 being	 contiguous	 with	 the	 ancient	 Israelites—as	 Akenson	 puts	 it	 a	 “single	corporate	personality”	that	“runs	back	in	time	to	Abraham	and	forward	in	time	to	the	very	end	of	the	future”	(1992,	40).	The	problem	facing	Israel’s	architects	was	that	by	the	late	1960s	their	vision	required	redefinition,	if	it	was	to	remain	a	Jewish	state.	Labour	Zionism	atrophied	ideologically	after	realising	its	principal	objective	 in	 1948	 and	 hence	 territorial	 expansion	 became	 the	 only	 means	 of	sustaining	its	hegemony.	Biale	concludes	that	the	long-term	impact	of	the	Six	Day	War	was	 to	 extinguish	 any	 lingering	 Labour	 Zionist	 ambition	 to	make	 Israel	 a	normal	nation.	Israel’s	conflict	with	its	Arab	neighbours	imbued	the	state	with	a	
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new	 “ideology	 of	 survival”	 that	 has	 become	 predominant	 in	 national	 politics	(1986,	146).			The	Messianism	of	 the	West	Bank	settlers	synthesises	the	old	pioneering	ethos	with	 a	 new	 survivalist	 nationalism	 that	 no	 longer	 regards	 Jews	 as	 a	 normal	nation	 but	 as	 the	 primary	 actors	 in	 history.	 This	 was	 key	 to	 resolving	 the	contradiction	 in	 Zionism	 between	 returning	 to	 history	 and	 the	 sense	 of	inferiority	deeply	 ingrained	within	 it.	Zionism	deemed	Jews	powerless	 to	make	history	outside	their	own	land.	Consequently	they	were	 impotent	 in	the	face	of	the	Holocaust	as	the	fate	of	a	rootless	existence.	The	powerlessness	that	Scholem	lamented	stems	from	the	Zionist	abstraction	of	Jewish	identity	from	the	genius	of	other	nations.	Establishing	a	Jewish	state	with	a	unique	history	meant	negating	not	 only	 exile,	 but	 the	 world-historical	 contribution	 Jews	 had	 made	 to	 the	national	genius	of	Germany,	France,	 Iraq	and	so	on.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	New	Hebrew	discarded	significant	non-religious	aspects	of	Jewish	culture,	such	as	the	Yiddish	language,	as	relics	of	exile.			Jewish	 pioneers	 sought	 roots	 in	 Palestine	 where,	 like	 New	 England’s	 Puritan	colonists,	they	found	themselves	strangers	in	a	strange	land.	Emulating	the	first	American	nationalists,	Zionist	ideologues	conceived	a	rational	blueprint	for	their	new	society.	This	they	discovered	by	reinterpreting	the	Bible	as	a	history	book,	but	 in	 so	 doing	 programmed	 the	 ideological	 coordinates	 of	 irrational	nationalism.	 Israel’s	 founding	 fathers	 were	 not	 agents	 of	 European	imperialism—the	Yishuv	was	of	autonomous	design.	The	Zionist	colonisation	of	Palestine	artificially	engineered	ethnically	exclusive	social	relations,	which	were	at	times	exploited	by	the	British	authorities,	but	were	ultimately	antagonistic	to	
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them.	 The	 State	 of	 Israel	 was	 nonetheless	 established	 on	 an	 irreconcilable	ideological	impulse	to	be	both	Western	and	autochthonous.	In	Altneuland,	Herzl	expressed	the	occidental	character	of	the	Zionist	endeavour	through	his	literary	avatar,	 the	 Lithuanian	 immigrant,	 David	 Littwak.	 Addressing	 the	 utopian	settlement	of	Neudorf,	Littwak	reminds	his	audience:			How	 could	 we	 have	 achieved	 results	 that	 no	 one	 else	 had	 achieved	 here	before?	True,	 you	worked	with	 all	 the	 fervour	 of	 Jewish	 love	 for	 the	 sacred	soil.	That	soil	was	unproductive	for	others,	but	for	us	it	was	good	soil.	Because	we	fertilized	it	with	our	love.	Our	first	settlers	had	proven	thirty	years	earlier	what	 could	 be	 done	 here.	 Yet	 their	 settlements	 were	 worth	 little	 from	 the	economic	 viewpoint	 because	 they	 were	 based	 on	 a	 false	 principle.	With	 all	their	modern	machinery,	those	settlers	were	able	to	create	only	the	old	type	of	village.	But	you	have	the	New	Village.	And	that,	my	friends,	is	not	the	work	of	your	hands	only.		 Don’t	 imagine	 I	 am	 jesting	 when	 I	 say	 that	 Neudorf	 was	 built	 not	 in	Palestine,	but	elsewhere.	It	was	built	in	England,	in	America,	in	France	and	in	Germany.	It	was	evolved	out	of	experiments,	books,	and	dreams.	(1997,	143)			For	Herzl,	Jews	have	a	privileged	relationship	with	the	land	as	“sacred	soil”,	but	its	 cultivation	 is	 a	 Western	 episteme.	 The	 kibbutz	 movement	 evolved	 from	precepts	of	European	origin,	but	ultimately	foundered	on	the	basic	contradiction	between	 socialist	 collectivisation	 and	 nationalist	 idealisation	 of	 the	 land.	 This	was	 inevitable	given	the	Yishuv’s	ethnicised	social	relations	and	the	 ideological	imperative	of	demonstrating	 Jewish	 indigeneity	 to	perpetuate	 them	 in	 the	new	state.			Zionism	had	to	be	 ideologically	recalibrated	because	the	Western	 idea	of	 Israel	actually	 undermined	 Jewish	 indigeneity	 as	 the	 principal	 justification	 for	settlement.	 The	 rise	 of	 Jewish	 fundamentalism	 since	 the	 1950s	 should	 not,	however,	 be	 interpreted	 as	 an	 ideological	 reaction	 against	 the	 West	 as	 a	geopolitical	 entity	 but	 rather	 towards	 the	 Enlightenment’s	 universal	 ideas.	
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Jewish	 fundamentalism	 has	 evolved	 alongside	 its	 Christian	 and	 Islamic	counterparts	 as	 militant	 opposition	 to	 the	 Enlightenment’s	 attempt	 to	“emancipate	 reason	 from	 faith”	 (Kepel	 1994,	 143).	 At	 an	 ideological	 level,	fundamentalism	inverts	the	precedence	of	culture	over	nature.	Religious	Zionist	settlers	 interpret	 their	 presence	 on	 the	 land	 as	 God’s	 will	 and	 attribute	supernatural	properties	to	the	land	as	a	primary	agent	in	Jewish	culture.	For	this	reason	they	deem	Jewish	culture	to	be	inert	outside	the	Land	of	Israel.			Fundamentalists	regard	their	faith	as	explaining	the	material	world	and	human	agency	within	 it.	 They	 do	 not	 regard	 faith	 as	 being	 incompatible	with	modern	scientific	 knowledge	 and	 technology	 but	 as	morally	 guiding	 their	 development	(Euben	1999,	69).	Hence	Religious	Zionist	settlers	have	embraced	museums	and	archaeology,	which	were	once	the	preserve	of	rational	scientific	enquiry,	and	use	the	internet	and	digital	technologies	as	media	for	cultural	representation.	Their	aim	is	not	 to	return	to	 the	social	conditions	of	ancient	 Israel	 in	material	 terms,	but	to	reconfigure	Israeli	modernity	in	conformity	with	the	moral	universe	of	the	Halakah.	 Religious	 fundamentalism	 has	 gained	 ideological	 ground	 in	 Western	societies,	and	simultaneously	in	Israel,	as	spiritual	prophylaxis	against	neoliberal	restructuring.	 Ironically	 there	 is	 an	 ideological	 symmetry:	 neoliberalism	 also	holds	 that	 society’s	 ills	 stem	 from	 emancipating	 reason	 from	 faith—in	 the	guiding	force	of	the	market.	 In	the	darkness	of	the	desert,	 the	ancient	Hebrews	forged	 the	 cult	 of	 Yahweh	 to	 illuminate	 a	 harsh	 and	 future-blind	 existence.	Modern	Israel	stands	thus	in	the	fading	light	of	the	ancients	as	messianic	dreams	shine	on	in	the	gloaming.	
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Four	
	
Dead	Generations:	Elegy	and	Authenticity	in	Irish	Republicanism		The	centenary	of	the	1916	Easter	Rising	against	British	imperial	rule	inevitably	acted	as	a	lightning	rod	for	Irish	Republicans	across	the	island	of	Ireland.	As	the	centenary	 loomed,	 the	 Republic	 Of	 Ireland 64 	was	 mired	 in	 political	 crisis	following	 the	 February	 General	 Election.	 At	 the	 ballot	 box	 voters	 expressed	strong	disillusionment	with	 the	 status	quo.	 Sinn	Féin	 saw	 its	 representation	 in	the	 Dáil	 increase	 as	 support	 for	 the	 Irish	 Labour	 Party	 dwindled.	 Fine	 Gael	finished	 narrowly	 ahead	 of	 its	main	 rival,	 Fianna	 Fáil,	 forcing	 the	 party	 of	 the	Taoiseach	Enda	Kenny	 to	 form	a	minority	government.	Both	Sinn	Féin	and	 the	left-wing	 Anti-Austerity	 Alliance-People	 Before	 Profit	 coalition	 gained	momentum	 from	 the	 popular	 protest	 movement	 against	 the	 government’s	austerity	 policies	 and	 its	 controversial	 imposition	 of	 water	 charges.	 Amid	 the	political	 turmoil,	politicians	of	all	parties	sought	to	claim	the	 legacy	of	1916.	 In	doing	 so,	 they	 exposed	 the	 Irish	 state’s	 historical	 ambivalence	 towards	 its	progenitors	and	the	vicissitudes	of	a	society	based	on	a	promise	unfulfilled.	Over	Easter	 the	 General	 Post	 Office	 (GPO)	 became	 the	 centrepiece	 of	 an	 expensive	state-sponsored	 spectacle.	 The	 gathering	 of	 the	 country’s	 elites	 exposed	 the	social	chasm	between	the	Irish	Republic	proclaimed	by	Patrick	Pearse	on	Easter	Monday	 1916	 and	 the	 prevailing	 neoliberal	 consensus	 north	 and	 south	 of	 the	border	a	century	later.																																																									64	This	term	refers	to	the	state	established	by	Irish	parliamentary	legislation	in	1948.	Hereafter	I	use	“Irish	Republic”	 in	reference	to	the	political	entity	defined	by	the	Provisional	Government’s	1916	Proclamation.	
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The	 events	 of	 1916	 infuse	 the	 Republic	 of	 Ireland’s	 national	 heritage	 as	 the	premonition	 of	 Irish	 statehood.	 After	 the	 partition	 of	 Ireland	 in	 1921	 and	subsequent	Civil	War,	nationalist	politicians	both	for	and	against	the	Anglo-Irish	Treaty	assumed	the	mantle	of	the	1916	rebels.	After	the	Irish	Free	State	became	the	 Republic	 of	 Ireland,	 militant	 Republicans	 continued	 to	 challenge	 its	legitimacy,	claiming	to	be	the	true	heirs	of	the	Provisional	Government.	The	Irish	state	marked	the	fiftieth	anniversary	of	the	Rising	with	elaborate	pageantry,	but	after	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 Troubles	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 in	 1969,	 official	commemorations	 were	 downgraded	 as	 subsequent	 governments	 feared	association	with	the	Provisional	IRA.65			Since	the	1998	Belfast	(Good	Friday)	Agreement,	the	Irish	state	has	attempted	to	reclaim	 its	ownership	of	 the	Easter	Rising	 from	Sinn	Féin.	As	Taoiseach,	Bertie	Ahern	moved	to	reassert	Fianna	Fáil’s	Republican	credentials	in	2001,	declaring	of	Pearse:	“We	are	his	heirs.”	He	also	drew	on	Fianna	Fáil’s	lineage	as	the	party	founded	by	 the	Rising	 leaders	Éamon	de	Valera	and	Constance	Markievicz.	His	government	 established	 the	 1916	 Centenary	 Commemoration	 Committee	 to	mark	 the	 ninetieth	 anniversary	 and	 staged	 the	 first	 military	 parade	 in	 Dublin	since	1971	 (McCarthy	2012,	 345-355).	Announcing	 the	parade	 to	Fianna	Fáil’s	2005	party	conference,	Ahern	described	the	Irish	Army	as	the	“true	successors”	of	 the	1916	Volunteers	(Doherty	2007,	379).	Sinn	Féin’s	 leadership	was	absent	from	the	reviewing	stand	at	the	GPO,	 its	president	Gerry	Adams	expressing	the	party’s	 preference	 for	 an	 “inclusive,	 civic	 and	 cultural	 celebration”	 over	 a	militaristic	parade	(391).	The	impact	of	the	2008	financial	crisis	was	to	foreclose	
																																																								65	“Provisional	IRA”	refers	to	the	organisation	that	split	from	the	Irish	Republican	Army	in	1969.		
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on	 Ahern’s	 optimism	 and	 question	 his	 re-assertion	 of	 the	 state’s	 ideological	hegemony	over	1916.	With	anti-austerity	forces	gaining	ground	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland,	the	centenary	became	inextricably	linked	to	the	politics	of	the	present.	Amid	a	deepening	social	malaise,	Sinn	Féin	instrumentalised	the	legacy	of	1916	to	 challenge	 the	 nationalist	 credentials	 of	 Fine	 Gael	 and	 Fianna	 Fáil	 under	 the	slogan	“Join	the	Rising.”			Integral	to	Sinn	Féin’s	strategy	of	delegitimising	the	Irish	state’s	claim	to	be	the	Irish	 Republic	 proclaimed	 in	 1916	 is	 the	 Rising’s	 unique	 position	 within	 the	national	 heritage.	 Sinn	 Féin	 adapted	 models	 established	 by	 the	 state	 and	commercial	 tourist	 sectors	 to	 deploy	 its	 own	 activist	 heritage	 for	 autonomous	commemorations	 of	 the	 Rising.	 The	 dynamics	 of	 Republican	 activist	 heritage	differed	north	and	south	of	the	border,	owing	to	Sinn	Féin’s	duality	as	a	party	of	opposition	 at	 Leinster	 House	 and	 government	 at	 Stormont.	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 joint	profile	as	a	party	of	protest	and	government	has	sometimes	proved	problematic	since	its	major	electoral	breakthroughs,	in	the	Republic	in	2002	and	in	Northern	Ireland	in	2003	(Frampton	2009,	149).	The	party’s	southern	breakthrough	under	the	slogan	“An	Ireland	of	Equals”	came	on	the	back	of	campaigning	on	a	left-wing	agenda	at	odds	with	the	dominant	neoliberal	consensus	(135-137).	A	volte-face	towards	a	more	business-friendly	platform	proved	disastrous	 in	 the	2007	Irish	General	 Election.	 Pivoting	 leftward	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 2008	 crisis,	 Sinn	 Féin	bounced	 back	 in	 2011.	 In	 the	 2007	 Stormont	 Assembly	 elections,	 Sinn	 Féin	finished	 well	 ahead	 of	 its	 main	 nationalist	 rival,	 the	 Social	 Democratic	 and	Labour	 Party	 (SDLP).	 At	 Stormont,	 Sinn	 Féin	 has	 tactically	 downplayed	 its	executive	responsibility	for	imposing	austerity	policies	(McKearney	2011,	200).		
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Sinn	Féin	inaugurated	its	Easter	Rising	centennial	programme	in	February	2015.	The	launch	was	symbolically	held	at	Wynn’s	Hotel	in	Dublin,	where	the	decision	to	 form	 the	 Irish	 Volunteers	 was	 taken	 in	 1913	 and	 Cumann	 na	 mBan	 (the	Women’s	 Council)	 was	 founded	 the	 following	 year.	 At	 the	 event,	 the	 party’s	leaders	were	joined	by	an	actor	playing	the	role	of	Patrick	Pearse.	Re-enactivism	was	to	be	a	central	feature	of	Sinn	Féin’s	alternative	centenary,	beginning	with	a	re-enactment	of	 the	 funeral	of	 the	Fenian	 Jeremiah	O’Donovan	Rossa	 in	August	1915.	 At	 Glasnevin	 Cemetery,	 Pearse	 gave	 his	most	 famous	 speech,	 containing	the	immortal	lines:	“Life	springs	from	death;	and	from	the	graves	of	patriot	men	and	women	 spring	 living	nations”	 (quoted	 in	McGarry	2016,	 91-92).	 In	 the	 re-enactment	 a	 coffin	 was	 symbolically	 transported	 from	 Dublin	 City	 Hall	 to	Glasnevin	by	horse-drawn	hearse	and	then	carried	by	pallbearers	from	the	Cabra	Historical	 Society. 66 	An	 actor	 performed	 Pearse’s	 oration	 before	 the	 re-enactivists	 simulated	 the	 graveside	 fusillade	 with	 replica	 rifles.	 The	 re-enactment	of	O’Donovan	Rossa’s	funeral	established	the	paradigm	for	Sinn	Féin’s	public	events	over	the	2016	Easter	weekend.	On	Good	Friday	the	party	organised	another	 funeral	 procession,	 this	 time	 for	 an	 imagined	 interment.	 The	 “Lost	Leaders	 March”	 was	 billed	 as	 a	 “historical	 cortege”	 from	 Kilmainham	 Gaol	 to	Arbour	Hill	Cemetery	to	give	the	Rising’s	leaders	the	ceremony	denied	them	by	the	British	authorities	in	1916.			Below	I	examine	the	political	dynamics	of	Sinn	Féin’s	Easter	commemorations	in	both	 the	southern	and	northern	contexts,	but	also	 in	relation	to	 the	 ideological	hegemony	of	the	Irish	state,	which	Republican	activist	heritage	sought	to	disrupt.																																																									66	A	local	history	and	amateur	re-enactment	group	that	has	become	a	regular	fixture	at	Sinn	Féin	events	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland.	
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Time	 and	 geography	 did	 not	 allow	 for	 studying	 local	 commemorations	 so	 I	confine	my	enquiry	to	Sinn	Féin’s	national	centennial	programme.	My	fieldwork	was	 carried	out	 over	Easter	 2016	 in	Dublin	 and	Belfast,	 as	 the	primary	 loci	 of	commemoration.	I	will	also	discuss	the	interventions	of	“dissident”	Republicans	in	 this	 context.	 In	 a	 case	 study	 of	 the	 political	 battle	 over	 Moore	 Street’s	preservation,	I	consider	the	ideological	architecture	of	the	Republic	of	Ireland’s	national	heritage	to	identify	the	contradictions	inherent	in	Sinn	Féin’s	attempts	to	 recuperate	 it.	 My	 principal	 theme	 is	 authenticity	 as	 a	 central	 tenet	 of	 Irish	Republicanism.	 The	 core	 Republican	 values	 of	 blood	 sacrifice	 and	insurrectionary	 lineage	 require	 authentication	 through	 elegiac	 ritual	performance.	In	this	light,	activist	heritage	as	a	social	construct	of	the	neoliberal	present	exposes	the	contradictions	within	contemporary	Republicanism.	
	
The	Living	Present			On	the	centenary	of	the	1798	United	Irishmen	Rebellion,	 James	Connolly	wrote	that	 “any	 movement	 which	 would	 successfully	 grapple	 with	 the	 problem	 of	national	freedom	must	draw	its	inspiration,	not	from	the	mouldering	records	of	a	buried	 past,	 but	 from	 the	 glowing	 hopes	 of	 the	 living	 present,	 the	 vast	possibilities	 of	 the	 mighty	 future”	 (1987,	 323).	 In	 the	 “living	 present”	 of	 the	Republic	 of	 Ireland,	 the	 image	 of	 Connolly	 appears	 in	 various	 social	environments,	 many	 of	 them	 unlikely	 sites	 for	 honouring	 a	 revolutionary.	Despite	Connolly’s	 socialism	being	anathema	 to	 the	Establishment,	 his	 colossal	stature	 in	 modern	 Ireland	 cannot	 be	 easily	 ignored.	 Today,	 just	 as	 the	Proclamation	 of	 the	 Irish	 Republic	 in	 1916	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 national	heritage,	so	too	are	the	signatories,	although	they	do	not	always	sit	comfortably	
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in	public	 life.	Connolly	and	 the	 Irish	Citizen	Army	(ICA)	 figured	prominently,	 if	ambiguously,	 in	 the	 National	 Museum	 of	 Ireland’s	 exhibition	 Proclaiming	 a	
Republic:	 The	 1916	 Rising.	 The	 “Plough	 and	 the	 Stars”	 flag	 that	 flew	 over	 the	Imperial	Hotel	opposite	the	GPO	was	displayed	as	an	iconic	object.	Undermining	his	status	as	a	military	commander,	the	exhibition	reproduced	words	attributed	to	 Connolly	 from	 an	 exchange	 with	William	 O’Brien	 at	 Liberty	 Hall:	 “WE	 ARE	GOING	OUT	TO	BE	SLAUGHTERED.”		Of	all	the	1916	leaders,	 it	 is	Connolly	whose	legacy	has	been	most	manipulated	and	distorted	by	posterity.	His	political	 authority	 is	 claimed	by	 all	 branches	of	Republicanism,	as	well	as	by	the	Irish	labour	movement.	English	contextualises	Sinn	Féin’s	longstanding	identification	with	Connolly	within	the	protean	quality	of	 its	 socialism	 (2003,	 345).	 In	 Northern	 Ireland,	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 complicity	 in	austerity	has	been	accompanied	by	moves	to	control	Connolly’s	historical	legacy.	Sinn	 Féin	 summoned	 its	 power	 at	municipal	 and	 executive	 level	 to	 sponsor	 a	new	 statue	 of	 Connolly	 outside	 the	 Falls	 Community	 Office	 in	 Belfast	 for	 the	Rising	commemorations.	The	statue	was	unveiled	on	Good	Friday	by	Sinn	Féin	culture	minister,	Carál	Ní	Chuilín,	and	Connolly’s	great-grandson,	James	Connolly	Heron.	 A	 new	 interpretative	 centre	 near	 Connolly’s	 former	 home	 on	 the	 Falls	Road	 is	planned,	with	 funding	 from	Belfast	City	Council	and	the	Department	of	Culture,	Arts	and	Leisure	(DCAL).67		Following	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 left	 turn	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 2007	 Irish	 General	Election,	 Connolly’s	 legacy	 has	 renewed	 relevance.	 Connolly	 was	 the	 most																																																									67	The	centre	 is	 intended	to	be	part	of	the	Gaeltacht	Way	and	is	 funded	by	DCAL	through	Fáilte	Feirste	 Thiar	 (Welcome	 to	 West	 Belfast),	 an	 organisation	 for	 promoting	 local	 tourism	 (see	discussion	below).		
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prominent	of	 the	1916	 leaders	 in	 the	party’s	 “Join	 the	Rising”	propaganda.	His	muscular	role	in	the	Rising	is	a	source	of	legitimacy	for	a	party	laying	claim	to	the	physical	 force	 tradition	 of	 Irish	 Republicanism.	 On	 the	 Saturday	 of	 the	 Easter	weekend,	 Sinn	 Féin	 organised	 a	 re-enactment	 of	 the	 ICA’s	march	 from	Liberty	Hall	 to	 St	 Stephen’s	 Green	 that	 began	 the	 Rising	 on	 Easter	 Monday.	 Under	Connolly’s	second-in-command,	Michael	Mallin,	an	ICA	contingent	made	its	way	up	Grafton	Street	to	the	Green,	arriving	shortly	after	midday.	Once	in	control	of	the	Green,	they	dug	trenches	to	fortify	their	position	(see	Townshend	2015,	164-167).			
	
Photo	4.1	Marchers	stop	symbolically	outside	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach,	Merrion	Street.	
	
	Sinn	 Féin	 originally	 advertised	 the	 re-enactment	 to	 follow	 this	 route,	 but	 was	forced	to	change	plans	after	the	authorities	closed	the	road	for	the	Easter	Sunday	state	parade.	Having	been	denied	access	to	Grafton	Street,	Sinn	Féin’s	march	was	re-routed	via	Merrion	Square	in	the	government	district.	On	Merrion	Street	they	
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deliberately	halted	outside	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	building	(photo	4.1).	Leading	 the	 march	 were	 professional	 actors	 from	 Claíomh68,	 an	 Irish	 “living	history”	 group,	 playing	 ICA	 commandants	 Michael	 Mallin	 and	 Constance	Markievicz	and	their	fellow	officer,	Christy	Poole	(photos	4.1	and	4.2).	They	were	followed	by	a	column	from	the	Cabra	Historical	Society	and	the	Ancient	Order	of	Hibernians	pipe	band.	
	
	
Photo	4.2	Actors	playing	(left	to	right):	Constance	Markievicz,	Michael	Mallin	and	Christy	Poole.	
	
	Although	 loud	 and	 frenetic,	 the	march	was	disciplined	 in	 its	 progress	onto	 the	Green,	where	 it	 gathered	 around	 the	Wolfe	 Tone	monument	 at	 the	 north-east	corner.	 The	 Cabra	Historical	 Society	 formed	 up	 to	 perform	 a	 salute	with	 their	rifles	and	 the	Claíomh	actors	adopted	a	central	position	before	 the	Wolfe	Tone																																																									68	Claíomh	(Sword)	specialises	in	Irish	medieval	and	early	modern	history.	The	organisation	aims	to	 “spread	 awareness	 of	 Ireland’s	 rich	 resources	 of	 Medieval	 and	 Early	 Modern	 history	 and	archaeology	 through	means	 of	 entertaining	battle	 demonstrations,	 craft	 displays	 and	palatable	but	 informative	 talks	with	 the	aid	of	museum-quality	reconstructions”	 (http://www.claiomh.ie,	accessed	 April	 13,	 2016).	 Its	 clients	 include	 Irish	 state	 heritage	 institutions	 and	 tourist	attractions.	 Significantly	 its	 actors	 also	 participated	 in	 events	 for	 the	 state-sponsored	 1916	centenary	programme.	
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monument.	The	crowd	was	addressed	by	the	Sinn	Féin	deputy	for	Dublin	Fingal,	Louise	O’Reilly,	who	delivered	a	left-wing	anti-austerity	message,	calling	for	the	Irish	 Republic	 envisaged	 by	 Connolly.	 O’Reilly	 linked	 her	 theme	 of	 a	 workers’	republic	to	the	plight	of	sacked	workers	at	Clerys,	the	Dublin	department	store,	the	 grand	 and	 vacant	 front	 of	 which	 stands	 opposite	 the	 GPO.69	The	 original	edifice	 was	 obliterated	 by	 British	 artillery	 fire	 during	 the	 Rising	 and	 its	reincarnation	incorporates	elements	of	the	old	Imperial	Hotel.	Household	names	like	Clerys	are	themselves	part	of	the	city’s	heritage	and	of	Dubliners’	collective	memory.	The	disappearance	of	traditional	institutions	from	the	era	of	the	Rising	is	 not	 only	 symptomatic	 of	 post-2008	 economic	 trauma	 but	 also	 of	 a	 deeper	social	disquiet	haunting	the	centenary.	Invoking	Connolly,	O’Reilly	appeals	to	the	popular	 animus	 against	 the	 rapacious	 venture	 capitalism	 that	 has	 overtaken	Irish	society	in	recent	decades.	
	After	 the	 speeches	 the	 Claíomh	 actors	 stayed	 to	 interact	 with	 the	 marchers,	speaking	in	the	first	person	after	the	convention	of	“living	history”	interpreters.	The	actor	playing	Michael	Mallin	answered	questions	about	the	ICA	uniform	and	the	 German	Mauser	 rifle,	 explaining	 its	 technical	workings	 (photo	 4.3).	 It	 was	noticeable	 that	 the	 actors	 were	 professionals,	 experienced	 in	 working	 with	heritage	 audiences.	The	 interactive	nature	of	 the	 encounter	 suggested	 a	public	engagement	 strategy	 designed	 to	 short-circuit	 the	 machine	 politics	 of	Establishment	 parties.	 This	 outreach	 strategy	 did	 not	 involve	 Sinn	 Féin	politicians,	 however,	 but	 was	 devolved	 to	 professionals	 whose	 brief	 was	 to	engage	the	audience.	In	this	task	the	Claíomh	actors	were	reprising	their	role	at																																																									69	Clerys	closed	in	2015	after	its	American	owners	sold	up	to	a	consortium	of	venture	capitalists.	The	 workforce	 was	 summarily	 dismissed	 and	 given	 only	 statutory	 redundancy	 payments,	prompting	a	public	outcry	and	the	“Justice	for	Clerys	Workers”	campaign.		
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public	 heritage	 attractions	 where	 they	 demonstrate	 and	 explain	 the	 past	 as	“living	history”.		
	
Photo	4.3	“Living	history”:	actor	demonstrating	how	a	Mauser	rifle	works.			Afterwards	participants	posted	photographs	of	themselves	online,	as	one	would	for	 a	 conventional	 day	 out	 at	 any	 heritage	 site	 or	 carnival.	 Some	 are	 digitally	altered	 to	 look	 old,	 using	 a	 sepia	 effect.	 Attending	 the	 march	 manifests	 an	ideological	commitment	to	Sinn	Féin	and	its	Republican	liturgy	but	by	dressing	up,	participants	were	also	engaging	 in	a	new	form	of	political	 theatre,	different	from	 the	 sombre	militaristic	 rituals	of	 traditional	Republicanism.	 In	 this	 sense,	the	 social	 experience	 of	 heritage	 and	 tourism	 can	 interplay	 with	 politics	 and	collective	 memory	 in	 real	 time.	 Re-enacting	 past	 lives	 is	 nostalgic,	 but	 also	aspires	 to	 alterity—in	 this	 case	 an	 Ireland	 that	might	 have	 been	 or	may	 be	 to	come.	For	the	period-costumed	marchers,	St	Stephen’s	Green	is	a	social	arena	for	what	Boym	terms	“creative	nostalgia”:		
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The	problem	with	prefabricated	nostalgia	 is	 that	 it	 does	not	help	us	 to	deal	with	the	future.	Creative	nostalgia	reveals	the	fantasies	of	the	age,	and	it	is	in	those	fantasies	and	potentialities	that	 the	 future	 is	born.	One	 is	nostalgic	 for	the	past,	not	for	the	way	it	was,	but	for	the	past	the	way	it	could	have	been.	It	is	this	past	perfect	that	one	strives	to	realise	in	the	future.	(2001,	351)			Sinn	 Féin’s	 creative	 nostalgia	 brought	 the	 party	 into	 confrontation	 with	 the	authorities	 over	 the	 route.	 It	 was	 forced	 into	 a	 climb-down	 that	 tarnished	 its	credibility	as	a	party	of	protest.	Later	 that	day,	dissident	Republicans	 from	the	Irish	Republican	Socialist	Party	(IRSP)	marched	from	Liberty	Hall	to	the	GPO.	A	young	female	re-enactivist	read	Pearse’s	Proclamation	in	Irish	outside	the	GPO,	in	 defiance	 of	 the	 authorities.	 That	 dissident	 Republicans	 not	 only	 defied	 the	state	 to	 enter	 O’Connell	 Street	 but	 also	 managed	 to	 rally	 outside	 the	 GPO	challenged	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 monopoly	 of	 commemoration.	 Participants	 in	 the	 IRSP	march	also	wore	period	ICA	uniforms	but	were	joined	by	others	in	contemporary	black	 paramilitary	 dress.	 The	 IRSP	was	 the	 political	wing	 of	 the	 Irish	National	Liberation	 Army	 before	 the	 latter	 declared	 a	 permanent	 end	 to	 its	 armed	campaign	in	2009.	Although	the	IRSP	no	longer	advocates	armed	struggle,	one	of	its	 founders,	Tommy	McCourt,	 told	 the	rally	 that	 “had	the	men	and	the	women	who	took	this	building	been	alive	today,	there’s	every	likelihood	they’d	be	sitting	in	Maghaberry	Prison	or	Portlaoise”	(2016).70			Re-enactivism	has	therefore	spread	beyond	the	rituals	of	Sinn	Féin	to	the	ranks	of	 dissident	 Republicans	 opposed	 to	 the	 Belfast	 Agreement.	 For	 Sinn	 Féin,	 the	historicisation	 of	 Republican	 armed	 struggle	 through	 re-enactivism	authenticates	 its	own	blood	sacrificial	 tradition,	but	also	confines	it	 to	the	past.	
																																																								70	Maghaberry	Prison	in	Northern	Ireland	and	Portlaoise	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland	are	the	main	incarceration	sites	for	dissident	Republican	prisoners.	
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Antipathetic	 to	 Sinn	 Féin,	 dissident	 Republicans	 are	 now	 adopting	 these	practices	to	demonstrate	that	the	buried	past	cannot	be	hermetically	sealed	off	from	the	living	present.			
Republicanism	Redux	in	West	Belfast			Every	 year	 on	 Easter	 Sunday,	 marchers	 join	 the	 Belfast	 National	 Graves	Association	parade	following	the	Republican	colour	party	along	the	Falls	Road	to	Milltown	Cemetery.	 Thousands	 of	 local	 residents	 and	 visitors	 line	 the	 route	 to	watch.	Re-enactivism	became	a	feature	of	the	Easter	parade	after	the	Provisional	IRA’s	announcement	of	a	permanent	end	to	its	armed	campaign	in	2005	and	was	in	evidence	at	the	ninetieth	anniversary	of	the	Rising.	On	the	fiftieth	anniversary,	a	special	commemorative	parade	was	held	from	the	Falls	Road	to	Casement	Park,	an	 event	 organised	 by	 a	 coalition	 of	 Republican	 and	 left-wing	 groups.	 In	 1966	Belfast	 became	 the	 “capital”	 of	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 commemorations,	 with	 events	 in	Dublin	monopolised	by	the	Irish	state	(O’Callaghan	2007,	107-108).			In	 2016	 Sinn	 Féin	 found	 itself	 in	 a	 similar	 position	 with	 its	 Dublin	 parade	 to	Glasnevin	 Cemetery	 again	 re-routed	 by	 the	 Irish	 authorities.	 Advertised	 as	Moore	 Street,	 where	 the	 Rising	 leaders	 surrendered,	 the	 assembly	 point	 was	switched	to	north	Dublin,	away	from	the	city	centre.	Robbed	of	its	visual	impact,	the	Dublin	commemoration	was	relegated	to	the	status	of	a	minor	event,	with	the	Irish	 state’s	 elaborate	 military	 parade	 taking	 centre	 stage.	 Belfast	 would	therefore	 be	 the	 capital	 for	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 1916	 centenary,	 with	 the	 parade	gathering	at	the	Divis	Tower	at	the	foot	of	the	Falls	Road.	
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									Photo	4.4	D	Company	flag	and	Sinn	Féin	1918	election	replica	poster,	Divis	Street.			When	I	arrive	at	the	Divis	Tower,	the	area	is	bedecked	with	Irish	tricolours	and	placards	bearing	 images	of	 the	Rising	 leaders.	 Sinn	Féin	has	 also	placed	 “1918	election	 replica”	 posters	 on	 the	 lamp-posts	 for	 the	 forthcoming	 Stormont	Assembly	elections	in	May.	More	ominously,	green	“D	Company”	flags	are	flying	alongside	 the	 placards	 (photo	 4.4).	 The	 Belfast	 Brigade	 Second	 Battalion’s	 D	Company	(nicknamed	“the	Dogs”)	was	the	local	unit	of	the	Provisional	IRA,	with	a	fearsome	reputation.	The	flags	appeared	on	the	Lower	Falls	over	the	weekend	
	 227	
before	Easter,	with	Sinn	Féin	publicly	denying	 responsibility	 in	 the	media	 (see	Monaghan	 2016).	 As	 I	 walk	 up	 to	 the	 Falls	 Road,	 I	 pass	 a	 group	 assembling	around	Barrack	Street	 for	a	separate	march	to	the	D	Company	memorial	 in	the	Garden	of	Remembrance.	Among	 those	on	parade	are	uniformed	veterans	of	D	Company.			Just	off	the	Falls	Road	the	Victorian	edifice	of	Conway	Mill	juts	into	the	sky	before	the	“Peace	Wall”	that	separates	the	area	from	the	Protestant	Shankill.	Inside	the	mill	complex	 is	a	host	of	community	organisations,	small	businesses	and	a	bar.	Behind	 the	main	building	 is	 the	 Irish	Republican	History	Museum.	The	activist	museum	 was	 the	 brainchild	 of	 Eileen	 Hickey,	 the	 Provisional	 IRA’s	 Officer	Commanding	 in	 Armagh	 Gaol	 between	 1973	 and	 1977.	 A	 small	 volunteer-run	organisation,	the	museum	opened	in	2007	on	the	first	anniversary	of	her	death.	The	mill	has	historical	associations	with	local	Republicanism	and	hosted	one	of	the	 “Concerned	 Republicans”	 debates	 that	 discussed	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 controversial	proposal	 to	 endorse	 the	 Police	 Service	 of	 Northern	 Ireland	 (PSNI)	 in	 2006.	 In	attendance	 were	 dissident	 Republicans	 from	 the	 32	 County	 Sovereignty	Movement,	 Republican	 Sinn	 Féin	 and	 the	 Irish	 Republican	 Socialist	 Party.	 The	debates	 provided	 political	momentum	 for	 future	 dissident	 activism	 (Frampton	2011,	208).			During	my	visit	to	the	museum	the	previous	week,	I	asked	one	of	its	volunteers	about	 the	 Easter	 Sunday	 parade	 to	 which	 he	 replied,	 “Which	 one?”	 When	 I	clarified	 that	 I	meant	 the	National	Graves	Association’s,	he	referred	to	 it	as	 the	
	 228	
“Sinners’	 parade”.71 	An	 elderly	 man	 from	 Clonard,	 also	 a	 volunteer	 at	 the	museum,	 described	 to	 me	 his	 life	 after	 joining	 the	 IRA	 in	 the	 early	 1960s.	Recognising	 my	 academic	 interest,	 he	 was	 engaging	 and	 stressed	 that	 I	 was	“welcome”	 in	 the	 museum,	 which	 for	 him	 appeared	 to	 be	 a	 source	 of	considerable	 pride	 and	 social	 status.	 I	 asked	 him	 if	 he	 remembered	 the	 1966	Easter	 commemoration	 and	 he	 told	 me	 that	 during	 the	 parade	 he	 and	 other	Republicans	collected	hurling	sticks	to	defend	the	Catholic	community	against	an	attack	by	the	B	Specials.	He	told	me	about	Loyalist	incursions	into	Bombay	Street	in	1969	and	how	Protestants	were	used	as	“militia”	by	the	British.	He	then	spoke	of	his	time	as	a	training	officer	in	the	Provisional	IRA,	mentioning	proudly	that	he	procured	 the	 weapons	 displayed	 in	 the	 museum.	 He	 enthused	 about	 the	Thompson	 machine	 gun	 as	 an	 old	 favourite	 among	 Republicans,	 owing	 to	 its	firepower.	 I	 asked	 him	 what	 he	 thought	 about	 the	 period	 uniforms	 marchers	would	 be	 wearing	 on	 Easter	 Sunday.	 He	 opposed	 this	 practice	 as	 relegating	armed	struggle	 to	 the	past.	He	 revealed	 that	he	would	be	attending	a	 separate	Easter	 commemoration	 at	 the	 Clonard	 Martyrs	 Memorial	 Garden	 to	 pay	 his	respects	to	fallen	comrades.72	In	the	course	of	our	discussion,	it	became	clear	to	me	 that	 for	 him	 the	 “war”	 against	 the	 British	 is	 not	 over.	My	 suspicions	were	confirmed	when	towards	 the	end	of	our	conversation,	he	mentioned	his	recent	release	from	prison.			The	Irish	Republican	History	Museum	uses	emotive	visual	stimuli	 to	convey	 its	deterministic	topos	that	Irish	freedom	can	be	won	only	through	armed	struggle.																																																									71	“Sinner”	is	a	colloquial	term	for	Sinn	Féin	supporters.	72	The	garden	was	created	under	the	auspices	of	the	Greater	Clonard	Ex-Prisoners’	Association	as	a	memorial	 to	the	dead	of	 the	 local	C	Company	and	displays	a	plaque	honouring	“the	people	of	the	Greater	Clonard	who	have	 resisted	and	still	 resist	 the	occupation	of	our	 country”	 (Viggiani	2014,	97-107).	
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Militant	 Republicanism	 is	 materialised	 through	 artefacts	 representing	 its	physical	force	tradition:	inter	alia,	weapons,	prison	craft	and	the	memorabilia	of	slain	volunteers.	The	British	state	is	represented	by	mannequins	in	the	uniform	of	 the	 B	 Specials,	 the	 Royal	 Ulster	 Constabulary	 (RUC)	 and	 the	 British	 Army.	Northern	 Protestant	 identity	 is	 reduced	 to	 Orange	 paraphernalia,	 displayed	alongside	that	of	the	Ulster	Defence	Regiment.	There	is	no	consistent	chronology	in	 the	museum.	Time	periods	are	blurred,	with	 the	various	 incarnations	of	 the	IRA	fighting	both	the	British	and	Irish	states	across	an	elided	history.	MacDonagh	attributes	 the	 “elision”	 or	 “foreshortening”	 of	 time	 to	 the	 Irish	 political	 psyche	(1983,	 2).	 Elision	 of	 time	 is	 a	 reductionist	 ideological	 property	 of	 nationalism	that	permeates	Irish	Republicanism.			Exhibited	around	the	museum	are	weapons	“used	in	the	cause	of	Irish	freedom”	over	 the	 centuries.	 Pikes	 from	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 are	 displayed	 with	percussion	 and	 bolt-action	 rifles	 carried	 by	Republicans	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 and	early	 twentieth	 centuries	 (photo	 4.5).	 These	 are	 juxtaposed	 with	 a	 rocket-propelled	grenade	launcher	and	assault	rifles	from	the	arsenal	of	the	Provisional	IRA—including	a	variant	of	the	legendary	Armalite	(photo	4.6).73	In	the	technical	descriptions	 of	 the	weapons	 on	 the	 labels,	 I	 recognise	 the	 expertise	 of	 the	 old	training	 officer;	 the	 Heckler	 and	 Koch	 G3	 rifle	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 schematic	showing	 its	 firing	mechanism	(photo	4.6).	One	of	 the	many	examples	of	prison	craft	compares	the	Battle	of	New	Ross	during	the	United	Irishmen	Rebellion	with	D	Company	fighters	destroying	a	British	armoured	car	on	the	Lower	Falls.	In	the	crudely	drawn	banner	the	weapons	in	the	museum	can	be	seen	in	the	hands	of																																																									73	Large	numbers	of	Armalite	rifles	were	smuggled	into	Northern	Ireland	from	the	United	States	during	 the	 1970s	 to	 become,	 arguably,	 the	 Provisional	 IRA’s	weapon	 of	 choice	 (English	 2003,	116-117).	
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the	 “Dogs”.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 weaponry	 in	 the	 museum	 does	 not,	 however,	represent	an	alternative	form	of	decommissioning.	Here	the	guns	are	ciphers	for	a	 timeless	politics	with	a	singular	and	 incontrovertible	aim:	British	withdrawal	from	Ireland.		
	
Photos	 4.5	 and	4.6	Firearms	exhibits	 featuring	a	range	of	weapons	used	by	Republicans	 from	the	early	nineteenth	to	the	late	twentieth	centuries.			When	 I	 visit	 the	 museum	 again	 on	 Easter	 Sunday,	 a	 woman	 shows	 me	 the	recreation	 of	 Eileen	 Hickey’s	 cell	 at	 Armagh	 Gaol	 (photo	 4.7).	 She	 draws	 my	attention	 to	 a	 photograph	 of	 Hickey’s	 fellow	 prisoner	 and	 close	 comrade,	Mairéad	 Farrell,	 a	 Volunteer	 killed	 by	 the	 Special	 Air	 Service	 on	 Gibraltar	 in	1988.	In	the	entrance	to	the	museum	there	is	a	memorial	with	a	Roll	of	Honour	listing	 the	 names	 of	 Republican	 women	 who	 made	 the	 “supreme	 sacrifice”	between	 1971	 and	 1992	 (photo	 4.8);	 Farrell’s	 is	 one	 of	 the	 eighteen	 names	recorded.	 The	 museum	 therefore	 performs	 a	 commemorative	 function	 in	
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memorialising	 the	 martyrs	 of	 the	 armed	 struggle.	 My	 guide	 carefully	 explains	that	 the	 museum	 is	 not	 publicly	 funded	 nor	 politically	 aligned	 because	 the	committee	 running	 it	 wants	 to	 be	 free	 from	 outside	 control.	 Prison	 and	martyrdom	 as	 the	 corollaries	 of	 armed	 struggle	 are	 the	 basic	 motifs	 in	 the	museum.		
	
															Photo	4.7	Museum	reconstruction	of	Eileen	Hickey’s	cell	at	Armagh	Gaol.		
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													Photo	4.8	Memorial	to	Republican	women	with	a	Roll	of	Honour	1971-1992.				The	 display	 of	 funereal	 artefacts	 sanctifies	 past	 Republican	 martyrs	 while	simultaneously	drawing	contemporary	parallels.	On	the	wall	hangs	the	flag	from	the	coffin	of	the	IRA	leader	Joe	McKelvey,	executed	without	trial	by	the	Irish	Free	State	 authorities	 in	 1922	 (photo	 4.9).	 McKelvey	 was	 shot	 alongside	 fellow	prisoners	Liam	Mellows,	Rory	O’Connor	and	Dick	Barrett	in	reprisal	for	the	IRA’s	killing	 of	 two	 pro-Treaty	Dáil	 deputies	 (Regan	 2001,	 115-120).	 The	men	were	incarcerated	 for	 their	part	 in	 the	IRA’s	occupation	of	 the	Dublin	Four	Courts	 in	
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defiance	of	 the	new	Provisional	Government.	McKelvey’s	 image	also	appears	 in	the	mural	to	Eileen	Hickey	on	Conway	Street	(photo	4.10).		
	
Photo	4.9	Irish	tricolour	flag	draped	over	Joe	McKelvey’s	coffin,	1922.		
		
	
Photo	4.10	Mural	depicting	Eileen	Hickey	(right)	and	Joe	McKelvey	(centre),	Conway	Street.	
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The	headstone	of	an	IRA	Volunteer	executed	by	the	British	authorities	in	1942	is	also	 exhibited	 as	 a	memento	 mori.	 Thomas	 (Tom)	 Williams	 lived	 in	 Bombay	Street	 and	 served	 in	 C	 Company,	 like	 the	 man	 from	 Clonard	 that	 I	 met.	 His	remains	 were	 reburied	 at	 Milltown	 Cemetery	 in	 2000	 after	 exhumation	 from	Crumlin	Road	Gaol	under	a	Royal	Prerogative	of	Mercy.	Many	thousands	joined	the	 funeral	 procession	 to	 the	 family	 plot	 (Hartley	 2014,	 313-315).	 The	 shirt	Williams	was	wearing	when	he	was	wounded	during	an	 IRA	operation	against	the	RUC	on	Easter	Sunday,	1942	 is	 framed	above	 the	headstone.	By	displaying	sepulchral	objects	in	conjunction	with	clothing	and	personal	effects,	the	museum	materialises	 the	 sacrifices	 of	Republican	martyrs	 to	 inspire	 feelings	 of	 sadness	and	 loss,	but	also	anger.	The	 inclusion	of	Volunteers’	portrait	photographs	and	Catholic	 liturgical	ephemera	reflects	 the	prevalence	of	 religious	 iconography	 in	Republican	commemoration	(see	Jarman	1997,	154).			For	Easter	week	the	museum	has	produced	a	special	exhibition	that	opens	on	the	Sunday.	 In	 keeping	 with	 the	 museum	 ethos,	 the	 exhibition	 emphasises	 the	military	aspects	of	 the	Rising	and	presupposes	 the	visitor	 is	 familiar	with	 Irish	history	 and	 the	 Republican	 credo.	 There	 is	 an	 obvious	 intersection	 of	 activist	heritage	and	the	amateur	enthusiasm	of	the	local	history	group.	In	the	middle	of	the	room,	the	Irish	Volunteers,	Irish	Citizen	Army	and	Na	Fianna	Éireann	appear	as	 uniformed	 mannequins	 in	 the	 convention	 of	 the	 British	 Army	 regimental	museum	 (photo	4.11).	One	 case	 contains	 a	 collection	 “discovered	by	workmen	renovating	a	derelict	house	 in	 the	Woodvale	area	of	Belfast	 in	 the	 late	1980s.”	The	 label	 speculates	 that	 the	 artefacts	 and	 ephemera	 of	 the	 Ulster	 Volunteer	Force	discovered	in	a	Protestant	area	of	Belfast	may	have	belonged	to	a	veteran	
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who	also	 served	 in	 the	Ulster	36th	Division	during	World	War	One.	Possibly	 in	recognition	 of	 the	 recent	 trend	 toward	 reconciliation	between	Protestants	 and	Catholics	over	World	War	One	military	service,	the	label	acknowledges	that	the	36th	Division	“worked	closely”	with	the	16th	(Irish)	Division	that	included	“many	men	from	the	Falls	who	were	committed	Nationalists.”	(This	statement	is	slightly	out	 of	 step	with	 the	 general	 portrayal	 of	 Protestants	 and	possibly	 indicates	 an	idiosyncratic	curatorial	hand	at	work.)	In	another	case	the	ill-fated	mission	of	the	steamship,	 Aud,	 to	 smuggle	 arms	 for	 the	 Rising	 to	 the	 Irish	 Volunteers	 is	described.	A	bullet	recovered	from	the	sunken	ship	is	displayed	with	the	stock	of	a	Russian	Mosin-Nagant	rifle	of	the	type	contained	in	the	German	arms	shipment.	The	 remains	 of	 two	 rifles	 –	 a	 Mauser	 and	 a	 Lee	 Enfield	 –	 “discovered	 in	 the	basement	 of	 a	 house	 in	 Dublin	 City	 centre”	 represent	 the	 weaponry	 used	 by	Volunteers	and	British	soldiers	during	the	Rising.		
	
Photo	4.11	Special	exhibition	held	for	the	Easter	Rising	centenary	at	the	Irish	Republican	History	Museum.		
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In	a	self-reflexive	move,	 the	exhibition	 includes	a	case	dedicated	to	past	Easter	commemorations	 as	 a	 device	 for	 activating	 local	 collective	memory.	There	 is	 a	collection	 of	 material	 from	 1966,	 including	 objects	 and	 ephemera	 from	Republican	 commemorations	 in	 the	 north	 and	 the	 official	 programme	 in	 the	Republic	of	Ireland.	Articles	from	local	newspapers	have	been	reproduced	with	photographs	 of	 prominent	 northern	 Republicans.	 The	 1966	 ephemera	 are	displayed	 alongside	 Irish	 postage	 stamps	 and	 medals	 struck	 for	 the	 2016	municipal	 commemoration	 in	 Belfast.	 In	 linking	 these	 time	 periods,	 the	exhibition	 points	 to	 the	 continuity	 of	 northern	 Republican	 commemoration,	which	 has	 at	 times	 posed	 a	 simultaneous	 challenge	 to	 British	 and	 Irish	 state	power.		There	is	a	marked	emphasis	on	the	role	of	individual	personalities	in	forging	the	direction	of	 the	Republican	movement	but	 also	 in	 conferring	 legitimacy	on	 the	armed	struggle.	The	exhibition	displays	a	hat	formerly	belonging	to	the	Wexford	Republican,	Maire	Comerford,	who	was	 in	Dublin	during	 the	1916	Easter	week	and	became	a	 life-long	activist	 in	Cumann	na	mBan	after	witnessing	the	Rising.	According	to	the	label,	Comerford	gave	the	hat	to	Dolours	Price,	who	donated	it	to	 the	 museum.	 Before	 her	 death	 in	 2013,	 the	 ex-prisoner	 Price	 had	 been	 a	dissident	 critic	 of	 Sinn	 Féin	 and	 the	 Belfast	 Agreement.	 Although	 the	museum	does	not	explicitly	endorse	the	continued	use	of	violence	to	achieve	Irish	unity,	there	is	no	discussion	of	the	peace	process.	The	museum	therefore	expresses	the	dissident	viewpoint	sotto	voce:	Republicanism	as	a	purely	military	struggle	based	on	the	individual	sacrifice	of	the	Volunteer,	through	martyrdom	or	incarceration.			
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The	 exhibition	 visually	 identifies	physical	 force	Republicanism	with	 the	 sacred	duty	to	honour	the	men	of	1916.	The	label	for	a	fragment	of	debris	from	Nelson’s	pillar	 describes	 the	 latter	 as	 having	 been	 “decommissioned”	 in	 1966.74	The	exhibition	concludes	with	a	case	displaying	prison	craft	produced	by	“Republican	POWs”	in	Maghaberry.	A	Celtic	cross	bears	Pearse’s	words	at	O’Donovan	Rossa’s	funeral:	 “Ireland	 unfree	 shall	 never	 be	 at	 peace.”	 Inside	 the	 case	 is	 a	 requiem	mass	 booklet	 and	 two	 spent	 cartridges	 from	 the	 Irish	 state	 funeral	 of	 Thomas	Kent,	 held	 retrospectively	 in	 2015	 at	 Castlelyons.	 Kent	 was	 executed	 for	participating	in	a	shoot-out	with	the	Royal	Irish	Constabulary	immediately	after	the	Rising.	As	a	martyr	of	1916,	Kent’s	sacrifice	authenticates	that	of	present-day	Republicans	 imprisoned	 in	Maghaberry.	Kent,	 like	McKelvey	and	Williams,	was	entombed	a	pure	Republican,	untainted	by	political	compromise	with	the	British	state.			Armed	struggle	is	sacrosanct	in	the	museum	but	its	authenticity	is	threatened	by	outside	 forces.	 The	 activist	 museum	 is	 itself	 part	 of	 the	 burgeoning	 Troubles	heritage	 industry	 in	 which	 many	 ex-prisoners	 are	 now	 employed.	 During	 my	visits	 I	witness	a	steady	flow	of	 tourists	entering	the	museum,	accompanied	by	black	taxi	drivers.	Typically	driven	by	former	Republican	or	Loyalist	combatants,	the	black	taxi	takes	the	visitor	from	the	city	centre	to	sites	around	West	Belfast	associated	 with	 the	 Troubles.	 I	 witness	 a	 tour	 group	 in	 the	 museum’s	 library	space	being	told	by	the	taxi	driver	about	how	important	access	to	a	library	was	
																																																								74	The	pillar	 formerly	stood	in	O’Connell	Street	near	the	GPO	before	 it	was	blown	up	by	an	IRA	splinter	 group	 Saor	Uladh	 (Free	Ulster)	 to	mark	 the	 fiftieth	 anniversary	 of	 the	Rising	 (Whelan	2003,	204-207).		
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for	Republican	prisoners.75	Conway	Mill,	the	Peace	Wall,	paramilitary	murals	and	cemeteries	 are	 all	 part	 of	 a	 post-conflict	 topography	 in	 which	 tourism	 is	 an	economic	 driver	 for	 urban	 regeneration.	 Walking	 the	 Falls	 Road,	 I	 observe	numerous	 tourists	 photographing	 the	 murals	 with	 iPhones.	 The	 Troubles	heritage	 industry	 also	 receives	 public	 funds	 from	 various	 sources	 including	Belfast	City	Council,	DCAL	and	the	EU.76			In	 broader	 terms	 the	 state-sponsored	 re-branding	 of	 the	 Falls	 area	 as	 the	“Gaeltacht	Quarter”	 has	 stamped	 its	 urban	heritage	with	 a	Gaelic-Irish	 cultural	identity.	 Gaelicisation	 reflects	 the	 influence	 of	 Sinn	 Féin	 in	 municipal	government,	 but	 also	 a	 long-term	 strategy	 of	 cultural	 nationalism	 as	 a	counterpoise	to	armed	struggle.	Sinn	Féin’s	contemporary	agenda	has	its	origins	in	the	party’s	takeover	of	cultural	life	in	Catholic	West	Belfast	in	the	1980s	(see	Jarman	 1997,	 150-151).	 August	 1988	 witnessed	 the	 inaugural	 West	 Belfast	Festival,	 now	 rebranded	 the	 Féile	 an	 Phobail	 (People’s	 Festival).	 Sinn	 Féin	conceived	the	festival	to	counteract	negative	publicity	following	the	brutal	killing	of	 two	 British	 soldiers	 in	West	 Belfast	 that	 year.	 The	 plain-clothed	 corporals,	Derek	Wood	and	David	Howes,	were	shot	dead	by	the	Provisional	IRA	after	being	dragged	from	their	car	and	beaten	by	the	crowd	during	a	funeral	procession	that	was	being	filmed	by	British	and	Irish	television.		
																																																								75	The	 museum’s	 library	 contains	 printed	 material	 on,	 among	 other	 topics,	 British	 and	 Irish	politics	 and	Republicanism.	 There	 is	 a	 section	marked	 “The	 British	 and	 Loyalists.”	 The	 library	also	features	an	AV	presentation	with	archival	images	and	footage	of	the	Troubles.	76	For	example,	Coiste	is	a	local	commercial	outfit	funded	by	the	European	Regional	Development	Fund:	 “Your	 Coiste	 Irish	 Political	 Tour	 Guides	 will	 be	 former	 political	 prisoners	 from	 the	Republican	 community,	who	weave	 their	personal	 account	of	 the	British/Irish	 conflict	 into	 the	wider	history	of	this	centuries	old	conflict.”	After	the	tour,	participants	are	invited	to	enjoy	a	pint	of	the	“black	stuff”	(http://www.coiste.ie/about-us/,	accessed	April	24,	2016).		
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Photo	 4.12	Na	Fianna	Éireann	(Soldiers	of	 Ireland)/Cumann	na	mBan	Easter	Rising	centenary	mural,	off	the	Falls	Road.			Today	 the	Fáilte	Feirste	Thiar	office	 stands	opposite	 the	Cultúrlann	McAdam	Ó	Fiaich	arts	and	cultural	centre.	In	the	latter,	Irish	is	spoken	by	staff	and	visitors	who	 frequent	 its	 restaurant	 and	 bookshop.	 The	 Gaeltacht	 Quarter	 follows	 the	municipal	 heritage	 scheme	 of	 outdoor	 interpretation	 at	 historic	 buildings	 and	heritage	 sites.	Tourists	 can	 follow	a	 two-mile	heritage	 trail,	 the	Gaeltacht	Way,	from	 the	 centre	 to	 Belfast	 City	 Cemetery	 on	 the	Upper	 Falls.	 Republicanism	 is	deeply	embedded	 in	 tourism	packages	with	West	Belfast’s	murals	a	prominent	attraction.	New	murals	have	been	produced	for	the	Rising	centenary	and	there	is	competition	 among	 Republican	 groups	 offering	 their	 own	 narratives	 of	 1916	(photo	 4.12).	 The	 landscape	 of	 the	 Falls	 over	 Easter	 week	 illuminates	 the	underlying	politicisation	of	this	new	heritage	industry	and	why	it	is	an	artificial	product	of	West	Belfast	in	the	present.		
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I	decide	to	observe	the	Easter	parade	from	outside	the	Cultúrlann,	situated	in	a	former	Presbyterian	church	near	the	junction	with	Beechmount	Avenue.	Outside,	spectators	are	lining	the	street	with	a	group	of	young	children	who	are	wearing	green	 berets	 and	 orange	 scarves	 and	 preparing	 to	 join	 the	 parade.	 I	 notice	immigrants	among	the	spectators—one	is	wearing	a	Sinn	Féin	Easter	lily	badge.	The	parade	arrives,	led	by	a	man	and	a	woman	in	Irish	Volunteer	uniform,	with	an	 Irish	 wolfhound	 beside	 them.	 The	 actors	 from	 Claíomh	 are	 reprising	 their	roles	as	the	Rising	leaders.	They	are	walking	ahead	of	the	colour	party,	who	are	dressed	 as	 Irish	 Volunteers.	 Behind	 the	 colour	 party	 a	 group	 of	marchers	 are	wearing	 the	 traditional	Republican	uniform	of	 black	 beret,	 black	 tie	 and	white	shirt.	This	group	is	followed	by	Gerry	Adams,	inside	a	phalanx	of	bodyguards.			The	 atmosphere	 is	 relaxed	 and	 people	 are	 joining	 the	 parade	 en	 route.	 Many	participants	 are	 in	 period	 costume	 to	 varying	 degrees	 of	 sophistication,	 as	soldiers	of	the	Irish	Volunteers,	Irish	Citizen	Army	and	Cumann	na	mBan.	Some	have	adopted	the	trench	coats	and	flat	caps	worn	by	IRA	men	during	the	War	of	Independence	 and	 the	 Civil	 War.	 Some	 carry	 replica	 rifles	 and	 one	 marcher	shoulders	a	mock	Lewis	gun.	Amid	the	re-enactivists	enjoying	their	day	out	are	the	relatives	of	dead	Provisional	IRA	Volunteers,	carrying	framed	photographs	of	their	 loved	 ones	 (photo	 4.13,	 right).	 As	 a	 commemorative	 event,	 the	 parade	enacts	 a	 duality	 between	 the	 vivacity	 of	 a	 community	 pageant	 and	 the	 slow,	sombre	 progress	 of	 a	 funeral	 procession.	 In	 the	 crowd	 I	 notice	 obvious	 class	differentials	 and	 marchers	 from	 other	 countries,	 including	 Basques	 and	Corsicans	supporting	their	fellow	nationalists.		
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Photo	 4.13	 Easter	 Sunday	 parade,	 Falls	 Road,	 2016:	 the	woman	 on	 the	 far	 right-hand	 side	 is	carrying	a	portrait	of	a	dead	relative.		
	
	The	parade	gradually	files	into	Milltown	Cemetery	and	gathers	around	the	New	Republican	 Plot.	 On	 the	 gable	 wall,	 the	 Proclamation	 of	 the	 Irish	 Republic	 is	reproduced	 beneath	 an	 Easter	 lily	 in	 memoriam	 to	 the	 seventy-seven	Republicans	 interred	 within.	 The	 dead	 generations	 of	 the	 Provisional	 IRA,	Cumann	na	mBan	and	Na	Fianna	Éireann	include	Mairéad	Farrell	and	the	1981	hunger	strikers,	Bobby	Sands,	Joe	McDonald	and	Kieran	Doherty	(Hartley	2014,	219-220).	 The	 colour	 party	 takes	 up	 position	 at	 the	 memorial	 and	 stands	 to	attention	for	the	speeches	given	from	a	separate	platform	to	the	left	(photo	4.14).	From	the	stage	an	actor	appears	to	perform	several	“pageants”	in	the	character	
	 242	
of	Patrick	Pearse.	He	 re-enacts	 the	 reading	of	 the	Proclamation	and	 the	eulogy	from	O’Donovan	Rossa’s	funeral.	He	also	plays	to	his	Belfast	audience	by	reading	the	 mobilisation	 order	 for	 the	 city’s	 Irish	 Volunteers	 from	 1916.	 The	 crowd	seems	 largely	 unmoved	 by	 his	 performance	 and	 appears	 listless	 at	 times.	 At	Milltown	 there	 are	 more	 obvious	 Catholic	 overtones	 to	 the	 ritual	 than	 at	 the	Dublin	 events.	 At	 one	 point	 the	 Rosary	 is	 read	 and	 people	 in	 the	 crowd	 cross	themselves.	 The	 colour	 party	 solemnly	 lowers	 its	 flags	 over	 the	 graves	 of	 the	Volunteers	below,	following	military	tradition.		
	
Photo	4.14	Colour	party	standing	to	attention	at	the	New	Republican	Plot,	Milltown	Cemetery.			When	 Gerry	 Adams	 takes	 the	 stage	 he	 begins	 by	 welcoming	 us	 to	 “this	 holy	place”.	 He	 presents	 his	 local	 credentials	 by	 recalling	 childhood	 memories	 of	being	taken	to	Casement	Park	by	his	brothers	in	1966.	Adams’s	speech	is	tailored	to	 his	 Belfast	 audience	 and	 tones	 down	 the	 left-wing	 rhetoric	 from	 his	 Good	
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Friday	address	in	Dublin.	He	does	not	react	to	the	hallowed	ground	of	Milltown	with	 any	 pronounced	 emphasis	 on	 the	 armed	 struggle.	 Instead	 he	 condemns	John	Redmond	and	Edward	Carson	as	“men	of	violence”,	who	sent	thousands	of	young	men	from	the	Falls	and	the	Shankill	into	the	carnage	of	World	War	One.	At	Arbour	Hill,	Adams	attacked	those	Irish	politicians	“on	a	new	crusade	to	revive	Redmondism	and	to	denigrate	the	leaders	buried	here.”	Speaking	to	the	Belfast	crowd,	Adams’s	theme	of	Redmondite	betrayal	is	redirected	towards	Sinn	Féin’s	northern	 nationalist	 rivals,	 the	 SDLP.	 He	 makes	 a	 pragmatic	 defence	 of	 Sinn	Féin’s	record	at	Stormont	and	the	austerity-laden	“Fresh	Start”	deal	signed	with	the	Democratic	Unionist	Party	in	2015,	which	he	omitted	from	his	Dublin	speech.		At	 the	 conclusion	 of	 Adams’s	 oratory	 the	 colour	 party	 fires	 a	 simulated	 volley	with	their	replica	rifles	as	the	sound	effect	of	gunshots	is	broadcast	through	the	PA	 system.	 Before	 we	 depart,	 Adams	 asks	 the	 crowd	 to	 “dismiss”	 the	 colour	party,	observing	martial	convention.	Just	a	few	yards	from	the	sacred	site	of	the	Provisional	 IRA,	 the	 spectacle	 of	 the	 faux	 fusillade	 verges	 on	 pastiche.	 In	 the	1970s	 and	 1980s,	 Republican	 gatherings	 at	 Milltown	 were	 typically	 tense	standoffs,	 with	 British	 security	 forces	 surveilling	 mourners	 from	 afar.	 The	dramatic,	 elegiac	 rituals	 of	 the	 Provisional	 IRA	 were	 also	 punctuated	 by	performative	interludes.	For	a	Volunteer’s	funeral,	the	black	beret	and	gloves	of	the	deceased	would	be	placed	on	the	coffin,	which	was	draped	in	a	tricolour.	The	hat	and	gloves	symbolised	the	dead	Volunteer’s	membership	of	 the	Provisional	IRA	and	their	absence	from	its	ranks.	At	a	given	moment	a	masked	firing	party	would	emerge	from	the	crowd	to	shoot	into	the	air	over	the	coffin.	Bobby	Sands’s	emotive	 funeral	 cortege	 to	Milltown	 in	1981	climaxed	 in	 this	way,	with	Adams	
	 244	
eulogising	him	at	the	graveside.	Today	at	Milltown	ceremonies,	participants	go	to	witness	Republicanism	redux:	“living	history”	with	period-costumes	and	replica	rifles	 replacing	 paramilitary	 transgressions	 of	 state	 power.	 Among	 the	 re-enactivists	are	real	veterans	of	the	Belfast	Brigade	who	now	stand	grim-visaged,	facing	history	in	the	wrong	direction.			Speaking	 outside	 Belfast	 City	 Hall	 in	 1995,	 Adams	 infamously	 responded	 to	 a	heckler	 challenging	 him	 over	 the	 Provisional	 IRA’s	 ceasefire	 saying,	 “They	haven’t	 gone	 away	 you	 know.”	 Through	 re-enactivism	 Sinn	 Féin	 is	 stating	unequivocally	 that	 the	 Provisional	 IRA	 has	 gone	 away.	 The	 period-costumed	performances	 now	 commonplace	 at	 Sinn	 Féin	 public	 events	 were	 in	 the	 past	accompanied	by	re-enactivism	that	drew	on	Provisional	IRA	history.	At	the	2009	National	Hunger	Strike	Commemoration	in	the	village	of	Galbally,	re-enactivists	dressed	 as	 an	 Active	 Service	 Unit,	 with	 balaclavas	 and	 assault	 rifles.	 The	paramilitary	overtones	of	the	commemoration	reflected	rural	Tyrone’s	status	as	a	heartland	of	physical	force	Republicanism.	Responding	to	Unionist	criticisms	of	the	Gaelic	Athletic	Association	for	hosting	the	commemoration	and	of	Sinn	Féin	as	 its	 organiser,	 the	party	played	down	 the	 significance	of	 the	display	 as	mere	“pageantry	and	street	theatre”	(Belfast	News	Letter,	August	20,	2009).		In	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 Galbally	 controversy,	 paramilitary	 re-enactivism	 has	 given	way	 to	 what	 can	 genuinely	 be	 described	 as	 politicised	 pageantry	 and	 street	theatre.	 By	 drawing	 a	 clear	 line	 under	 its	 past	 as	 the	 political	 wing	 of	 the	Provisional	 IRA,	 Sinn	Féin	 is	 announcing	 its	present	potential	 as	 a	party	of	 all-Ireland	government.	In	so	doing,	Sinn	Féin	is	attempting	to	achieve	two	mutually	exclusive	objectives.	On	the	one	hand,	 it	seeks	to	commit	armed	struggle	to	the	
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past;	 on	 the	 other	 it	 must	 authenticate	 its	 place	 in	 Republican	 history	 as	 the	moral	 custodian	 of	 the	 true	 faith.	 English	 argues	 that	 the	 politics	 of	 the	Provisional	IRA	were	defined	by	violence	and	once	it	became	clear	that	progress	could	be	made	through	purely	political	means,	the	organisation	began	a	process	of	 dissolution	 (2003,	 344).	 Although	 the	 Provisional	 IRA	 has	 unquestionably	gone	 away,	 Sinn	 Féin,	 as	 its	 former	 political	 representatives,	 cannot	 evade	responsibility	 for	 elegising	 its	 martyrs	 without	 risk	 of	 undermining	 its	Republican	 credibility.	 Professional	 career	 politicians,	 like	 vice	 president	Mary	Lou	McDonald,	have	risen	through	Sinn	Féin’s	ranks	to	the	detriment	of	activists	with	 military	 pedigrees.	 This	 situation	 has	 produced	 an	 authenticity	 deficit	within	 Sinn	 Féin	 that	 is	 actually	 exacerbated	 by	 its	 historicisation	 of	 armed	struggle.	Heritage	can	act	as	a	socially	progressive	force	when	it	places	the	past	at	a	relative	distance	to	the	present,	but	this	is	impossible	within	the	ideological	strictures	of	Irish	Republicanism	when	the	past	is	deemed	the	essential	validator	of	 the	 present.	 Sinn	 Féin	 is	 a	 hostage	 of	 the	 past	 because	 that	which	 the	 Irish	revolutionaries	 of	 1916	 fought	 for	 cannot	 be	 realised	 within	 the	 ideological	confines	 of	 neoliberalism,	 and	 their	 resurrection	 as	 “living	 history”	 only	sharpens	this	reality.			Elsewhere	over	Easter	weekend,	several	dissident	Republican	commemorations	took	place	with	traditional	paramilitary	colour	parties	and	masked	men	openly	parading	in	Coalisland	and	Lurgan.	Numerous	commentators	have	pointed	to	the	heterogeneity	 among	 “dissident”	 Republican	 groups	 which	 problematises	 the	term	(Whiting	2015,	65;	Tonge	2011,	98;	Horgan	2013,	135-137).	Groups	with	links	 to	 paramilitaries	 are	 unanimous	 in	 their	 opposition	 to	 the	 Belfast	
	 246	
Agreement	 but,	 for	 both	 legal	 and	 ideological	 reasons,	 often	 ambivalent	 about	their	support	for	political	violence.	(The	inability	of	such	groups	to	speak	openly	for	armed	militants	inevitably	robs	them	of	the	kudos	previously	enjoyed	by	Sinn	Féin.)	 However,	 what	 unites	 the	 opponents	 of	 the	 Agreement,	 whether	 they	support	or	reject	the	use	of	physical	force,	is	their	intense	ideological	opposition	to	Sinn	Féin	as	“sellouts”	(Tonge	2011,	108).			The	fact	that	some	dissident	groups	have	now	adopted	re-enactivism	for	Easter	commemorations	 illustrates	how	their	politics	 is	responsive	 to	 the	authenticity	deficit	within	mainstream	Republicanism.	For	these	groups	the	historicisation	of	armed	struggle	not	only	authenticates	the	continuity	of	true	Republicanism	but	can	also	conceal	subversive	politics	in	the	present.	They	are	not	placing	the	past	at	a	distance,	but	 stating	 that	past	and	present	are	coterminous.	Re-enactivism	was	 in	 evidence	 at	 several	 dissident	 Republican	 commemorations	 over	 the	Easter	weekend.	On	Easter	Sunday,	 the	Rising	commemoration	 in	Dundalk	was	led	by	a	colour	party	from	the	Republican	Network	for	Unity	(RNU),	dressed	in	the	uniform	of	the	Irish	Volunteers.	Other	participants	wore	Volunteer	uniforms,	trench	 coats	 and	 carried	 replica	 rifles.	At	 the	previous	 year’s	 event,	 the	 colour	party	was	 in	black	paramilitary	 fatigues.	The	RNU	grew	out	 of	 the	 “Concerned	Republicans”	debates	and	was	originally	an	ex-prisoners’	organisation	(Whiting	2015,	 132-133;	 Frampton	 2011,	 218-224;	 Horgan	 2013,	 121-123).	 Now	 a	political	party,	the	RNU	does	not	openly	endorse	the	use	of	violence	but	has	its	own	 “POW	Department”	Cogús	 (Conscience),	 supporting	dissident	prisoners	 in	Maghaberry	and	Portlaoise.			
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The	apparent	exception	to	this	trend	is	Republican	Sinn	Féin	(RSF),	members	of	which	marched	from	the	Garden	of	Remembrance	to	the	GPO	on	Easter	Monday,	led	 by	 a	masked	 colour	 party	 in	 green	 paramilitary	 battle	 dress.	 Unlike	 other	dissident	 groups,	 RSF	 remains	 opposed	 to	 unity	 among	 anti-Agreement	Republicans,	 seeing	 themselves	 instead	 as	 part	 of	 an	 unbroken	 historical	continuity	(Whiting	2015,	130).	RSF	split	from	Sinn	Féin	in	1986	over	whether	to	end	 the	 Republican	 movement’s	 historical	 policy	 of	 parliamentary	abstentionism.	 In	 breaking	 away,	 the	 southern-based	 RSF	 leadership	 received	the	political	blessing	of	Tom	Maguire,	the	last	surviving	opponent	of	the	Anglo-Irish	Treaty	in	the	Second	Dáil.	Maguire’s	endorsement	also	conferred	legitimacy	on	the	Continuity	IRA,	which	is	linked	to	RSF	(Sanders	2011,	144-145).	RSF	does	not	 historicise	 its	 public	 rituals	 like	 other	 Republican	 groups	 because	 it	 sees	itself	as	part	of	a	singular	lineage	that	needs	no	authentication.	For	RSF	there	is	no	 “living	history”,	only	an	armed	struggle	 for	 Irish	 freedom	 in	 the	present.	 Its	public	 rituals	 are	modelled	 on	 those	 of	 the	 Provisional	 IRA	 before	 1986,	 after	which	it	saw	Republicanism	as	contaminated	through	contact	with	the	politically	illegitimate	institutions	of	Leinster	House	and	Stormont.					Sinn	 Féin’s	 activist	 heritage	 is	 an	 outgrowth	 of	 a	 new	 political	 strategy	predicated	 on	 cultural	 nationalism.	 Under	 this	 logic,	 partition	 is	 transcended	through	 a	 cross-border	 cultural	 framework	 underpinning	 a	 singular	 Irish	national	 identity.	 Irish	national	unification	can	therefore	be	achieved	culturally,	armed	 insurrection	 having	 consistently	 failed	 to	 achieve	 political	 unity.	 Sinn	Féin’s	 cultural	 turn	 is	 also	 a	 reflection	 of	 its	 ideological	 commitment	 to	 the	politics	of	 identity.	Bean	traces	this	to	the	influence	of	the	British	Labour	Party	
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left,	and	the	diversity	policies	of	the	Greater	London	Council	in	the	1980s	(2007,	154-158).	Sinn	Féin’s	identity	politics	would	also	be	consistent	with	its	strategic	reorientation	to	“progressive	neoliberalism”	imported	from	the	United	States.			Cultural	unification	is	furthermore	designed	to	overcome	the	basic	contradiction	of	 the	 Belfast	 Agreement	 for	 Irish	 Republicans.	 The	 Provisional	 IRA	 hunger	striker	Tommy	McKearney,	today	a	socialist	critic	of	Sinn	Féin,	concurs	with	the	assessment	of	 the	 former	Ulster	Unionist	 Party	 leader,	David	Trimble,	 that	 the	Agreement	 copper-fastened	 Northern	 Ireland	 within	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 by	making	constitutional	change	possible	only	by	majority	consent	(2011,	186).	By	accepting	this	principle,	Sinn	Féin	negated	the	Proclamation	of	the	Irish	Republic	that	declared	the	“right	of	the	people	of	Ireland	to	the	ownership	of	Ireland,	and	to	the	unfettered	control	of	Irish	destinies,	to	be	sovereign	and	indefeasible”	(my	emphasis).	 Seen	 from	 this	 perspective,	 Sinn	 Féin	 can	 no	 longer	 claim	 to	 be	authentically	 Republican.	 If	 Republicanism	 has	 its	 ideological	 taproot	 in	 the	Proclamation,	then	Sinn	Féin	has	abdicated	this	sacred	authority.					From	the	stage	at	Milltown,	Adams	declared	Sinn	Féin’s	opposition	to	a	“leave”	vote	in	the	June	referendum	on	Britain’s	EU	membership.	Drawing	a	veil	over	the	party’s	 historical	 antipathy	 to	 European	 federal	 integration,	 he	 stated	 that	 the	“imposition	of	a	land	border	and	economic	barriers	are	not	in	the	interest	of	the	people	 of	 this	 island.”77	Sinn	 Féin’s	 stance	 on	 “Brexit”	 confirms	 its	 status	 as	ideological	successor	to	the	SDLP,	which	under	John	Hume’s	leadership	reframed	the	 Irish	national	question	as	an	 integral	European	 issue.	 It	 also	 indicates	Sinn	
																																																								77	In	 the	 event	 a	majority	 in	Northern	 Ireland	 voted	 to	 “remain”	 in	 the	 EU,	 but	 at	 48.85%	 the	turnout	in	West	Belfast	was	the	lowest	of	any	Northern	Irish	constituency	(EONI	n.	d.).		
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Féin’s	 readiness	 to	 emulate	 the	 Scottish	 National	 Party	 in	 combining	 Gaelic	cultural	 nationalism	with	 European	 regionalism.	 In	 taking	 this	 path,	 Sinn	 Féin	has	 followed	 the	 political	 trajectory	 of	 other	 minority	 nationalist	 movements	elsewhere	 in	 a	 supranational	 Europe	 unimaginable	 to	 Pearse	 or	 the	 “patriot	dead”	sleeping	in	the	crowded	earth	at	Milltown.			
Step	Into	History	
	
	February	2016	saw	the	launch	of	what	Gerry	Adams	described	in	the	catalogue	as	 the	 “centrepiece	 of	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 centenary	 programme”—the	 “Peoples’	 [sic]	Exhibition”	Revolution	1916	 at	 the	Ambassador	Theatre	 in	Dublin.	Billed	as	 the	“Original	 and	 Authentic	 Exhibition”,	 Revolution	 1916	 was	 widely	 advertised	through	 print	 and	 online	 media	 and	 via	 Irish	 radio	 and	 cinemas.	 It	 was	 also	picked	 up	 by	 the	mainstream	press	 and	 even	 discussed	 in	 the	 same	 breath	 as	major	state-sponsored	centennial	exhibitions	at	the	National	Museum	of	Ireland	and	the	GPO	(see	Linehan	2016).	A	stylised	promotional	trailer	promised	visitors	the	chance	to	“walk	in	the	footsteps	of	the	rebel	leaders	in	this	interactive	family	exhibition.”78	In	 their	 choice	 of	 venue,	 the	 exhibition’s	 organisers	 aimed	 for	historical	 authenticity.	 The	 Ambassador	 Theatre	 is	 part	 of	 the	 Georgian-era	Rotunda	Hospital	complex.	Sinn	Féin	traces	 its	 foundation	to	the	meeting	there	of	 the	 convention	 of	 the	 National	 Council	 in	 1905,	 at	 which	 Arthur	 Griffith	proposed	the	“Sinn	Féin”	(“Ourselves”)	policy	for	Ireland.79	Thousands	crammed	into	the	concert	hall	in	1913	to	enrol	in	the	Irish	Volunteers	at	a	public	meeting	addressed	by	Patrick	Pearse.	The	majority	of	exhibits	displayed	in	the	exhibition																																																									78	https://www.facebook.com/therising2016,	accessed	May	1,	2016.	79	This	 is	 an	 oversimplification.	 Sinn	 Féin	 was	 founded	 in	 1908	 when	 the	 National	 Council	merged	with	the	Sinn	Féin	League.	The	latter	was	formed	by	Griffith’s	Cumann	na	nGaedheal	and	the	Dungannon	Clubs	in	1907	(Foster	1989,	611).	
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were	on	 loan	from	the	Irish	Volunteers	Commemorative	Organisation	(IVCO).80	The	Ambassador	occupies	a	commanding	position	at	the	top	of	O’Connell	Street,	with	the	Garden	of	Remembrance	behind	it	in	Parnell	Square.	Its	close	proximity	to	 the	 Irish	state’s	official	 commemorations	on	O’Connell	Street	meant	 that	 the	exhibition	 not	 only	 made	 a	 visual	 impact	 in	 the	 locale	 of	 the	 GPO,	 but	 also	achieved	political	vocality	in	the	meta-narrative	of	the	Rising	centenary.			Upon	 entering	 the	 Ambassador,	 the	 visitor	 saw	 two	 large	 murals	 depicting	pivotal	 moments	 in	 the	 Rising.	 They	 were	 conceived	 by	 Danny	 Devenny,	 who	painted	 the	mural	of	Bobby	Sands	on	 the	wall	of	Sinn	Féin’s	office	on	 the	Falls	Road.	 Incorporating	 the	 cultural	 practice	 of	 mural	 painting	 authenticated	 the	exhibition	 for	 Republican	 audiences	 and	 also	 for	 the	 tourist	 industry.	 In	 the	lobby	the	visitors	were	introduced	to	the	exhibition	by	Ambassador	staff	in	Irish	Volunteer	 uniform.	 Afterwards	 they	 were	 led	 upstairs	 to	 watch	 a	 short	 film	rehearsing	 the	 principal	 exhibition	 themes.	 It	 began	 by	 highlighting	 the	significance	of	the	O’Donovan	Rossa	funeral,	stage-managed	by	Tom	Clarke	as	a	“call	 to	 arms”	 for	 the	 Rising.	 Connolly	 took	 centre	 stage	 in	 the	 film	 as	 the	voiceover	 explained	 how	 the	 Irish	 Citizen	 Army	 was	 formed	 to	 “protect	 the	people”,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 impoverished	 conditions	 of	 Dublin.	 Footage	 of	 his	great-grandson,	 James	Connolly	Heron,	addressing	Sinn	Féin’s	 centennial	event	at	the	Dublin	Mansion	House	in	January	2016	was	also	played	to	get	an	idea	of	“what	James	Connolly	might	have	sounded	like.”	(A	continuity	error:	Connolly	as	someone	 born	 and	 raised	 in	 Edinburgh	 would	 not	 have	 spoken	 with	 an	 Irish	accent.)	 In	 front	 of	 the	 stage	 two	 actors	 from	 Claíomh	 appeared	 in	 period																																																									80	The	 IVCO	 “holds	 exhibitions,	 lectures	 and	 displays	 throughout	 Ireland,	 showing	 the	 artifacts	and	telling	the	story	of	 the	 Irish	Volunteers”	(http://www.irishvolunteers.org/about/,	accessed	May	1,	2016).	The	organisation	endorsed	Sinn	Féin	in	the	2016	Irish	General	Election.	
	 251	
costume;	 the	 original	 copy	 of	 the	 Proclamation	 was	 also	 on	 show	 in	 the	exhibition.	In	an	erudite	speech,	Connolly	Heron	lauded	the	“golden	generation”	of	1916,	“At	this	time	in	this	great	capital	city	of	rebellion	and	revolution,	at	the	outset	of	our	celebrations	it	can	be	said	that	the	An	Claíomh	Solais,	the	Sword	of	Light,	is	now	passing	to	a	new	generation	of	citizens.”81	Connolly	Heron	referred	to	 a	 “generation	 of	 women,	 no	 longer	 willing	 to	 be	 slaves	 of	 the	 slave,	 but	destined	to	become	arguably	the	first	armed	and	uniformed	women’s	movement	in	world	history.”	The	prominence	of	women	in	the	Rising	was	a	theme	coursing	through	the	identity	politics	of	Sinn	Féin’s	centennial	commemoration.			Described	as	the	“1916	Museum	Section”,	 the	upper	 level	of	 the	exhibition	was	divided	 into	two	spaces.	The	 first	contained	a	day-by-day	account	of	 the	Rising	and	the	second	focused	on	the	dramatis	personae.	A	soundtrack	of	period	music	was	 playing	 to	 generate	 an	 appropriate	 ambiance.	 Three-dimensional	 objects	were	 displayed	 throughout	 in	 conjunction	 with	 original	 artworks.	 Embedded	within	the	exhibition	were	key	messages	 from	Sinn	Féin’s	Rising	narrative	that	were	 audible	 in	 its	 leaders’	 speeches	 over	 the	 Easter	 weekend.	 The	 party	demonstrated	 its	 cultural	 nationalism	 through	 the	 provision	 of	 bilingual	 text,	which	is	also	standard	practice	in	Irish	state	heritage	institutions.		The	 Rising	 was	 presented	 as	 the	 defining	moment	 in	 Irish	 history:	 a	 national	destiny	 shaped	 by	 clandestine	 physical	 force	 Republicanism.	 Visitors	 were	reminded	of	 the	Proclamation’s	statement	 that	“six	 times	during	the	past	 three	hundred	 years	 they	 have	 asserted	 it	 in	 arms.”	Here	 the	 narrative	 performed	 a	sleight	 of	 hand	 by	 taking	 the	 Proclamation’s	 reference	 to	 the	 Irish	 Republican																																																									81	“The	Sword	of	Light”	refers	to	the	Gaelic	League’s	newspaper,	edited	by	Patrick	Pearse.			
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Brotherhood	(IRB)	 to	portray	 it	as	 the	 “parent”	of	 the	 Irish	Volunteers	and	 the	Irish	 Citizen	 Army.	 After	 1914	 the	 IRB	 became	 the	 leading	 force	 in	 the	 Irish	Volunteers,	but	Connolly’s	 force	had	completely	 independent	roots	 in	 the	1913	Dublin	 Lockout	 (see	 Matthews	 2014,	 22-23).	 Relations	 between	 the	 two	movements	 were	 at	 times	 strained	 between	 1913	 and	 1916.	 Connolly	 was	brought	onto	the	IRB	military	council	at	a	late	stage	to	avert	the	possibility	of	his	organisation	launching	an	insurrection	unilaterally	(McGarry	2016,	107).			In	 the	 first	 room	 there	was	 an	 emphasis	 on	 firearms	 and	militaria	 with	 guns,	uniforms	 and	 service	 medals	 on	 prominent	 display	 to	 illustrate	 the	 military	history	 of	 the	 Rising	 underpinning	 the	 main	 narrative.	 A	 Mauser	 rifle,	purportedly	belonging	to	the	IRB	leader	Tom	Clarke,	was	positioned	alongside	a	Sinn	Féin	 armband.	The	most	 impressive	 exhibit	was	 an	 original	 Proclamation	which	the	label	recorded	as	“one	of	only	50	left	in	existence.”	By	emphasising	the	scarcity	 and	monetary	 value	 of	 the	 artefact,	 the	 exhibition	 sought	 to	 justify	 its	claim	 to	 be	 “original	 and	 authentic”.	 Around	 the	 ninetieth	 anniversary	 of	 the	Rising,	memorabilia	were	 in	 demand	during	 the	 consumer	 boom	of	 the	 “Celtic	Tiger”	economy.	Controversially,	wealthy	private	collectors	were	able	to	outbid	the	 National	 Museum	 and	 National	 Library	 of	 Ireland	 at	 public	 auctions.	 In	protest,	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 youth	 wing,	 Ógra	 Sinn	 Féin,	 picketed	 a	 sale	 at	 Adam’s	Auctioneers	 in	 Dublin	 (McCarthy	 2012,	 397-398).	 The	 exhibition’s	 curator,	Bartle	D’Arcy,82	had	taken	pains	to	include	as	many	original	artefacts	as	possible,	often	 accompanied	 by	 information	 confirming	 their	 provenance	 and	 market	
																																																								82	D’Arcy	 was	 the	 national	 coordinator	 of	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 1916	 centenary	 programme	 and	 has	 a	professional	background	in	heritage	and	tourism.	
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value.	 Ironically	 this	 practice	 revealed	 the	 influence	 of	 consumerism	 by	commodifying	their	historical	value.			On	 the	 lower	 level	 of	 the	 exhibition	 the	 visitor	 was	 invited	 to	 “follow	 in	 the	footsteps	 of	 history”	 and	 “relive	 the	 Rising”.	 The	 experience	 began	 in	 a	 room	intended	to	reimagine	the	look	and	feel	of	the	GPO	itself.	Within	was	featured	a	reproduction	 period	 telephone	 box	 that	 the	 visitor	 could	 enter	 and	 simulate	making	a	call.	A	contemporary	photograph	of	the	GPO	visualised	the	interior;	an	original	 artefact	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 brass	 handle	 from	 the	 revolving	 door	materialised	 the	 building	 itself.	 Here	 the	 designers	 followed	 the	 convention	 of	recreating	 environments	 through	 in	 situ	 installations	 in	 public	 museums	 (see	Kirshenblatt-Gimblett	1998,	19-20).		The	visitor	was	then	invited	to	“escape”	by	exiting	at	the	side	of	the	room.	On	the	evening	of	Friday	April	28,	1916,	with	the	GPO	ablaze,	the	remaining	rebels	were	forced	 to	 escape	 through	 a	 side	 door,	 running	 across	Henry	 Street	 into	Henry	Place.	 An	 advance	 party	 ventured	 out	 and	 attempted	 to	 charge	 the	 British	barricade	 on	 Moore	 Street.	 Their	 commander,	 Michael	 (The)	 O’Rahilly,	 was	mortally	 wounded	 in	 the	 assault	 and	 died	 overnight,	 having	 taken	 refuge	 in	Sackville	 Lane	 (McGarry	 2016,	 205-206).	 Walking	 into	 a	 recreation	 of	 Henry	Place,	the	visitor	heard	the	sound	of	gun	fire	and	saw	simulated	flashes	from	the	British	machine	gun	 in	Moore	Lane.	There	was	a	mock-up	of	O’Brien’s	mineral	water	 factory	 that	 stood	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 Henry	 Place	 and	 Moore	 Lane.	Crossing	 over,	 the	 visitor	 entered	 the	 room	 at	 16	 Moore	 Street	 where	 the	Provisional	Government	is	conventionally	thought	to	have	taken	the	decision	to	surrender.		
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Before	reaching	the	Stonebreakers’	Yard,	where	the	 leaders	were	executed,	 the	visitor	 experienced	 the	 landing	 at	 Kilmainham	 and	 could	 walk	 into	 Patrick	Pearse’s	cell.	Outside	the	door	crucifixes	were	displayed,	accompanied	by	a	letter	of	provenance	from	a	priest	who	attended	the	condemned	leaders.	The	leitmotif	was	 the	 song	Óró	sé	do	bheatha	 ‘bhaile	 (Oh	Ro	Welcome	Home),	which	 Pearse	allegedly	whistled	on	the	way	to	his	execution.83	In	the	Stonebreakers’	Yard,	an	empty	chair	represented	the	one	into	which	Connolly	was	strapped	to	be	shot.	As	an	 interactive	 exhibit	 in	which	 the	 visitor	would	 sit	 on	 the	 chair,	 this	 had	 the	unintentional	 effect	 of	 encouraging	 irreverence.	 Visitors	 inevitably	 took	photographs	of	one	another	adopting	poses	from	the	triumphalist	to	the	darkly	comic.	One	older	woman	held	aloft	a	commemorative	scarf	bearing	images	of	the	Rising	leaders;	it	recalled	the	type	produced	for	football	fixtures	(photo	4.15).			
	
Photo	4.15	Visitor	posing	for	a	photograph	on	the	chair	in	the	mock	Stonebreakers’	Yard.																																																									83	The	song’s	inclusion	in	the	exhibition	and	parallel	use	in	Sinn	Féin’s	re-enactivism	may	reflect	the	 influence	 of	 popular	 culture,	 as	 it	 features	 prominently	 in	Ken	 Loach’s	 film	The	Wind	That	
Shakes	the	Barley	(2006).	
	 255	
Another	sat	down	and	crossed	himself	in	the	Catholic	manner,	perhaps	a	delayed	reaction	 to	 the	display	outside	Pearse’s	 cell.	One	visitor	was	 told	by	 the	 friend	about	 to	 take	a	photograph,	 “You’re	about	 to	be	executed,	 look	sad,	 cry.”	Some	visitors	simply	used	the	chair	to	rest	and	chat.	These	spontaneous	acts	of	levity	jarred	 with	 the	 soundtrack	 of	 the	 lost	 leaders’	 final	 words,	 playing	 through	 a	speaker.	If	the	exhibit	was	designed	to	inspire	empathy,	its	interactivity	negated	the	aim.	By	incorporating	interactive	elements	that	allowed	visitors	to	“relive	the	Rising”,	 the	 exhibition	 had	 demonstrably	 been	 influenced	 by	 state	 heritage	models.	Simulating	environments	of	pain	and	suffering,	such	as	World	War	One	trenches,	 is	 a	 longstanding	 feature	 of	 state	 museums	 and	 heritage	 sites.	 The	crude	manifestation	of	this	in	Revolution	1916	was	no	amateur	misappropriation,	however,	but	rather	illustrated	the	universally	flawed	conception	of	this	type	of	interactive	exhibit.		Although	the	 lower	 level	was	described	as	the	“1917-1923	Section”	chronicling	the	Irish	War	of	Independence	and	Civil	War,	the	latter	event	was	largely	absent.	The	ascendancy	of	Sinn	Féin	and	its	electoral	eclipse	of	the	Irish	Parliamentary	Party	were	 foregrounded	 in	 an	 obvious	 analogy	 to	 the	 contemporary	 political	situation	 in	 the	 Republic.	 References	 to	 two	 events	 of	 1917,	 the	 election	 in	
absentia	 to	Westminster	of	the	Republican	prisoner,	 Joseph	McGuiness,	and	the	death	on	hunger	 strike	of	 the	1916	 rebel,	Thomas	Ashe,	 also	 invoked	parallels	with	the	H-Block	protests	of	the	1980s.	In	its	narrative	of	the	period	between	the	Rising	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 first	 Dáil	 in	 1919,	 the	 exhibition	 reiterated	 the	linear	continuity	of	armed	struggle	masterminded	by	a	Republican	underground.		
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In	 discussing	 the	 period	 of	 the	War	 of	 Independence	 and	 the	 treaty	 with	 the	British	 that	 precipitated	 the	 Civil	War,	 the	 exhibition’s	 authors	were	 forced	 to	omit	 inconvenient	truths.	The	colossal	 figure	of	Michael	Collins	 loomed	large	in	all	 his	 historical	 ambiguity	 as	 the	 director	 of	 the	 military	 campaign	 against	British	occupation	between	1919	and	1921	and	as	one	of	the	principal	architects	of	 the	 treaty	 that	 divided	 Ireland	 after	 the	 truce.	 Dominating	 the	 room	was	 a	Crossley	 automobile	 reputedly	 used	 by	 Collins	 and	 Kevin	 O’Higgins	 (later	assassinated	by	anti-Treaty	Republicans)	as	a	Free	State	Army	staff	 car	 (photo	4.16).	A	revolver	that	allegedly	belonged	to	Collins	was	displayed	next	to	it	with	a	letter	confirming	its	provenance	from	1922.		
	
Photo	4.16	Crossley	car	that	the	exhibition’s	curators	claimed	was	used	by	Michael	Collins.			In	 the	 exhibition’s	 portrayal	 of	 the	 Irish	 revolutionary	 era,	 Michael	 Collins’s	reputation	 appeared	 stainless.	 Dolan	 speculates	 that	 Collins	 retains	 respect	among	 Republicans	 because	 his	 assassination	 in	 1922	meant	 that	 he	 was	 not	
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implicated	in	the	atrocities	carried	out	by	the	Free	State	government	during	the	Civil	War	 (2003,	 67).	 Nevertheless	 his	 complicity	 in	 the	 Free	 State’s	 campaign	against	 anti-Treaty	 Republicans	 is	 undeniable.	 Collins,	 as	 chairman	 of	 the	Provisional	 Government,	 approved	 the	 use	 of	 force	 to	 end	 the	 rebel	 IRA’s	occupation	 of	 the	 Four	 Courts	 in	 1922.	 After	 the	 British	 pressured	 the	Provisional	 Government	 to	 quell	 the	 insurgency,	 the	 Free	 State	 Army	 used	British	artillery	to	shell	the	Four	Courts	(Regan	2001,	71-74).				Seen	 from	 this	historical	perspective	one	might	have	anticipated	Collins	would	play	the	role	of	traitor	in	Revolution	1916,	but	the	events	leading	to	the	Civil	War,	and	 particularly	 his	 controversial	 role	 in	 negotiating	 the	 treaty,	 were	 glossed	over.	 A	 Free	 State	 Army	 tunic	 and	 service	 revolver	 were	 the	 only	 visual	references	to	the	Civil	War.	The	narrative	 identified	Collins	with	the	IRB	as	the	historical	“parent”	of	the	Volunteers,	but	also	the	Provisional	IRA	as	the	child	of	the	 anti-Treaty	 IRA	 of	 1922.	 The	 political	 logic	 is	 that	 from	 small	 Republican	secret	 societies	 operating	 illegally	 spring	mass	movements:	 Sinn	 Féin	 in	 1918	and	 the	 party	 of	 today.	 Collins	 himself	 thought	 the	 Treaty’s	 compromise	 on	“dominion	 status”	 for	 Ireland	 represented	 a	 “stepping	 stone”	 toward	 the	Republic,	 but	 IRA	men	 like	 Liam	Mellows	 thought	 the	 Republic	 had	 come	 into	existence	with	the	inauguration	of	the	first	Dáil	in	1919	(Townshend	2013,	355).	In	1922	Collins	was	president	of	the	IRB’s	supreme	council,	of	which	the	majority	was	pro-Treaty.	This	body	viewed	 itself	 as	 sovereign	over	 the	elected	Dáil	 and	after	the	latter	was	dissolved	in	August,	it	effectively	held	executive	power	over	the	government,	army	and	police.	Regan	has	argued	that	anti-Treaty	Republicans	saw	Collins	and	 the	 IRB	 leadership	as	a	 “military	dictatorship”	 (2013,	130).	By	
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suppressing	 the	 Four	 Courts	 rebellion	 Collins	 certainly	 put	 paid	 to	 the	 anti-Treaty	IRA’s	plans	to	liberate	Ulster	through	a	border	war.								Spencer	 has	 remarked	 on	 the	 clear	 historical	 parallel	 between	 contemporary	dissident	 Republican	 enmity	 towards	 Gerry	 Adams	 for	 signing	 the	 Belfast	Agreement	 and	 anti-Treatyites’	 condemnation	 of	 Collins	 as	 a	 traitor	 in	 1922	(2015,	 29).	 The	 exhibition’s	 sympathetic	 portrayal	 of	 Collins	 promoted	 the	legitimacy	of	Republican	pragmatism	today.	Collins’s	“stepping	stone”	argument	was	premised	on	the	strategic	priority	of	achieving	British	military	withdrawal	from	Ireland.	With	the	end	of	the	British	Army’s	Operation	Banner	 in	Northern	Ireland	in	2007,	Adams	and	the	Sinn	Féin	leadership	can	advance	an	analogous	rationale	 for	 the	 Agreement	 as	 another	 “stepping	 stone”.	 Sinn	 Féin’s	Republicanism	is	now	closer	to	Collins’s	than	that	of	the	men	of	the	Four	Courts.	It	is	also	a	product	of	its	time	and	place	and	here	the	limits	of	historical	analogy	are	 reached.	 Gerry	 Adams	 and	 Michael	 Collins	 are	 unique	 historical	 actors,	practising	politics	in	radically	different	eras.	Only	an	Irish	Republican	would	see	the	first	man	as	a	reincarnation	of	the	second.		At	 the	 climax	 of	 the	 exhibition,	 a	 room	 commemorated	 latter-day	 martyrs	 of	Republicanism—the	 hunger	 strikers	 of	 1981.	 On	 the	 walls	 was	 a	 series	 of	enlarged,	unofficial	commemorative	stamps	of	each	hunger	striker,	designed	by	the	 artist	 Robert	 Ballagh.	 The	 appropriation	 of	 this	 medium	 suggested	 a	Republican	 riposte	 to	 official	 modes	 of	 commemoration.	 Here	 the	 Sinn	 Féin	narrative	of	1916	came	full	circle	to	the	threshold	event	in	the	party’s	electoral	fortunes.	 Central	 to	 this	 section	 was	 the	 figure	 of	 Bobby	 Sands	 and	 his	 1981	victory	 in	 the	 Westminster	 by-election	 for	 Fermanagh/South	 Tyrone.	
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Significantly	there	were	no	artefacts	relating	to	Bobby	Sands	displayed.	Given	his	sister	 Bernadette	 Sands-McKevitt’s	 well-publicised	 dissident	 views,	 this	 may	have	 indicated	 familial	animosity	 toward	Sinn	Féin.84	In	a	sense,	by	making	the	connection	between	the	hunger	strikers	and	the	rise	of	Sinn	Féin,	the	exhibition	validated	 criticisms	 made	 by	 some	 dissident	 Republicans	 that	 the	 leadership	exploited	the	deaths	for	political	gain	(see	Frampton	2011,	164-165).85			Politicised	 relics	 are	 important	 devices	 for	 connecting	 dead	 martyrs	 to	 living	activists.	A	shirt	belonging	to	Sands’s	fellow	hunger	striker,	Kieran	Doherty,	was	exhibited,	neatly	folded.	Doherty	was	also	elected	in	absentia	as	a	deputy	for	the	Dáil	constituency	of	Cavan-Monaghan	in	the	1981	Irish	General	Election.	Among	the	personal	effects	and	ephemera	of	the	hunger	strikers	was	another	electoral	artefact:	a	poster	for	Mairéad	Farrell’s	campaign	as	a	“political	prisoner”	in	Cork	during	the	1981	election.	Farrell,	who	along	with	two	other	women	prisoners	at	Armagh	 Gaol	 joined	 the	 first	 H-Block	 hunger	 strike	 in	 1980,	 was	 honoured	 in	Gerry	Adams’s	Easter	 addresses	 at	Arbour	Hill	 and	Milltown	Cemetery.	Adams	invoked	 Farrell	 to	 personify	 his	 theme	 of	 women’s	 equality,	 but	 also	 the	authenticity	of	armed	struggle.	Farrell’s	appearance	 in	 the	exhibition	conveyed	the	key	message	that	physical	 force	 is	the	 legitimate	basis	of	the	contemporary	political	struggle.			As	 with	 exhibitions	 in	 any	 public	 museum	 in	 Europe	 and	 North	 America,	 the	visitor	to	Revolution	1916	was	compelled	to	leave	via	the	gift	shop.	Inside	there	
																																																								84	Sands-McKevitt	was	a	founder	member	of	the	32	County	Sovereignty	Movement,	members	of	which	initially	acted	as	an	anti-Agreement	faction	within	Sinn	Féin	before	their	expulsion	in	1998	(Whiting	2015,	100-101).		85	Dissidents	also	condemned	Sinn	Féin	 for	exploiting	 the	 thirty-fifth	anniversary	of	 the	hunger	strikes	for	electioneering	purposes	(see	O’Hara	2016).	
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were	expensive	Patrick	Pearse	and	Proclamation	branded	t-shirts	for	sale	(photo	4.17).	Each	day	at	noon	outside	the	Ambassador,	an	actor	performed	as	Pearse,	reading	the	Proclamation	aloud	on	O’Connell	Street,	while	flanked	by	uniformed	Irish	Volunteers.	On	the	centenary	of	Easter	Monday	1916,	this	took	place	among	huge	 crowds	 thronging	 O’Connell	 Street	 (photo	 4.18).	 After	 the	 parade	 of	 the	Irish	Defence	Forces	the	day	before,	O’Connell	Street	was	finally	returned	to	the	people	on	Easter	Monday	as	crowds	flocked	to	take	part	in	RTÉ’s	1916:	Reflecting	
the	Rising,	a	series	of	public	events	around	the	city.		
	
Photo	4.17	Patrick	Pearse	and	Proclamation	t-shirts	on	sale	in	the	Revolution	1916	gift	shop.			In	 its	 theatricality	 the	 performance	 followed	 the	 example	 of	 the	 Rising	protagonists	 who	 sought	 ways	 to	 historicise	 their	 actions	 by	 reading	 the	Proclamation	outside	the	GPO	and	hoisting	flags	above	it	(Foster	2014,	230-231).	Unlike	the	Republicans	of	1916	however,	Sinn	Féin’s	re-enactivists	were	unable	to	 step	 outside	 the	 politics	 of	 their	 own	 time.	 Their	 political	 theatre	 over	 the	
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Easter	weekend	 lacked	 the	white	heat	of	 conviction	 that	burned	within	Pearse	and	Connolly.	It	was	packaged	and	historicised	for	a	transient	consumer	society,	in	which	oldness	has	become	an	unassailable	index	of	cultural	value.	Revolution	
1916	was	politics	 in	 sepia,	where	even	 the	 technicolour	 imagery	of	 the	hunger	strikers	of	our	time	seemed	detached	from	lived	experience.		
	
																	Photo	4.18	An	actor	in	the	role	of	Patrick	Pearse	reading	the	Proclamation	on		O’Connell	Street,	Easter	Monday	2016.	
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Sinn	Féin’s	activist	heritage	reflects	the	party’s	growing	professionalisation	and	adaptation	 to	 a	 political	 landscape	 in	 which	 innovation	 is	 required	 to	outmanoeuvre	 its	 rivals.	 Although	 innovative	 politically,	 Revolution	 1916	was	devoid	of	substantive	originality	and	authenticity	in	cultural	terms.	It	was	bereft	of	an	iconic	object	through	which	to	channel	nationalist	sentiment;	in	a	political	culture	 shaped	 by	 Catholic	 iconography,	 this	 was	 a	 palpable	 sin	 of	 omission.	Dublin’s	Sinn	Féin	mayor,	Críona	Ní	Dhálaigh,	understood	the	symbolic	power	of	such	icons.	She	successfully	petitioned	the	Imperial	War	Museum	to	borrow	the	Na	Fianna	Éireann	banner	seized	by	British	soldiers	from	Constance	Markievicz’s	home	in	1916.	It	was	displayed	at	City	Hall	for	the	centenary.			Of	 the	 2006	 commemorations	 Wills	 writes	 that	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 “Rebel	 Dublin”	walking	 tours	 and	 sale	 of	 1916-themed	 Christmas	 cards	 amounted	 to	 “Rising	kitsch”	 (2009,	 216).	 Revolution	 1916	 with	 its	 garish	 spectacles	 and	 crass	invitation	 to	 “relive	 the	 Rising”	 should	 also	 be	 seen	 in	 this	 light.	 Sinn	 Féin’s	activist	 heritage	 is	 attuned	 to	 the	 version	 of	 Irish	 history	 in	 popular	 culture.	Embedded	 in	 the	 exhibition’s	 narrative	 of	 the	 centuries-old	 struggle	 for	 Irish	freedom	 were	 evocative	 tales	 of	 heroes	 and	 villains,	 romance	 and	 death.	 The	catalogue	proudly	stated	that	the	Crossley	car	featured	was	used	in	Neil	Jordan’s	biopic,	 Michael	 Collins	 (1996).	 The	 reference	 spoke	 volumes	 for	 the	 authors’	rationale	that	our	understanding	of	history	and	politics	is	shaped	by	the	popular	culture	of	film,	television	and	omnipresent	consumption.	This	assumption	is	not	unique	to	the	private	sphere—it	is	now	commonplace	in	the	state	heritage	field.	On	O’Connell	Street	a	banner	at	 the	side	of	one	of	 the	RTÉ’s	stages	proclaimed	“Step	Into	History”,	recalling	the	offer	to	“follow	in	the	footsteps	of	history”	at	the	
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Ambassador.	The	two	near-identical	declamations	were	made	with	the	certainty	of	being	on	the	right	side	of	history,	but	the	scene	on	O’Connell	Street	that	day	suggested	that	the	Irish	state’s	authoritative	voice	is	faltering.		
The	Pathos	of	Conservation			Under	neoliberalism,	heritage	becomes	the	patina	of	history	where	objects	and	places	 may	 act	 as	 repositories	 for	 collective	 memories,	 but	 also	 social	imaginaries.	At	Arbour	Hill,	Gerry	Adams	emoted	that	it	was	a	“metaphor	of	our	times”	 that	 in	 the	 centenary	 year	 the	 “relatives	 of	 the	 1916	 leaders	 and	 their	supporters	should	be	forced	to	take	this	state	to	the	High	Court	in	order	to	save	our	national	heritage	at	Moore	Street.”	Sinn	Féin	has	been	a	vocal	supporter	of	the	longstanding	campaign	to	“Save	Moore	Street”	that	 is	 indeed	a	metaphor	of	the	 times,	 although	 not	 in	 the	 way	 that	 Adams	 meant.	 The	 national	 drama	surrounding	 Moore	 Street	 began	 in	 1998,	 when	 the	 area	 was	 earmarked	 for	redevelopment	 within	 Dublin	 City	 Council’s	 urban	 regeneration	 scheme.	 A	property	developer	was	granted	permission	by	 the	council	 to	build	a	 shopping	centre	on	land	between	O’Connell	Street	and	Moore	Street,	on	the	site	of	the	old	Carlton	Cinema.	Under	 the	plan,	 the	buildings	of	10-25	Moore	Street	would	be	demolished	to	make	way	for	a	“Millennium	Mall”.			A	heritage	campaign	was	launched	to	preserve	the	Georgian	edifice	of	16	Moore	Street,	 the	last	headquarters	of	the	Provisional	Government.	The	campaign	was	originally	 spearheaded	 by	 the	 National	 Graves	 Association	 and	 the	 National	Trust	 for	 Ireland	 (An	 Taisce)	 and	 endorsed	 by	 historians	 Tim	 Pat	 Coogan	 and	David	Edwards.	The	Save	16	Moore	Street	Committee	included	James	Connolly’s	
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grandson,	 John,	 and	 Michael	 O’Rahilly’s	 granddaughter,	 Nuala	 O’Rahilly-Price.	The	campaign	achieved	 its	primary	objective	when	 the	council	added	numbers	14-17	 to	 its	 Record	 of	 Protected	 Structures	 in	 2006.	 The	 decision	 followed	 a	2005	 survey	 by	 the	 architects	 Shaffrey	 Associates	 and	 the	 historian	 John	Montague	 that	 recommended	 the	 preservation	 of	 these	 buildings.	 In	 2007	 the	Minister	 for	 the	 Environment,	 Heritage	 and	 Local	 Government,	 Dick	 Roche,	signed	 a	 preservation	 order	 for	 14-17	Moore	 Street	 as	 a	 National	 Monument.	Central	 government	 intervention	 created	 a	 political	 triangulation	 between	 the	Irish	state,	Dublin	City	Council	and	campaigners	 that	has	 thrown	up	a	series	of	legal	 and	 moral	 complexities	 over	 what	 constitutes	 the	 national	 heritage	 and	who	has	the	authority	to	define	it.		Another	developer,	Chartered	Land,	acquired	 the	site	 in	2008	and	was	granted	planning	 permission	 by	 the	 council	 for	 a	 “mixed	 use”	 (commercial	 and	residential)	development	over	a	city	block	bounded	by	Parnell	Street,	O’Rahilly	Parade	(formerly	Sackville	Lane),	Moore	Lane,	Moore	Street,	Henry	Place,	Henry	Street	 and	 Upper	 O’Connell	 Street.	 After	 the	 council	 approved	 this	 “Dublin	Central”	development,	 appeals	were	 lodged	by	campaigners	and	a	hearing	was	convened	at	 the	Gresham	Hotel	 in	April	2009.	At	 this	point,	 the	Save	16	Moore	Street	campaign	split	into	two	opposing	camps.	The	first	was	broadly	supportive	of	 the	 development,	 with	 the	 proviso	 that	 a	 museum	 would	 be	 opened	 at	 16	Moore	Street	and	the	other	buildings	comprising	the	National	Monument	would	be	restored.	The	second	group	opposed	the	development,	alongside	the	National	Graves	Association	and	An	Taisce.	In	her	report	to	An	Bord	Pleanála,	the	Senior	Planning	 Inspector,	 Jane	 Dennehy,	 expressed	 “fundamental	 concerns”	 over	 the	
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extent	of	 the	demolition	proposed	by	Chartered	Land	 (An	Bord	Pleanála	2009,	104).	 Dennehy	 stated	 that	 the	 “demolition	 of	 Moore	 Lane	 and	 Henry	 Place	between	O’Rahilly	 Place	 [sic]	 and	Moore	 Street	 as	 proposed	 is	 in	 conflict	with	regard	 to	 article	 7	 of	 the	 Venice	 Charter,	 with	 the	 established	 pattern	 of	 the	street	 and	 lane	 work	 within	 the	 area	 and	 within	 the	 setting	 and	 context	 of	 a	National	 Monument”	 (76).86	After	 revising	 its	 proposals,	 Chartered	 Land	 was	granted	planning	permission	by	An	Bord	Pleanála	 in	March	2010	on	 condition	that	 any	 work	 at	 14-17	 Moore	 Street	 must	 be	 undertaken	 with	 ministerial	approval	under	the	National	Monuments	(Amendment)	Act	2004.			Out	 of	 the	 2009	 split	 arose	 two	 competing	 visions	 of	Moore	 Street:	 a	museum	contained	within	 a	 larger	 “mixed	 use”	 development	 and	 a	 dedicated	 historical	and	 cultural	 quarter	 linking	 the	 GPO	 and	Moore	 Street	 topographically.	 Those	supporting	 the	 “Dublin	 Central”	 plan	 remained	 focussed	 on	 the	 National	Monument,	 viewing	 it	 as	 the	 historically	 authentic	 site	 of	 the	 Rising.	 They	adopted	a	more	pragmatic	position	based	on	restoring	it	as	a	museum	in	time	for	the	 centenary.	 Beyond	 their	 objections	 to	 work	 being	 carried	 out	 within	 the	preservation	boundary	of	 the	National	Monument,	 the	appellants	 in	2009	were	also	concerned	about	the	destruction	of	the	historical	fabric	of	the	area	in	which	the	 final	 act	 of	 the	 Rising	 took	 place.	 In	 their	 estimation	 Henry	 Street,	 Henry	Place,	 Moore	 Lane,	 Moore	 Street	 and	 O’Rahilly	 Parade	 were	 the	 streets	 and	laneways	 of	 the	 rebels’	 last	 stand	 and	 their	 historical	 integrity	 should	 be	preserved.																																																											86	Article	7	of	the	1964	International	Charter	for	the	Conservation	and	Restoration	of	Monuments	and	Sites	(Venice	Charter)	states:	“A	monument	is	inseparable	from	the	history	to	which	it	bears	witness	and	from	the	setting	in	which	it	occurs”	(ICOMOS	1964).	
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After	 members	 of	 the	 Dáil,	 Seanad	 and	 Dublin	 City	 Council	 raised	 substantial	objections	 to	 Chartered	 Land’s	 revised	 proposals,	 a	 Moore	 Street	 Advisory	Committee	 was	 established	 in	 2012.	 Following	 a	 public	 consultation,	 it	recommended	that	the	Minister	for	the	Arts,	Heritage	and	the	Gaeltacht,	 Jimmy	Deenihan,	withhold	his	consent	for	work	to	begin	at	14-17	Moore	Street	(Moore	Street	 Advisory	 Committee	 2013).	 Deenhihan	 nonetheless	 granted	 permission	for	Chartered	Land	to	proceed	in	2013.	He	agreed	to	the	demolition	of	post-1916	elements	within	the	structure	of	the	National	Monument,	along	with	13,	18	and	19	Moore	Street	as	buildings	post-dating	 the	Rising.	He	refused	permission	 for	several	proposed	structural	alterations	within	the	preservation	order	boundary	of	 the	National	Monument,	 including	underground	work	 and	 the	demolition	of	pre-1916	elements	within	its	curtilage.			At	 the	2014	municipal	elections,	Sinn	Féin	became	the	 largest	group	on	Dublin	City	 Council.	 At	 Easter	 2014,	 Sinn	 Féin	 seized	 on	 the	 emotive	 issue	 of	 Moore	Street	 by	 proposing	 its	 own	 vision—the	 1916	 Revolutionary	 Quarter.	 This	alternative	plan	was	based	on	the	preservation	of	the	entire	terrace	between	10	and	25	Moore	Street	as	a	“battlefield	site”.	Sinn	Féin	embraced	the	Moore	Street	issue	to	challenge	the	Irish	state	in	the	run-up	to	the	Rising	centenary.	The	party	condemned	the	National	Asset	Management	Agency	(NAMA)	for	acting	as	a	“life	support	machine”	 to	Chartered	Land,	 stating,	 “It	would	be	 an	outrage	 if	 public	funds	 were	 to	 be	 used	 to	 destroy	 most	 of	 this	 historic	 quarter,	 thus	accomplishing	something	that	artillery	bombardment	in	1916	and	again	in	1922	failed	to	do”	(Sinn	Féin	2014,	9).	Political	pressure	mounted	on	the	government.	Leading	 figures	 in	 the	 original	 campaign	 were	 increasingly	 pushed	 into	 the	
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background	by	 other	 personalities,	 particularly	 by	 James	Connolly	Heron,	who	emerged	 as	 a	 firebrand.	 At	 the	 “Arms	 Around	 Moore	 Street”	 protest	 in	 2014,	Connolly	Heron	reminded	the	crowds	that	Kilmainham	Gaol	had	been	preserved	through	the	efforts	of	campaigners,	but	also	recalled	the	unsuccessful	campaign	to	save	Wood	Quay	(2014).87			In	 November	 2014,	 Dublin	 City	 Council	 rejected	 a	 deal	 that	 would	 have	transferred	ownership	of	24-25	Moore	Street	to	Chartered	Land	in	return	for	the	developer’s	 agreement	 to	 restore	 the	National	Monument	buildings	 in	 time	 for	the	Rising	centenary,	with	NAMA	funding	(The	Irish	Times,	November	4,	2014).	The	following	year	Deenihan’s	successor,	Heather	Humphreys,	bowed	to	political	pressure	by	announcing	 that	 the	state	would	purchase	 the	National	Monument	buildings	 within	 its	 centenary	 programme.	 In	 September	 2015,	 the	 British	property	 developer	 Hammerson	 acquired	 the	 “Dublin	 Central”	 loan	 portfolio	from	NAMA.	 The	 government’s	 contractor,	 Lissadell	 Construction,	 began	work	on	the	14-17	Moore	Street	site	in	November.	The	company’s	brief	was	to	restore	the	structure	to	 its	1916	state	and	build	the	commemorative	centre	 in	time	for	the	 centenary.	 	 The	 project	 was	 to	 be	 overseen	 by	 a	 steering	 committee,	consisting	of	the	Department	of	Arts,	Heritage	and	Gaeltacht,	Dublin	City	Council,	the	Office	 of	 Public	Works,	 the	National	 Archives	 and	 the	National	Museum	of	Ireland.	 Humphreys	 took	 care	 to	 emphasise	 that	 the	 development	 of	 the	 new	commemorative	centre	was	proceeding	in	consultation	with	the	1916	relatives.	In	many	ways	the	authority	of	the	relatives	–	on	whatever	side	of	the	argument	they	stood	–	reflected	their	status	as	living	heritage,	a	pure	bloodline	to	1916.																																																									87	Wood	Quay	was	 a	 Viking	 archaeological	 site	where	 the	 then	Dublin	 Corporation	 planned	 to	build	new	civic	offices.	Public	opposition	to	the	plans	led	to	the	“Save	Wood	Quay”	campaign	and	an	occupation	of	the	site	by	protestors	in	1979.	
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The	political	stakes	were	raised	in	January	2016	when	activists	mounted	a	week-long	occupation	of	14-17	Moore	Street.	Protestors	claimed	that	Lissadell	was	not	safeguarding	 the	National	Monument	and	that	demolition	work	was	happening	behind	a	hoarding	the	company	had	erected	over	the	terrace.	At	the	end	of	the	month	a	“Save	Moore	Street	from	Demolition”	protest	march	was	organised	from	Liberty	 Hall	 to	 the	 GPO	 via	 Moore	 Street.	 Among	 the	 marchers	 were	 re-enactivists	 and	 Claíomh	 actors,	 one	 of	 whom	 addressed	 the	 rally	 outside	 the	GPO.	Sinn	Féin	organised	demonstrations	and	its	activist,	Colm	Moore,	launched	a	challenge	in	the	High	Court	to	halt	the	work	taking	place	onsite.	Responding	to	a	Sinn	Féin	motion	in	the	Dáil,	Humphreys	rejected	the	party’s	claim	that	the	rest	of	the	Moore	Street	terrace	was	historic,	stating,	“Quite	simply	what	is	there	now	was	not	there	in	1916”	(Dáil	Éireann	Debates,	Vol.	905,	No.	1,	2016,	85).		The	High	Court	ruled	in	March	that	the	“Moore	Street	Battlefield”	site	(although	not	 all	 buildings	 thereon)	 comprises	 a	 National	Monument	 under	 the	 relevant	statutes	(2016,	392-395).	The	judgement	drew	heavily	on	the	opinion	of	heritage	professionals,	 including	 that	 of	 the	 archaeologist	 Franc	 Myles,	 who	 in	 2012	prepared	 a	 report	 for	 the	 National	 Museum	 of	 Ireland	 and	 the	 National	Monuments	Service	of	the	Department	of	Arts,	Heritage	and	the	Gaeltacht.	Myles	used	the	Bureau	of	Military	History	depositions,	made	in	the	1950s	and	released	by	 the	 Irish	 government	 in	 2003,	 as	 primary	 sources	 in	 his	 investigation.	 His	report	 identified	 the	 “White	House”	 and	 the	O’Brien’s	mineral	water	 stores	 on	Henry	Place	described	in	the	witness	statements.	He	recorded	bullet	strikes	and	other	damage	to	the	building	fabric,	as	well	as	the	O’Brien’s	signage	visible	under	the	 Goodall’s	 of	 Ireland	 fascia	 on	 Henry	 Place.	 Crucially,	Myles	 discovered	 the	
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holes	 in	 the	walls	 at	14-17	Moore	Street,	made	by	 the	 retreating	 rebels	 (2015,	41-45).88			The	 High	 Court	 judgement	 also	 took	 into	 account	 the	 views	 of	 the	 former	director	of	the	National	Museum	of	Ireland,	Patrick	Wallace.	He	argued	that	the	National	Monument’s	 topographical	 position	made	 it	 a	 “key	 component	 of	 the	General	 Post	 Office-Moore	 Street	 axis	 through	 the	 1916	 battlefield	 landscape”	(High	Court	of	 Ireland	2016,	149).	 In	his	opinion,	 the	minister	should	take	 into	account	 the	whole	precinct	 from	the	north	side	of	 the	GPO	 to	O’Rahilly	Parade	when	making	his	decision.	He	cautioned	Deenihan	against	the	potential	“moral,	cultural	historical,	political	and	economical	fallout”	of	not	preserving	the	site	as	part	 of	 the	 national	 heritage	 (151).89	Both	 the	 arguments	 employed	 in	 Colm	Moore’s	 application	 and	 the	 rhetoric	 employed	 by	 leading	 campaigners	 like	Connolly	 Heron	 reflect	 the	 findings	 of	 heritage	 professionals,	which	 they	 have	frequently	manipulated	towards	political	ends.		The	High	Court	judgment	amounted	to	recognition	of	Sinn	Féin’s	key	demand.	In	the	media	Colm	Moore	appeared	as	a	nominee	of	the	1916	Relatives	Association,	flanked	 by	 prominent	 activists	 Connolly	 Heron	 and	 Proinsias	 O	 Rathaille,	grandson	of	Michael	O’Rahilly.	 In	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 centenary,	 Sinn	 Féin	made	political	 capital	 out	of	 the	 “Save	Moore	Street”	 campaign	and	was	prominently	associated	 in	 the	 media	 with	 Connolly	 Heron	 and	 O	 Rathaille.	 The	 original	campaign	 was	 irrevocably	 split,	 with	 a	 flux	 of	 different	 groups	 converging	 on	
																																																								88	The	existence	of	the	holes	was	an	important	factor	in	the	High	Court	judge’s	consideration	of	whether	or	not	neighbouring	structures	should	be	preserved.	The	holes	are	also	 integral	to	the	“1916	Rebellion	Museum”	concept	proposed	by	the	Save	No.	16	Moore	Street	Committee	(see	n.	90	below).		89	Wallace	was	an	archaeologist	himself	and	headed	the	team	that	excavated	the	Wood	Quay	site.	
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Moore	Street	in	January	2016,	ranging	from	Occupy	Moore	Street	to	the	dissident	Republicans	of	éirígí	and	the	1916	Societies.90		
	
	
Photo	4.19	Freshly	sanitised	hoarding	over	the	National	Monument	at	14-17	Moore	Street,	Good	Friday	2016.	
	
	Before	the	Easter	weekend,	the	hoarding	on	Moore	Street	was	covered	in	graffiti.	Most	prominent	among	the	slogans	were	words	attributed	to	Bobby	Sands:	“OUR	REVENGE	 WILL	 BE	 THE	 LAUGHTER	 OF	 OUR	 CHILDREN.”	 By	 the	 morning	 of	Good	Friday	the	hoarding	had	been	scrubbed	clean	and	the	area	edified	for	the	Irish	 state’s	official	 commemorations	 (photo	4.19).	On	Easter	Monday,	Heather	Humphreys	 laid	 a	wreath	outside	 the	National	Monument	 and	was	met	with	 a	noisy	 protest	 from	 campaigners	who	 claimed	 she	 intended	 to	 appeal	 the	High	Court’s	decision	(photos	4.20	and	4.21).	
																																																									90	The	original	campaign	had	by	this	stage	split	into	two	rival	groups:	the	Save	16	Moore	Street	Committee,	fronted	by	Connolly	Heron,	and	the	Save	No.	16	Moore	Street	Committee,	led	by	John	Connolly.	
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Photo	4.20	Save	Moore	Street	From	Demolition	protest,	Easter	Monday	2016.	
	
	
	
Photo	 4.21	 Protestor	 holding	 a	 “Citizen’s	 Injunction”	 prohibiting	 further	 work	 on	 the	 Moore	Street	terrace,	Easter	Monday	2016.			In	June	2016	Humphreys	announced	that	the	government	would	appeal	the	High	Court	ruling	and	set	up	a	Moore	Street	Consultative	Group	to	consider	the	site’s	
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future.	The	group	included	representatives	of	the	two	rival	campaigns,	the	1916	Relatives	 Association,	 Dublin	 City	 Council	 and	 the	 political	 parties.	 Its	 report	recommended	that	the	“Moore	Street	battlefield	area”	be	redeveloped	as	part	of	an	 “historic	 cultural	 quarter”,	 following	 objectives	 in	 the	 Council’s	 Dublin	 City	Development	 Plan	 2016-2022.	 This	 would	 include	 the	 creation	 of	 a	“revolutionary	trail”	linking	major	1916	heritage	sites.	The	report	also	proposed	that	the	Irish	state	make	10-25	Moore	Street	the	“centre	point	of	historical	focus	and	 cultural	 celebration”.	 Restoration	 of	 key	 buildings	 should	 adopt	 the	approach	of	“capturing	the	moment	in	time”,	which	would	not	preclude	a	visitors	centre	nor	a	museum	(2017,	6).	Humphreys	cautiously	welcomed	the	report	and	accepted	one	of	its	key	recommendations	to	establish	a	new	advisory	group	for	reaching	a	resolution	based	on	“consensus”.		In	 the	Moore	 Street	 saga	we	may	 perceive	 the	 trauma	 of	 a	 society	 convulsing	from	 untrammelled	 neoliberalism.	 The	 campaign	 to	 “Save	 Moore	 Street”	 has	grown	 increasingly	 idealistic	 in	 its	 aims,	 drawing	on	 the	wellspring	 of	 popular	yearning	 for	 the	 lost	 republic	 of	 1916.	 The	 real	 issue	 was	 never	 really	 about	Moore	Street	becoming	a	museum,	but	why	what	so	many	Irish	people	believe	it	stands	for	remains	so	distant	from	their	reality.	Moore	Street	is	the	mirror	of	an	abstract	citizenry	who	can	no	longer	see	their	reflection	in	the	national	heritage.	The	 centenary	 sharpened	 these	 contradictions	 as	 the	 state	 offered	 the	 film	
Ireland	 Inspires91	and	 airbrushed	 the	 real	 men	 and	women	 of	 1916	 out	 of	 the	picture.																																																										91	The	film	used	the	slogan	“Remember	Where	We	Came	From”	but	made	no	mention	of	the	1916	leaders.	 Controversially	 it	 contained	 footage	 of	 Queen	 Elizabeth	 II	 visiting	 Dublin’s	 Garden	 of	Remembrance	in	2011	and	David	Cameron	laying	a	wreath	with	Enda	Kenny	to	 “Reconcile	Our	Different	Journeys.”	Sinn	Féin	used	the	slogan	the	“1916	Rising	Inspires”	as	a	riposte.	
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While	 the	 contention	 of	 heritage	 professionals	 that	 the	 GPO	 and	Moore	 Street	constitute	a	topographical	and	historical	unity	is	unquestionably	sound,	how	we	comprehend	 the	 past	 cannot	 be	 detached	 from	 the	 social	 totality.	Writing	 at	 a	time	 when	 gentrification	 threatened	 his	 adopted	 home	 of	 Spitalfields,	 Samuel	illuminated	 the	 irony	 that	 restoration	 yields	 up	 buildings	 that	 can	 only	 reflect	their	own	time:		 It	is	the	pathos	of	conservation…	that	it	produces	the	opposite	of	its	intended	effect.	Returning	buildings	to	their	original	condition	(or	attempting	to	do	so)	robs	 them	of	 the	very	quality	 for	which	they	are	prized—oldness…	Fetishing	period,	it	freezes	the	building	at	a	point	where	history	has	not	yet	happened	to	it.	Removing	every	memory	 trace,	 it	 allows	neither	 imaginative	nor	physical	space	 for	 the	 barnacles	 which	 have	 accreted	 over	 time…	What	 emerges	 in	purist	restoration	is	a	building	that	is	innocent	of	history.	(1989,	162)			The	 pathos	 of	 conservation	 has	 come	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	 restoration	 of	 14-17	Moore	Street	that	aims	to	return	these	buildings	to	their	1916	state.	It	is	hoped	that	 they	will	 recapture	 in	 this	way	 the	era	when	 the	 Irish	Republic	 came	 into	being,	but	this	 is	 impossible.	The	buildings	that	now	comprise	the	terrace	have	led	many	 lives	 since	 1916;	 some	were	 not	 even	 in	 existence	when	 the	 drama	took	 place.	 There	 is	 also	 the	 problem	 of	 contemporary	 historiography	 that	questions	 the	 location	 of	 the	 last	 headquarters	 of	 the	Provisional	Government.	Several	commentators	have	disputed	the	traditionally	accepted	account	given	by	Elizabeth	 O’Farrell	 in	 1917.	 O’Farrell,	 who	 acted	 as	 messenger	 between	 the	Provisional	Government	and	 the	British	 commander	Brigadier-General	William	Lowe,	recalled	the	 location	being	at	No.	16.	 In	2006,	Chartered	Land	appointed	the	 British	 historian	 Charles	 Townshend	 to	 carry	 out	 an	 investigation.	 He	concluded	 that	 the	 headquarters	 had	 actually	 been	 several	 doors	 down	 the	terrace,	 in	 premises	 rebuilt	 in	 the	 1970s.	 Myles	 has	 refuted	 Townshend’s	
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findings,	stating	categorically	that	his	archaeological	analysis	in	2012	confirmed	the	historic	status	of	No.	16	(2015,	41).	Matthews,	however,	cites	several	witness	statements	 from	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Military	 History	 depositions	 that	 place	 the	location	above	a	fish	shop.	Liam	Tannam	recalled	being	in	Kelly’s	fish	shop	(Nos	24-25)	 with	 Tom	 Clarke	 and	 seeing	 the	 other	 leaders	 in	 a	 room	 there.	 Oscar	Traynor	remembered	reporting	to	Pearse	at	Hanlon’s	 fish	shop	(Nos	20-21).	 In	their	testimonies	both	men	mentioned	the	strong	smell	of	fish	(2014,	127-128).92	If	either	of	these	accounts	is	accurate	then	the	building	no	longer	exists	and	the	National	Monument	is	a	statutory	falsification	of	history.			The	historical	record	notwithstanding,	the	pathos	of	conservation	compromises	Moore	Street	from	another	angle.	When	formulating	their	plans	for	the	Rising,	its	architects	 chose	 the	 GPO	 as	 the	 centrepiece	 of	 their	 insurrection	 precisely	because	 it	stood	apart	 from	other	buildings.	The	GPO	was	the	birthplace	of	 the	Irish	Republic	as	the	crucible	of	its	ideals.	Like	all	great	revolutionaries,	the	1916	leaders	understood	that	history	is	not	made	in	laneways	but	in	state	institutions	where	 power	 is	 exercised.	 The	 GPO,	 as	 a	 major	 communications	 hub	 of	 the	British	Empire,	represented	the	summit	of	the	revolutionaries’	vaulting	ambition	to	national	 independence.	On	an	alternate	 timeline	 in	which	 the	 Irish	Republic	survived	the	maelstrom	of	Easter	1916,	the	GPO	would	doubtless	have	become	a	museum,	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 vanquished	 imperialism.	 It	 would	 have	 followed	 the	precedent	 of	 the	 Louvre	 as	 an	 institution	 transformed	 to	 demonstrate	 popular	sovereignty.	
																																																								92	McGarry	 also	 has	 the	 Provisional	 Government	meeting	 at	 Hanlon’s,	 where	 Seán	McLoughlin	volunteered	to	lead	a	charge	on	the	British	barricade	(2016,	208).	
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																					Photo	4.22	Volunteers	collecting	for	Irish	soup	kitchens	(left),	O’Connell							Street,	Good	Friday	2016.				In	many	respects	Sinn	Féin’s	political	opportunism	over	Moore	Street	diminished	the	 symbolic	 power	 of	 the	 GPO	 over	 the	 Easter	 weekend.	 Outside	 the	 GPO,	voluntary	 workers	 were	 collecting	 for	 “Irish	 soup	 kitchens”	 in	 a	 street	 where	begging	is	now	commonplace	(photo	4.22).	Simultaneously	the	sacred	terrain	of	the	 GPO	 was	 being	 fenced	 off	 to	 accommodate	 state	 officials	 and	 visiting	dignitaries	 with	 no	 ingress	 for	 the	 populace.	 In	 the	 event	 only	 the	 unpopular	
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torchbearers	of	dissident	Republicanism	communed	under	its	portico	in	defiance	of	the	state.			Republicans	 idealise	 the	 buildings	 of	 Moore	 Street	 and	 its	 laneways,	 reducing	their	histories	to	a	moment	in	time.	Even	where	structures	post-date	1916	they	are	 sanctified	by	 their	 associations.	Here	 again	 Sinn	Féin	 faced	 the	problem	of	authenticity.	Activists	 sought	 to	 challenge	 the	 state	over	 its	 stewardship	of	 the	national	 heritage,	 but	 despite	 her	 disingenuousness,	 Humphreys’s	 recourse	 to	originality	was	valid.	To	present	 the	past	as	 synthetica	 is	 to	be	unfaithful	 to	 it.	History	 becomes	meaningless	when	 its	 events	 become	detached	 from	material	reality.	The	dilapidated	state	of	Moore	Street’s	environs	in	the	late	1990s	spoke	to	 the	 lack	 of	 any	 progressive	 social	 policy	 at	 national	 or	municipal	 level.	 The	neoliberal	solution	was	to	build	a	shopping	mall.	The	area’s	authentic	social	life	–	including	 its	 market	 trade	 –	 was	 threatened	 by	 the	 quietus	 of	 gentrification.	Campaigners	 rightly	 drew	 attention	 to	 this	 in	 their	 arguments,	 but	 seemed	unaware	 of	 the	 contradiction	 in	what	 they	were	 advocating.	 Samuel	 cautioned	that	“piecemeal	conservation	can	serve,	despite	itself,	as	a	license	and	invitation	to	 wholesale	 commercial	 redevelopment	 in	 which	 historic	 landmarks	 are	preserved	 while	 the	 total	 environment	 is	 metamorphosed”	 and	 undesirable	structures	 “bulldozed	out	 of	 existence”.	He	observed	 that	 listed	buildings	 raise	property	 prices	 in	 the	 area	 and	make	 it	more	 desirable	 for	 developers	 (1989,	167).		A	 socially	 progressive	urban	 regeneration	 scheme	would	breathe	new	 life	 into	the	 community	 by	 restarting	 its	 economic	motor	 from	within.	 Redevelopment	would	preserve	the	historical	footprint	of	the	area	so	that	it	remains	familiar	to	
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residents	 and	 interpretable	 for	 visitors.	 Reconstruction	 would	 retain	architectural	 features	 from	 the	 full	 life-cycle	 of	 historic	 buildings	 whilst	integrating	 new	 structures.	 In	 this	 way	 the	 battlefield	 of	 1916	 would	 not	 be	restored	as	it	was	–	a	nationalist	fantasy	–	but	the	GPO	and	the	stations	of	Moore	Street	could	be	understood	as	part	of	a	historic	landscape	at	a	relative	distance	from	the	present	and	the	future.	
	
The	Substance	of	Freedom			The	 image	 of	 Patrick	 Pearse	 as	 the	 first	 president	 of	 the	 Irish	 Republic	 and	commander-in-chief	 of	 its	 army	 was	 unsurprisingly	 commonplace	 during	 the	1916	centenary.	Placards	bearing	his	portrait	were	displayed	on	lamp-posts	on	the	 Falls	 Road	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Sinn	 Féin-sponsored	municipal	 commemorations	(photo	4.23).	Pearse	is	nevertheless	an	ambivalent	martyr	for	Sinn	Féin,	as	he	is	for	the	Irish	state.	Sinn	Féin	meant	the	reading	of	the	Proclamation	outside	the	Ambassador	 and	 at	 its	 various	 Easter	 weekend	 pageants	 as	 a	 critique	 of	 the	emptiness	 of	 Irish	 state	 rituals.	 Higgins	 underlines	 the	 performative	 power	 of	Pearse’s	reading	of	the	Proclamation	outside	the	GPO,	signalling	the	coming	into	being	of	 the	new	state.	Maintaining	 the	authority	of	 the	Proclamation	 required	that	it	be	repeatedly	reasserted	through	official	re-enactments.	Once	the	symbols	of	Pearse	and	the	Proclamation	ceased	to	possess	their	original	“transformative”	power,	they	became	“empty	icons”,	reduced	to	sentimental	kitsch	and	objects	of	nostalgia	(2009,	131-133).	Encrypted	in	Sinn	Féin’s	critique	of	the	Irish	state	is	a	burning	 contradiction:	 the	 party’s	 own	 degeneration	 into	 kitsch	 and	 nostalgia.	The	spectacle	of	an	actor	performing	Pearse	on	O’Connell	Street	was	pure	kitsch.	
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By	 reducing	 the	 reading	 of	 the	 Proclamation	 to	 a	 period	 costume	 drama,	 Sinn	Féin	unintentionally	illuminated	its	own	negation	of	Pearse’s	ideals.		
	
																										Photo	4.23	Patrick	Pearse	placard,	Falls	Road,	Belfast,	Easter	2016.			In	Ghosts	Pearse	wrote:		 A	nation’s	fundamental	idea	of	freedom	is	not	affected	by	the	accidents	of	time	and	circumstance.	It	does	not	vary	with	the	centuries,	or	with	the	comings	and	goings	of	men	or	of	empires.	The	substance	of	truth	does	not	change,	nor	does	the	substance	of	freedom.	(1916,	4-5)								At	 Arbour	 Hill,	 Gerry	 Adams	 condemned	 the	 official	 state-sponsored	 banner	placed	 on	 the	 façade	 of	 the	Bank	 of	 Ireland	 and	 featuring	 portraits	 of	 Grattan,	Parnell,	O’Connell	and	Redmond	but	omitting	the	 leaders	of	1916	(photo	4.24).	
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In	Pearse’s	eyes	these	four	were	not	authentic	Irish	patriots	because	they	were	not	 separatists;	 they	made	 compromising	 compacts	with	 the	 British.	 Although	Sinn	Féin	strove	in	its	centennial	programme	to	portray	itself	as	the	guardian	of	Pearse’s	 unbroken	 “chain”	 of	 separatism,	 the	 party’s	 Republicanism	 now	 lacks	authenticity.	 Pearse’s	 ghost	 haunts	 Adams	 and	 his	 colleagues	 as	 they	 confront	this	reality.			
	
Photo	 4.24	 1916	 centenary	 banner	 on	 the	 Bank	 of	 Ireland	 building	 in	 College	 Green,	 Dublin,	Easter	2016.			Pearse	was	a	religious	nationalist	and	his	 Irish	Republic	was	a	sacred	vessel	of	moral	 virtue.	 He	 condemned	 the	 Irish	 Parliamentary	 Party	 for	 its	 negation	 of	separatism:		 They	have	conceived	of	nationality	as	a	material	thing,	whereas	it	is	a	spiritual	thing.	They	have	made	the	same	mistake	that	a	man	would	make	if	he	were	to	forget	that	he	has	an	immortal	soul.	They	have	not	recognised	in	their	people	the	image	and	likeness	of	God.	(1916,	4)		
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Sinn	Féin’s	own	condemnation	of	the	Irish	political	class	as	Redmondites	reborn	thus	 rings	 hollow.	 In	 campaigning	 to	 save	Moore	 Street,	 the	 party	 has	 viewed	material	things	as	empty	vessels	into	which	Irish	nationality	can	be	poured	and	distilled.	 The	 Revolution	 1916	 exhibition	 simultaneously	 offered	 “original	 and	authentic”	artefacts	and	a	gift	 shop	commodifying	Pearse	as	a	 celebrity	martyr	for	a	consumerist	age.	Sinn	Féin’s	Republicanism	possesses	no	spiritual	weight	or	 constancy.	 Its	modern	 saints	 are	 akin	 to	 those	 iconographed	 in	 churches—passionless	and	devoid	of	meaning.	Bobby	Sands	was	 inspired	by	Pearse	to	die	for	Ireland,	having	likewise	gazed	upon	the	pitiless	face	of	its	mythical	matriarch,	Cathleen	Ní	 Houlihan.	 He	 is	 now	 an	 empty	 icon—another	 ghost	 abroad	 in	 the	half-light	of	the	lost	republic.			In	 Sinn	 Féin’s	 recuperation	 of	 Pearse	 and	 Sands,	 we	 may	 comprehend	 how	nationalism	replays	a	 series	of	 slowly	degrading	 images	 that	grow	 fainter	with	each	iteration.	Irish	Republicanism	has	embraced	activist	heritage	because	it	has	no	 transformative	 blueprint	 for	 the	 future.	 Re-enactivism	 as	 a	 medium	 for	radical	 politics	 is	 ultimately	 flawed	by	 its	 subservience	 to	 the	past.	 Sinn	Féin’s	predicament	 is	 ironically	 shared	 by	 dissident	 Republicans	 and	 the	 Irish	Establishment	parties	north	and	south	of	the	border	as	the	political	after-birth	of	1916.	 For	 all	 his	 Gaelic	 mysticism,	 Pearse	 was	 a	 radical	 moderniser	 whose	Christian	revolutionary	vision	rejected	vapid	middle-class	consumerism	(Kiberd	2009,	67).	 Irish	modernity	has	fractured	under	neoliberalism	to	the	extent	that	the	 buried	 past	 must	 be	 constantly	 excavated	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 the	 living	present.	 Irish	politics	 remains	 in	 thrall	 to	 the	sacrifice	of	 the	dead	generations,	but	not	the	substance	of	freedom	they	died	for.	Consequently	at	the	centenary	of	
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the	Easter	Rising,	heritage	displaced	history	and	we	all	looked	into	the	past	as	if	through	a	stereoscope	with	its	brilliant	illusion	of	depth.	
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Five	
	
Immortal	Memories:		
Loyalism,	Nostalgia	and	Identity	Politics	in	the	North	of	Ireland		At	 the	 close	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 Tony	 Blair’s	 “New	 Labour”	 government	ushered	in	a	new	constitutional	era	that	saw	devolution	for	Wales	and	Scotland	and	 the	 restoration	 of	 self-government	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 under	 the	 1998	Belfast	Agreement.	Enshrining	the	peace	process	in	a	document	set	in	motion	a	political	 tectonic	 that	 has	 seen	 the	 Ulster	 Unionist	 Party	 (UUP)	 and	 the	 Social	Democratic	and	Labour	Party	 (SDLP)	supplanted	by	 their	 respective	 rivals,	 the	Democratic	Unionist	Party	(DUP)	and	Sinn	Féin.	With	hindsight	the	ascendancy	of	 the	 latter	 two	 parties	 was	 inevitable	 under	 the	 “consociational	 model”	 of	power-sharing	within	the	Agreement	(see	Wilford	and	Wilson	2006,	14-16).	This	institutionalised	 the	 principle	 of	 communal	 “designation”	 whereby	 Assembly	members	must	identify	themselves	as	“Unionist”,	“Nationalist”	or	“Other”.	Votes	on	“key	decisions”	require	“parallel	consent”	(reciprocal	majorities	of	“Unionist”	and	 “Nationalist”	 blocs)	 and	 an	 overall	 majority	 of	 members,	 or	 a	 “weighted	majority”	 of	 at	 least	 forty	 per	 cent	 of	 each	 faction	 and	 sixty	 per	 cent	 overall	(24).93	In	effect	both	the	Assembly	and	the	Executive	are	thus	compromised	by	
																																																								93	At	the	March	2017	Assembly	elections	“designated”	Unionists	failed	to	win	a	majority	of	seats	for	 the	 first	 time.	The	DUP,	UUP,	Traditional	Unionist	Voice	 and	 an	 Independent	Unionist	won	forty	 seats	 between	 them.	 Together	 Sinn	 Féin	 and	 the	 SDLP	 won	 thirty-nine	 seats.	 The	 2015	Fresh	 Start	 Agreement	 reduced	 the	 total	 number	 of	 seats	 from	 108	 to	 ninety,	 which	 proved	electorally	advantageous	to	the	Nationalist	parties	(Russell	2017,	11).	The	election	was	triggered	by	Sinn	Féin’s	refusal	to	nominate	a	successor	to	Martin	McGuinness	following	his	resignation	as	deputy	 first	minister	 in	 January.	McGuinness	 ostensibly	 resigned	 in	 protest	 after	 first	minister	Arlene	Foster	refused	to	step	down	over	the	Renewable	Heat	Incentive	scandal,	in	which	she	was	implicated.	 (McGuinness’s	 failing	 health	 doubtless	 forced	 the	 issue.)	 The	 political	 crisis	 at	Stormont	 resulted	 in	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	 Executive	 and	 British	 government	intervention.		
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an	 ethno-political	 schemata	 based	 on	 the	 presumption	 of	 a	 perpetual	Unionist/Nationalist	dichotomy.			The	net	outcome	of	the	peace	process	has	been	a	very	different	kind	of	devolved	state	 from	 that	 which	 existed	 prior	 to	 the	 British	 government’s	 decision	 to	impose	 direct	 rule	 in	 1972.	 If	 the	 Belfast	 Agreement	 gave	 birth	 to	 a	 form	 of	governance	 based	 on	 political	 co-dependency	 between	 Unionism	 and	Nationalism,	 Stormont	 was	 originally	 premised	 on	 a	 permanent	 Unionist,	perforce	Protestant,	hegemony.	At	Stormont	the	first	prime	minister	of	Northern	Ireland,	 James	Craig,	 famously	declared,	“We	are	a	Protestant	Parliament	and	a	Protestant	State”	 (Northern	 Ireland	House	of	Commons	Debates,	Vol.	16,	1934,	1095).	In	other	words,	Craig	not	only	regarded	Protestants	as	the	natural	ruling	class,	but	also	coterminous	with	the	polity.			Scholars	have	deliberated	over	Ulster	Protestant	identity	and	its	unique	status	in	modern	 Britain.	 There	 has	 been	much	 discussion	 as	 to	 why	 Ulster	 Protestant	commercial	elites	were	not	attracted	to	either	Irish	or	British	nationalism.	Miller	argues	 that	 the	 affluence	 generated	 by	 industrialisation	 in	Wales	 and	 Scotland	deterred	 nationalist	 sentiment	 and	 guaranteed	 bourgeois	 loyalty	 to	Westminster.	By	contrast,	industrialisation	was	uneven	in	Ireland,	with	only	the	north	 sharing	 Britain’s	 general	 developmental	 trajectory	 (1978,	 64-65).	 The	Ulster	 Protestant	 identity	 was	 not	 subsumed	 into	 British	 nationality	 however,	but	 premised	 on	 a	 social	 contract,	 or	 covenant,	 with	 the	 Crown	 that	 could	 be	forfeited	in	the	event	of	a	constitutional	rift	(103).	The	lack	of	co-nationality	with	the	British	people	was	 exposed	during	 the	Home	Rule	 crisis	 of	 1910-14,	when	Ulster	Protestants	rebelled,	believing	that	Westminster	had	broken	the	contract.	
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In	 the	 constitutional	 settlement	 of	 1920,	 Ulster’s	 ruling	 class	 recognised	 that	their	 interests	 were	 best	 served	 by	 remaining	 within	 the	 British	 Empire,	 but	demanded	a	devolved	state	to	guarantee	their	political	autonomy.	Unionists	had	already	signalled	their	political	autonomy	from	British	elites	by	establishing	the	Ulster	Unionist	 Council	 in	 1905.	 A	 hint	 of	Ulster	 nationalism	 resurfaced	 in	 the	politics	of	Bill	Craig’s	Ulster	Vanguard	movement	after	direct	rule	was	imposed	in	 1972.	 Vanguard	 called	 for	 a	 renegotiation	 of	 Ulster’s	 constitutional	relationship	with	the	United	Kingdom	and	mooted	a	federal	solution	(1972).	The	paramilitary	 Ulster	 Defence	 Association	 (UDA)	 went	 further	 in	 advocating	 an	independent	 Ulster,	 within	 the	 European	 Economic	 Community	 and	 the	Commonwealth,	 to	ensure	 the	new	nation’s	 economic	viability	 (Loughlin	1995,	202-205;	 McAuley	 2016,	 65-66).	 The	 Vanguard	 and	 UDA	 positions	 briefly	converged,	 with	 paramilitaries	 playing	 a	 decisive	 role	 in	 the	 Ulster	 Workers’	Council	Strike	that	brought	down	the	Sunningdale	power-sharing	agreement	 in	1974	 (Bruce	 1994,	 12-15).	 Unionist	 posturing	 in	 the	 early	 1970s	 indicated	covenantal	 thinking	 but	 it	 would	 not	 generate	 a	 reprise	 of	 the	 Home	 Rule	insurrection.	 Northern	 Ireland	 was	 already	 in	 terminal	 economic	 decline	 and	would	not	have	been	viable	 as	 an	 independent	 state.	The	majority	of	northern	Catholics	would	be	unwilling	citizens	of	an	Ulster	nation	state	in	any	case.		Although	 the	 Unionist	 state	 espoused	 a	 concept	 of	 citizenship,	 this	 did	 not	correlate	with	nationality	as	per	the	 liberal	democratic	norm.	In	most	respects,	before	 1969	 Ulster	 Protestant	 identity	 was	 defined	 more	 in	 opposition	 to	Catholicised	 Gaelic	 culture	 than	 any	 cogent	 notion	 of	 Britishness.	 The	 British	state	 was	 largely	 absent	 from	 life	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 until	 the	 start	 of	 the	
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Troubles,	when	troops	were	deployed	to	quell	rioting	in	Derry.	Northern	Ireland	thus	 failed	to	evolve	a	genuine	sense	of	citizenship,	but	crucially	could	not	rely	on	 the	 British	 state	 to	 instil	 one	 either.	 Loughlin	 suggests	 that	 as	 premier,	Terence	 O’Neill	 planned	 to	 modernise	 Northern	 Ireland	 by	 embracing	 Harold	Wilson’s	 1960s	 “scientific	 revolution”.	 Integrating	 Ulster	 into	 modern	 Britain	required	Protestants	 to	 change	 their	 political	 outlook	 and	Catholics	 to	 adopt	 a	British	 identity.	 The	 patrician	 O’Neill	 baulked	 at	 the	 radical	 intervention	 in	Northern	Ireland’s	economy	and	society	required	to	realise	this	transformation	(1995,	175-176).	In	the	late	1960s,	the	Northern	Ireland	Civil	Rights	Association	exposed	 the	 inherent	 corruption	 of	 the	 Unionist	 state.	 The	 support	 of	 a	significant	minority	of	predominantly	middle-class	Protestants	for	Catholic	civil	rights	 caused	 what	 Akenson	 describes	 as	 a	 “stress	 fracture	 in	 the	 covenantal	mindset”	(1992,	273).	The	civil	rights	movement	led	indirectly	to	the	demise	of	the	 “Protestant	 State”,	 with	 Northern	 Ireland	 becoming	 an	 administrative	component	of	the	United	Kingdom	until	1998.			Ritualised	associational	culture,	 in	particular	that	of	the	Loyal	Orders,	 is	deeply	ingrained	 in	 the	politics	of	Unionism.	During	 the	direct	 rule	period	 this	culture	remained	 largely	within	 the	orbit	of	mainstream	Unionism,	but	also	developed	autonomous	 tendencies	 within	 grassroots	 Loyalism.	 I	 begin	 by	 looking	 at	Loyalist	World	War	One	centennial	commemoration	that	has	superficially	united	the	Unionist	parties,	Loyal	Orders	and	political	elements	associated	with	Loyalist	paramilitarism.	 I	 use	 the	 term	 “Loyalism”	 in	 its	 historical	 sense	 as	 signifying	loyalty	 to	 the	 Crown,	 albeit	 conditional	 on	 the	 maintenance	 of	 contractual	obligations.	 I	 also	 recognise	 the	 idiosyncratic	 working-class	 connotations	 of	
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contemporary	 Loyalism	 and	 hereafter	 employ	 the	 term	 “Unionism”	 with	reference	to	the	Protestant	Establishment	in	Ireland	after	the	1800	Act	of	Union.			World	War	One	 commemoration	 offers	 an	 opportunity	 to	 analyse	 the	 political	dynamic	between	Unionism	and	Loyalism.	Below	I	describe	how	the	latter	may	present	 ideological	 challenges	 to	 the	 former,	 particularly	 in	 Loyalist	constructions	 of	 Britishness.	 I	 explore	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 Loyalist	 activist	heritage	articulates	 social	group	 identities	and	nostalgia	 for	 the	past.	My	study	then	focuses	on	the	Loyal	Orders	as	traditional	Unionist-orientated	organisations	forced	to	adapt	 to	a	 transformed	political	 landscape	after	1998.	 I	examine	how	the	 Orange	 Order	 has	 embraced	 the	 activist	museum	 as	 a	medium	 of	 cultural	representation	 and	 advocacy,	 but	 also	 identity	 politics	 in	 the	 framework	 of	British	multiculturalism.	In	a	case	study	of	the	Twaddell	Avenue	protest	camp,	I	consider	 these	museums	 in	 relation	 to	 the	Order’s	 parading	 tradition,	with	 its	capacity	 to	stoke	communal	 tensions.	Finally,	 I	visit	 the	activist	museum	of	 the	Apprentice	Boys	of	Derry,	which	I	compare	with	its	Orange	counterpart.	Through	my	fieldwork	in	the	environs	of	a	declining	Loyalist	community,	I	interrogate	the	social	parameters	of	Ulster	Protestant	identity.	In	so	doing	I	assess	the	future	of	Loyalism	 as	 a	 form	 of	 irrational	 regionalism	 and	 the	 prospect	 of	 Ulster	nationalism.	
	
Sound	and	Fury	
	
	On	Ogilvie	Street	 in	East	Belfast,	a	wall-mounted	panel	painting	depicts	a	fallen	soldier	of	 the	Royal	 Irish	Regiment	 in	 the	windswept	 landscape	of	Afghanistan	(photo	5.1).	The	dead	man	is	held	by	the	spectral	figure	of	a	36th	(Ulster)	Division	
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soldier	 reaching	 out	 from	 a	 desolate	World	War	 One	 battlefield.	 The	 duotone	colour	 scheme	 reinforces	 the	 key	 message:	 “Time	 changes!	 But	 The	 Sacrifice	Remains	The	Same.”			
	
Photo	5.1	Cosy	Somme	Association	panel	painting,	Ogilvie	Street,	East	Belfast.		
	
	Funded	by	 the	European	Union,	 the	painting	was	undertaken	as	part	of	Belfast	City	 Council’s	 “Promoting	 the	 Positive	 Expression	 of	 Cultural	 Heritage”	programme.94	Its	 creator,	 the	 Cosy	 Somme	 Association,	 is	 one	 of	 several	 local	groups	in	Northern	Ireland	dedicated	to	commemorating	the	Ulster	Division	and	its	 supreme	sacrifice	at	 the	Battle	of	 the	Somme	 in	1916.	The	Ulster	Division’s	heroism	 at	 the	 Somme	 has	 become	 a	 Loyalist	 “root	 paradigm”.	 Members	 of	
																																																								94	The	 painting	 was	 funded	 by	 the	 EU’s	 Programme	 for	 Peace	 and	 Reconciliation	 in	 Northern	Ireland	 and	 the	 Border	 Region	 of	 Ireland	 (PEACE	 III).	 Traditionally	 such	 imagery	 would	 be	executed	as	a	mural,	but	during	my	research	in	Belfast	I	have	observed	several	examples	of	this	type	of	painting	 in	both	Loyalist	 and	Republican	areas,	 indicating	new	 technical	 approaches	 to	the	medium,	the	greater	sophistication	of	which	may	be	the	result	of	public	funding.		
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Somme	 Associations	 are	 typically	 working-class	 and	 connected	 to	 the	paramilitary	Ulster	Volunteer	Force	(UVF)	(Brown	2007,	720).	Formed	in	1966,	the	UVF	claims	to	be	the	heir	of	the	militia	founded	by	the	Ulster	Unionist	Council	in	 1913	 to	 oppose	 Home	 Rule	 which	 subsequently	 became	 the	 nucleus	 of	 the	Ulster	Division.95		Should	such	statements	from	grass	roots	Loyalist	organisations	be	interpreted	as	expressions	 of	 Britishness	 or	 a	 separate	 Ulster	 Protestant	 identity	 that	 deems	such	 sacrifices	 an	 existential	 necessity?	 For	 Graham	 and	 Shirlow,	 the	 UVF	 has	appropriated	 the	 Ulster	 Division	 and	 the	 Somme	 as	 “people’s	 history”	 to	 be	recuperated	 from	 Unionism.	 Imagery	 of	 sacrificial	 suffering	 is	 not	 a	straightforward	affirmation	of	Britishness	but	rather	a	questioning	of	 it.	 In	 this	context,	 Loyalist	 memorialisation	 of	 the	 Somme	 reflects	 the	 “dissolution	 of	Britishness”	 (2002,	 901).	 For	 Brown,	 by	 contrast,	 Loyalist	 Somme	commemorations	signify	a	perpetual,	non-negotiable	attachment	to	Britishness.	Loyalists	 crave	 acceptance	 by	 mainstream	 Unionism	 and	 hence	 endeavour	 to	establish	common	lineage	in	their	commemorations	(2007,	718-719).			For	 the	 UVF	 and	 its	 political	 representatives,	 the	 Progressive	 Unionist	 Party	(PUP),	 commemorating	 the	Ulster	Division	 is	 driven	 by	 a	 desire	 to	 undermine	Unionist	hegemony.	Grassroots	Loyalist	commemorations	of	World	War	One	are	also	contoured	by	 the	 identity	politics	of	Northern	 Ireland’s	 “culture	wars”.	On	Northumberland	 Street,	 which	 intersects	 the	 Shankill	 and	 the	 Falls	 Roads,	 the	West	Belfast	Athletic	and	Cultural	Society	has	erected	a	public	“artwork”	telling																																																									95	Grayson	 highlights	 how	 the	 story	 of	 UVF	 veterans	 who	 served	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 British	Army,	including	the	10th	(Irish)	Division,	is	not	told	because	it	does	not	fit	the	West	Belfast	local	history	narrative	of	1913-14,	conjoining	the	original	and	contemporary	outfits	(2016,	131).	
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the	life	story	of	John	Patterson.	After	serving	in	the	British	Army	in	the	Boer	War,	Patterson	 became	 commander	 of	 the	West	 Belfast	 UVF	 in	 1913.	During	World	War	 One,	 Patterson	 commanded	 the	 Jewish	 Legion	 in	 Palestine,	 a	 post	 that	brought	him	into	contact	with	legendary	Zionists,	Joseph	Trumpeldor	and	Ze’ev	Jabotinsky.	 The	 display	 concludes	 with	 the	 re-interment	 in	 Jerusalem	 of	 the	“Christian	 Zionist	 Legend”	 Patterson	 and	 quotes	 Benjamin	 Netanyahu’s	description	of	him	as	the	“godfather	of	the	Israeli	army”	(photo	5.2).	There	is	a	quotation	 from	 Patterson	 about	 the	 Jewish	 Legion’s	 emulating	 the	 Ancient	Hebrews:	“YOU	CAN	RECREATE	THAT	HISTORIC	PAST	IN	THE	PRESENT.”			
	
Photo	5.2	Zionist	imagery	in	the	John	Patterson	exhibit,	Northumberland	Street,	West	Belfast.	
		Loyalist	 visual	 identification	 with	 Israel	 is	 not	 uncommon	 in	 Belfast.	 For	example,	in	Loyalist	residential	areas	of	East	Belfast,	Israeli	flags	are	flown	from	
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lamp-posts	 alongside	 the	 Union	 flag	 and	 the	 Saltire.	 However,	 as	 Guelke	observes,	 this	 phenomenon	 represents	 political	 opportunism	 on	 the	 part	 of	Loyalists	(2008,	29).	The	superficial	analogy	between	Loyalism	and	Zionism	has	no	 historical	 basis	 and	 is	 a	 direct	 consequence	 of	 Loyalist	 hostility	 to	Republicanism. 96 	At	 the	 other	 end	 of	 Northumberland	 Street	 a	 dissident	Republican	mural	shows	Irish	and	Palestinian	“P.O.W.s”	clasping	hands	through	cell	bars	(photo	5.3).		
	
	
Photo	5.3	Dissident	Republican	mural	expressing	solidarity	with	Palestinian	political	prisoners,	Northumberland	Street.		
	Patterson’s	appearance	 in	 this	Manichean	 landscape	 indicates	 that	Loyalists	do	not	 see	World	War	 One	 commemoration	 as	 a	mode	 of	 reconciliation	with	 the	other	 community.	 In	 June	 2016	 the	 Patterson	 display	 was	 vandalised	 and																																																									96	Ironically,	in	their	struggle	against	the	British	Empire	radical	young	Revisionist	Zionists	were	influenced	by	blood	sacrificial	Irish	Republicanism	(see	Shindler	2010,	145-147).	
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suffered	 fire	 damage	 (photo	 5.4).	 In	 response,	 the	 West	 Belfast	 Athletic	 and	Cultural	 Society	 erected	 a	 sign	 above	 it,	 condemning	 the	 actions	 of	 “IRISH	REPUBLICAN	RACISTS”	and	asking,	“WHERE	IS	THE	EQUALITY?	WHERE	IS	THE	RECONCILIATION?”		
	
Photo	 5.4	Arson	damage	 to	 the	Patterson	display	on	Northumberland	Street	with	a	 statement	from	the	West	Belfast	Athletic	and	Cultural	Society	condemning	the	action	(top	left).			Although	 the	Patterson	 exhibit	 acknowledges	 that	 he	was	 an	 Irishman	born	 in	Westmeath	 to	 “a	 Protestant	 father	 and	 a	 Catholic	 mother”,	 by	 constructing	 a	narrative	 linking	 his	 service	 in	 the	 UVF	with	 his	 later	 Zionist	 sympathies,	 the	political	 message	 instantly	 reinforces	 the	 predominant	 Loyalist/Republican	binary	 in	West	Belfast.	The	choice	of	Patterson	as	subject	makes	no	attempt	 to	find	 common	 ground	with	 Belfast	 Catholics	 because	 it	 explicitly	 identifies	 him	with	 another	 ethnic	 group	 in	 the	 context	 of	 his	 war	 service.	 Solidarising	with	Israel	can	only	be	interpreted	by	Republicans	as	a	riposte	to	the	pro-Palestinian	mural	at	the	other	end	of	the	street.	The	juxtaposition	of	the	original	UVF	and	the	
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IDF	 by	 an	 organisation	 with	 known	 links	 to	 a	 paramilitary	 group	 is	 another	attempt	 to	 legitimise	 Loyalist	 militarism.	 In	 this	 Loyalist	 narrative,	 the	 IDF	replaces	 the	British	armed	 forces	as	 the	source	of	 legitimacy.	As	 “godfather”	of	the	IDF	and	an	ex-commander	of	the	UVF,	Patterson’s	words	are	rearticulated	to	send	a	message	to	Loyalist	West	Belfast:	“THE	FUTURE	IS	YOURS,	IF	YOU	HAVE	THE	WILL,	IF	YOU	HAVE	THE	FAITH.”			In	Northern	 Ireland	 the	 future	 is	obscured	by	 the	past	 in	a	 centennial	heritage	deluge.	 The	 centenary	 of	 the	 Ulster	 Solemn	 League	 and	 Covenant	 in	 2012	marked	 the	beginning	of	 the	so-called	 “Decade	of	Centenaries”	on	 the	 island	of	Ireland.	This	is	being	commemorated	through	official	state-funded	programmes	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland	and	Northern	Ireland,	and	a	range	of	activist	heritage	interventions.	 In	 Northern	 Ireland,	 practically	 the	 entire	 Unionist	 camp	 has	combined	as	“stakeholders”	in	the	Unionist	Centenary	Committee	(UCC),	whose	affiliates	 include	 the	 DUP,	 UUP	 and	 the	 PUP.	 Numerous	 other	 organisations	linked	 to	 Loyalist	 paramilitarism	 are	 involved,	 including	 the	 Ulster	 Defence	Union,	the	West	Belfast	Athletic	and	Cultural	Society	and	the	36th	Ulster	Division	Memorial	 Association.97	The	 Grand	 Orange	 Lodge	 of	 Ireland,	 the	 Independent	Loyal	Orange	Institution	and	the	Apprentice	Boys	of	Derry	are	also	participants,	along	 with	 the	 Confederation	 of	 Ulster	 Bands.	 The	 UCC	 is	 represented	 on	 the	official	Northern	 Ireland	World	War	One	Centenary	Committee,	 chaired	by	 the	DUP’s	Jeffrey	Donaldson.		
																																																								97	The	Ulster	Defence	Union	 is	a	pseudonym	used	by	the	UDA	following	 its	declaration	that	 the	“war	 is	 over”	 in	 2007.	 By	 referencing	 the	militia	 formed	 in	 1893	 to	 resist	 Gladstone’s	 second	Home	Rule	bill,	the	UDA	is	aping	the	UVF	in	appropriating	the	history	of	Unionism	as	a	badge	of	legitimacy	 (see	 Viggiani	 2014,	 155-157).	 The	 West	 Belfast	 Athletic	 and	 Cultural	 Society	 was	established	 by	 ex-UVF	 combatants	 (Smithey	 2011,	 159).	 The	 36th	 Ulster	 Division	 Memorial	Association	is	the	umbrella	organisation	for	local	Somme	Associations	across	Northern	Ireland.	
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The	UCC	was	initiated	in	2010	at	a	small	meeting,	mainly	of	Loyalists,	chaired	by	the	 former	 Ulster	 Unionist	 Lord	 Mayor	 of	 Belfast,	 Ian	 Adamson. 98 	It	 was	subsequently	expanded	and	officially	 launched	at	Craigavon	House99	in	2011	in	the	 presence	 of	 leading	 Unionist	 and	 Loyalist	 politicians,	 including	 Ian	 Paisley	Senior	 and	 Northern	 Ireland’s	 culture	 minister,	 Nelson	 McCausland.	Representatives	 of	 the	 Orange	 Order	 and	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys	 of	 Derry	 also	attended.	 Adamson’s	 pivotal	 role	 in	 establishing	 the	 UCC	 illustrates	 how	Unionism	 is	 a	 porous	 ideological	 organism.	 Adamson	 was	 a	 prime	 mover	 in	forming	 the	 Somme	 Association	 in	 1990.	 The	 Association,	 which	 is	 now	responsible	for	the	Ulster	Memorial	Tower	near	Thiepval	Wood	and	the	Somme	Museum	at	Newtonards,	 is	 not	 connected	 to	 the	 36th	Ulster	Division	Memorial	Association.100	Although	 established	 as	 a	 heritage	 charity	 to	 promote	 cross-community	 awareness	 of	 Ireland’s	 role	 in	 World	 War	 One,	 the	 Somme	Association	 has	 formal	 links	 to	 the	 Orange	 Order	 that	 may	 compromise	 this	objective	 (Jeffery	 2000,	 177).	 The	 Somme	 Association	 is	 firmly	 rooted	 in	 the	Unionist	camp	and	was	a	“stakeholder”	in	the	UCC.	It	was	also	influential	during	the	 official	 commemorations.	 	 On	 July	 1	 2016,	 the	 Somme	Museum	hosted	 the	national	vigil	 organised	by	 the	Northern	 Ireland	World	War	One	Committee	 to	mark	the	beginning	of	the	Battle	of	the	Somme.																																																										98 	See	 the	 minutes	 of	 the	 meeting	 available	 at	 http://www.ianadamson.net/myblog/	2010/08/25/grand-unionist-centenary-committee-2/,	accessed	June	8,	2016.	99	Craigavon	 House	 was	 a	 symbolic	 choice,	 given	 its	 history	 as	 the	 former	 residence	 of	 James	Craig	and	site	of	the	mass	demonstration	of	1911	that	mobilised	the	core	of	the	future	UVF	from	the	Orange	Order	and	Unionist	Clubs.	100	The	Ulster	Memorial	Tower	is	a	replica	of	Helen’s	Tower	on	the	Clandeboye	Estate	at	Conlig,	County	Down,	where	the	Ulster	Division	trained.	Erected	in	1921	on	the	initiative	of	James	Craig,	the	 Tower	 stands	 on	 the	 site	 of	 the	 Schwaben	 Redoubt,	 the	 German	 position	 captured	 by	 the	Ulster	 Division	 on	 July	 1,	 1916.	 It	 subsequently	 fell	 into	 disrepair	 and	 was	 renovated	 by	 the	Somme	Association	in	the	late	1980s	(Jeffery	2000,	137).		
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Adamson	is	also	well	known	as	an	author	and	propagator	of	the	Cruthin	theory	as	 Ulster’s	 origin	 story.	 In	 his	 hypothesis,	 the	 Cruthin	 were	 a	 pre-Celtic	 tribal	people	inhabiting	the	north	east	of	Ireland	until	Gaelic	encroachment	during	the	Iron	Age	 forced	 them	 to	migrate	 to	 Lowland	 Scotland	 (see	 Adamson	 1974).101	Under	 this	 logic,	 the	 Ulster	 Plantation	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 signified	 a	return	 of	 the	 Cruthin’s	 descendants	 to	 their	 ancestral	 homeland	 (Nic	 Craith	2002,	 93-95).	 During	 its	 brief	 flirtation	 with	 Ulster	 independence,	 the	 UDA	embraced	the	Cruthin	as	a	historical	rejoinder	to	Irish	nationalism,	but	its	rank	and	file	remained	unconvinced	by	this	line	of	argument	(Bruce	1992,	233-236).	Eccentrically,	 the	 UCC’s	mission	 statement	 resurrects	 the	 Cruthin	 origin	 story,	presumably	under	Adamson’s	influence:		 Today	we	must	 use	 this	 decade	 to	 establish	 in	 Ulster	 a	 cultural	 consensus,	irrespective	of	political	 conviction,	 religion	or	 ethnic	origin,	using	a	broader	perspective	of	our	past	to	create	a	deeper	sense	of	belonging	to	the	country	of	our	ancient	British	ancestors.			For	this	land	of	the	Cruthin	is	our	homeland	and	we	are	its	children.	We	have	a	right	to	her	name	and	nationality.		We	have	a	right	to	belong	here,	a	right	to	be	heard	here,	a	right	to	be	free;	 free	from	suspicion,	 free	from	violence	and	free	 from	 fear.	 We	 must	 therefore	 develop	 the	 vision	 of	 a	 new	 and	 united	Ulster,	to	which	all	can	give	their	allegiance,	so	we	may	achieve	a	government	of	all	the	people,	by	all	the	people,	for	all	the	people.	For	only	in	the	complete	expression	of	our	Ulster	identity	lies	the	basis	of	that	genuine	peace,	stamped	with	 the	hallmarks	of	 justice,	 goodness	and	 truth,	which	will	 end	at	 last	 the	war	in	Ireland.		For	we	are	a	Risen	People	and	Liberation	is	our	song.102			Political	endorsement	from	mainstream	Unionism	gave	the	UCC’s	events	a	high	profile	and	facilitated	access	to	public	funding,	including	a	Heritage	Lottery	Fund	grant.	The	UCC	has	staged	exhibitions	of	artefacts	and	ephemera	of	James	Craig																																																									101	Scholars	have	concluded	that	as	a	culture,	the	Cruthin	have	left	no	archaeological	traces	(see	Mallory	and	McNeill	1991,	176-178).	102	http://www.unionistcentenaries.com/dynamic_content.php?id=110,	accessed	June	8,	2016.	
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and	 the	 UVF	 at	 Craigavon	 House	 and	 more	 prestigiously	 at	 the	 Glasnevin	Cemetery	 Museum	 in	 Dublin. 103 	The	 centennial	 programme	 consisted	 of	exhibitions,	 talks,	 concerts,	 parades	 and	 re-enactments.	 Some	 events	 were	organised	 by	 the	 UCC,	 others	 by	 sub-committees	 under	 its	 umbrella.	 In	 April	2014	a	parade	was	held	 in	Larne	 to	 commemorate	 the	 centenary	of	Operation	Lion,	 when	 the	 UVF	 secretly	 imported	 arms	 from	 Germany	 aboard	 the	 SS	
Clydevalley.	At	the	event,	PUP	leader	Billy	Hutchinson	appeared	on	the	platform	dressed	as	Edward	Carson	and	reviewed	the	period-costumed	UVF	troops	as	the	talismanic	 Unionist	 had	 done	 at	 Larne	 in	 1914	 (Stewart	 1967,	 222-223).	Hutchinson’s	in-character	recital	of	Carson’s	melancholic	words	at	the	height	of	the	Home	Rule	crisis	made	for	a	somewhat	ambiguous	statement:		 I	see	no	hope	of	peace.	I	see	nothing	at	the	present	moment	but	darkness	and	shadow	and	although	darkness	and	shadow	may	pass	away,	still	we	must	do	all	that	darkness	and	those	shadows	command.	We	must	be	ready…	and	in	my	opinion	unless	something	happens,	 the	evidence	of	which	one	 fails	 to	 see	at	the	present	moment,	the	time	cannot	be	far	delayed	when	we	will	have	once	more	to	assert	the	manhood	of	our	race	and	to	show	the	government,	and	all	whom	 it	 may	 concern,	 that	 we	 are	 unconquerable	 and	 that	 we	 will	 never	submit	to	Home	Rule.	(2014)			Hutchinson’s	performance	demonstrated	the	essence	of	the	Loyalist	paradox.	He	impersonated	 the	 high	 priest	 of	 Unionism	 whilst	 staking	 a	 rival	 claim	 to	 the	history	 of	 the	 Larne	 gunrunning	 as	 a	 chapter	 in	 the	 Loyalist	 “collective	autobiography”.		Unionism	marked	the	outbreak	of	World	War	One	and	its	aftermath	by	dramatic	large-scale	military	 parading	 through	Belfast,	with	 City	Hall	 acting	 as	 the	 focal	
																																																								103	The	exhibition	received	 funding	 from	the	 Irish	government	and	was	opened	by	the	Minister	for	Arts,	Heritage	and	the	Gaeltacht,	Jimmy	Deenihan.	
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point.	On	Ulster	Peace	Day	in	1919,	the	British	viceroy,	Lord	French,	saluted	the	parading	servicemen	as	spectators	massed	around	the	Queen	Victoria	statue	on	the	 east	 side	 of	 City	 Hall	 (Johnson	 2003,	 73-75).	 Conversely	 the	 re-enactivist	elements	of	the	Unionist	Centenaries	are	primarily	of	Loyalist	design.	On	May	9,	2015,	a	parade	was	organised	by	the	36th	(Ulster)	Division	Memorial	Association	under	the	auspices	of	the	UCC	to	mark	the	centenary	of	the	troops’	“march	past”	City	Hall	before	their	departure	for	the	front.			Re-enactivism	is	not	bound	by	the	strictures	of	what	actually	happened.	In	1915	the	Ulster	Division’s	military	parade	and	review	took	place	 in	South	Belfast,	on	open	 ground	 between	 the	 Malone	 Road	 and	 the	 River	 Lagan,	 near	 Deramore	Park.	The	public	were	not	permitted	to	spectate.	Afterwards	the	troops	marched	to	 City	 Hall	 via	 Lisburn	 Road,	 Shaftesbury	 Square,	 Great	 Victoria	 Street	 and	Wellington	 Place.	 On	 the	 day,	 shops	 were	 closed	 and	 the	 city	 centre	 was	bedecked	with	 flags,	 bunting	 and	banners	welcoming	 the	 troops.	City	Hall	was	draped	 with	 the	 flags	 of	 the	 wartime	 Allies.	 On	 horseback	 at	 the	 head	 of	 his	troops	was	Major-General	 Charles	H.	 Powell,	 commanding	 officer	 of	 the	Ulster	Division	and	formerly	of	the	North	Down	UVF.	Upon	arriving	at	City	Hall,	Powell	took	his	place	at	the	saluting	base	with	the	man	designated	to	inspect	the	troops,	Major-General	Sir	Hugh	McCalmont,	Unionist	MP	 for	North	Antrim.	The	review	stand	was	located	in	front	of	the	statue	of	Queen	Victoria.	McCalmont	was	in	fact	the	 third	 choice	 as	 Lord	 Kitchener	 had	 “found	 it	 impossible	 to	 accept	 the	invitation	of	the	Ulster	Division”	and	the	man	deputised	to	inspect	the	troops	in	his	place,	Field	Marshall	Lord	Grenfell,	had	also	cancelled	at	the	last	minute	(The	
Northern	Whig,	 May	 8,	 1915,	 12).	 Watching	 the	 march-past	 with	 the	 military	
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brass	 were	 Carson,	 the	 Lord	 Mayor	 of	 Belfast	 Crawford	 McCullagh	 and	 the	Unionist	grandees	of	the	Belfast	Corporation.	The	commander	of	the	UVF,	George	Richardson,	was	also	in	the	ticketed	enclosure.			Wounded	soldiers	recently	returned	from	the	front	were	spectators	on	the	day.	The	 UVF	 Motor	 Corps	 transported	 the	 invalids	 from	 hospital	 to	 the	 Unionist	headquarters	in	the	Old	Town	Hall	where	they	could	see	from	the	windows	the	troops	 passing.	 (The	 presence	 of	 the	 wounded	 exposes	 the	 simplistic	 Loyalist	narrative	of	 the	UVF	merging	seamlessly	 into	 the	Ulster	Division,	as	 these	men	had	 already	 seen	 action.)	 The	 original	 march-past	 mobilised	 practically	 the	entire	Ulster	Division	of	around	seventeen	thousand	servicemen.	Fife	and	drums	and	 pipers	 accompanied	 the	 marching	 troops.	 Field	 ambulances	 of	 the	 Royal	Army	Medical	Corps	were	displayed,	as	were	new	machine	guns	to	showcase	the	weaponry	of	modern	war.	A	reporter	declared	that	the	parade	represented	“the	Black	 North	 at	 its	 proudest	 and	 best!”	 (Belfast	 Telegraph,	 May	 10,	 1915,	 3).	Another	 correspondent	 described	 scenes	 of	 patriotic	 fervour	 as	 the	 parade	climaxed	with	a	 spontaneous	 rendition	of	 the	national	anthem.	Dignitaries	and	spectators	 joined	 in	 the	 singing,	which	 resulted	 in	 the	military	 cordon	 around	City	Hall	being	lifted	and	onlookers	rushing	to	greet	Carson	(Belfast	News	Letter,	May	10,	1915,	8).	One	commentator	enthused:		 Though	the	service	khaki	is	the	same,	and	the	grand	old	service	flag	is	the	same,	while	the	service	rifle	 is	not	materially	different	 from	those	which	were	 so	 sensationally	 landed	 at	 Larne	 a	 year	 ago,	 there	has	been	more	of	 a	transformation	 than	 is	 shown	 by	 outward	 and	 visible	 signs	 in	 turning	 the	Ulster	Volunteer	into	the	British	soldier	ready	for	the	front.	When	the	majority	of	those	clear-eyed,	broad-shouldered,	strong-limbed	fellows	first	donned	the	khaki	 who	 among	 them	 ever	 thought	 of	 going	 to	 fight	 among	 Belgian	 flax	fields	or	French	vineyards.	Their	imagination	roamed	no	further	than	a	gallant	stand	on	their	own	fields	for	faith	and	freedom	against	the	threatened	“strong	
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hand”	 of	 a	 hereditary	 foe	 or	 a	 sacrifice	 of	 life	 by	 way	 of	 protest	 against	threatened	coercion.	Now	 their	 ambition	 is	 to	 join	 comrades	 who	 are	 fighting	 and	 dying	abroad	 for	 safety	 and	 honour	 at	 home.	 The	 imperial	 idea	 for	 the	 time	 has	banished	every	other	consideration,	and	the	watchword	of	the	U.V.F.,	“Ulster,”	has	given	way	to	the	more	comprehensive	watchword,	“Britannia.”		 (The	Northern	Whig,	May	10,	1915,	7)			The	political	subtext	of	 the	march-past	was	 that	 the	War	Office	was	requesting	an	additional	six	to	seven	thousand	recruits	before	the	Ulster	Division	could	go	to	 the	 front.	 On	 the	 day	 posters	 were	 put	 up	 on	 the	 parade	 route	 with	 the	slogans,	 “Wouldn’t	 you	 rather	 be	marching	with	 your	 pals	 to-day	 than	 looking	on?”	 and,	 “Is	 the	 Ulster	 Division	 to	 be	 kept	 at	 home	 because	 you	 hesitate?”	(Grayson	 2009,	 22).	 Flag-waving	 jingoism	 notwithstanding,	 Carson	 and	 his	fellow	Unionist	mandarins	were	weary	participants	in	the	pageantry.		The	 centennial	 re-enactment	 made	 numerous	 historical	 revisions	 to	accommodate	 both	 practical	 organisational	 considerations	 and	 political	expediency.	Re-enactivists	were	joined	on	parade	by	Orangemen	and	Apprentice	Boys	and	a	host	of	Loyalist	flute	bands.	The	contemporary	route	began	in	North	Belfast	at	Fortwilliam	Park	and,	unlike	the	marchers	of	1915,	crossed	the	Lagan	into	East	Belfast.	(In	1915	the	parade	dispersed	at	the	junction	of	Royal	Avenue	and	North	Street,	immediately	north	of	City	Hall.)	When	the	parade	reached	City	Hall	 it	 was	 led	 by	 three	 mounted	 re-enactivists	 playing	 the	 parts	 of	 Major-General	Powell	and	his	staff	(photo	5.5).	There	followed	a	colour	party	bearing	banners	 of	 the	 Ulster	 Division	 and	 the	 UVF.	 Troops	 in	 period	 uniform	shouldering	 replica	 Lee	 Enfield	 rifles	 and	 Lewis	 guns	marched	 past	 spectators	gathered	on	 the	pavements.	 In	some	cases	 the	uniforms	displayed	a	significant	
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attention	 to	 detail	 by	 reproducing	 regimental	 insignia	 and	 indicating	 specific	brigades	and	battalions.	Features	of	the	original	parade	were	carefully	recreated,	including	 the	Cyclist	Corps	who	dismounted	upon	passing	City	Hall	 (photo	5.6,	left).		
	
Photo	 5.5	 A	 re-enactivist	 playing	 Major-General	 Powell	 (right),	 outside	 Belfast	 City	 Hall,	Donegall	Square.			There	 were,	 however,	 a	 number	 of	 deliberate	 continuity	 errors	 in	 the	contemporary	re-imagining.	Standards	of	local	Somme	Associations	were	carried	behind	 the	 banner	 of	 the	 36th	 (Ulster)	 Division	Memorial	 Association.	 The	 re-enactment	blurred	the	boundaries	between	the	Ulster	Division	and	the	original	UVF,	with	participants	dressed	both	as	the	British	Army	recruits	of	1915	and	as	militants	 of	 1913-14.	 A	 large	 detachment	 of	 UVF	 nurses	 marched	 behind	 a	motorised	Ulster	Division	 field	ambulance.	Nurses	were	not	on	parade	 in	1915.	
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Hence	 their	 inclusion	 was	 a	 means	 of	 allowing	 women	 to	 participate	 and	 a	retrospective	 recognition	 of	 their	 role	 in	 the	 UVF	 and	 the	 wider	 war	 effort.	Several	Austin	motorcars	were	also	on	show,	manned	by	period-costumed	UVF	men.	One	of	the	cars	had	a	Vickers	machine	gun	mounted	on	the	back	to	recreate	one	of	the	UVF’s	improvised	military	vehicles	(photo	5.6).	
	
	
Photo	5.6	Austin	motorcar	with	replica	Vickers	machine	gun	in	the	rear	and	dismounted	period	UVF	cyclists	in	the	road	behind	(left).		
	
	Period	costume	is	now	a	feature	of	paramilitary	commemorations	for	fallen	UVF	gunmen	 (Evershed	2016,	253-254).	There	were	obvious	visual	 allusions	 to	 the	present	day	UVF	in	the	march-past.	Among	the	flute	bands	were	several	whose	instruments	and	apparel	bore	emblems	of	 the	original	UVF,	and	 its	motto	 “For	God	and	Ulster”,	which	are	understood	analogically	by	Loyalist	constituencies	as	paramilitary	ciphers	(photo	5.7).		
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Photo	5.7	Period-costumed	UVF	Regimental	Band	with	bass	drum	emblazoned	“U.V.F	1912”.			
	
Photo	5.8	Flute	band	of	the	Monkstown	Young	Citizen	Volunteers	whose	bannerette	records	that	they	were	established	in	1974.		
	Among	 the	massed	 ranks	were	men	wearing	 the	 standard	 paramilitary	 formal	dress	 of	 black	 suit,	 white	 shirt	 and	 black	 tie,	 historicised	 by	 a	 flat	 cap	 and	 a	
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period	 UVF	 armband.	 In	 another	 contemporary	 twist,	 the	 flute	 band	 of	 the	Monkstown	branch	of	 the	Young	Citizen	Volunteers	 (YCV)	was	prominent	near	the	front	of	the	parade	(photo	5.8).	Today	recognised	as	the	UVF’s	youth	wing,	in	1915	 the	 original	 Young	 Citizen	 Volunteers	 marched	 as	 the	 14th	 Royal	 Irish	Rifles,	accompanied	by	a	pipe	band.		“Blood	and	Thunder”	flute	bands	are	a	staple	of	Loyalist	commemorations.	They	emerged	in	Protestant	urban	areas	from	the	mid-1960s	and	are	characterised	by	their	working-class	membership	and	distinctive	uniformed	identities.	Some	have	direct	 links	 to	 the	Loyalist	paramilitaries,	whereas	others	are	opposed	 to	 them	(Bryan	2000,	126-129).	Originating	 in	the	eighteenth-century	Volunteer	militia,	the	marching	tradition	was	subsequently	co-opted	by	the	Orange	Order,	whose	parades	 adopted	 the	 martial	 drum	 and	 fife.	 Jarman	 attributes	 younger	generations’	interest	in	parading	to	the	popularity	of	“Blood	and	Thunder”	bands	but	 suggests	 that	 they	 demonstrate	 the	 declining	 power	 of	 traditional	Orangeism.	 For	 the	 young	 musicians,	 the	 bands	 signify	 their	 “demand	 for	innovation	 and	 change	 within	 Protestant	 popular	 culture”	 (2000,	 171).	 The	popularity	 of	 the	bands	 therefore	places	 the	Orange	Order	 in	 a	 dilemma.	They	attract	 new	 generations	 to	 parading	 but	 also	 bring	 problematic	 paramilitary	associations	and	encourage	raucous	behaviour	from	the	“blue	bag	brigade”		(Kaufmann	2009,	292-293).104			At	 the	 2015	 march-past,	 paramilitary-linked	 bands	 paraded	 alongside	 Orange	lodges	 and	 the	Apprentice	Boys’	 General	 Committee	 (photo	 5.9).	 A	member	 of																																																									104	A	 reference	 to	 the	 blue	 bags	 used	 to	 carry	 cheap	 alcohol	 bought	 in	 corner	 shops.	 The	 UCC	shows	a	keen	awareness	of	this	problem,	stating	very	clearly	on	its	publicity	that	alcohol	is	not	to	be	consumed	during	events.		
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the	Pride	of	Ardoyne	band’s	colour	party	carried	a	banner	with	the	slogan:	“END	HATRED	 OF	 ORANGE	 CULTURE.”	 The	 presence	 of	 the	 bands	 at	 City	 Hall	 with	their	 booming	 bass	 drums	 and	 piercing	 flutes	 illustrates	 how	 traditional	parading	has	been	reinvented	as	a	medium	for	identity	politics.	In	the	promotion	of	 a	 sui	 generis	 Ulster	 Protestant	 identity	 within	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	mainstream	Unionism	and	Loyalism	find	common	cause.	However,	the	Unionist	Centenaries	also	reflect	 internecine	tensions	over	who	defines	this	 identity	and	who	 is	 seen	 as	most	 vigilant	 in	 its	 defence.	 Loyalists	were	most	 visible	 at	 the	march-past	 of	 City	Hall	 and	 as	 such	were	 asserting	 a	 rival	 claim	 to	 the	 sacred	symbols	of	Unionism.		
	
Photo	5.9	Apprentice	Boys	of	Derry	contingent	carrying	the	General	Committee’s	banner.			Jarman	 differentiates	 Republican	 and	 Loyalist	 parades,	 stating	 that	 the	 latter	represent	martial	displays	wherein	participants	and	spectators	remain	separate.	By	contrast	their	Republican	equivalents	tend	to	be	more	informal	with	no	fixed	
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dress	code,	gender	or	age	distinctions	(1997,	152).	The	march-past	was	a	martial	presentation	with	no	informal	participation	and	a	much	higher	level	of	 internal	discipline	and	choreography	 than	 is	 typical	 at	Republican	parades.	There	were	nevertheless	 significant	 similarities	 evident	 between	 the	 two	 parading	traditions.	 Republican	 parades	 have	 a	 parallel	 tradition	 of	 formal	 attire,	 with	uniformed	 flute	 bands.	 Re-enactivism	 has	 added	 a	 new	 dimension	 to	 this	 by	introducing	a	period	dress	code.	Loyalist	parades	are	also	open	to	participants	of	both	genders	and	young	people	have	a	visible	profile	in	the	flute	bands.			
	
Photo	5.10	Union	flags	and	Loyalist	banners	on	the	gates	of	Belfast	City	Hall.			Although	the	parade	at	City	Hall	was	colourful,	loud	and	at	times	entertaining	–	for	 example,	 the	 flute	 bands’	 performances	 included	 crowd-pleasing	 flourishes	like	baton	throwing	–	it	did	not	evoke	a	festive	carnival	atmosphere.	The	culture	of	 carnival	 typically	 inverts	 social	 norms	 in	 performative	 spectacles	 that	 are	fantastic,	chaotic	and	sometimes	surreal.	By	contrast	Loyalist	parades	project	a	
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static	 social	 order	 in	 which	 group	 identities	 are	 fixed.	 The	 costumed	performative	aspects	of	Loyalist	re-enactivism	are	therefore	integrated	into	the	presentation	of	this	social	order.	The	parade	was	rigid	in	its	formal	aspects	and	designed	to	re-signify	public	space	that	was	originally	the	sacred	ground	of	“big	house”	 Unionism.	 The	most	 significant	 historical	 revision	 in	 the	 centennial	 re-enactment	was	the	absence	of	the	reviewing	stand	at	City	Hall.	In	place	of	the	old	Establishment	were	rank-and-file	Loyalists	who	festooned	the	gates	of	City	Hall	with	Union	flags	and	banners	(photo	5.10).		The	Cenotaph	in	the	grounds	of	City	Hall	was	retroactively	incorporated	into	the	march-past.	 In	 1915	 the	north	 side	 of	Donegall	 Square	was	 inaccessible	 to	 the	public.	 For	 the	 re-enactment	 it	 fulfilled	an	 important	 ritual	 function	as	passing	marchers	 respectfully	 lowered	 their	 banners	 to	 the	 Cenotaph	 in	 martial	tradition.	They	also	followed	the	military	convention	of	not	 lowering	the	Union	flag	 (photo	 5.11).	 Traditionally	 the	 Cenotaph	 is	 the	 fulcrum	 of	 official	commemorations,	 but	 for	 the	march-past	 it	 was	 publicly	 accessible	 and	 could	therefore	 be	 commandeered	 by	 Loyalists.	 	 In	 his	 commentary	 on	 war	monuments,	Mosse	identifies	their	democratic	potential	for	negating	social	rank	and	 status	 (1990,	 99).	With	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 old	 Unionist	 Establishment,	 the	Cenotaph	 has	 been	 democratised	 as	 the	 locus	 of	 commemoration	 in	 terms	 of	both	 physical	 access	 and	 meaning.	 In	 tipping	 their	 banners,	 Loyalists	 were	honouring	the	dead	from	their	communities—in	all	conflicts.	Among	the	banners	lowered	was	 that	 of	 the	British	Army’s	Ulster	Defence	Regiment	 (UDR),	which	was	 carried	by	 the	Rising	 Sons	Flute	Band	 from	East	Belfast	 (photo	5.11).	The	band’s	 corporate	 identity	 is	 based	 on	 the	 Royal	 Irish	 Rifles,	 reproducing	 the	
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regiment’s	 insignia	 on	 its	 uniforms	 and	 instruments.	 In	 its	 semiotics	 the	 band	conflates	the	historic	UVF,	YCV,	Ulster	Division,	UDR	and,	by	allusion,	latter	day	Loyalist	paramilitaries,	in	a	legitimate	military	continuum.		
	
Photo	5.11	Rising	Sons	Flute	Band	lowering	their	banners	as	they	pass	the	Cenotaph	(the	Union	flag	is	kept	raised).				The	re-enactment	of	the	march-past	revealed	the	dilemma	facing	contemporary	Unionism.	Despite	their	patronage	of	the	UCC,	neither	the	UUP	nor	the	DUP	had	a	visible	presence	at	the	event.	Participation	in	events	re-enacting	the	Home	Rule	crisis	and	its	aftermath	would	have	drawn	unwanted	attention	to	the	fact	that	in	power-sharing	 with	 Sinn	 Féin,	 the	 DUP	 has	 forfeited	 the	 Ulster	 Covenant.	Loyalist	World	War	One	centennial	re-enactivism	has	followed	the	trajectory	of	earlier	 UVF	 commemorations	 in	 challenging	 mainstream	 Unionism	 for	ownership	 of	 this	 history.	 For	 Loyalists,	 and	 elements	 associated	 with	 the	PUP/UVF	 particularly,	 re-enactivism	 has	 provided	 a	 means	 of	 counteracting	
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exclusion	 at	 Stormont.105	The	 UCC	 has	 offered	 the	 chance	 to	 insert	 a	 Loyalist	counter-narrative	 into	 the	official	Unionist	history	of	 the	Home	Rule	 crisis	 and	World	War	One,	with	the	Somme	as	its	apotheosis.					The	 centenaries	 of	 2016	 have	 produced	 an	 unprecedented	 interaction	 of	 state	and	 activist	 heritage	 in	 Northern	 Ireland.	 The	 Somme	 centenary	 generated	 an	overlapping	 programme	 of	 events	 Belfast	 Somme	 100.	 Funded	 by	 Belfast	 City	Council	 and	 run	 by	 the	 community	 research	 group,	 History	 Hub	 Ulster,	 the	programme’s	eclectic	event	partners	ranged	from	the	Imperial	War	Museum	to	the	Orange	Order.	 The	UCC	 and	 a	 number	 of	 grassroots	 Loyalist	 organisations	were	actively	involved,	with	representatives	on	the	Advisory	Panel.	On	June	18,	the	 2016	 Committee	 organised	 a	 parade	 to	 the	 Cenotaph	 and	 then	 up	 the	Shankill	Road	to	Woodvale	Park	for	a	re-enactment	of	the	Ulster	Division’s	attack	on	July	1,	1916.106			The	 Upper	 Shankill	 features	 a	 number	 of	 murals,	 billboards	 and	 other	 public	displays	about	the	original	UVF,	the	Ulster	Division	and	the	Somme.	Outside	the	local	 Iceland	 supermarket	 a	 plaque	 marks	 the	 location	 of	 the	 original	 UVF’s	Stewart’s	Yard	training	ground.	Adjacent	to	the	Rex	Bar,	a	self-referential	display	describes	the	UCC’s	commemorations,	with	a	 large	section	devoted	to	the	2013	UVF	centenary.	 (The	Rex	Bar	 is	 strongly	associated	with	 the	present-day	UVF.)	The	 historical	 nexus	 of	 the	 original	 UVF	 and	 the	 Ulster	 Division	 is	 also	
																																																								105	The	PUP	has	held	no	seats	since	the	resignation	of	 its	 leader,	Dawn	Purvis,	 in	2010	over	the	party’s	continued	links	with	the	UVF.	106	The	 2016	 Committee	 was	 close	 to	 the	 PUP,	 drawing	 activists	 from	 the	 voluntary	 Greater	Shankill	 Action	 for	 Community	 Transformation	 (ACT)	 initiative.	 ACT	 provides	 support	 and	training	 for	 ex-combatants	 of	 the	 UVF	 and	 Red	 Hand	 Commando	 with	 the	 stated	 aim	 of	reintegrating	them	into	society.	William	Mitchell,	a	PUP	activist	and	former	UVF	prisoner,	sat	on	the	Belfast	Somme	100	advisory	panel	as	an	ACT	representative.		
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triangulated	 to	 contemporary	 paramilitaries.	 On	 Glenwood	 Street	 there	 is	 a	memorial	 to	 the	 fallen	 of	 No.	 4	 Platoon,	 A	 Company,	 in	 the	 UVF’s	 1st	 Belfast	Battalion.	 Images	 of	 Edward	 Carson	 reviewing	 Ulster	 Volunteers	 and	 Ulster	Division	troops	are	juxtaposed	with	paramilitaries	on	the	streets	of	West	Belfast	(photo	5.12).		
	
Photo	 5.12	 UVF	memorial	 to	 the	 dead	 of	 No.	 4	 Platoon,	 A	 Company,	 1st	 Battalion,	 Glenwood	Street.		
	
	Towards	 the	 top	 of	 the	 Shankill	 Road	 is	 the	 1st	 Shankill	 Somme	 Association’s	Garden	 of	 Reflection,	 in	 a	 small	 annex	 of	 the	 Shankill	 Graveyard.	 The	 physical	structure	 of	 Loyalist	 memorials	 and	 format	 of	 their	 annual	 commemorations	resemble	 the	 forms	 and	 practices	 of	 memorialisation	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 British	Commonwealth	(Viggiani	2014,	130).	The	memorial	in	the	Garden	is	frequently	used	 for	 Loyalist	 remembrance	 ceremonies,	 acting	 as	 an	 unofficial	 cenotaph	(photo	5.13).	
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Photo	5.13	Unofficial	cenotaph	in	the	1st	Shankill	Somme	Association’s	Garden	of	Reflection.	
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								Photo	5.14	Poppy	Board	displayed	on	the	fence	of	the	Garden	of	Remembrance,										Shankill	Road.	
	
	For	 the	 centennial	 commemorations,	 the	 2016	 Committee	 organised	 the	production	 of	 “Poppy	 Boards”	 featuring	 the	 names	 and	 addresses	 of	 the	 war	dead	from	the	Greater	Shankill	area	(photo	5.14).	These	were	displayed	all	over	the	Upper	Shankill	and	prominently	on	the	fence	surrounding	its	main	Garden	of	Remembrance.	 Next	 to	 the	 centre	 named	 after	 the	 former	 PUP	 leader	 Hugh	Smyth,	the	Garden	commemorates	those	killed	in	the	two	world	wars	and,	more	ambiguously,	 in	 “subsequent	 conflicts”.	Memorialisation	on	 the	Shankill	 is	 thus	
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conceived	 in	 visual,	 material	 and	 territorial	 terms,	 and	 blurs	 temporal	boundaries.	 The	 media	 employed	 in	 memorialisation	 combine	 traditional	Loyalist	practices	of	wall	decoration	and	parading	with	 the	grammar	of	official	commemoration.	 Individualising	 the	 war	 dead	 on	 the	 “Poppy	 Boards”	 also	follows	 the	 official	 procedure	 of	 naming	 the	 fallen	 on	 war	 memorials.	 The	process	of	commemoration	thus	becomes	peripatetic	through	an	extension	into	unofficial	realms	of	social	life.		
	
Photo	 5.15	 Scene	 from	 the	 Battle	 of	 the	 Somme	 1916	 promotional	 film	 (source:	 http://	www.jw8films.com).			The	Somme	re-enactment	was	widely	advertised	via	social	media,	 in	shops	and	other	public	 spaces	and	was	 included	 in	 the	Belfast	Somme	100	programme.	 In	Loyalist	 areas	 of	 Belfast	 and	 other	 parts	 of	 Northern	 Ireland,	 green	 Ulster	Division	 flags	 flew	 from	 lamp-posts	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 centenary.	 The	 flags	were	the	 initiative	of	the	Loyalist	Communities	Council	as	a	“protocol”	to	avoid	the	 proliferation	 of	 contentious	 paramilitary	 symbols	 in	 Loyalist	 areas	 (Belfast	
News	 Letter,	 May	 12,	 2016).107 	In	 anticipation	 of	 the	 re-enactment	 a	 short	
																																																								107	The	Loyalist	Communities	Council	is	an	umbrella	organisation	representing	the	UVF,	UDA	and	the	Red	Hand	Commando.		
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promotional	 film	 was	 released,	 dramatising	 “The	 Great	 Push”.	 A	 professional	production,	the	film	portrayed	gritty,	realistic	scenes	of	trench	life	(photo	5.15)	with	stylised	dialogue	attuned	to	popular	cultural	representations	of	the	war.		The	 film	 set	 the	 dramatic	 tone	 for	 the	 re-enactment	 in	 Woodvale	 Park.	 The	preceding	 parade	 approached	 Belfast	 from	 all	 directions,	 converging	 on	 the	Cenotaph	for	a	wreath-laying	ceremony.	It	then	proceeded	up	the	Shankill	Road	before	entering	Woodvale	Park,	where	a	memorial	tree	was	planted	and	a	short	service	 of	 remembrance	 held.	 Large	 numbers	 of	 spectators	 gathered	 on	 the	Upper	 Shankill	 to	 watch	 the	 parade.108 	Onlookers	 of	 all	 ages	 crowded	 the	pavements,	 with	 families	 bringing	 their	 young	 children	 to	 watch.	 Many	 wore	commemorative	t-shirts	and	carried	flags	juxtaposing	the	Somme	centenary	with	the	 campaign	of	 “Our	Wee	Country”	Northern	 Ireland	 in	 the	European	 football	championships.109	Alcohol	consumption	was	widespread,	with	drinkers	congreg-ating	 outside	 bars	 and	 the	 “blue	 bag	 brigade”	 conspicuous	 on	 the	 street.	Organisers	were	explicit	that	alcohol	was	not	to	be	consumed	inside	the	park	and	ACT	stewards	checked	people	at	the	gates	as	they	entered.	Although	there	was	a	conspicuous	PSNI	presence	on	 the	way	up	 to	Woodvale	Park,	 no	officers	were	visible	inside.			The	 re-enactment	 was	 held	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 park	 in	 an	 enclosure	 that	recreated	the	Ulster	Division	Base	Depot,	at	which	the	troops	arrived	in	northern	France.	At	one	end	of	the	field	was	a	mock-up	of	the	Ulster	Division	trenches	and	
																																																								108	Few	turned	out	to	watch	the	parade	on	the	Lower	Shankill,	a	scenario	possibly	explained	by	the	 event’s	 UVF	 associations.	 The	 Lower	 Shankill	 has	 historically	 been	 UDA	 territory,	 with	ongoing	tensions	between	the	two	paramilitary	groups	periodically	erupting	in	violent	feuding.			109	There	 are	 several	 Loyalist	 souvenir	 shops	 on	 the	 Upper	 Shankill,	 selling	 commemorative	paraphernalia.	One	shop	was	selling	the	UVF	magazine,	The	Purple	Standard.	
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at	 the	other	a	German	bunker	 flying	 the	 imperial	 flag.	Beside	 the	Ulster	 trench	was	a	reproduction	World	War	One	tank.	The	re-enactment	was	premised	on	the	Ulster	 Division’s	 legendary	 assault	 on	 the	 German	 lines	 on	 July	 1,	 1916.	 The	Division’s	objective	that	day	was	to	advance	to	the	northeast	of	Thiepval	Wood,	taking	 the	Schwaben	Redoubt	before	 reaching	a	point	 just	below	 the	village	of	Grandcourt	 on	 the	 German	 defensive	 line.	 In	 the	 event	 D	 company	 of	 the	 9th	Royal	Irish	Rifles	reached	their	objective	but	were	beaten	back	to	the	Schwaben	Redoubt.	 The	 exhausted	 men	 found	 themselves	 surrounded,	 forcing	 them	 to	retreat	after	the	Germans	attacked	in	the	evening	(Grayson	2009,	80-84).		
	
Photo	5.16	The	death	of	Billy	McFadzean:	a	re-enactivist	pretending	to	smother	a	grenade.			In	 the	 build-up	 to	 re-enacting	 these	 dramatic	 events,	 the	 organisers	 employed	several	audio-visual	techniques	to	inspire	pathos.	The	scene	was	set	with	World	War	One	era	popular	music.	Country-tinged	and	quasi-traditional	ballads	were	then	played	as	a	narrator	recounted	the	Ulster	Division’s	heroic	deeds.	One	of	the	
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ballads	 was	 The	 Bloody	 Road	 to	 the	 Somme	 by	 the	 former	 PUP	 leader,	 Brian	Ervine.	The	song	tells	the	story	of	the	formation	of	the	UVF	to	“stand	for	the	red	hand	 and	 Crown”	 and	 contains	 the	 lyrics,	 “These	 were	 the	 seed	 of	 mighty	Cúchulainn,	 These	 were	 the	 sons	 of	 Congal	 Claen,	 Determined	 that	 Gael	 and	Rome	 should	 not	 rule	 them,	And	England	 if	 need	 be	withstand.”	 Ervine’s	 song	appropriates	Irish	traditional	balladry	and	mythological	figures	to	evince	Ulster	nativism,	 in	 sharp	 contrast	 to	 the	 ensuing	 bombastic	 pomp	 of	 Rule	 Britannia.	Immediately	 before	 the	 main	 event	 there	 was	 a	 short	 vignette	 of	 Billy	McFadzean,110	set	to	a	version	of	an	eponymous	ballad	by	the	UVF-affiliated	folk		band,	The	Platoon	(photo	5.16).111		
	
Photo	5.17	Choreographed	sequence	in	which	the	Union	flag	is	dropped	on	the	battlefield	before	being	symbolically	picked	up	and	carried	forward.																																																									110	William	 McFadzean	 served	 in	 the	 14th	 Royal	 Irish	 Rifles	 after	 joining	 the	 YCV.	 He	 was	posthumously	awarded	the	Victoria	Cross	for	throwing	himself	onto	a	stray	grenade	to	save	his	comrades’	lives.	111	Loyalist	songs	frequently	appear	on	jukeboxes	in	paramilitary	clubs	and	on	CD	compilations.	The	Platoon	is	popular	among	UVF	supporters	and	performs	at	paramilitary	fundraising	events	(Pietzonka	2013,	95).	The	band’s	close	links	to	the	UVF	may	explain	why	an	alternative	version	of	the	 song	was	 played	 at	 the	 event,	 although	 its	members	 and	 supporters	would	 recognise	 it	 as	part	of	what	Jarman	calls	the	“popular	culture	of	paramilitarism”	(2004,	435).		
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The	attack	began	to	a	soundtrack	of	staccato	machine	gun	fire	and	low	mournful	music	as	explosions	blew	compost	and	smoke	over	the	battlefield	into	the	crowd.	Emerging	 from	 the	 trenches,	 many	 of	 the	 re-enactivists	 fell	 dead,	 with	 only	 a	handful	 reaching	 the	German	 lines.	The	soldier	carrying	 the	Union	 flag	became	one	of	the	casualties.	After	he	dropped	the	flag,	it	was	recovered	symbolically,	in	a	 choreographed	 action	 (photo	5.17).	Upon	 the	 capture	 of	 the	bunker,	 the	 flag	was	 raised	 and	 the	 re-enactment	 ended	 with	 participants	 and	 the	 crowd	standing	for	a	rendition	of	God	Save	the	Queen	(photo	5.18).		
	
Photo	 5.18	 Re-enactivists	 and	 spectators	 standing	 for	 God	 Save	 the	 Queen	 after	 the	 German	bunker	is	captured.	
	
	Several	 re-enactivists	were	wearing	orange	 sashes,	 including	one	of	 the	 few	 to	reach	 the	 German	 bunker	 (photo	 5.19).	 This	 follows	 the	 standard,	 almost	certainly	 apocryphal,	 Unionist	 narrative	 of	 the	 Somme.	 Under	 the	 old	 Julian	calendar,	July	1	fell	on	the	same	date	as	the	Battle	of	the	Boyne.	Troops	of	the	9th	Royal	 Irish	 Rifles	 reputedly	 went	 into	 battle	 wearing	 sashes,	 with	 their	
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commanding	 officer,	 Major	 G.	 H.	 Gaffikin,	 waving	 them	 on	 with	 an	 orange	handkerchief	(Grayson	2009,	90).	
	
	
Photo	5.19	Re-enactivist	wearing	a	sash	(centre)	during	the	assault	on	the	bunker.				The	 narrator	 emphasised	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 Protestant	 faith	 and	 Orange	culture	in	the	Ulster	Division:			 It	was	noted	by	 the	 officers	 that	 the	men	of	 the	Ulster	Division	were	 rarely	seen	without	 a	 Bible	 in	 their	 hands.	 This	was	 a	 practice	 they	 brought	 from	their	daily	lives….	As	that	morning	of	July	broke,	some	men	had	remembered	the	significance	of	the	date.	On	this	date	they	would	go	into	battle	like	many	of	their	 forefathers	 did	 back	 in	 1690	 in	 the	 Battle	 of	 the	 Boyne.	 Speculation	suggests	that	some	of	them	even	wore	their	orange	sashes.	This	isn’t	beyond	belief	 as	 we	 know	 for	 certain	 that	 the	 Ulster	 Division	 had	 Orange	 lodge	meetings	 regularly,	 and	 when	 we	 think	 how	 committed	 they	 were	 to	 their	faith,	we	think	it	is	safe	to	say	they	were	committed	to	their	culture	too.			Re-enactivism	 enabled	 the	 2016	 Committee	 to	 present	 the	 Somme	 as	 a	 heroic	epic,	 embodying	 the	 Loyalist	 “root	 paradigm”.	 The	 capture	 of	 the	 Schwaben	Redoubt	represents	a	perfect	moment	in	time	when	the	mettle	of	Ulstermen	was	
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tested	and	proven	in	the	heat	of	battle.	For	the	male	re-enactivists,	participating	in	 the	 assault	 was	 also	 a	 trial	 of	 manhood	 and	 there	 was	 much	 camaraderie	afterwards	 as	 they	 shook	 hands	 and	 posed	 for	 photographs	 with	 family	 and	friends.	 The	 role	 of	 women	 in	 the	 war	 effort	 was	 also	 acknowledged	 by	 the	narrator,	 and	 personified	 in	 the	 large	 number	 of	 female	 re-enactivists	performing	 as	 nurses,	munitions	workers	 and	members	 of	 the	Women’s	 Land	Army	 (photo	 5.20).	 Re-enactivism	 brings	 its	 own	 elevated	 social	 status,	 partly	derived	 from	 the	gravity	of	historical	 association,	but	also	 from	 the	prestige	of	public	performance.		
	
Photo	 5.20	Female	re-enactivists	playing	nurses,	munitions	workers	and	Women’s	Land	Army	members	in	the	recreated	Ulster	Division	Base	Depot.					The	 organisers	 evidently	 consider	 re-enactivism	 an	 innovative	 medium	 for	remaining	 relevant	 to	 contemporary	 Loyalist	 audiences,	 and	 young	 people	 in	
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particular.	 The	 sophisticated	 display	 featured	 thrilling	 pyrotechnics	 and	 was	carefully	 choreographed	 to	 drive	 home	 key	 messages	 echoing	 current	 tropes	within	 Loyalism.	 PUP-aligned	 activists	 once	 again	 reinvented	 the	 traditional	Unionist	 canon	as	a	Loyalist	 “people’s	history”.	 In	 conjunction	with	 the	 “Poppy	Board”	project,	the	re-enactment	individualised	working-class	soldiers	like	Billy	McFadzean	 as	 plebeian	 heroes	 who	 gave	 their	 lives	 for	 God	 and	 Ulster.	Representing	 the	Ulster	Division	 as	 a	 popular	 force	 drawn	 from	working-class	Protestant	 districts	 complements	 the	 visual	motif	 of	 the	UVF	 as	 a	 paramilitary	“People’s	Army”	in	the	murals	of	the	Shankill.		Loyalist	World	War	One	 re-enactments	 are	 a	product	 of	 contemporary	politics	and,	like	their	Republican	counterparts,	they	are	designed	to	inspire	the	pathos	intrinsic	 to	 identity	 politics	 (see	 Finlay	 2001,	 17).	 Evoking	 the	 pathos	 of	collective	 suffering	 through	 a	 medium	 influenced	 by	 popular	 cultural	representations	 of	 war	 can	 have	 unintended	 consequences.	 With	 its	pyrotechnics,	 choreographed	 routines	 and	 sentimental	 soundtrack,	 the	 event	aroused	 conflicting	 emotions.	 On	 a	 superficial	 level,	 both	 participants	 and	spectators	were	clearly	enjoying	themselves.	The	re-enactivists	smiled	and	joked	before	 “going	 over	 the	 top”	 and	 their	 audience	 was	 obviously	 entertained	 by	what	 they	 saw.	When	 the	 numerous	 explosions	 made	 people	 jump	 there	 was	palpable	 excitement.	 Moments	 choreographed	 to	 stimulate	 Loyalist	 sentiment,	such	 as	 the	 singing	 of	 the	 national	 anthem	 and	 tales	 of	 the	 Ulster	 Division’s	martyrs,	 were	 greeted	with	 a	 reverence	 alloyed	 by	 the	 trivialising	 customs	 of	consumer	 society.	 When	 God	 Save	 the	 Queen	 was	 broadcast	 over	 the	 public	address	 system,	 the	 re-enactivists	 on	 the	 battlefield	 and	 large	 sections	 of	 the	
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crowd	bowed	their	heads,	but	some	held	up	iPhones	and	cameras	to	capture	the	scene	 as	 they	 would	 at	 any	 public	 spectacle	 (photo	 5.21).	 Unlike	 the	 silent,	sombre	 atmosphere	 of	 state	 war	 commemorations,	 the	 Somme	 re-enactment	offered	noisy	entertainment	with	an	esoteric	message.			
	
Photo	 5.21	 Surveying	 the	 battlefield	 at	Woodvale	 Park:	 spectators	 taking	 photographs	 during	
God	Save	the	Queen	as	others	bow	their	heads	respectfully.			The	organisers	conceived	the	re-enactment	as	a	serious	commemoration	of	 the	Ulster	Division’s	sacrifice,	but	the	medium	is	incompatible	with	this	aim.	“Living	history”	arose	 from	 the	popularisation	of	 the	past	after	World	War	Two	when,	under	 the	 influence	 of	 film	 and	 television,	 audiences	 were	 increasingly	accustomed	 to	 visualising	 the	 past	 as	 a	 dramatic	 tableau.	 History	 was	 to	 an	extent	democratised	by	this	process	but	with	the	obvious	drawback	that	“living	history”	 is	 now	 universally	 presented	 as	 an	 authentic	 portrayal	 of	 the	 past	 by	professionals	and	amateurs	alike.	The	reality	that	no-one	can	replicate	what	the	past	was	actually	like	has	obvious	political	ramifications.	The	past,	 in	becoming	
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more	viscerally	human	and	 lifelike,	has	become	 less	about	what	we	know,	and	more	about	what	we	 feel.	This	can	disrupt	our	critical	 faculties	and	accentuate	our	 emotional	 responses,	 which	 explains	 the	 political	 utility	 of	 re-enactivism.	The	 emotive	 power	 of	 “living	 history”	 finds	 its	 popular	 cultural	 parallel	 in	televisual	media,	as	clearly	demonstrated	by	the	release	of	the	promotional	film	as	a	prelude	to	the	Somme	re-enactment.			The	re-enactment	movement	also	has	roots	in	older	forms	of	military	pageantry.	In	the	north	of	Ireland	there	are	obvious	prototypical	models	for	contemporary	Loyalist	 re-enactivists	 to	 follow.	During	 the	Home	Rule	 crisis,	 the	 original	UVF	staged	 “mimic	 battles”	 and	 “field	 days”.	 On	 Boxing	 Day	 1913,	 the	 UVF’s	 5th	Tyrone	 Regiment	 marched	 from	 the	 Castlehill	 Demesne	 to	 Augher	 Castle	 in	County	 Tyrone,	 where	 two	 companies	 defended	 against	 a	 mock	 attack	 by	 the	other	five	(Bowman	2007,	126).	There	is	also	the	annual	tradition	of	the	“Sham	Fight”	at	Scarva	in	County	Down.	Each	year	in	July,	the	Royal	Black	Institution	re-enacts	the	Battle	of	the	Boyne,	after	parading	through	the	village	of	Scarva.	Re-enactivists	perform	as	Williamite	and	 Jacobite	 troops	 sword-fighting	and	 firing	shotguns	into	the	air,	before	King	William	bests	King	James	(Buckley	1989,	186).			In	 the	 Boyne	 and	 Somme	 re-enactments,	 Ulster	 Protestants	must	 impersonate	their	 heroic	 ancestors	 whilst	 simultaneously	 assuming	 the	 identity	 of	 their	mortal	 foes	 –	 Catholics	 and	 Germans	 –	 before	 symbolically	 vanquishing	 them.	Just	as	historicised	paramilitarism	is	read	analogically	by	Loyalist	constituencies,	there	 can	 be	 no	 doubt	 that	 acute	 moments	 of	 sectarian	 tension	 generate	 the	potential	 for	 allegorical	 interpretations.	 Loyalist	 re-enactments	 are	 not	 overtly	sectarian,	but	their	semiotics	encode	histories	of	inter-communal	animosity.	The	
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marching	 columns	 of	 period-costumed	 Ulster	 Volunteers	 are	 a	 statement	 that	Loyalist	 paramilitaries	 are	 presently	 committed	 to	 the	 peace	 process,	 but	may	also	be	reactivated	in	the	future	if	it	becomes	untenable.			The	darker	undertones	of	Loyalist	re-enactivism	have	been	recognised	by	some	prominent	 actors	 within	 the	 paramilitary	 hierarchy.	 Speaking	 at	 the	 2012	Political	 Studies	 Association	 conference,	 the	 UDA	 brigadier	 Jackie	 McDonald	commented	on	the	UCC’s	centennial	commemoration	of	the	Balmoral	Review112	at	Ormeau	Park:		 The	problem	we	have	is…	the	Orange	[Order]	and	the	bands	will	take	the	first	part	of	the	parade,	and	then	it	will	be	the	UVF	in	the	Somme	gear	–	the	Somme	associations	 and	what	 they’re	 telling	 us	 is	 they’ll	 have	 the	 uniforms,	 they’ll	have	 the	 antique	 motors	 with	 the	 machine	 guns	 on	 them	 and	 all	 the	paramilitary	flags	–	and	the	UDA	will	be	suited	and	booted,	the	Ulster	Defence	Union	will	be	wearing	their	green	blazers	and	what	have	you.		If	 you’re	 a	 nationalist	 –	 and	 this	 parade	 passes	 parts	 of	 Short	 Strand	 or	wherever	 –	 how	are	 you	 going	 to	 feel?	Are	 you	 going	 to	 feel	 threatened?	 Is	that	going	to	be	a	positive	thing	or	a	negative	thing?	And	I’d	be	wary	that	as	part	of	the	peace	process	we	should	all	be	moving	forward	and	we	should	be	taking	into	consideration	how	the	nationalists	feel.	But	the	Orange	Order	are	saying,	 “that’s	 not	 our	 problem,	 that’s	 the	 police	 problem”	 [sic].	 People	belonging	to	us	have	asked	them	what	happens	if	the	dissidents	[Republicans]	attack	the	parade?	“That’s	not	our	problem,	that’s	the	problem	for	the	police.”	What	happens	if	the	local	blue	bag	brigade	joins	in	and	causes	problems?	“Oh	that’s	not	our	problem,	that’s	the	PSNI	problem.”			But	it’s	not.	It’s	their	problem.	It’s	their	parade	and	they’re	responsible	for	the	behaviour	of	the	people	in	it…	I	support	the	Orange,	but	I	don’t	want	anything	to	do	with	them	if	you	know	what	I	mean.	(Quoted	in	Meban	2012)		McDonald’s	 views	 indicate	 awareness	 among	 the	 more	 politically	 advanced	sectors	of	Loyalism	that	re-enacting	the	past	closes	the	political	aperture	through	which	 the	 future	can	be	envisioned.	Unlike	Republican	commemorations	of	 the																																																									112	The	 2012	 “festival”	 commemorated	 the	 mass	 demonstration	 against	 Home	 Rule	 at	 the	Balmoral	Showgrounds	of	the	Agricultural	Society	on	Easter	Tuesday	1912.		
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Easter	 Rising,	 Loyalist	 centennial	 re-enactivism	 does	 not	 represent	 “creative	nostalgia”.	 Where	 Republicans	 are	 imagining	 what	 might	 have	 been	 or	 what	might	be	to	come,	Loyalists	are	nostalgically	commemorating	an	ossified	past—what	was	and	is	no	more.			In	 the	cataclysm	of	World	War	One,	Fussell	perceives	an	epistemological	break	with	traditional	patriotic	values:		 The	Great	War	was	perhaps	the	last	to	be	conceived	as	taking	place	within	a	seamless,	 purposeful	 “history”	 involving	 a	 coherent	 stream	 of	 time	 running	from	past	through	present	to	future…	the	Great	War	took	place	in	what	was,	compared	with	ours,	a	static	world,	where	values	appeared	stable	and	where	the	meanings	of	abstractions	seemed	permanent	and	reliable.	Everyone	knew	what	Glory	was,	and	what	Honor	meant.	(1975,	21)				In	 a	 sense	 Loyalism	 has	 preserved	 these	 values,	 but	 refracted	 through	disillusionment	 with	 the	 social	 hierarchy	 that	 exalted	 them.	 For	 Loyalists,	 the	Somme	 is	 an	 emblem	 of	 Ulster	 Protestant	 glory	 and	 honour,	 an	 ideal	 that	Unionists	 cannot	 live	 up	 to.	 Unionism	 has	 failed	 in	 its	 historical	 mission	 to	preserve	the	social	order	that	justified	such	monumental	sacrifices.	Loyalist	war	commemorations	thus	perform	an	allegorical	function	by	articulating	feelings	of	loss	 for	other	aspects	of	 the	static	world	–	 industry,	employment,	community	–	that	have	disappeared	or	been	fragmented.	The	Somme	is	now	sacralised	within	Loyalism	as	a	metaphor	for	communal	sacrifice,	heroism	and	fortitude	in	the	face	of	 social	 deprivation	 and	 political	 marginalisation.	 Commemorations	 are	 a	critique	 of	 Britishness	 in	 that	 they	 portray	 the	 Ulster	 Division	 as	 a	 beacon	 of	moral	purity	 in	an	 increasingly	 soiled	and	 fractured	Union.	By	 reifying	a	 social	group	 identity	 founded	on	 the	sanctity	of	blood	sacrifice,	Loyalists	are	edifying	their	 culture	 from	 external	 pollutants.	 This	 should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	
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negation	 of	 Britishness,	 but	 an	 idealisation	 of	 it	 within	 the	 realm	 of	 Ulster	nativism.		Collective	 identity	 rests	 on	 shared	 social	 memory	 and	 knowledge	 that	 are	articulated	 through	 a	 common	 language	 and	 symbolic	 system	 as	 the	 basis	 of	“cultural	formation”	(Assman	2011,	119-120).	The	internecine	struggle	between	Loyalism	and	Unionism	is	over	who	controls	the	symbols	and	therefore	leads	the	collective.	 Billy	 Hutchinson	 played	 Edward	 Carson	 to	 usurp	 the	 history	 of	 the	Larne	gun-running	operation	from	“big	house”	Unionism.	Adopting	the	“people’s	history”	approach,	Loyalists	recompose	the	Unionist	narrative	by	foregrounding	its	working-class	actors.	 Ironically	 the	PUP	and	other	UVF-linked	organisations	have	 appropriated	 the	 “history	 from	 below”	 ethos	 from	 British	 Marxist	historians	and	re-purposed	it	to	represent	the	agency	of	working-class	Loyalists.	The	rank	and	file	of	the	UVF/Ulster	Division	are	elevated	to	stand	alongside	the	grandees	of	Unionism.	The	PUP	has	sought	to	identify	itself	with	Unionist	culture	and	 manipulate	 its	 symbolic	 system	 to	 outflank	 the	 DUP	 in	 working-class	Protestant	 communities.	 However,	 the	 gambit	 of	 proletarianising	 Unionism	neglects	 the	 pan-class	 nature	 of	 the	Ulster	 covenantal	 ideal.	 In	 challenging	 the	DUP	on	its	own	ground,	the	PUP	has	been	unable	to	reprise	the	populist	appeal	of	 Paisleyism	 in	 the	 1960s.	 Paisley’s	 platform	 attracted	Unionists	 disillusioned	with	corruption	in	the	UUP	and	working-class	Protestant	voters	alarmed	by	the	Northern	 Ireland	Labour	Party’s	 support	 for	Catholic	 civil	 rights	 (Nelson	1984,	60).	The	flawed	nature	of	the	PUP’s	strategy	was	borne	out	in	the	May	2016	and	March	2017	Assembly	elections	when	it	failed	to	win	any	seats,	polling	negligibly	in	 both	 contests.	 Loyalist	 voters	 clearly	 identify	 with	 being	 Protestant	 and	
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working-class,	but	not	with	the	PUP’s	continued	association	with	paramilitarism	that	sits	uneasily	with	its	political	reorientation	toward	populism.			In	the	Unionist	Centenaries,	Loyalists	have	wrested	control	of	the	language	and	symbols	of	Ulster	Protestant	cultural	formation	from	mainstream	Unionism,	but	are	unable	to	enunciate	a	counter-narrative.	Loyalism’s	great	limitation	is	that	it	cannot	 abjure	 the	 symbol	 of	 the	 Crown	 and	 is	 therefore	 unable	 to	 project	 an	alternative	destiny.	This	generates	a	collective	sense	of	impotence	in	the	face	of	the	 future,	 and	 leaves	 only	 the	 past	 as	 a	 cultural	 echo	 chamber.	 Communal	sacrifice	 as	 the	 refrain	 of	 Loyalist	 war	 commemoration	 represents	 an	 end	 in	itself	with	no	reciprocity	from	the	Crown.	Furthermore	there	is	no	demonstrable	introspection	as	to	why	Ulstermen	fought	so	hard	for	an	ingrate	empire.	After	all,	Lord	Kitchener	had	no	time	to	inspect	the	Ulster	Division	and	left	the	job	to	an	Irish	Unionist.	Loyalists	still	 regard	war	as	a	 force	of	history	and	an	existential	necessity	 for	 Ulster	 Protestants,	 the	 gleaming	 Britannic	 Crown	 most	 recently	lighting	the	way	to	dusty	death	in	Helmand.		
Immortal	Memories			Buffeted	 by	 the	 political	 upheavals	 of	 the	 1990s,	 the	 Loyal	 Orange	 Institution	(popularly	known	as	the	Orange	Order,	henceforth	the	Order)	has	undertaken	a	strategic	reappraisal	and	entered	the	fray	of	Northern	Ireland’s	“culture	wars”.	In	1995	the	Order	became	embroiled	in	a	series	of	violent	standoffs	with	the	Royal	Ulster	Constabulary	(RUC)	at	Drumcree	Church	in	Portadown.	That	year	the	RUC	attempted	 to	 re-route	 the	Portadown	District’s	 annual	 parade	 commemorating	the	Battle	of	the	Boyne	on	July	12	(“the	Twelfth”).	The	parade	would	pass	up	the	
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Garvaghy	 Road	 through	 a	 predominantly	 Catholic	 area,	 against	 the	 wishes	 of	local	residents.	After	a	protest	rally	addressed	by	David	Trimble	and	Ian	Paisley	sparked	 violent	 clashes	 between	 Orangemen	 and	 police,	 a	 deal	 was	 reached	whereby	 the	 parade	was	 permitted	 to	 proceed	 silently	 up	 the	 Garvaghy	 Road.	Orange	triumphalism	when	the	parade	reached	Portadown	prompted	the	RUC	to	take	 a	 harder	 line	 the	 following	 year.	 The	 ensuing	 civil	 disorder,	 including	violence	 and	 intimidation	 by	 local	 UVF	 paramilitaries,	 forced	 the	 police	 to	acquiesce	 once	 again.	 Further	 capitulation	 in	 1997	 preceded	 the	 new	 Parades	Commission’s	 decision	 to	 re-route	 the	 parade	 in	 1998.	 The	 resulting	 unrest	across	Northern	Ireland	saw	three	Catholic	children	burnt	to	death	after	a	petrol	bomb	was	 thrown	 into	 their	home.	An	RUC	constable,	 Frank	O’Reilly,	was	also	killed	 during	 a	 Loyalist	 riot.	 The	 lethal	 disturbances	 caused	 a	 split	 within	 the	Order	 between	 its	 Belfast	 leadership	 and	 the	 Portadown	 District.	 Prominent	clergymen	and	senior	figures	in	Unionism,	including	Trimble,	called	for	an	end	to	the	Drumcree	protest	(Bryan	2000,	1-6,	173-176).		“Drumcree	 IV”	 left	 the	Order	politically	 isolated	and	 its	 institutional	 reputation	badly	damaged.	The	 involvement	of	Orangemen	 in	 the	2001	Holy	Cross	School	protests	 in	 the	Ardoyne	area	of	Belfast	 further	sullied	the	Order’s	public	 image	(Kaufmann	 2009,	 291).	 In	 response,	 a	 public	 relations	 working	 party	 was	established	and	media	consultants	were	employed	for	the	2002	marching	season	to	 train	 Orange	 spokesmen.	 A	 Communications	 Committee	 was	 also	 set	 up	 to	oversee	 development	 of	 an	 Orange	 “brand”.	 In	 tandem	 with	 its	 new	 public	relations	 campaign,	 the	 Order’s	 Education	 Committee	 set	 about	 bidding	 for	
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public	 funding	 for	 cultural	projects	 as	 an	 apparent	 convert	 to	multiculturalism	(302-303).		The	 British	 state	 has	 actively	 promoted	 multiculturalist	 policies	 through	 the	“two	 traditions”	 model	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 (Rolston	 1998,	 254-258).	 The	Cultural	 Traditions	 Group,	 which	 became	 a	 sub-committee	 of	 the	 Northern	Ireland	 Community	 Relations	 Council	 in	 1990,	 originated	 as	 an	 NGO	 in	 1983.	Culturally	relativist	in	outlook,	it	provided	early	sponsorship	for	Orange	heritage	projects	(267-268).	Finlayson	explains	its	rationale	thus:			 The	hope	 is	 that,	 if	 given	 the	opportunity,	 if	 “given”	a	voice,	people	will	 feel	able	to	relax,	confident	in	their	own	cultural	tradition,	free	from	threat	so	they	may	explore	and	engage	with	others.	Conflict	will	be	suspended	in	the	public	forum	of	open	and	tolerant	cultural	encounter.	(1997,	79)			In	 decoupling	 cultural	 identity	 from	 its	 political	 construction,	 the	 relativism	of	the	Cultural	Traditions	Group	mirrored	 that	underlying	 the	peace	process	 as	 a	whole.	 In	 the	wake	of	 the	Belfast	Agreement,	 cultural	 relativism	has	become	a	major	plank	of	public	policy,	and	a	cornerstone	of	political	strategy	at	Stormont.	Finlay	 concludes	 that	 the	 Agreement	 in	 effect	 forged	 a	 bicultural	 model	 for	Northern	Ireland.	Politics	rooted	in	the	demand	for	“parity	of	esteem”	reflect	the	essentialist	notions	of	identity	at	the	core	of	liberal	multiculturalism	(2004a,	23-24).	 Sinn	 Féin	 now	 uses	 this	 rubric	 to	 assert	 the	 Gaelic	 identity	 of	 northern	Catholics,	 but	 also	 to	 make	 claims	 of	 communal	 victimhood	 under	 Unionist	domination	(Finlay	2004b,	138).	The	bicultural	superstructure	cemented	by	the	Agreement	 was	 therefore	 one	 in	 which	 identity	 became	 the	 most	 valuable	political	currency.	The	volubility	of	identity	politics	and	the	Republican	recourse	to	victimhood	have	generated	an	inevitable	Orange	symmetry.	
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The	Grand	Orange	Lodge	of	 Ireland	was	awarded	£3.6	million	by	the	EU	for	 its	“Reaching	Out	Through	Cultural	Heritage”	(REACH)	project	in	2012.113	REACH	is	premised	 on	 redeveloping	 two	 of	 the	Order’s	 buildings	 –	 Schomberg	House	 in	Belfast	and	Sloan’s	House	 in	Loughgall	–	as	“interpretive”	heritage	centres.	The	stated	aim	of	 the	project	 is	 to	 “create	understanding,	 education,	 tolerance,	 and	mutual	respect”	under	the	following	precepts:		 Education	–	to	promote	the	Institution’s	cultural	heritage.		Peace	 and	 Reconciliation	 –	 to	 encourage	 greater	 understanding	 about	Orangeism,	its	legacy,	activities,	and	place	in	society.		Preservation	–	of	historic	artefacts	relating	to	the	institution.114			The	Museum	of	Orange	Heritage	at	Sloan’s	House	opened	in	2015	as	the	fruit	of	work	undertaken	jointly	by	the	County	Lodge	of	Armagh	and	the	Grand	Orange	Lodge	 of	 Ireland.	 Present	 at	 the	 inauguration	 were	 the	 minister	 for	 social	development	 Mervyn	 Storey,	 Diane	 Dodds	 MEP	 and	 Jim	 Nicholson	 MEP.	 In	 a	gesture	 of	 cross-community	 amity,	 the	 Gaelic	 Athletic	 Association	 star	 Jarlath	Burns	was	also	in	attendance.			The	museum	is	located	on	Loughgall’s	Main	Street	in	the	building	where	the	first	warrants	of	the	Orange	Order	were	issued	in	1795,	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	Battle	of	the	Diamond.	The	house	belonged	to	James	Sloan,	the	Order’s	first	secretary,	who	kept	an	inn	there.115	The	first	room	–	“Sloan’s	Parlour”	–	exhibits	the	 table	where	 Sloan	 and	 his	 three	 associates	 founded	 the	movement	 (photo																																																									113	REACH	was	part	 funded	by	the	PEACE	III	programme.	It	received	matched	funding	from	the	Northern	 Ireland	 Executive’s	 Department	 for	 Social	 Development	 and	 the	 Department	 of	 the	Environment,	Community	and	Local	Government	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland.	114	http://www.orangeheritage.co.uk/about-us/,	accessed	July	2,	2016.	115	Sloan’s	House	was	formerly	known	as	the	Orange	Museum	and	was	opened	for	this	purpose	by	the	County	Lodge	of	Armagh	in	1961.	
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5.22).	Each	of	the	“Founding	Fathers”	has	a	potted	biography.	The	reputed	words	of	 the	 recipient	 of	 the	 first	 warrant,	 James	 Wilson	 of	 County	 Tyrone,	 are	emblazoned	 on	 the	 wall:	 “I	 will	 light	 a	 star	 in	 the	 Dyan	 that	 will	 eclipse	 you	forever.”	 Wilson’s	 earlier	 adherence	 to	 Freemasonry	 did	 not	 offer	 suitable	protection	for	“Protestant	lives	and	property.”	He	is	acknowledged	as	a	pioneer	for	 establishing	 an	 Orange	 Club	 in	 1792	 “with	 a	 view	 to	 raising	 Protestant	political	consciousness.”	The	moment	of	the	Order’s	inception	is	dramatised	in	a	sound	 recording	 of	 actors	 (local	 Orangemen)	 playing	 the	 parts	 of	 Sloan	 and	Wilson,	with	the	latter	declaring:		 The	Diamond	was	an	example	of	how	 things	are.	They	brought	hundreds	 to	the	Diamond	and	had	we	not	defeated	them,	Loughgall	would	have	been	next.				
	
Photo	 5.22	 Sloan’s	 Parlour:	 scene	 recreating	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 first	 warrants	 at	 the	 original	table.			In	 the	 main	 gallery	 there	 is	 a	 timeline	 plotting	 a	 chronology	 from	 the	 Ulster	Plantation	to	the	present.	The	Plantation	is	credited	with	ending	Gaelic	feudalism	
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and	 bringing	 new	 economic	 prosperity	 in	 its	 wake.	 The	 narrative	maintains	 a	localised	focus	on	Armagh,	emphasising	that	the	foundation	of	the	Order	“flows	from	the	presence	of	Protestant	settlement	 in	the	area.”	One	of	 the	exhibition’s	central	motifs	is	the	1641	Rebellion	in	which	“all	Protestants”	were	targeted	and	many	 fell	 victim	 to	 “murders	 and	 massacres”.	 Accompanying	 the	 panel	 is	 a	touchscreen	 interactive	 based	 on	 depositions	 archived	 at	 Trinity	 College,	Dublin.116	This	contains	a	warning	that	“Guardian	supervision	is	advised”	owing	to	the	traumatic	nature	of	the	material.	The	integration	of	the	1641	depositions	into	 the	exhibition	 indicates	 an	awareness	 that	 the	past	 cannot	 legitimately	be	presented	 as	 folklore	 in	 a	 publicly	 funded	 heritage	 project.	 Instead	 there	 is	 a	more	sophisticated	instrumentalisation	of	academic	research	which	employs	its	findings	 selectively	 and	 takes	 advantage	 of	 the	 gaps	 and	 ambiguities	 in	 its	sources.	 The	 methodology	 at	 work	 reveals	 both	 the	 academic	 training	 of	 the	REACH	 project’s	 architects,	 and	 the	 influence	 of	 university-based	 researchers	who	have	engaged	with	the	Order	in	recent	decades.		The	1641	rebellion	is	placed	in	a	continuum	with	the	Troubles:		Politically	the	aim	was	to	return	control	of	Ireland	to	Roman	Catholic	rule.	As	with	so	many	 tragic	events	 in	 Irish	history,	 the	Rebellion	quickly	descended	into	sectarian	conflict.				There	is	a	pointed	reference	to	the	destruction	of	Loughgall’s	church	where	it	is	claimed	that	three	hundred	Protestant	men,	women	and	children	were	stripped	naked	 and	 held	 captive	 “without	 food	 or	 water	 before	 being	 dismembered	 or	burned	alive	inside.”	A	photograph	of	the	ruined	church	is	reproduced	as	a	visual																																																									116	The	depositions	were	collected	by	government	commissioners	 in	the	period	1641-1655.	See	the	1641	Depositions	Project	available	at	http://www.1641.tcd.ie.	
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aid	for	the	visitor.117	The	text	goes	on	to	claim	that	the	“ill-fated	survivors	were	then	forced	along	the	road	to	Portadown	where	they	were	stripped	on	the	bridge	and	 forced	 into	 the	water.”	 According	 to	 the	 text,	 between	 120	 and	 190	men,	women	and	children	were	drowned	in	the	River	Bann.118	The	overall	death	toll	of	the	Rebellion	ranges	between	twelve	and	seventeen	thousand,	which	the	visitor	is	 told	 is	 much	 lower	 than	 earlier	 estimates	 of	 one	 hundred	 thousand.119	The	ghoulish	 description	 of	 the	 persecution	 of	 Protestants	 is	 also	 qualified	 by	recognition	of	Catholic	suffering:		 There	were	many	 tragic	 incidents	 and	 atrocities	 carried	out	by	 all	 involved.	Just	as	the	memory	of	the	 initial	massacres	 in	Ulster	would	be	sealed	on	the	psyche	 of	 Ulster	 and	 Irish	 Protestants,	 so	 the	 ruthless	 suppression	 of	 the	rebellion	 by	 Oliver	 Cromwell,	 in	 1649,	 would	 profoundly	 impact	 the	 Irish	Roman	Catholic	community.			In	its	portrayal	of	the	Rebellion,	the	exhibition	follows	the	political	imperative	of	“parity	 of	 esteem”	 in	 communal	 victimhood.	 Although	 there	 is	 recognition	 of	Catholic	suffering	 in	the	1640s,	 this	 is	portrayed	as	the	work	of	English	troops.	Irish	Protestant	atrocities	remain	unacknowledged,	preserving	the	unassailable	status	of	 the	1641	Rebellion	 in	Orange	mythology	alongside	 the	Boyne	and	the	Somme.	Visible	in	the	symmetry	of	Unionist/Nationalist	mythologies	is	an	elision	of	time	that	connects	the	events	of	the	1640s	with	1690,	1916	and	the	Troubles	as	 immortal	 memories.	 When	 an	 Orange	 hall	 is	 attacked	 in	 the	 present,	 the																																																									117	This	is	misleading	as	it	gives	the	impression	that	the	ruins	are	what	remains	of	the	destroyed	church.	In	fact	the	official	heritage	interpretation	states	that	the	church	was	“burned	down	in	the	1641	rebellion”	and	then	“rebuilt	in	1740”	and	does	not	refer	to	deaths.	118	Simms	concludes	 that	a	 figure	of	around	one	hundred	deaths	 is	probably	accurate	based	on	accounts	in	the	Armagh	depositions	(1993,	124-127).	119	Historians	 have	 hitherto	 based	 their	 findings	 on	 a	 small	 percentage	 of	 the	 depositions.	 The	commissioners	themselves	could	only	estimate	the	death	toll	as	“many	thousands”	and	the	real	figure	is	unknowable	owing	to	the	nature	of	the	material.	According	to	the	general	editor	of	the	1641	 Depositions	 Project,	 the	 evidence	 does	 not	 support	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 premeditated	 “general	massacre”	 of	 Protestants	 and	 forensic	 study	 of	 all	 the	 depositions	 must	 now	 be	 undertaken	(Clarke	2013,	47-49).	
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“memory”	 of	 1641	 is	 invoked.	 Here	 we	 also	 perceive	 the	 influence	 of	multiculturalism	 by	which,	 as	 Rolston	 puts	 it,	 “history,	 colonialism,	 inequality,	sectarianism	are	all	 reduced	 to	 relatively	 simplistic	explanations	which	rest	on	social	 psychology,	 postmodernist	 discourse	 and	wishful	 thinking”	 (1998,	 254).	Under	 Northern	 Ireland’s	 retrofit	 biculturalism,	 the	 contemporary	 Orange	psyche	must	endure	the	suffering	of	Protestant	past	lives	as	Republicans	feel	the	pain	of	Cromwell’s	Catholic	victims	at	Drogheda	and	Wexford.			Next	 in	 the	persecutory	continuum	 is	 the	Battle	of	 the	Diamond	as	 the	 turning	point	 in	 Protestant	 fortunes.	 The	 events	 of	 1641	 and	 1795	 are	 linked	teleologically	as	the	inevitable	outcome	of	Catholic-Protestant	animosities	in	the	sectarian	psycho-geography	of	Armagh.	The	battle	is	also	brought	to	life	through	a	sound	recording	in	which	the	voices	of	local	Protestant	Peep	O’	Day	Boys	and	Catholic	Defenders	can	be	heard.	All	speak	in	the	vernacular	of	the	present	day.	The	 “secret	 agrarian	 societies”	 of	 the	 Defenders	 and	 Peep	 O’	 Day	 Boys	 are	described	as	providing	“a	voice	 for	the	ordinary	working	man”.	Fights	between	these	 groups	 “often	 descended	 into	 sectarian	 brawls	 at	 markets,	 fairs	 and	crossroads.”	Violent	raids	on	property	belonging	to	the	“other”	community	were	“motivated	 as	much	 by	 economics	 as	 by	 sectarianism	with	 the	 attackers	 often	trying	 to	 destroy	 weaving	 looms.”	 After	 one	 such	 raid	 on	 the	 Winter	 family	homestead	 at	 the	 Diamond	 crossroads	 outside	 Loughgall,	 local	 Protestants	rushed	to	aid	their	co-religionists.	Spurred	into	action	the	authorities	intervened	to	prevent	more	Defenders	joining	the	fight	from	other	parts	of	Armagh.120	Upon	the	formation	of	the	Order,	warrants	were	issued	at	the	cost	of	one	Irish	guinea,	
																																																								120	Dan	Winter’s	cottage	is	still	owned	by	the	family	and	open	to	the	public	as	a	visitor	attraction.	
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which	 “may	have	been	an	attempt	 to	dissuade	Peep	O’	Day	Boys	 from	 joining.”	The	 implication	 is	 clear:	 Protestant	 recourse	 to	 violence	 is	 justified	 when	 the	community	faces	an	immediate	threat.	However,	the	rule	of	law	must	otherwise	be	 respected	 and	 Protestants	 should	 defer	 to	 the	 state	 when	 it	 asserts	 its	covenantal	 authority.	 The	 museum’s	 treatment	 of	 the	 Battle	 of	 the	 Diamond	exposes	 innate	evangelical	 thinking.	As	Bruce	observes,	 the	evangelical	view	of	violence	 holds	 it	 to	 be	 legitimate	when	 the	 state	 reneges	 on	 its	 obligations	 to	protect	the	citizenry	(1994,	34-36).		The	speculation	that	Sloan	and	his	collaborators	sought	to	exclude	Peep	O’	Day	Boys	 from	 membership	 reflects	 the	 Orange	 self-image	 of	 Protestant	respectability.	 Although	 the	 root	 causes	 of	 agrarian	 violence	 may	 be	understandable,	 the	Order	 is	 driven	by	 the	higher	moral	 purpose	of	 defending	the	 “Protestant	 Faith”.	 The	 appeal	 of	 the	 Peep	 O’	 Day	 Boys	 for	 the	 Protestant	“working	man”	alludes	to	contemporary	Loyalist	paramilitarism.	Recent	analysis	records	 that	 over	 half	 the	 Orange	 membership	 defines	 itself	 as	 working-class	(McAuley,	Tonge,	and	Mycock	2011,	58).	One	of	the	exhibition’s	key	messages	is	therefore	 that	 respectable	 Protestants	 of	 all	 classes	 should	 join	 the	 Order	 and	behave	in	a	disciplined	manner,	rather	than	engaging	in	sectarian	skirmishes.		Protestant	actions	at	the	Diamond	are	placed	in	the	historical	context	of	the	Irish	Volunteer	 movement	 formed	 to	 “defend	 Britain”	 in	 1778	 when	 its	 army	 was	absent	protecting	the	American	colonies.	Among	the	founders	of	the	Order	were	former	Volunteers	who	 “remained	 strongly	 supportive	of	 the	British	 system	of	democracy.”	Following	the	Order’s	establishment,	Orangemen	played	“a	vital	role	in	putting	down	the	1798	rebellion	as	members	of	local	Yeomanry	Corps.”	In	its	
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historical	 contextualisation,	 the	 exhibition	 paints	 a	 distorted	 and	 at	 times	contradictory	picture	of	this	period,	with	significant	lacunae.	Urban	Presbyterian	merchants	were	prominent	in	the	Volunteer	movement	wherein	they	advocated	enhancing	 Irish	 parliamentary	 power.	 Ulster’s	 Anglican	 rentiers	 were	represented	 in	 the	 Dublin	 Parliament	 whereas	 merchants	 were	 electorally	marginalised,	a	state	of	affairs	that	led	many	to	support	the	United	Irishmen	and	Catholic	 emancipation.	 In	 the	 countryside	 poorer	 Presbyterian	 tenant	 farmers	were	 also	 discontent	with	 the	 gentry	 and	 attracted	 to	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 United	Irishmen.	However,	landed	elites	were	in	a	position	to	make	Protestant	farmers	a	better	offer	by	privileging	them	over	Catholics	in	the	competition	for	tenancies.	Rural	Presbyterians	 thereafter	 abandoned	 the	merchants’	 cause	 for	Orangeism	and	 a	 “special	 relationship”	 with	 the	 landlords	 (Miller	 1978,	 54-56).	 The	exhibition	 reads	 this	history	backwards	 to	establish	a	 false	 continuity	between	the	politics	of	the	Volunteer	movement	and	Orangeism	as	institutional	stalwarts	of	British	parliamentary	democracy	and	constitutional	liberty.		Marking	 the	 role	of	Orangemen	 in	 the	 suppression	of	 the	United	 Irishmen,	 the	exhibition	 emphasises	 that	 the	 Order’s	 founders	 were	 implacably	 opposed	 to	sectarianism.	 After	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 Grand	 Lodge	 of	 Ireland	 in	 1798,	 the	leadership	expressed	its	disapproval	of	sectarian	“party	tunes”,	such	as	Croppies	
Lie	Down,	for	being	“directly	contrary	to	our	principles	as	reflecting	on	a	part	of	our	 fellow	 subjects	 for	 their	 religious	 persuasion.”	 After	 mining	 its	 past	 to	confirm	 the	 Order’s	 non-sectarian	 credentials,	 the	 exhibition	 lists	 the	“Qualifications	of	an	Orangeman”.	Regarding	an	Orangeman’s	conduct	toward	his	fellow	subjects:		
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He	should	strenuously	oppose	the	fatal	errors	and	doctrines	of	the	Church	of	Rome,	and	other	non-Reformed	faiths,	and	scrupulously	avoid	countenancing	(by	 his	 presence	 or	 otherwise)	 any	 act	 of	 ceremony	 of	 Roman	 Catholic	 or	other	 non-Reformed	 worship;	 he	 should,	 by	 all	 lawful	 means,	 resist	 the	ascendancy,	encroachment	and	the	extension	of	their	power,	ever	abstaining	from	 all	 uncharitable	words,	 actions,	 or	 sentiments	 towards	 all	who	 do	 not	practise	the	Reformed	and	Christian	faith.				Under	 this	 rulebook,	 members	 of	 the	 Order	 can	 co-exist	 with	 people	 of	 other	faiths	 and	 cultures,	 but	 cannot	 integrate	with	 them.	 Orangemen	 cannot	marry	Catholics	or	participate	in	Catholic	religious	rituals	without	contaminating	their	way	 of	 life.	 They	 must	 remain	 at	 a	 respectful	 distance	 from	 Catholics	 whilst	maintaining	their	own	cultural	traditions	unimpeded.	The	Orange	ideal	of	what	it	is	 to	be	an	Ulster	Protestant	 is	 thus	more	or	 less	 identical	 to	 that	of	1795.	The	museum’s	main	trope	is	continuity:	Protestants	cannot	be	uprooted	from	the	soil	of	Armagh.	Orangeism	offers	them	a	constant	and	unbending	ideological	defence		in	the	face	of	social	change.			
	
Photo	5.23	Main	gate	of	the	abandoned	PSNI	station	at	Loughgall.		
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In	 Loughgall	 the	 past	 seeps	 into	 the	 present,	 with	 Sloan’s	 House	 figuring	prominently	 in	 the	 Unionist	 topography	 alongside	 the	 Orange	 hall	 and	 parish	church.	At	the	edge	of	the	village	is	the	shuttered	shell	of	the	former	PSNI	station	(photo	5.23).	In	1987	Loughgall	made	national	headlines	when	the	RUC	barracks	was	 devastated	 by	 a	 massive	 bomb.	 Fleeing	 the	 scene,	 the	 Provisional	 IRA’s	active	 service	 unit	was	 ambushed	 by	members	 of	 the	 Special	 Air	 Service	who	raked	 their	 van	with	 gunfire,	 killing	 all	 eight	 occupants	 and	 a	 passer-by	 in	 the	process.	 Today	 there	 is	 no	 police	 station	 and	 the	 British	 Army	 is	 gone.	 The	exhibition’s	 elision	of	 the	1641	Rebellion	and	 the	Battle	of	 the	Diamond	hence	appeals	 to	contemporary	Protestant	anxieties	over	 their	potential	encirclement	by	 the	 Defenders’	 descendants.	 In	 defiance	 the	 activist	 museum	 recalls	 the	moment	of	Orange	genesis	at	Sloan’s	House	as	an	immortal	memory.			The	Belfast	branch	of	 the	Museum	of	Orange	Heritage	was	also	opened	 in	 June	2015,	with	former	Irish	president	Mary	McAleese	playing	the	bicultural	card	at	the	official	inauguration:		 The	 culture	 of	 the	 Orange	 is	 not	 my	 culture,	 but	 it	 is	 the	 culture	 of	 my	neighbours	and	we	who	are	the	children	of	the	Jacobites	and	the	Williamites,	we	share	this	space,	we	share	this	island.	(The	Irish	News,	June	25,	2015)			Schomberg	House	 is	 located	at	 the	 far	end	of	 the	Cregagh	Road	 in	East	Belfast.	The	 social	 composition	 of	 Cregagh	 combines	 working-	 and	 middle-class	residents	and	shows	visible	signs	of	recent	immigration	from	Eastern	Europe	in	its	shops	and	businesses.	Upon	entering	Schomberg	House,	the	visitor	is	invited	to	take	a	self-guided	tour	of	the	museum.	The	exhibition	begins	with	the	Glorious	Revolution	and	the	Williamite	campaign	in	Ireland	as	the	two	epochal	events	in	
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the	Protestant	Ascendancy.	A	life-size	Jacobite	dragoon	sits	astride	a	white	horse,	riding	 into	 battle	 (photo	 5.24).	 The	 text	 praises	 the	 Jacobite	 troops’	 gallantry,	recording	 that	after	 the	Treaty	of	Limerick	concluded	hostilities	 in	1691,	many	left	 to	 find	 fighting	 fame	 elsewhere	 on	 the	 continent	 in	 the	 “Flight	 of	 the	Wild	Geese”.	 The	 red-coated	 dragoon	 causes	 cognitive	 confusion	 by	 recalling	 the	traditional	Loyalist	pose	of	William	 III	on	a	white	horse,	visible	on	many	gable	wall	murals	and	Orange	lodge	banners	(photo	5.25).		
	
Photo	5.24	Mannequin	dressed	as	a	Jacobite	dragoon	at	the	Battle	of	the	Boyne.			The	Battle	of	 the	Boyne	 is	 represented	using	old-fashioned	museum	devices	of	the	costumed	mannequin	and	scale-model	battlefield.	More	sophisticated	audio-visual	technology	is	employed	to	introduce	a	performative	dimension.	A	series	of	short	 monologues	 given	 by	 period-costumed	 actors	 relives	 the	 Williamite	campaign	 and	 its	 legacy.	 The	 first	 character	 recounts	 how	 he	 joined	 the	Protestant	militia	after	hearing	that	“there’s	going	to	be	a	massacre.”	Fearing	for	
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his	 life,	 he	 summons	 the	 social	 memory	 of	 the	 1641	 Rebellion	 and	 praises	William	as	“our	deliverer”.	In	a	departure	from	the	traditional	Orange	narrative,	the	 militiaman	 places	 the	 battle	 in	 a	 European	 context.	 He	 talks	 of	 different	languages	being	spoken,	which	he	cannot	understand,	but	says	of	the	Huguenots	that	they	were	“tough	lads”	and	“sound	Protestants”.			Another	actor	speaks	of	 the	Episcopalian	repression	of	 Irish	Presbyterians	that	forced	many	to	flee	to	the	American	colonies.	The	emigrant	states	proudly	that,	“We	made	a	life	for	ourselves	in	the	new	world	after	being	forced	out	of	the	old	one.”	Part	costume	drama,	the	film	portrays	Protestants	as	the	defenders	of	civil	and	religious	liberty	in	Ireland,	but	also	as	the	architects	of	American	democracy.	The	viewer	is	reminded	of	Matthew	Thornton,	the	Limerick	émigré	who	became	one	 of	 the	 signatories	 of	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence	 in	 1776.	 In	 the	accompanying	text	the	origin	of	the	term	“hillbilly”	is	explained	as	being	from	the	Appalachian	Mountains,	where	 locals	 described	 Irish	Protestant	 immigrants	 as	“King	 Billy’s	 Men	 from	 the	 mountains	 or	 hills”.	 The	 story	 of	 Irish	 Protestant	immigration	 draws	 on	 the	 globalised	 cultural	 capital	 of	 American	 liberal	democracy	as	 a	 source	of	political	 legitimacy	 for	Orangeism.	Bill	 Clinton	was	a	prominent	 international	 figure	 in	 the	 Northern	 Irish	 peace	 process	 and	emphasised	 his	 own	 Irish	 Protestant	 lineage	 during	 negotiations.	 Making	connections	 with	 North	 America	 also	 suggests	 an	 appeal	 to	 American	 and	Canadian	 tourists	 looking	 for	 heritage	 attractions	 in	 Belfast.	 An	 Orange	 lodge	banner	from	Ontario	is	prominently	displayed	at	the	beginning	of	the	exhibition	(photo	5.25).		
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										Photo	5.25	Orange	Young	Britons	lodge	banner	from	Ontario,	Canada.			One	of	the	major	exhibits	is	the	book	of	the	Paymasters	General	of	the	Williamite	army	in	Ireland,	Charles	Fox	and	Thomas	Coningsby.	It	records	payments	made	to	a	variety	of	parties	during	the	military	campaign.	The	book	has	been	digitised	and	 reproduced	 as	 a	 touchscreen	 interactive,	 another	 common	 strategy	 for	
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audience	 engagement	 in	 public	 museums.	 It	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 document	 of	military	and	social	historical	interest.	In	the	label	accompanying	the	book,	there	is	mention	of	 payments	made	 to	Huguenot	 and	Danish	 troops,	 underlining	 the	European	nature	of	the	conflict.	There	is	an	added	touch	of	sensationalism	in	the	reference	to	spies	in	the	pay	of	the	Williamite	cause.	The	display	is	described	as	a	“virtually	unexplored	historical	manuscript”.	The	book’s	novelty	is	augmented	by	its	cultural	value	as	a	historical	tool	for	understanding	the	past:		It	would	be	wrong	to	say	that	it	is	a	forgotten	past,	for	that	is	certainly	not	the	case	 in	 Ireland,	where,	we	can	safely	 say,	 the	 implications	of	 the	War	of	 the	Three	Kingdoms	were	 to	 shape	 the	 future	 in	many	different	ways.	 So	 if	 the	past	is	not	forgotten,	it	deserves	to	be	understood.			The	educational	goal	of	understanding	the	past	is	one	of	the	central	tenets	of	the	REACH	 project.	 The	 book	 is	 presented	 interactively	 to	 demonstrate	 the	exhibition’s	commitment	to	this	objective	but	in	adopting	the	methodology	of	the	state	heritage	sector,	the	activist	museum	is	at	no	stage	depoliticised.	Elsewhere	the	 depiction	 of	 the	 Williamite	 campaign	 in	 Ireland	 has	 shrine-like	 qualities.	William’s	 saddlecloth	 is	 framed	 as	 a	 sacred	 artefact.	 A	 nineteenth	 century	Grandmaster’s	 Jewel	encasing	a	 lock	of	William’s	hair	 is	an	Orange	reliquary.	A	pen	allegedly	made	of	wood	from	the	Betsy	Cairns,	the	ship	that	carried	William	to	Ireland,	is	another	relic	of	Protestant	deliverance.	These	are	accompanied	by	a	fragment	of	the	obelisk	erected	to	commemorate	the	Battle	of	the	Boyne	in	1736.	The	 obelisk	 stood	 on	 the	 banks	 of	 the	 Boyne	 before	 it	 was	 blown	 up	 by	Republicans	 in	 1923.121	The	 inclusion	 of	 esoteric	Williamite	 relics	 is	 explicitly	
																																																								121	Fitzpatrick	posits	that	the	Boyne	obelisk	was	in	fact	blown	up	by	the	Free	State	Army,	citing	attempts	by	the	Order	to	acquire	the	land	and	preserve	the	monument	before	1923	(2014,	52).	Today	the	Order	continues	to	campaign	for	a	new	obelisk	to	be	built	on	the	site	where	the	base	of	
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political	 because	 in	 an	 activist	 museum	 they	 are	 unmediated	 by	 contextual	interpretation.	In	the	social	arena	of	the	activist	museum,	partisan	perspectives	prevail.	 The	 curatorial	 rationale	 underpinning	 the	Museum	of	Orange	Heritage	sees	 Protestants	 as	 the	 primary	 audience.	 Catholics	 are	 a	 secondary	 audience,	who	are	encouraged	to	understand	Orange	culture	as	being	separate	from	theirs.	Objects	that	have	symbolic	resonance	for	Protestants	owing	to	their	associations	with	the	Williamite	cult	are	not	conceived	as	being	part	of	a	shared	history,	but	one	 shaped	 by	 a	 Protestant/Catholic	 dualism.	 In	 step	 with	 the	 prevailing	biculturalism,	 the	museum	presents	 the	 past	 as	 the	 history	 of	 “two	 traditions”	which	can	only	be	understood	as	oppositional	identities.	Even	when	the	scope	of	the	narrative	is	broadened	to	include	Huguenots	and	other	Europeans,	they	are	defined	within	it	as	Protestants	or	Catholics.		After	 establishing	 the	 macro-historical	 context,	 the	 exhibition	 proceeds	 to	discuss	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Orange	 Order	 at	 Loughgall.	 The	 text	 emphasises	that	 the	 Order	 was	 a	 “democratic	 organisation”	 originally	 founded	 “to	 defend	Irish	Protestantism	and	Protestant	hearth	and	home”.	This	section	examines	the	turbulent	relationship	between	the	Order	and	the	British	state	in	the	nineteenth	century,	 but	 also	 recognises	 tensions	 between	 grassroots	 Orangeism	 and	 the	Grand	 Lodge	 in	 Dublin.	 In	 its	 references	 to	 government	 proscriptions,	 a	 clear	analogy	 is	 drawn	 with	 the	 Order’s	 present-day	 battles	 with	 the	 Parades	Commission.	The	confrontation	between	Orangemen	and	Nationalists	at	Dolly’s	Brae	in	1849	appears	as	a	premonition	of	Drumcree	and	other	flashpoints.																																																																																																																																																																	the	 original	 is	 still	 extant.	 To	 this	 end	 the	 Boyne	 Foundation	 has	 purchased	 the	 land	 on	 the	riverbank,	and	in	2009	set	up	the	Boyne	Loyal	Orange	Lodge	1690.	
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William	Johnston	of	Ballykilbeg	 is	 lionised	as	an	Orange	 folk	hero	 for	 leading	a	parade	from	Newtonards	to	Bangor	in	1867	to	flout	the	1850	Party	Processions	Act.	 Johnston	 became	 a	 member	 of	 parliament	 the	 following	 year,	 after	 his	release	from	prison.	He	would	be	of	particular	interest	to	Orangemen	visiting	the	museum.	 Johnston’s	 portrait	 was	 traditionally	 hung	 in	 Orange	 halls	 and	 his	memory	 is	 often	 evoked	 whenever	 the	 authorities	 attempt	 to	 ban	 or	 reroute	marches	 (Buckley	1989,	 188).	He	 is	 also	 featured	on	many	 lodge	banners	 as	 a	popular	 figure	 in	 Orangeism.	 The	 growth	 of	 large-scale	 parading	 in	 the	 1860s	and	 1870s	 transplanted	 rural	 Orange	 culture	 into	 Protestant	 working-class	districts	 of	Belfast	where	 it	 became	a	mechanism	 for	 regulating	 the	 expanding	labour	market.	In	the	cities,	Orangeism	took	on	a	different	social	character	as	the	rural	dynamic	of	landlord-tenant	patronage	was	replaced	by	a	more	autonomous	urban	 Protestant	 working-class	 culture.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 conservative	 elites	were	 compelled	 to	 construct	 a	 new	 hegemonic	 relationship	 with	 Protestant	workers,	wherein	 the	 latter	 perceived	 support	 for	Orangeism	as	 being	 in	 their	economic	interest	(Bryan	2000,	44-47).			The	 exhibition’s	 treatment	 of	 the	 Order’s	 fractious	 relationship	 with	 the	 state	during	the	nineteenth	century	reveals	many	of	its	institutional	ambiguities.	The	survival	of	the	Order	in	the	face	of	parliamentary	repression	is	portrayed	as	the	outcome	 of	 grassroots	 resistance,	 at	 times	 in	 defiance	 of	 the	 leadership.	 In	 its	portrayal	 of	 Johnston	 and	 the	 vertical-horizontal	 dialectic	 of	 Orangeism,	 the	exhibition	 services	 the	 contemporary	 political	 agenda.	 Grassroots	 activism	 in	defence	of	parading	has	maintained	the	Order’s	vitality,	despite	negative	media	coverage.	Reinforcing	this	message	with	reference	to	the	movement’s	formative	
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history	 caters	 for	 the	 museum’s	 core	 demographic	 of	 Orange	 activists,	 who	regularly	organise	lodge	visits.		When	 discussing	 the	 Order’s	 past	 as	 an	 outlawed	 secret	 society,	 the	 text	 is	careful	 to	 distinguish	 Orange	 opposition	 to	 “the	 Government”	 from	 rebellion	against	 the	Crown.	The	Order’s	 role	 in	mobilising	 Loyalist	 opposition	 to	Home	Rule	is	justified	on	the	grounds	that	it	“would	be	detrimental	to	the	economy	of	Ireland,	especially	Ulster,	lead	to	the	break-up	of	the	British	Empire	and	result	in	the	oppression	of	the	Reformed	Faith.”	A	large	photograph	of	the	UVF	Motorcycle	Corps	 at	 Balmoral	 illustrates	 the	 section	 on	 the	 Ulster	 Covenant.	 The	 row	 of	militant	 Ulster	 Volunteers	 underlines	 the	 Order’s	 steadfastness	 in	 the	 face	 of	Home	Rule.	Orangemen	were	the	vanguard	of	the	“mass	mobilisation	of	ordinary	people”,	 forming	a	 “guard”	at	Belfast	City	Hall	 to	protect	 those	entering	 to	sign	the	Covenant.		Orange	 militancy	 over	 Home	 Rule	 is	 balanced	 against	 the	 Order’s	 intense	devotion	 to	 the	 Crown	 in	 time	 of	 war.	 Military	 warrants	 issued	 to	 lodges	 in	regiments	 tasked	 with	 suppressing	 the	 United	 Irishmen	 are	 listed	 as	 a	 roll	 of	honour.	 The	 exhibition	 gives	 an	 early	 account	 of	 a	 lodge	meeting	 in	 the	 Royal	Artillery	at	Sevastopol	during	the	Crimean	War.	A	photograph	shows	members	of	the	 East	 Belfast	 Loyal	 Orange	 Lodge	 862	 (8th	 Royal	 Irish	Rifles)	 posing	 on	 the	Western	Front	wearing	sashes	and	collarettes.	There	is,	however,	no	mention	of	the	 official	 prohibition	 of	 military	 lodges	 in	 the	 armed	 forces	 during	 the	nineteenth	century.	It	was	not	until	the	formation	of	the	Ulster	Division	in	1914	that	military	 Orangeism	 gained	 the	 approbation	 of	 the	 authorities	 (Fitzpatrick	2014,	31-34).	
	 343	
The	record	of	Orange	war	service	is	presented	as	a	seamless	tapestry	of	valour	and	virtue.	Audio	narrations	amplify	the	basic	theme.	There	is	an	account	of	the	Somme	by	a	former	member	of	the	Central	Antrim	UVF	who	participated	in	the	Larne	gunrunning	before	volunteering	for	the	Ulster	Division.	He	describes	lodge	meetings	in	his	regiment	and	fellow	soldiers	wearing	orange	ribbons	and	sashes.	In	 the	 glass	 case,	 a	 range	 of	 objects	 and	 ephemera	 intertwine	 histories	 of	 the	UVF,	 Home	 Rule,	 the	 Ulster	 Division	 and	 the	 post-partition	 security	 forces	 in	Northern	Ireland.			
	
Photo	 5.26	Mannequins	 in	 RUC	 and	 UDR	 uniform	 in	 front	 of	 a	 Belfast	 Orange	 lodge	 banner	honouring	the	UDR.				This	 section	 effects	 a	 terminological	 transition	 from	 discussing	 “Ireland”	 (and	“Irish”	 Unionism)	 to	 the	 new	 “Ulster”	 state	 with	 no	 explanation	 of	 partition.	
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There	 is	 temporal	 distortion	 as	 the	 insurgent	 UVF	 metamorphoses	 into	 the	Ulster	Division	and	the	UDR.	Underneath	the	banner	of	the	“Ulster	Defenders	of	the	 Realm”	 are	 mannequins	 in	 RUC	 and	 UDR	 uniform	 (photo	 5.26).	 In	 its	conflation	of	military	symbolism	and	time	periods,	this	section	of	the	exhibition	imitates	Loyalist	parades	 in	which	 the	UVF	and	UDR	are	 typically	portrayed	as	having	the	same	lineage.	The	figurative	presence	of	the	RUC	and	UDR	makes	for	a	muscular	 visual	 statement.	 In	 this	 uniformed	 embodiment	 of	 the	 old	 Unionist	state,	 there	 is	 a	 latent	 note	 of	 sectarianism.	 The	 RUC	 and	 the	 UDR	 were	 the	institutional	 foci	 of	 long-term	 Catholic	 grievances	 over	 Protestant	 domination.	The	overwhelmingly	Protestant	UDR,	a	British	Territorial	Army	regiment	formed	out	of	 the	Ulster	 Special	Constabulary	 (the	notorious	B	 Specials),	was	 long	 the	subject	 of	 controversy	 over	 its	 collusion	 with,	 and	 infiltration	 by,	 Loyalist	paramilitaries	 (O’Leary	 and	 McGarry	 1993,	 267-270;	 Bruce	 1992,	 215-218).	Among	older	Catholics,	the	institutional	identification	of	Orangeism	and	security	forces	 compromised	 by	 sectarianism	 would	 doubtless	 provoke	 negative	responses.	 Representing	 the	 old	 social	 order	 in	 this	 way	 also	 compounds	 the	absence	 of	 Catholic	 perspectives	 in	 the	 exhibition.	 Catholics	 appear	 either	 as	enemies	 (Jacobites,	 Republicans)	 or	 as	 marginal	 actors	 in	 a	 past	 where	Protestants	were	always	on	the	right	side	of	history.			The	 exhibition	 goes	 on	 to	 show	 the	Order	 in	 a	 different	 light	 as	 a	 “worldwide	movement”	 and	proudly	declares	 that	 there	 are	Grand	Lodges	 in	many	 former	British	colonies.	The	photographic	backdrop	of	this	section	shows	the	Lagos	Fine	Blues	Loyal	Orange	Lodge	(LOL)	801	in	the	1930s.	Imagery	of	black	Africans	in	full	Orange	regalia	certainly	confounds	stereotypes.	The	point	is	driven	home	by	
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another	large	image	of	the	Las	Vegas	Purple	Star	LOL	212	with	a	black	American	Orangeman	 garishly	 garbed	 in	 sash	 and	 stars	 and	 stripes	 tie.	 A	 touchscreen	interactive	 allows	 the	 visitor	 to	 search	 a	map	 of	 “World	 Orangeism	 Today”	 to	discover	active	and	defunct	lodges	in	different	countries.	Presenting	the	Order	as	a	multiracial	 international	 fraternity	 in	 this	way	 plays	 to	 the	 gallery	 of	 liberal	multiculturalism.	 There	 is	 no	 mention	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 Orangeism	 in	 these	countries	 has	 had	 to	 adapt	 to	 intemperate	 political	 climes.	 For	 example,	 in	Canada,	 the	 Order’s	 diminishing	 influence	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	 brought	about	 its	 conversion	 to	 Canadian	 patriotism	 and	 opposition	 to	 Québécois	nationalism	 (McAuley,	 Tonge,	 and	Mycock	2011,	 48-49).	 The	Canadian	Order’s	declining	membership	 also	 forced	 the	 leadership	 to	 accept	 Protestant-Catholic	mixed	marriages	in	the	mid-1990s	(Kaufmann	2009,	315).		In	this	section	the	popular	culture	of	Northern	Ireland	is	co-opted	to	broaden	the	appeal	 of	 Orangeism.	 Arguably	 the	 museum’s	 most	 high-profile	 exhibit	 is	 the	collarette	George	Best	wore	as	a	member	of	the	Junior	Royal	Black	Institution.122	Best’s	footballing	prowess	has	granted	him	iconic	status	among	Protestants	and	Catholics	 in	Northern	 Ireland,	 but	 also	 throughout	 the	UK	 and	 the	Republic	 of	Ireland.	 The	 museum’s	 collection	 is	 short	 of	 objects	 with	 cross-community	resonance.	There	are	artefacts	of	historical	 importance,	such	as	an	apron	worn	by	 an	 Orangeman	 at	 Dolly’s	 Brae,	 but	 these	 have	 clear	 political	 meanings	inseparable	 from	 the	 institutional	 environment	 in	 which	 they	 are	 displayed.	Channelling	 the	 prestige	 of	 a	 high-profile	 sportsman	 permits	 the	 Order	 to	portray	itself	as	culturally	mainstream.	Best’s	collarette	sits	alongside	that	worn																																																									122 	The	 Royal	 Black	 Institution	 is	 a	 more	 exclusive,	 religious	 and	 upper-class	 branch	 of	Orangeism,	organised	 in	preceptories.	Each	 is	drawn	 from	 the	 “Royal	Arch	Purple”	 chapters	of	the	Order	(see	Buckley	1985,	31-32).	
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by	 Terence	 O’Neill	 as	 an	 Orangeman.	 The	 implication:	 the	 great	 and	 the	 good	among	Ulster	Protestants	endorse	Orangeism	as	cultural	orthodoxy	in	Northern	Ireland.	 (During	my	 visit,	 I	 observe	 two	 young	 religious	Orangemen	 enthusing	about	the	collarette,	clearly	proud	that	such	an	internationally	renowned	person	shared	their	worldview	at	the	same	age.)			The	 exhibition	 indulges	 in	 historical	 revisionism	 in	 its	 framing	 of	 the	 Order’s	political	 development	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 In	 the	 description	 of	 the	relationship	between	Orangeism	and	“Political	Unionism”,	the	Order	is	promoted	as	 the	 progressive	 child	 of	 constitutional	 liberty	 whose	 “patriotic	 credentials”	were	established	in	the	1790s.	The	progressive	character	of	Orangeism	has	been	overshadowed	by	its	subsequent	conversion	to	Unionism:		 It	 was	 this	 support	 for	 the	 Constitutional	 settlement	 that	 often	 resulted	 in	Orangemen,	or	the	Institution,	being	regarded	as	reactionary	or	conservative,	during	the	political	reforms	of	the	Nineteenth	Century.						To	say	that	Orangemen	have	always	been	conservative	or	unionist	would	be	an	oversimplification.	Many	Orangemen,	if	not	a	majority,	opposed	the	Act	of	Union…			The	 reinvention	 of	 Orangemen	 as	 “patriots”	 is	 a	 subtle	 negation	 of	 Irish	nationalism.	 Between	 1782	 and	 1801,	 when	 the	 Dublin	 Parliament	 was	legislatively	 independent	 of	 Britain,	 the	 Irish	 Patriot	 Party	 represented	 the	landed	 interests	 of	 the	 Anglican	 Protestant	 Ascendancy.	 However,	 Anglican	“colonial	 nationalism”	 meant	 subjugating	 both	 Irish	 Catholics,	 and	 Ulster	Presbyterians	(McBride	1998,	20).	The	reference	to	Orangemen	opposing	the	Act	of	 Union	 is	 accurate,	 but	 omits	 the	 rationale	 for	 abandoning	 their	 Irish	“patriotism”.	 Most	 Loyalists	 opposed	 the	 Union,	 but	 Catholic	 emancipation	 in	1829	 made	 the	 logic	 of	 an	 Irish	 Parliament	 redundant.	 By	 this	 time	 the	
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Protestant	Ascendancy	came	to	see	the	Union	as	the	best	defence	against	Rome	and	 an	 Irish	 Parliament	 under	 the	 sway	 of	 Catholics	 and	 Liberals	 (Fitzpatrick	2014,	15).			The	Act	of	Union	repackaged	the	Williamite	social	contract	under	new	political	realities.	Disestablishment	of	 the	Church	of	 Ireland	 in	1869	broke	the	compact,	causing	a	brief	surge	of	Orange	support	for	Home	Rule,	but	this	evaporated	when	the	cause	became	associated	with	Catholic	Irish	nationalism	(Miller	1978,	62).	In	its	 efforts	 to	distance	Orangeism	 from	Tory	 reaction,	 the	exhibition	 submerges	the	 primary	 factor	 in	 the	 Order’s	 growth.	 It	 was	 the	 multi-class	 Protestant	opposition	 to	 Catholic	 rights	 that	 nourished	 Orangeism	 in	 this	 period.	 To	recognise	this	historical	 truth	would	be	to	 illuminate	the	movement’s	sectarian	origins.	Instead	the	history	of	nineteenth	century	Orangeism	is	falsified	to	imbue	it	with	Whig/Liberal	 characteristics	 as	 a	 champion	 of	 constitutional	 freedoms.	The	 visitor	 is	 exhorted	 to	 “remember	 1690”	 when	 the	 Glorious	 Revolution	enshrined	 a	 series	 of	 liberties	 including	 “Religious	 Toleration”,	 “Freedom	 of	Speech”,	 “Freedom	 of	 the	 Subject”,	 “Parliamentary	 Democracy”	 and	“Constitutional	 Monarchy”.	 The	 grafting	 of	 liberal	 democratic	 values	 onto	Orangeism	 falsely	 situates	 the	 Order	 within	 the	 universalist	 tradition	 of	 the	Enlightenment	and	veils	its	particularist	ideological	character.		The	 symbiosis	 of	 Orangeism	 and	 Unionism	 is	 explained	 by	 mass	 Protestant	opposition	 to	Home	Rule	 and	 the	Order	 is	 credited	with	being	 instrumental	 in	establishing	 the	 Ulster	 Unionist	 Council	 in	 1905.	 Orangeism	 is	 shown	 to	 have	been	 the	 hegemonic	 ideology	 in	 the	 Unionist	 state	 after	 1921.	 Although	 not	explicitly	stated,	the	partition	of	Ireland	is	seen	as	marking	a	cultural	shift	among	
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Ulster	 Protestants	 from	 Irishness	 to	 Britishness.	 Commenting	 on	 Orange	membership	in	the	historic	nine	counties	of	Ulster,	the	exhibition	states:		 The	Institution	remains	committed	to	the	constitutional	Union	between	Great	Britain	 and	 Northern	 Ireland,	 but	 aware	 that	 it	 retains	 members	 in	 the	Republic	of	 Ireland.	Although	in	a	different	country,	many	of	these	members	regard	themselves	as	being	culturally	British.			In	 other	 words,	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Unionist	 state	 negated	 any	 sense	 of	 Irish	identity	among	Protestants.	The	exhibition’s	reductionist	treatment	of	Protestant	Irishness	 lays	 bare	 the	 process	 in	 which	 activist	 heritage	 is	 politically	constructed	 in	 the	 present	 to	 underwrite	 social	 group	 identities.	 The	 largest	single	element	of	the	exhibition	concerns	contemporary	parading.	In	the	closing	section	 of	 the	 main	 gallery,	 the	 narrative	 picks	 up	 the	 earlier	 thread	 of	nineteenth	 century	 inter-communal	 tensions	 over	 parading.	 At	 this	 point	 the	political	dimension	of	the	cultural	“celebration	of	Orangeism”	is	obfuscated.	The	visitor	reads	 that	many	clashes	over	parading	 in	 the	nineteenth	century	“could	be	 characterised	 as	 ritual	 confrontations	 as	 opposed	 to	 politically	 driven	opposition.”	Bringing	 the	 issue	 into	 the	present,	 the	exhibition	narrative	 states	that	many	contemporary	 controversies	 can	be	explained	by	a	 failure	 to	diffuse	tensions	over	competing	“community	rights.”	The	root	cause	of	these	problems	is	isolated	 in	 the	 Troubles,	 implying	 that	 contemporary	 conflicts	 over	 parading	have	no	deeper	historical	causation	or	connection	to	the	ideological	circuitry	of	Orangeism.			The	Troubles	marked	the	“politicisation”	of	parading,	with	a	marked	acceleration	of	 this	 process	 in	 the	 1990s.	 Invoking	 violence	 against	 the	 “Orange	 Family”	during	 the	Troubles	and	 the	persistence	of	attacks	on	Orange	halls	 since	1998,	
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the	 narrative	 justifies	 Orange	 suspicion	 towards	 the	 “demands	 by	 emerging	residents’	associations	for	talks”.	In	other	words,	opposition	to	Orange	parades	is	politically	motivated	by	Republicans	and	therefore	illegitimate.	Republicans	have	been	 prominent	 in	 leading	 grassroots	 opposition	 to	 Orange	 parades,	 but	 the	exhibition’s	 underlying	 rationale	 is	 that	 Catholic	 antipathy	 to	 parading	 has	nothing	to	do	with	the	social	anxieties	it	may	cause.			The	 official	 “Orange	 View”	 is	 given	 as	 outright	 opposition	 to	 the	 1998	 Public	Processions	 (Northern	 Ireland)	 Act	 that	 created	 the	 Parades	 Commission	 as	“deeply	 and	 irrevocably	 flawed.”	 The	 Act	 should	 henceforth	 be	 scrapped	 and	replaced	 with	 new	 legislation,	 the	 content	 of	 which	 remains	 indeterminate.	There	 follows	a	contradictory	statement	that	“the	Orange	Institution	stands	 for	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	everyone	to	live	in	peace	and	equality	under	the	law.”	In	a	more	conciliatory	tone,	the	exhibition	refers	to	a	policy	change	on	the	part	of	the	 Grand	 Lodge	 of	 Ireland	 in	 2012,	 when	 it	 empowered	 Orange	 lodges	 to	negotiate	 over	parading	 at	 a	 local	 level.	 Ending	 the	policy	 of	 “non-engagement	with	 Sinn	 Fein-inspired	 resident	 associations”	 is	 portrayed	 as	 a	 means	 of	achieving	a	“lasting	positive	legacy.”			The	 2012	 ruling	 is	 hence	 the	 action	 of	 a	 “responsible	 stakeholder”	 in	 cross-community	 dialogue.	 Controversies	 over	 parading	 are	 deemed	 the	 upshot	 of	“opposing	viewpoints”	that	may	be	reconciled	by	mutual	agreement.	SDLP	MLA	Alban	 Maginness,	 DUP	 MP	 Nigel	 Dodds	 and	 UUP	 councillor	 David	 Taylor	 are	quoted	 as	 representing	 the	 Nationalist	 and	 Unionist	 positions.	 (Notably,	 the	SDLP	 is	 the	 acceptable	 face	 of	 Irish	 nationalism.)	 The	 discussion	 of	 parading	concludes	optimistically	by	declaring	 that	 the	Order	 is	 “committed	 to	playing	a	
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full	and	constructive	part	in	finding	a	practical	solution,	one	which	is	equal	and	equitable	 to	 all.”	 This	 stance	 reflects	 institutional	 incomprehension	 at	 why	parading	may	be	contentious	in	the	first	place.	By	identifying	the	Troubles	as	the	catalyst	 for	 cultural	 conflict,	 a	 fundamental	 misunderstanding	 of	 Northern	Ireland’s	past	is	revealed.	Behind	the	call	for	disbanding	the	Parades	Commission	is	 an	 Orange	 misperception	 of	 the	 era	 before	 the	 Troubles	 as	 a	 time	 when	Catholics	voiced	no	significant	opposition	to	parades	and	would	willingly	watch	them	as	entertainment.	This	outlook	informs	the	“re-branding”	of	the	Twelfth	in	Belfast	 as	 “Orangefest”,	 with	 a	 new	 approach	 designed	 to	 promulgate	 a	carnivalesque	atmosphere	(see	McAuley,	Tonge,	and	Mycock	2011,	111-112).	It	also	ignores	the	reality	that	at	times	when	Catholics	attempted	to	challenge	the	social	order	in	Northern	Ireland,	Orange	parades	were	highly	politicised	by	the	Order	itself	(Nelson	1984,	69-70).		The	 misrepresentation	 of	 Catholics	 as	 passive	 in	 the	 face	 of	 Orange	 “public	celebrations”	 reflects	 the	 exhibition’s	 preoccupation	 with	 Catholics	 as	 either	historical	bystanders	or	aggressors.	The	parading	issue	is	deliberately	discussed	in	conjunction	with	the	persecution	of	Orangemen	during	the	Troubles.	Catholic	opposition	 to	 parading	 is	 thus	 coupled	 to	 Republican	 culpability	 in	 political	violence.	 An	 adjoining	 room	 set	 recreates	 the	 interior	 of	 an	 Orange	 hall	 and	portrays	 different	 aspects	 of	 lodge	 culture	 (photo	 5.27).	 The	 centrality	 of	 the	Protestant	 faith	 is	 foregrounded	 whilst	 emphasising	 that,	 despite	 having	“theological	 differences	with	 other	 faiths”,	members	 of	 the	Order	must	 refrain	from	“uncharitable	acts	or	words	towards	others.”	The	Orange	hall	is	described	as	the	“social	and	cultural	focal	point	for	the	Protestant	community.”	A	series	of	
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filmed	interviews	plays	onscreen,	in	which	Orangemen	discuss	their	experiences	of	the	Order.	They	accentuate	the	importance	of	the	parading	tradition	and	claim	victimhood	 by	 recounting	 attacks	 on	 Orange	 halls	 and	 their	 memories	 of	brethren	murdered	by	Republicans	during	the	Troubles.			
	
Photo	5.27	Museum	reconstruction	of	the	interior	of	an	Orange	hall.			Adjacent	to	the	room	set	is	a	stained	glass	window	bearing	a	motto	taken	from	Revelation	 2:10:	 “FAITHFUL	 UNTO	 DEATH”	 (photo	 5.28).	 The	 window	 has	 a	poppy	motif	 and	depicts	 the	Giant’s	 Causeway	 and	 the	Titanic	Belfast	 building	growing	 out	 of	 the	 East	 Belfast	 skyline.	 The	 imagery	 of	 war	 service	 and	 the	former	Harland	and	Wolff	shipyard	appear	in	the	window	to	signify	the	historical	roots	 of	 contemporary	 Orange	 identity.	 Beneath	 the	 window,	 a	 British	 Legion	wreath	has	been	laid	by	the	Grand	Lodge	of	Ireland.	Adjacent	to	the	window	is	a	touchscreen	 interactive	 “Murdered	 Members	 1961-2012”,	 wherein	 the	 visitor	can	access	the	332	names.	The	memorial	area	is	monitored	via	CCTV	and	visitors	
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are	 requested	 not	 to	 “interfere	 with	 the	 ICT	 equipment.”	 At	 the	 climax	 of	 the	exhibition,	 the	visitor	 thus	encounters	an	exhibit	with	a	dual	 function:	a	shrine	and	 advocacy	 for	 Orange	 victims.	 By	 emphasising	 Protestant	 suffering,	 the	exhibition	offers	a	rejoinder	to	Sinn	Féin’s	claims	of	communal	victimhood.	The	Order’s	justification	of	parading	as	defending	Protestant	cultural	tradition	in	the	teeth	of	persecution	is	symmetrical	to	Republican	arguments	over	the	historical	oppression	of	Gaelic	culture.							
	
Photo	5.28	Memorial	stained	glass	window	with	poppy	motif	and	images	of	Ulster:	the	Titanic	Belfast	building	(left)	and	the	Giant’s	Causeway	(right).			The	 exhibition’s	 authors	 clearly	 understand	 the	 political	 value	 of	 cultural	relativism.	On	 the	upper	 floor	of	 the	museum	 is	a	 temporary	exhibition	on	 the	defining	 features	 of	 the	 parading	 tradition:	 Orange	 arches,	 drums,	 bands,	banners	 and	 uniforms.	 The	 exhibition	 is	 aimed	 primarily	 at	 children,	 with	interactive	 features	 and	 participatory	 activities	 (photo	 5.29).	 These	 include	dressing	 up	 in	 Orange	 costume,	 designing	 banners	 and	 audio	 stations	 for	
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listening	to	the	music	of	different	bands	(flute,	accordion,	drum	and	fife,	pipe	and	silver).		
	
Photo	5.29	Temporary	exhibition	space	configured	for	children’s	activities:	drawing,	dressing	up	and	experimenting	with	interactive	exhibits.			The	tradition	of	making	Orange	arches	in	Loyalist	communities	is	described	as	a	“feature	 of	 Orange	 cultural	 heritage”	 and	 a	 “symbol	 of	 community	 spirit	 and	pride	in	a	local	area.”	A	photograph	shows	an	arch	erected	in	Sandy	Row	in	1921.	There	 is	 no	 mention	 of	 the	 more	 provocative	 Loyalist	 tradition	 of	 lighting	bonfires	on	the	Twelfth	at	the	climax	of	the	marching	season.	Describing	the	first	Orange	parade	in	1796,	the	text	goes	on	with	the	understatement	that	“over	the	past	 200	 years	 there	 has	 been	 some	 controversy	 about	 a	 number	 of	 Orange	processions	 but	 this	 is	 very	 small	 compared	 to	 the	 positive	 and	 festival	 like	atmosphere	 that	 prevails	 during	 most	 Orange	 celebrations.”	 (There	 is	 an	assumption	 here	 that	 the	 visitor	 will	 know	 why	 Orange	 parades	 are	controversial.)	The	“band	tradition”	 is	discussed	as	a	cultural	activity	 involving	
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over	thirty	thousand	people	across	Ulster.	Although	it	refers	to	flute	bands,	the	popularity	 of	 the	 “Blood	 and	 Thunder”	 variety	 is	 downplayed,	 with	 a	 young	member	 of	 the	 Carryduff	 Blue	 Ribbon	 accordion	 band	 pictured	 at	 the	 2012	Unionist	 Centenaries	 commemoration	 of	 the	 Ulster	 Covenant.	 The	 youthful	bandsman	 appears	 as	 the	 respectable	 face	 of	 the	 band	 tradition,	 without	 any	paramilitary	associations.		Parading	 is	 historicised	 as	 cultural	 heritage	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 deliberately	depoliticises	 the	 ritual.	 This	 is	 clearly	 in	 line	 with	 the	 precepts	 of	 the	 REACH	project.	 However,	 in	 attempting	 to	 obviate	 problematic	 sectarian	 associations,	the	 activist	 museum	 inadvertently	 brings	 them	 into	 focus.	 In	 its	 interactive	features	the	exhibition	employs	standard	museum	methodologies	but	does	so	in	a	live	political	environment.	For	example,	the	visitor	cannot	listen	to	the	bands	at	the	 sound	 point	 without	 relating	 the	 experience	 to	 politics	 on	 the	 streets	 of	Northern	Ireland.	The	tradition	of	drumming	 is	placed	 in	a	European	historical	context	 as	 a	martial	practice	 that	may	have	been	 imported	 into	 Ireland	during	the	 Williamite	 campaign.	 In	 its	 narrative,	 the	 exhibition	 upholds	 the	 Lambeg	drum	as	a	cultural	icon	of	Orangeism	and	the	Protestant	community	at	large.123	There	 is	a	deliberate	disconnection	between	 the	cultural	artefacts	and	political	symbolism	of	parading.			Jarman	 argues	 that	 band	 performances	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 should	 be	understood	in	the	wider	European	context	of	playing	“rough	music”	to	intimidate	neighbours	 and	marginalised	 social	 groups	 (2000,	 162).	 In	 the	 exhibition,	 the																																																									123	Lambeg	drumming	is	actually	a	musical	tradition	Orangemen	share	with	their	closest	Catholic	counterparts	 the	Ancient	Order	 of	Hibernians.	 The	drum’s	 sheer	 size	makes	 it	 inconvenient	 to	carry	and	thus	relatively	rare	in	contemporary	Orange	parades	(Cooper	2009,	92-94).	
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sound	of	the	band	on	parade	is	abstracted	from	its	political	resonance	as	rough	music.	 Anyone	 who	 has	 observed	 a	 Loyalist	 parade	 will	 be	 familiar	 with	 the	visceral	drumming	and	piercing	sonic	quality	of	 the	 flutes,	which	have	obvious	potential	as	rough	music.	 In	another	social	arena	 these	sounds	would	not	have	the	 same	meaning	but	when	 associated	with	Orange	parading	 in	 the	 collective	memory,	they	can	be	understood	only	as	a	singularity.	The	fallacy	of	the	activist	museum	 is	 thus	 exposed:	 the	 cultural	 heritage	 of	 Orangeism	 cannot	 be	abstracted	 from	its	 ideological	properties.	Parading	 illustrates	how	an	object	 is	converted	into	a	sign	through	social	interaction.	As	Vološinov	proposes:		 Everything	ideological	possesses	meaning:	it	represents,	depicts,	or	stands	for	something	lying	outside	itself.	In	other	words,	it	is	a	sign.	Without	signs	there	is	
no	 ideology.	 A	 physical	 body	 equals	 itself,	 so	 to	 speak;	 it	 does	 not	 signify	anything	 but	wholly	 coincides	with	 its	 particular,	 given	 nature.	 In	 this	 case	there	is	no	question	of	ideology.	However,	 any	 physical	 body	may	 be	 perceived	 as	 an	 image…	 Any	 such	artistic-symbolic	 image	 to	 which	 a	 particular	 physical	 object	 gives	 rise	 is	already	 an	 ideological	 product.	 The	 physical	 object	 is	 converted	 into	 a	 sign.	Without	 ceasing	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 material	 reality,	 such	 an	 object,	 to	 some	degree,	reflects	and	refracts	another	reality.	(1973,	9)			Moreover	 the	 conversion	 of	 physical	 objects	 into	 signs	 is	 the	 basis	 of	 social	consciousness:		 Every	ideological	sign	is	not	only	a	reflection,	a	shadow,	of	reality,	but	is	also	itself	a	material	segment	of	that	very	reality.	Every	phenomenon	functioning	as	 an	 ideological	 sign	 has	 some	 kind	 of	 material	 embodiment,	 whether	 in	sound,	physical	mass,	color,	movements	of	the	body…	A	sign	is	a	phenomenon	of	 the	 external	world.	Both	 the	 sign	 itself	 and	all	 the	 effects	 it	 produces	 (all	those	 actions,	 reactions,	 and	 new	 signs	 it	 elicits	 in	 the	 surrounding	 social	milieu)	occur	in	outer	experience…	consciousness	itself	can	arise	and	become	a	
viable	fact	only	in	the	material	embodiment	of	signs.	(11)			Orange	regalia	are	 treated	as	cultural	heritage	with	no	potential	 for	 ideological	conversion	 into	 signs.	 The	 tradition	 of	 wearing	 the	 sash	 and	 collarette	 are	
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described	with	a	brief	explanation	of	 the	associated	symbolism:	 the	Holy	Bible,	Crown,	Ark	of	the	Covenant,	Aaron’s	rod,	the	sword	of	the	Lord	and	Gideon,	and	King	William	III.	The	symbols	are	explained	as	representing	the	“main	aspects	of	Orangeism	–	the	Reformed	Faith,	Cultural	Heritage,	History	and	Fraternity.”	The	deeper	 ethno-political	 design	 of	 these	 symbols	 is	 absent	 from	 the	 narrative,	along	 with	 their	 masonic	 origins.	 The	 Order’s	 Old	 Testament	 symbolism	originates	 in	 the	clandestine	associational	 culture	of	Freemasonry.	 It	 continues	to	 figure	analogically	 in	Orange	public	rituals	and	private	 initiation	ceremonies	which	 confirm	 the	 social	 status	 of	 Ulster	 Protestants	 as	 “God’s	 chosen	 people”	(Jarman	 1999,	 40;	 Buckley	 1989,	 188).	 Masonic	 symbols	 possess	 polysemic	qualities	 and	 have	 been	 repurposed	 for	 use	 in	 friendly	 societies	 and	 trade	unions.	 However,	 Old	 Testament	 and	 other	 masonic	 symbols	 sacred	 to	 the	culture	of	Orangeism	cannot	be	depoliticised.	Practising	Catholics	are	forbidden	to	join	the	Order,	a	political	reality	determining	the	meaning	of	Orange	symbols.			
	
Photo	 5.30	 “Create	 your	 own	 Orange	 banner”:	 a	 visitor	 has	 written,	 “Our	 Banner	 is	 still	 at	Drumcree”	on	the	whiteboard	(left).			
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The	interactive	allowing	visitors	to	design	their	own	banners	features	magnetic	symbols	that	can	be	arranged	on	a	template	and	pens	to	draw	on	a	whiteboard.	The	 visitor	 is	 encouraged	 “to	 draw	 a	 banner	 that	 would	 represent	 your	 own	family	or	community	 identity”	or,	 if	a	member	of	the	Order,	to	use	the	symbols	“to	create	your	own	Orange	banner.”	On	the	board,	a	visitor	has	used	the	symbol	of	the	Cross	and	Crown	(the	emblem	of	the	Royal	Black	Institution)	and	inscribed	“Portadown”	above	the	message:	“Our	Banner	is	still	at	Drumcree”	(photo	5.30).		
	
Photo	5.31	Inside	the	Twaddell	Avenue	protest	camp,	April	2016.	
	
	The	 representation	 by	 the	 Museum	 of	 Orange	 Heritage	 of	 the	 Order’s	 public	rituals	 demonstrates	why	 cultural	 identity	 cannot	 be	 cast	 off	 from	 its	 political	moorings.	 As	 physical	 objects	 converted	 into	 ideological	 signs,	 Orange	 regalia	have	 identical	 political	 meanings	 within	 and	 without	 the	 museum.	 The	ideological	 signification	of	objects	explains	 the	proliferation	of	material	 culture	in	 Orange	 public	 rituals.	 Banners	 are	 axiomatic	 of	 the	 social	 process	 of	
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converting	objects	 into	 ideological	signs.	The	visitor	to	the	museum	who	wrote	“Our	 Banner	 is	 still	 at	 Drumcree”	 was	 referring	 to	 the	 custom	 that	 the	 lodge	banner	must	 leave	 the	Orange	hall	on	 the	Twelfth	and	be	 returned	 in	order	 to	complete	 the	 ritual.	 Returning	 the	 banner	 to	 the	 hall	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	ritual’s	performance,	but	also	its	meaning.	
	
	
Photo	 5.32	 Loyalist	 banners	 and	 flags	 on	 Twaddell	 Avenue	 at	 the	 Crumlin	 Road	 roundabout,	April	2016.			After	the	Twelfth	parade	in	2013,	Ballysillan	LOL	1891	was	one	of	three	lodges	blocked	by	the	PSNI	on	the	return	leg	from	the	Field	in	South	Belfast	to	the	site	of	Ligoniel	Orange	hall	on	the	Crumlin	Road.124	The	Parades	Commission’s	decision	to	 re-route	 the	 parade	 sparked	 three	 days	 of	 rioting	 at	 the	 interface	 of	 the	Protestant	 Woodvale	 and	 predominantly	 Catholic	 Ardoyne	 areas.	 Interface	violence	in	North	Belfast	has	occurred	frequently	since	1995,	particularly	around	
																																																								124	The	 Ligoniel	 Orange	 hall	 was	 gutted	 by	 an	 arson	 attack	 in	 2011.	 The	 other	 two	 lodges	parading	were	the	Ligoniel	True	Blues	LOL	1932	and	the	Earl	of	Erne	LOL	647.			
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the	 July	marching	 season,	with	 Ardoyne	 a	 consistent	 flashpoint	 (Jarman	 2004,	424-425;	Shirlow	and	Murtagh	2006,	86-88).	In	the	wake	of	the	rioting,	a	protest	camp	was	established	on	Twaddell	Avenue	at	the	junction	of	Woodvale	Road	and	Crumlin	Road	(photos	5.31	and	5.32).	
	
	
Photo	 5.33	 Ballysillan	 lodge	 bannerette	 (left)	 stored	 in	 a	 portacabin	 at	 the	 Twaddell	 Avenue	protest	camp,	April	2016.				The	 lodges	 organised	 regular	 evening	 parades	 up	 Twaddell	 Avenue	 to	 the	junction,	where	substantial	PSNI	numbers	were	deployed	to	prevent	the	parade	proceeding	 onto	 the	 Crumlin	 Road.	 Ballysillan’s	 bannerette	 was	 stored	 in	 a	caravan	at	the	camp	and	carried	on	nightly	parades	up	to	the	police	lines	(photo	5.33).	The	 ideological	sign	of	 the	bannerette	was	made	through	the	continuous	cycle	 of	 parading	 to	 achieve	 the	 singular	 objective	 of	 return.	 On	 consecutive	years	the	PSNI	halted	the	lodge	at	the	top	of	Woodvale	Road	on	the	return	leg	of	
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the	Twelfth	parade,	although	significantly	in	2016	Ballysillan	was	the	only	one	of	the	three	lodges	to	reach	the	barriers.125		Twaddell	 followed	 the	 pattern	 of	 Drumcree	 in	 triggering	 cyclical	 Orange	confrontation	with	police	and	ancillary	Loyalist	unrest.	The	camp	also	took	shape	in	 the	 volatile	 climate	 of	 the	 Loyalist	 flag	 protests	 of	 2012-2013.	 The	 protests	spread	across	Northern	 Ireland	 in	response	 to	a	vote	by	Belfast	City	Council	 in	2012	to	change	its	official	policy	from	flying	the	Union	flag	all	year	to	flying	it	on	eighteen	 designated	 days.	 The	 protests	 exposed	 deep	 divisions	 between	 rank-and-file	 Loyalists	 and	 Unionist	 elites,	 but	 also	 a	 general	 lack	 of	 political	leadership	at	grassroots	 level	(Nolan	et	al.	2014,	76-80).	The	DUP	and	the	UUP	responded	by	electioneering	on	the	flag	issue	and	adopting	an	uncompromising	stance	 in	 the	 subsequent	 Haas-O’Sullivan	 talks,	 with	 the	 DUP	 including	 the	Reverend	 Mervyn	 Gibson	 in	 its	 negotiating	 team	 (130).	 Gibson,	 the	 Order’s	Belfast	 County	 Grand	 Chaplain,	 would	 become	 a	 prominent	 figure	 in	 the	Twaddell	 demonstrations.	 As	 happened	 at	 Drumcree,	 Twaddell	 has	 seen	 both	senior	Unionist	politicians	and	Orangemen	initially	showing	fervent	support,	but	subsequently	 retreating	 from	 the	 barricades.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 strong	 parallel	between	the	persistence	of	 the	Ballysillan	 lodge	and	Portadown	LOL	1	that	has	maintained	 a	 regular	 protest	 at	 Drumcree	 since	 1998	 despite	 police	containment.	 The	 political	 triangulation	 between	 mainstream	 Unionism,	Orangeism	and	grassroots	 Loyalism	 (including	paramilitaries)	 that	 occurred	 in	
																																																								125	This	prompted	media	speculation	over	a	possible	 rift	between	 the	 lodges	over	 the	 future	of	the	 protest.	 A	 deal	 was	 eventually	 struck	 between	 the	 Order	 and	 the	 Crumlin	 and	 Ardoyne	Residents	 Association,	 allowing	 all	 three	 Ligoniel	 lodges	 to	 return	 with	 their	 banners	 on	 the	morning	of	October	1,	2016,	after	which	the	camp	was	finally	dismantled.		
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Portadown	was	replicated	at	Twaddell,	but	like	the	flag	protests	is	indicative	of	a	sea	change	in	Loyalist	thinking.			The	secretary	of	the	Ballysillan	lodge,	Gerald	Solinas,	emerged	as	the	spokesman	for	the	Twaddell	camp.	Solinas,	a	 former	serviceman	in	the	Royal	Signals,	grew	up	on	Twaddell	Avenue	in	a	military	family.	He	had	a	religious	upbringing,	but	is	no	 longer	 a	 regular	 churchgoer	 outside	 his	 official	 lodge	 duties.126 	He	 was	attracted	to	Loyalist	activism	and	joined	the	Order	around	the	time	of	the	Holy	Cross	 School	 dispute.	He	 also	 became	 involved	 in	 the	Ulster	 Political	 Research	Group	 (UPRG)	 feeling	 that	 there	 was	 “no	 voice	 within	 Unionism	 for	 working-class	 interface	 areas”	 (Solinas,	 interview	 2016).	 Since	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	UDA’s	political	wing,	the	Ulster	Democratic	Party,	in	2001	the	UPRG	has	acted	as	its	 policy	 think-tank.	 After	 a	 consultation	 process	 with	 the	 paramilitary	 rank-and-file,	the	UPRG	advocated	a	state-funded	“Conflict	Transformation	Initiative”	in	 2006.	 A	 discussion	 document	 noted	 that,	 “Loyalist	 communities	 still	 have	difficulties	 in	 engaging	 in	 inter-community	work,	 and	 ‘single	 identity	work’	 to	enhance	 self-esteem	 is	 still	 very	 necessary”	 (Hall	 2006,	 20).	 It	 also	 proposed	“initiating	or	supporting	cross-community	and	interface	contacts”	(22).	In	2007	the	 Northern	 Ireland	 minister,	 Peter	 Hain,	 announced	 grant	 funding	 of	 £1.2	million	 for	 the	 initiative.	However,	 later	 that	year	the	SDLP	social	development	minister,	 Margaret	 Ritchie,	 suspended	 the	 funding,	 claiming	 the	 UDA	 had	 not	moved	on	from	criminality	after	violence	between	rival	factions	in	Carrickfergus	(Shirlow	2012,	147-156).																																																										126	Kaufmann	describes	Orangeism	as	a	“bridge	between	church-goers	and	non-attenders”	amid	a	general	decline	in	Protestant	church-going	since	the	late	1970s.	The	Order’s	own	internal	survey	data	have	recorded	low	levels	of	church	attendance	among	rank-and-file	Orangemen	(2009,	281).	
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Solinas	 was	 employed	 as	 a	 project	 worker	 on	 the	 Conflict	 Transformation	Initiative	 before	 it	 was	 wound	 up.	 As	 an	 activist	 he	 initiated	 the	 Protestant	Interface	 Network	 with	 responsibility	 for	 the	 Greater	 Shankill	 in	 areas	 under	UDA	 influence.	 He	was	 also	 active	 in	 the	 North	 and	West	 Belfast	 Parades	 and	Cultural	Forum	that	negotiated	with	the	Parades	Commission	 in	the	absence	of	any	 official	 Orange	 representation.127 	Solinas	 says	 that	 he	 did	 not	 actively	participate	 in	 the	 flag	 protests	 but	was	 present	 in	 his	 capacity	 as	 an	 interface	“community	worker”.	He	says	that	the	Loyalist	community	was	at	“boiling	point”	when	rioting	erupted	 in	2013	and	 that	 the	creation	of	 the	camp	was	 “a	way	of	channelling	 this	 frustration	 and	 anger”	 (Solinas,	 interview	 2016).	 The	 protest	was	 instigated	 with	 two	 primary	 objectives:	 to	 remove	 the	 sitting	 Parades	Commission	 and	 to	 complete	 the	 return	 leg	 of	 the	 2013	 Twelfth	 parade.	 The	camp’s	call	for	“civil	rights”	and	rhetoric	of	“civil	and	religious	liberties”	melded	the	 emancipatory	 language	 of	 the	 1960s	 with	 the	 traditional	 mantra	 of	Orangeism.	 The	 appropriation	 of	 the	 civil	 rights	 discourse	 reveals	 a	 profound	disillusionment	with	the	British	state	among	Loyalists	who	no	longer	believe	that	it	guards	their	interests.	Loyalists	idealise	the	symbols	of	British	statehood,	such	as	 the	 Crown	 and	 the	 Union	 flag,	 as	 signifying	 Ulster	 Protestant	 culture	 and	identity	but	reject	the	political	authority	which	they	represent.			
																																																								127	The	now-defunct	Forum	was	formed	in	2002	to	represent	“all	groupings	within	the	Unionist	community	 that	 are	 interested	 in	 preserving	 and	 promoting	 our	 cultural	 heritage”	(http://www.nwbelfastparadesforum.blogspot.co.uk,	 accessed	 August	 9,	 2016).	 Chaired	 by	Tommy	 Cheevers	 of	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys,	 the	 Forum	was	 a	 precursor	 to	 the	 alliance	 of	 Loyal	Orders	 and	Loyalist	 groups	 forged	 at	Twaddell.	 It	was	 involved	 in	 a	previous	dispute	with	 the	Parades	 Commission	 over	 the	 decision	 to	 re-route	 the	 Orange	 “Tour	 of	 the	 North”	 parade	 in	2011.	The	Commission’s	ruling	prevented	the	Ligoniel	True	Blues	and	Earl	of	Erne	lodges	passing	along	the	same	stretch	of	the	Crumlin	Road	at	the	Ardoyne	interface.										
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Alienation	from	the	state	is	matched	by	an	absence	of	effective	Loyalist	political	representation.	 In	 Solinas’s	 view	 the	 “Loyalist	 community	 is	 very	 fragmented,	there’s	 too	 many	 political	 parties.”	 He	 is	 critical	 of	 both	 mainstream	 Unionist	“dinosaurs”	 and	 the	Progressive	Unionists	who	were	most	 visibly	 active	 in	 the	Twaddell	protest:			 I	don’t	think	there	is	anybody	at	the	minute	who	represents	Loyalism,	the	PUP	are	making	 an	 attempt	 at	 it...	 They	 can’t	 decide	whether	 they’re	Unionist	 or	Loyalist…	 the	word	 Loyalist	 has	 always	 been	working	 class	 and	 Unionism’s	always	been	 a	middle	 class	 sort	 of	 thing,	 tip	 your	hat	 to	 the	man	 in	 the	big	house,	 so	 my	 view	 is	 they’re	 trying	 to	 be	 something	 they’re	 not.	 (Solinas,	interview	2016)				The	re-emergence	of	a	monolithic	Unionist	party	to	revivify	the	Ulster	Covenant	is	highly	improbable.128	At	the	time	of	the	Home	Rule	crisis,	a	vertical	structure	existed	 for	maintaining	Ulster’s	 covenantal	 society	 founded	 on	 the	 church,	 the	Order	 and	 a	 single	 Unionist	 party.	 After	 the	 creation	 of	 Northern	 Ireland	 this	vertical	mechanism	began	 to	break	down	and	Protestants	became	 increasingly	reliant	 on	 the	 state	 to	maintain	 the	 social	 fabric	 (Akenson	 1992,	 285).	 As	 the	state’s	 authority	began	 to	atrophy	 in	 the	1960s,	Paisleyism	and	other	 forms	of	radical	 grassroots	 Loyalism	 emerged	 to	 fill	 the	 void.	 Loyalism’s	 horizontal,	centrifugal	tendencies	account	for	the	fractious	nature	of	paramilitarism	and	the	lack	 of	 a	 coherent	 political	 direction.	 If	 the	 Order	 was	 instrumentalised	 for	mobilising	 the	 Protestant	working-class	 during	 the	Home	Rule	 crisis	 then	 that	vertical	dynamic	has	now	been	inverted.	Unionist	politicians	and	Orange	leaders	today	 gravitate	 to	 predominantly	 working-class	 Protestant	 insurgencies	 over	parades	and	flags	to	muster	support.																																																										128	Nonetheless	 given	 the	 UUP’s	 electoral	 decline	 and	 the	 DUP’s	 graduation	 to	 the	 Unionist	mainstream,	a	merger	of	the	two	parties	in	the	long-term	cannot	be	ruled	out.		
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Historically	 tensions	between	hardliners	 and	moderates	within	Unionism	have	tended	 to	 surface	 over	 Orange	 parades,	 but	 the	 lure	 of	 power	 has	 forced	compromise	 in	most	quarters.	Unionism	has	 thus	 failed	 to	meet	 its	 covenantal	obligations	 by	 acquiescing	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Parades	 Commission	 and	power-sharing	 with	 Sinn	 Féin.	 Orangeism	 now	 operates	 at	 grassroots	 level	 in	this	 political	 vacuum	 and,	 in	 its	 public	 intransigence	 over	 parading,	 offers	 a	rampart	against	what	Loyalists	see	as	a	Republican	rout.	Formally	divorced	from	the	UUP	in	2005,	the	Order	continues	to	recruit	Loyalists	whose	politics	may	be	at	variance	with	those	of	its	leadership,	which	are	still	orientated	to	Unionism.		Twaddell	 in	 many	 ways	 refracted	 the	 Orange	 populism	 of	 William	 Johnston	through	the	bicultural	 lens	of	 the	Belfast	Agreement.	 Johnston	himself	believed	in	 the	right	of	both	Protestants	and	Catholics	 to	parade	 in	 their	own	traditions	(Wright	1996,	341-342).	The	Twaddell	 camp	 justified	 its	 “civil	 rights”	 cause	 in	much	the	same	way	by	demanding	“equality”	between	the	two	traditions.	Herein	the	deeper	truth	that	antagonistic	identities	cannot	coexist	peacefully	within	the	same	social	 space	 is	obfuscated.	 In	denying	 the	social	 implications	of	parading,	the	 camp’s	 message	 echoed	 that	 of	 the	 Museum	 of	 Orange	 Heritage,	 but	 its	potential	 for	inflaming	sectarianism	was	fully	realised	at	the	Ardoyne	interface.	Loyalists	clearly	recognise	the	political	traction	of	“single	identity	work”.	Public	funding	 for	 this	 now	 favours	 what	 the	 state	 doubtless	 considers	 to	 be	“respectable”	 projects,	 like	 the	 Museum	 of	 Orange	 Heritage,	 over	 grassroots	Loyalist	initiatives	aimed	at	transitioning	paramilitaries.	The	Twaddell	camp	has	nonetheless	undertaken	 “single	 identity	work”	by	other	means	 to	 articulate	 an	identical	stance	on	parading.	
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At	 the	Somme	commemoration	parade	 in	 June	2016,	 the	Ballysillan	bannerette	was	 visible	 at	 the	 head	 of	 the	 lodge	 contingent,	 resplendent	 in	 the	 afternoon	sunshine	 (photo	5.34).	 Solinas	was	 leading	 the	way,	willing	 his	 brethren	 on	 in	high	 spirits.	This	 strain	of	 autonomous	working-class	Orangeism	 is	beyond	 the	control	 of	 the	 Grand	 Lodge	 of	 Ireland,	 just	 as	 it	was	 in	 centuries	 past.	 Among	these	 Orangemen	 there	 is	 no	 genuflection	 to	 “big	 house”	 Unionists	 or	 the	officialdom	at	Schomberg	House.		
	
Photo	5.34	Ballysillan	lodge	on	parade	with	its	bannerette	by	Woodvale	Park,	June	2016.			Orangeism	 therefore	 finds	 itself	 at	 a	 political	 crossroads.	 Top-level	 moves	 to	professionalise	 the	 Order	 as	 an	 NGO	 are	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 Orange	 grassroots.	After	the	Museum	of	Orange	Heritage	marked	the	occasion	of	its	five	thousandth	visitor,	 the	 Order	 announced	 a	 corporate	 retrenchment.	 This	 included	making	redundant	the	director	of	services,	David	Hume,	one	of	 the	museum’s	principal	architects,	 to	 be	 replaced	 by	 a	 new	 post	 of	 chief	 executive.	 The	 expense	 of	
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developing	the	museum,	much	of	it	met	by	the	Order	itself,	was	given	as	a	factor	in	the	cost-cutting	exercise	(Belfast	Telegraph,	December	31,	2015).	The	neglect	of	local	Orange	halls,	such	as	Ligoniel,	has	been	accompanied	by	an	extravagant	branding	 exercise	 that	 threatens	 to	 congeal	 the	 movement’s	 lifeblood	 of	working-class	Loyalists,	for	whom	“culture	wars”	are	fought	in	the	streets.		
The	Last	of	Ulster			In	2013	“Derry-Londonderry”	became	the	UK	City	of	Culture	hosting	artistic	and	musical	 spectacles	 in	 a	 kaleidoscopic	 display	 of	 biculturalism.	 This	 promised	much-needed	 investment	 in	 the	 now	 familiar	 UK-wide	 pattern	 of	 urban	regeneration	through	cultural	production.	The	award	presented	fresh	marketing	opportunities	 for	 the	 “Maiden	 City”	 as	 a	 tourist	 destination.	 Like	 Belfast,	 the	geography	of	communal	division	in	Derry	has	been	adapted	to	service	the	local	tourist	and	heritage	 industries.	Tourism,	heritage	and	 identity	politics	are	now	diffuse	within	the	post-industrial	landscape.	Derry’s	most	contentious	site	–	the	original	Walled	City	–	has	been	shaped	by	the	“shared	space”	agenda	promoted	through	 publications	 from	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 First	 Minister	 and	 Deputy	 First	Minister,	 and	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	 Executive:	 A	 Shared	 Future	 (2005)	 and	
Together:	 Building	 a	 United	 Community	 (2013).	 Both	 documents	 proposed	representing	cultural	identity	through	publicly	funded	heritage	and	arts	projects,	as	a	means	of	promoting	good	community	relations	(Hocking	2015,	29-30).			I	 travel	 to	Derry	on	the	Saturday	after	Easter	when	tensions	over	parading	are	running	high.	From	the	bus	station	I	enter	the	Walled	City	through	the	Shipquay	Gate	and	walk	up	to	the	Diamond.	The	square	is	dominated	by	the	Cenotaph	and	
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the	 shuttered	shop	 front	of	Austins,	which	a	blue	plaque	proclaims	 to	be	 “THE	WORLD’S	OLDEST	INDEPENDENT	DEPARTMENT	STORE”	(photo	5.35).	Austins	closed	 its	 doors	 in	 March	 2016,	 having	 fallen	 prey	 to	 the	 trade	 winds	 of	 the	market.	 The	 war	 memorial	 was	 restored	 with	 financial	 support	 from	 the	Heritage	 Lottery	 Fund.	 Spearheaded	 by	 the	 Holywell	 Trust,	 a	 publicly	 funded	peace-building	 organisation,	 the	 project	 identified	 the	 war	 dead	 listed	 on	 the	memorial,	conducted	educational	work	and	re-opened	the	gates	of	the	Cenotaph	to	 make	 it	 publicly	 accessible.	 The	 Trust’s	 efforts	 were	 endorsed	 by	 the	Apprentice	Boys	of	Derry	and	the	Diamond	was	re-designated	a	“shared	space”	(Hocking	 2015,	 126-128).	 The	 Diamond,	 as	 the	 symbolic	 heart	 of	 the	 city	 and	focus	 of	 inter-communal	 tension,	 is	 central	 to	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys’	 annual	commemorations	of	the	Siege	of	Derry	(Cohen	2007,	960).		
	
Photo	5.35	The	Cenotaph	(right)	and	the	façade	of	Austins	(left)	in	the	Diamond.			
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Derry	acted	as	a	crucible	for	the	Troubles	when	on	October	5,	1968,	the	RUC	met	a	peaceful	Northern	 Ireland	Civil	Rights	Association	march	with	baton	charges.	Police	brutality	ignited	three	days	of	rioting	on	the	Catholic	Bogside	to	the	west	of	 the	 Walled	 City.	 Out	 of	 the	 chaos	 emerged	 the	 Derry	 Citizens’	 Action	Committee,	 which	 campaigned	 to	 end	 Unionist	 control	 of	 the	 Londonderry	Corporation.	 The	 Committee	 opposed	 Unionist	 gerrymandering	 of	 electoral	boundaries	and	advocated	universal	suffrage	for	Derry’s	citizens	(Ó	Dochartaigh	2005,	18-22).	Today	Sinn	Féin	is	the	largest	party	on	Derry	and	Strabane	District	Council,	with	the	SDLP	a	distant	second,	ahead	of	the	DUP.	New	political	realities	have	forced	the	Apprentice	Boys	into	negotiating	with	old	enemies	and	reaching	accommodations	on	parading	and	other	 issues.	Major	demographic	 change	has	also	 occurred	 in	 the	 city	 since	 1968	with	many	 Protestants	moving	 eastwards	onto	the	Waterside,	leaving	only	the	small	Loyalist	enclave	of	the	Fountain	Estate	on	the	edge	of	the	Walled	City	(Shirlow	et	al.	2005,	14-15).			Heading	southwest	from	the	Diamond	onto	Society	Street,	I	reach	the	Apprentice	Boys	Memorial	Hall	which	houses	 the	Siege	Museum.	The	thematic	centrepiece	of	the	museum	is	the	Siege	of	Derry,	which	began	on	December	7,	1688	(Julian	calendar)	 when	 thirteen	 apprentices	 raised	 the	 drawbridge	 and	 closed	 the	Ferryquay	Gate	to	the	Jacobite	army.	The	siege	is	on	a	par	with	the	battles	of	the	Boyne	 and	 the	 Somme	 in	 Loyalist	 mythology.	 Co-financed	 by	 the	 PEACE	 III	programme	and	the	Heritage	Lottery	Fund,	the	museum	was	officially	opened	in	March	2016	with	Derry’s	Sinn	Féin	mayor,	Elisha	McCallion,	 in	attendance.	The	museum	 is	 part	 of	 a	 self-guided	 “Siege	Heroes	Trail”	 that	 takes	 in	 twenty-four	
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historic	sites	around	the	Walled	City.	Inside	the	museum	I	am	given	a	guide	for	the	Trail,	with	historical	information	and	a	map	of	the	Walled	City.			The	 museum’s	 permanent	 exhibition	 is	 arranged	 over	 three	 floors.	 On	 the	ground	 floor	 is	 a	 short	 introduction	 to	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys	 and	 their	 two	defining	 episodes:	 the	 “Shutting	 of	 the	 Gates”	 and	 the	 “Relief	 of	 Derry”.	 In	 the	corner	 of	 the	 gallery	 is	 a	 large	 effigy	 of	 “Lundy	 the	 Traitor”	 (see	 discussion	below)	of	 the	 kind	burned	 at	 the	 annual	 commemoration	of	 the	 original	 event	(photo	5.36).		
	
														 	 	Photo	5.36	Effigy	of	“Lundy	the	Traitor”	in	the	Siege	Museum.	
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The	ground	floor	also	provides	a	large-scale	map	of	the	Walled	City	for	visitors	to	orientate	 themselves.	There	 is	a	brief	overview	of	 the	city	 in	 the	context	of	 the	Ulster	 Plantation	 and	 a	 timeline	 recording	 milestones	 in	 seventeenth	 century	British	and	Irish	history,	including	a	backdrop	image	of	Protestants	being	forced	into	the	river	by	Catholic	pikes	during	the	1641	Rebellion.			The	spectre	of	1641	is	raised	again	at	the	start	of	the	siege	story	on	the	first	floor.	Acknowledging	 that	 the	 Comber	 Letter 129 	containing	 a	 plot	 to	 massacre	Protestants	was	“probably	a	hoax”,	it	is	offered	as	an	explanation	for	the	fearful	atmosphere	 in	 Derry	when	 the	 Catholic	 Earl	 of	 Antrim	 arrived	 at	 the	 gates	 of	Derry	with	his	 “Redshanks”.	The	arrival	of	 the	 Jacobite	 troops	placed	 the	city’s	Protestants	in	a	quandary:		 The	 citizens	 faced	 a	 dilemma:	 should	 they	 admit	 the	 King’s	 troops	 and	 risk	being	slaughtered	or	refuse	them	entry	and	risk	being	charged	with	rebellion?			The	existential	dilemma	of	1688	recurs	in	the	schizophrenic	history	of	Loyalism.	In	closing	the	gates	the	apprentices	took	unilateral	action	whilst	the	city’s	inept	burghers	vacillated.	By	selflessly	defending	their	co-religionists,	the	apprentices	bequeathed	 a	 voluntarist	 paradigm	 for	 Loyalists.	 The	 names	 of	 the	 thirteen	apprentices	are	listed	in	a	roll	of	honour	and	their	ringleader,	Henry	Campsie,	is	physically	 personified	 using	 a	 costumed	mannequin.	 The	 apprentices	 are	 also	visualised	two	dimensionally	through	a	dramatic	scene	in	the	style	of	a	graphic	novel,	calculated	to	appeal	to	young	visitors.																																																											129	The	 anonymous	 epistle,	 addressed	 to	 Lord	 Mount-Alexander,	 was	 allegedly	 found	 in	 the	streets	 of	 the	 small	 town	 of	 Comber	 in	 County	 Down.	 It	 was	 almost	 certainly	 a	 forgery	 but	alarmed	Derry	Protestants	(Bardon	2005,	152).		
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The	return	of	Crown	forces	to	Derry	under	the	command	of	Lieutenant-Colonel	Robert	 Lundy	 is	 portrayed	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 loyal	 entreaty	 to	 London.	 This	gave	 nominal	 control	 of	 the	 city	 to	King	 James,	 but	with	 a	 Protestant	 garrison	“agreeable	 to	 its	religious	concerns”.	The	visitor	 learns	 that	upon	the	arrival	of	King	James	at	the	gates	of	the	city	on	April	18,	1689,	soldiers	fired	upon	him	with	cries	 of	 “No	 surrender!”	 (The	 traditional	 Loyalist	 motto	 is	 headlined	 above	James’s	 portrait.)	 When	 city	 leaders	 attempted	 to	 mollify	 James,	 he	 offered	surrender	 terms.	 Unilateralism	 comes	 to	 the	 fore	 once	 more	 in	 the	 figure	 of	Adam	Murray,	a	 farmer-turned-soldier	who	challenged	Lundy’s	 leadership	as	a	popular	 tribune.	 The	 sword	 Murray	 reputedly	 carried	 during	 the	 siege	 –	 the	museum’s	most	significant	artefact	–	is	on	display.	Lundy	was	forced	to	resign	as	governor	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 duo,	 Colonel	 Henry	 Baker	 and	 Reverend	 George	Walker.	For	the	Apprentice	Boys,	the	usurpation	of	Lundy	by	Murray,	Baker	and	Walker	 was	 not	 being	 disloyal	 to	 the	 Crown.	 By	 this	 time	 James	 had	 been	dethroned	 by	 William	 and	 Mary	 and	 Lundy’s	 inability	 to	 meet	 the	 existential	threat	to	the	city’s	Protestants	exposed;	the	Loyalist	dilemma	was	thus	resolved	in	one	fell	swoop.		The	 exhibition	 emphasises	 the	 influence	 of	 differing	 first-hand	 accounts	 in	colouring	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 siege.	 Critiquing	 George	 Walker’s	 A	 True	
Account	of	the	Siege	of	London-Derry	(1689),	 it	 comments	 that	he	 concentrated	on	 his	 own	 role	 in	 the	 siege	 and	 “critics	 argued	 that	 his	 version	 of	 events	deliberately	 overlooked	 the	 involvement	 of	 others,	 particularly	 those	 of	 the	Presbyterian	 faith,	 the	majority	religion	of	 the	besieged	city.”	The	Presbyterian	John	 Mackenzie’s	 rejoinder	 A	Narrative	 of	 the	 Siege	 of	 London-Derry	 (1690)	 is	
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discussed	comparatively.	In	noting	the	disparities	between	the	two	accounts,	the	exhibition	pitches	for	historical	objectivity,	but	foregoes	any	mention	of	Walker’s	real	motivation.	Walker’s	account	marginalised	 the	role	of	Presbyterians	 in	 the	siege	because	he	was	in	thrall	to	the	Anglican	Establishment	(McBride	1997,	24-32).	There	 is	no	 implication	 that	Walker,	 a	 totemic	 figure	 for	Apprentice	Boys,	can	 have	 ill-served	 Derry’s	 citizenry.	 Walker’s	 lobbying	 of	 Parliament	 to	compensate	 the	 city	 for	 its	 losses	 and	 the	 garrison	 for	 unpaid	 wages	 is	recognised.	There	is	also	a	reference	to	the	1704	Test	Act,	which	meant	that	“in	addition	 to	 their	 financial	 loss	 the	 many	 Presbyterians	 who	 had	 defended	Londonderry	 in	 the	 name	 of	 Protestantism	 also	 lost	 some	 of	 their	 religious	rights”.	 It	also	“forbade	non-members	of	the	Anglican	church	from	holding	civil	office.”	The	radical	anti-Establishment	character	of	Ulster	Presbyterianism	in	this	period	is	circumlocuted	because	the	institutional	politics	of	the	Apprentice	Boys	cannot	 entertain	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 Siege	 of	 Derry	 is	 in	 reality	 emblematic	 of	Protestant	disunity.			Instead	the	exhibition	sews	the	Siege	of	Derry	into	a	broader	European	tapestry	of	rival	monarchies	and	wars	of	religion.	Jordanova	has	accused	public	museums	of	presenting	history	through	the	“idiom	of	heroes	and	villains”	(2000,	145).	The	Siege	Museum’s	“villains”	are	James	II	and	his	Irish	viceroy,	Richard	Talbot,	the	Earl	 of	 Tyrconnell,	 who	 appear	 alongside	 the	 personification	 of	 Catholic	malevolence,	 Louis	 XIV.	 Lundy	 is	 not	 portrayed	 as	 an	 out-and-out	 villain,	 but	rather	more	ambiguously	through	implied	treachery:		 Lundy	with	 the	 support	 of	 the	 civic	 leaders	 requested	 assistance	 from	King	William	 and	 on	 the	 21st	March,	 the	Deliverance	 arrived	with	 8,000	muskets	and	 480	 barrels	 of	 gunpowder.	 All	men	 in	 civil	 and	military	 positions	were	
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ordered	 to	 swear	 an	oath	of	 allegiance	 to	 the	new	King	 and	Queen,	William	and	Mary.	The	oath	was	overseen	by	Lundy,	who	indicated	that	he	had	taken	the	oath	privately.	This	 created	 suspicion	of	his	 loyalty	 for	many	within	 the	city.			The	 museum	 is	 unambiguous	 in	 celebrating	 its	 “Siege	 Heroes”	 as	 Loyalist	archetypes.	 Alongside	 Campsie,	 Murray,	 Baker	 and	 Walker	 are	 Colonel	 John	Mitchelburne	and	Captain	Micaiah	Browning,	a	martyr	 for	 the	cause.	Browning	was	killed	in	command	of	the	Mountjoy—the	ship	that	broke	through	the	boom	on	 the	Foyle	 to	 lift	 the	siege	on	 July	31,	1689.	Mitchelburne	also	appears	 in	an	animated	 film	 dramatising	 the	 events	 of	 the	 siege.	 His	 avatar	 is	 shown	symbolically	hoisting	the	crimson	flag	above	St	Columb’s	Cathedral	in	a	gesture	re-enacted	annually	by	the	Apprentice	Boys.	The	vivid	crimson	is	 juxtaposed	to	grayscale,	using	computer-generated	imagery.	Embedded	in	the	animation	is	the	exhibition’s	 principal	 message:	 “The	 courage	 of	 Londonderry’s	 citizens	 had	secured	the	city	for	King	William	and	delivered	civil	and	religious	liberty	for	all.”	The	 valour	 and	 stoicism	 of	 the	 “Siege	Heroes”	 in	 the	 face	 of	 imminent	 danger	draw	 an	 analogy	 for	 isolated	 Protestants	 living	 in	 Derry	 and	 other	 parts	 of	Northern	Ireland	today.			The	 museum’s	 second	 floor	 is	 dedicated	 to	 the	 history	 and	 culture	 of	 the	Apprentice	Boys.	The	“foundation”	of	the	organisation	is	traced	back	to	1714	and	a	 club	 formed	 by	 John	 Mitchelburne	 to	 “commemorate	 the	 relief	 of	 the	 city.”	Jumping	forward	a	century,	the	narrative	moves	to	the	“re-establishment”	of	the	Apprentice	 Boys	 in	 Dublin	 in	 1813.	 The	 narrative	 therefore	 circumnavigates	virtually	 the	 entire	 eighteenth	 century,	 during	 which	 political	 sea	 changes	 in	Ireland,	 wrought	 by	 the	 United	 Irishmen	 Rebellion,	 ideologically	 re-orientated	
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key	 strata	 of	 the	 Ulster	 Protestant	 population.	 There	 is	 no	 discussion	 of	 the	Volunteer	 movement,	 which	 probably	 invented	 the	 tradition	 of	 siege	commemoration	 in	 the	 1770s.	 After	 1778,	 siege	 commemorations	 were	dominated	by	the	Volunteer	militia.	That	year	Derry	raised	three	companies,	one	of	which	became	the	first	organisation	to	call	itself	the	Apprentice	Boys	of	Derry.	On	August	1,	1778,	the	Volunteers	marched	to	St	Columb’s	Cathedral	for	the	first	time.	In	1779	one	of	the	companies	fired	a	volley	in	the	Diamond	and	conducted	the	commemorative	ceremony	of	“Shutting	the	Gates”	on	December	7	(McBride	1997,	34-38).			In	 contrast	 to	 the	 Orange	 Order,	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys	 have	 made	 no	anachronistic	 attempts	 to	 employ	 their	 Presbyterian	 heritage	 as	 proof	 of	 a	progressive	tradition.	However,	the	Apprentice	Boys	have	followed	the	Order	in	striking	 from	 the	 historical	 record	 the	 primary	 impetus	 for	 the	 movement’s	foundation:	Catholic	emancipation.	Instead	the	narrative	skips	to	the	present	to	discuss	 the	 “Symbols	 and	 Salutes”	 of	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys’	 annual	commemorations.	On	the	first	weekend	in	December	the	“Shutting	of	the	Gates”	begins	on	Friday	at	midnight	with	the	firing	of	a	cannon	by	period-costumed	re-enactivists.	 They	 fire	 one	 shot	 and	 then	 three	 more	 to	 signify	 the	 number	thirteen.	 The	 members	 of	 the	 parent	 club130	then	 walk	 around	 the	 city	 walls	performing	 the	 “Touching	 of	 the	 Gates”	 ritual	 at	 each	 of	 the	 original	 gates	 to	symbolise	 the	 apprentices’	 action	 in	 1688.	 On	 the	 Saturday,	 the	 branches	 and	bands	of	the	Apprentice	Boys	parade	to	St	Columb’s	Cathedral	for	a	service	and	a	
																																																								130	There	are	presently	eight	parent	clubs	of	the	Apprentice	Boys	which	have	branches	in	other	parts	of	Northern	Ireland	as	well	as	England	and	Scotland.	Each	year,	on	a	rotational	basis,	 the	“Touching	of	the	Gates”	ceremony	is	performed	by	one	of	the	parent	clubs.	
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wreath-laying	ceremony	at	 the	Siege	Heroes	Mound.131	Afterwards	 they	parade	to	 Bishop	 Street	 where	 “Lundy	 the	 Traitor”	 is	 burned	 in	 effigy.	 The	 “Relief	 of	Derry”	 commemoration	 takes	 place	 on	 the	 second	 weekend	 in	 August.	 This	follows	the	symbolic	pattern	of	the	December	ritual	beginning	with	the	cannon	firing	 on	 Friday	 and	 the	 “Touching	 of	 the	 Gates”.	 The	 following	 morning	 the	parent	clubs	parade	around	the	city	walls	before	proceeding	to	the	Diamond	for	a	wreath-laying	ceremony	at	the	Cenotaph.	After	marching	to	St	Columb’s	 for	a	service,	the	General	Committee,	parent	clubs	and	bands	meet	the	main	parade	at	Craigavon	Bridge	where	 the	 “Relief	 of	Derry”	 is	 re-enacted.132	The	parade	 then	continues	to	the	Diamond	and	through	the	Fountain	before	crossing	over	to	the	Waterside.			
	
Photo	5.37	Lambeg	exhibited	beside	a	touchscreen	interactive	for	designing	and	playing	a	drum.																																																										131	The	mound	 is	 a	 memorial	 built	 and	maintained	 by	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys,	 where	 they	 claim	remains	of	the	siege	dead	discovered	during	renovation	work	on	the	cathedral	were	interred	in	1861.	132	The	 tercentenary	 of	 the	 Relief	 of	 Derry	 in	 1989	 saw	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 re-enactment	 as	 a	historical	“pageant”	(Fraser	2000,	184).	
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These	symbolic	rituals	are	materialised	through	a	mannequin	in	full	ceremonial	regalia	 and	 a	 replica	 bannerette.	 The	 performative	 aspects	 of	 parading	 culture	are	also	represented	physically	 through	 the	display	of	 flutes	 and	a	Lambeg.	An	interactive	 allows	 the	 visitor	 to	 “design	 your	 drum”	 and	 play	 it	 using	 a	touchscreen,	which	 emits	 the	 sound	of	 the	drumbeat	 (photo	5.37).	 Parading	 is	presented	as	an	opportunity	 for	 “non-members”	 to	 take	part	 in	 the	Apprentice	Boys’	commemorations.	The	authors	drive	home	that	parading	is	 indigenous	to	the	city:	“The	musical	tradition	that	has	grown	up	around	the	marching	bands	is	a	 rich	 aspect	 of	 Londonderry’s	 culture.”	 The	 Lambeg	 is	 described	 as	 being	“unique	to	Ulster”	and	“primarily	associated	with	the	Protestant	tradition.”			
	
								Photo	5.38	Film	footage	of	“Lundy	the	Traitor”	being	burned	in	effigy.			The	 rituals	 of	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys	 are	 also	 animated	 through	 film.	 This	 is	professionally	 crafted	 as	 a	 stylised	 version	 of	 the	 annual	 commemorations.	 In	
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bright	 sunshine	 spectators	 watch	 the	 re-enactment	 of	 the	 “Relief	 of	 Derry”,	consuming	 soft	 drinks.	 The	 camera	 captures	 onlookers	 of	 Asian	 appearance,	giving	the	impression	of	a	multicultural	pageant	with	a	carnivalesque	feel.	This	is	heightened	by	 the	bands’	 performances,	which	 impress	 the	 crowds	with	baton	twirling	 and	 other	 tricks.	 The	 volume	 is	 moderate	 so	 the	 sound	 of	 the	instruments	is	subdued.	This	does	not	convey	the	full	sensory	experience	of	the	“Blood	 and	 Thunder”	 flute	 bands	 that	 parade	 each	 year.	 Bands	 whose	instruments	 and	 regalia	 feature	 semiotic	 allusions	 to	 paramilitarism	 are	 not	shown	 in	 the	 film.	 The	 visitor	 watches	 “Lundy	 the	 Traitor”	 burning,	 but	 the	ritual’s	darker	overtones	are	glossed	over	(photo	5.38).	 In	2014,	Lundy’s	effigy	was	 incinerated	 wearing	 a	 sign	 on	 his	 back	 announcing:	 “THE	 END	 OF	 ALL	TRAITORS”.		Today	 the	 annual	 commemorations	 take	 place	 in	 an	 altered	 political	 terrain,	owing	to	Sinn	Féin’s	supremacy	in	municipal	government.	As	Cohen	puts	it,	the	Apprentice	Boys	now,	“march	under	the	protection	of	the	state,	but	also	by	the	suffrage	 of	 their	 foes”,	 seeing	 commemoration	 as	 “a	 victory	 for	 Protestant	culture,	 which	 has	 been	 substituted	 for	 Protestant	 power”	 (2007,	 965).	Nowadays	the	parade	routes	avoid	sectarian	interfaces.	Before	the	Troubles	the	“Relief	 of	 Derry”	 parade	 marched	 up	 Abercorn	 Road	 past	 the	 Catholic	 Long	Tower	 area,	 provoking	 sectarian	 clashes	 (Fraser	 2000,	 175-176).	 The	 current	status	quo	is	the	outcome	of	a	protracted	dispute	between	the	Apprentice	Boys	and	 the	 Sinn	 Féin-influenced	 Bogside	 Residents’	 Group	 at	 the	 height	 of	 the	Drumcree	saga.	The	latter	made	common	cause	with	its	peers	in	Portadown	and	Belfast	and	a	tense	standoff	occurred	over	a	planned	march	from	the	Bogside	to	
	 378	
the	 Diamond	 to	 commemorate	 the	 twenty-fifth	 anniversary	 of	 internment	 in	1996.	 The	 Residents’	 Group	 was	 ultimately	 successful	 in	 establishing	 the	principle	 of	 consent	 based	 on	 “parity	 of	 esteem”,	 in	 return	 for	 recognising	 the	Apprentice	Boys’	right	to	march	on	the	city	walls	overlooking	the	Bogside	(184-189).			Alluding	to	the	status	quo,	the	exhibition	states	that	“as	Northern	Ireland	looks	to	 a	 brighter	 future,	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys	 Association	 continues	 to	 play	 an	important	 role	 in	 building	 and	 maintaining	 peace.”	 The	 Siege	 Museum	 differs	from	 the	 Museum	 of	 Orange	 Heritage	 in	 not	 discussing	 the	 organisation’s	political	relationship	with	Unionism.	Senior	Apprentice	Boys	Gerald	Glover	and	Russell	Abernethy	were	prominent	 in	 the	Londonderry	Unionist	Association	 in	the	 1960s.	Operating	 in	 a	 network	 of	 the	Protestant	 churches,	 Loyal	Orders,	 B	Specials	and	the	UUP,	they	played	a	key	role	in	undermining	O’Neill’s	reforms	(Ó	Dochartaigh	 2005,	 67-70).	 In	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 Anglo-Irish	 Agreement	 the	Apprentice	Boys	gravitated	towards	the	DUP,	believing	that	 the	UUP	had	 failed	them	 politically	 (Fraser	 2000,	 183).	 In	 its	 retrospective	 on	 the	 Troubles	 the	exhibition	contains	a	familiar	Unionist	refrain:		 Many	people	consider	the	starting	point	of	“the	Troubles”	to	have	been	in	this	city	 in	1969.	Elements	within	the	Nationalist/Republican	community	viewed	the	annual	Apprentice	Boys	parade	as	a	 further	opportunity	 to	 confront	 the	Royal	Ulster	Constabulary	police	force	which	led	to	the	Battle	of	the	Bogside.				On	 a	 superficial	 level,	 the	 exhibition’s	 verdict	 on	 the	 Battle	 of	 the	 Bogside	 is	accurate.	 Catholic	 youths	were	proactive	 in	 the	 civil	 disorder	 that	 occurred	on	August	12,	1969	(Ó	Dochartaigh	2005,	101).	However,	 the	catalytic	role	played	by	 the	 “Relief	 of	 Derry”	 parade	 goes	 unmentioned,	 as	 do	 the	 negotiations	 that	
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took	 place	 between	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys	 and	 the	 Derry	 Citizens’	 Defence	Association	 beforehand,	 at	 which	 the	 former	 were	 warned	 of	 the	 potential	conflagration	 (Fraser	 2000,	 181;	 Ó	 Dochartaigh	 2005,	 103-104).	 There	 is	 no	reference	to	the	breakdown	of	trust	that	occurred	between	the	RUC	and	Derry’s	Catholic	 community	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 police	 violence.	 Catholics	 are	categorised	as	 the	 “Nationalist/Republican	community”	but	 in	1969	 this	would	have	been	an	oversimplification	of	the	complex	political	scene	in	the	Bogside.	In	lieu	of	any	exploration	of	the	root	causes	of	the	violence,	the	exhibition	reiterates	the	old	Unionist	suspicion	of	any	Catholic	social	protest	as	a	Republican	plot.	The	Troubles	were	therefore	caused	by	a	Catholic	 insurgency	against	 the	blameless	forces	of	law	and	order	in	a	previously	harmonious	city:		 The	 terrible	 violence	 of	 this	 period	 touched	 the	 lives	 of	 all	 communities	 in	Londonderry,	elsewhere	in	Northern	Ireland	and	beyond.	One	consequence	of	the	 violence	 in	 Londonderry	 was	 the	 reluctant	 exodus	 of	 around	 18,	 000	Protestants	 from	 the	West	Bank	of	 the	River	Foyle,	where	 they	had	 lived	 in	harmony	 with	 their	 Roman	 Catholic	 neighbours	 for	 generations,	 to	 the	Waterside	of	the	city	and	elsewhere.			To	add	pathos	to	this	claim	of	communal	victimhood,	the	visitor	is	directed	to	the	Book	 of	 Reflection	 containing	 the	 names	 of	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys	 killed	 in	 the	Troubles.	 The	 dedicated	 corner	 of	 the	 gallery	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 shrine	 at	 the	Museum	of	Orange	Heritage	and	fulfils	a	similar	advocacy	function.			The	 transformation	 of	 the	 “Relief	 of	 Derry”	 parade	 from	 a	 source	 of	 sectarian	conflict	 into	 a	 cultural	 heritage	 event	 –	 the	 Maiden	 City	 Festival	 –	 is	 then	discussed	 as	 an	 example	 of	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys	 “looking	 towards	 the	 future.”	The	festival	“promotes	the	siege	through	art,	dance,	music,	and	drama	which	has	opened	 up	 the	 city’s	 heritage	 to	 a	 new	 audience.”	Maiden	 City	 is	 the	Together	
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agenda	 in	 action.	 In	Together,	 the	 Community	 Festivals	 Fund	 is	 identified	 as	 a	boon	for	promoting	good	relations:			 Community	festivals	are	about	participation,	involvement	and	the	creation	of	a	sense	of	identity	and	are	important	in	contributing	to	the	social	well-being	of	a	community;	and	in	this	respect	the	CFF	enables	community	organisations	to	celebrate	their	cultural	identity	and	to	strengthen	community	relations.		(Northern	Ireland	Executive	2013,	90)				The	 Maiden	 City	 Festival	 is	 supported	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 public	 organisations	including	 Tourism	 Northern	 Ireland,	 Derry	 and	 Strabane	 District	 Council,	 the	Community	 Relations	 Council,	 the	 Ulster-Scots	 Agency	 and	 the	 Department	 of	Foreign	Affairs	 and	Trade	of	 the	Republic	 of	 Ireland.	As	well	 as	 the	 traditional	“Relief	of	Londonderry	Pageant”,	 there	 is	a	pronounced	emphasis	on	an	Ulster-Scots	 cultural	 identity.	 The	 Ulster-Scots	 Agency	 was	 established	 under	 the	Belfast	 Agreement	 as	 part	 of	 the	 North-South	 Language	 Body.	 The	 new	 body	gives	 the	Ulster-Scots	regional	dialect,	or	Ullans,	parity	with	 the	 Irish	 language.	The	 reinvention	 of	 Ullans,	 a	 variant	 of	 Scots	 originating	 in	 the	 seventeenth	century,	is	linked	to	Unionist	demands	for	“parity	of	esteem”	and	the	promotion	of	 “cultural	 traditions”	 (McCall	 2002,	199).	Although	Ulster-Scots	 is	 recognised	as	 a	 language	by	 the	British	 and	 Irish	 governments	 and	 the	EU,	 there	 remains	controversy	 over	whether	 it	 should	be	 considered	 a	 language	 or	 a	 dialect	(Nic	Craith	2001,	24-26).	The	promotion	of	Ulster-Scots	as	a	 language	was	essential	to	preserve	the	bicultural	balance	because,	as	Graham	notes,	 for	Unionists	“any	internal	 cultural	 synthesis	 would	 have	 to	 embrace,	 or	 at	 least	 acknowledge	elements	of	Irishness”	(1997,	53).			
	 381	
During	my	visit	 to	the	Siege	Museum,	an	Apprentice	Boys	branch	is	receiving	a	guided	tour.	At	one	point	the	guide	remarks	to	his	brethren	that	“many	present	day	 historians	 believe	 that	 Protestants	 don’t	 have	 a	 culture.”	 He	 says	 that	commemorating	 the	 Siege	 of	 Derry	 is	 not	 about	 being	 “triumphalist”	 or	 “flag-waving”	 but	 representing	 Protestant	 culture	 and	 tradition	 in	 a	 “dignified	manner”.	He	says	his	farewell	to	the	group	in	Ulster-Scots.	Talking	to	people	with	whom	he	shares	a	cultural	affinity	he	seems	at	ease,	 laughing	and	 joking	about	aspects	 of	 their	 rituals,	 and	 even	 explaining	 nuances	 of	 which	 they	 were	unaware.	 I	 am	nonetheless	 conscious	 that	 they	are	alert	 to	my	presence	 in	 the	gallery,	which	suggests	that	the	public	side	of	 these	visits	may	be	accompanied	by	a	more	politicised	dialogue	in	the	members-only	areas	of	the	building.			The	 Siege	Museum	 follows	 the	Museum	 of	 Orange	Heritage	 in	 obfuscating	 the	political	construction	of	cultural	identity.	In	its	depiction	of	the	Apprentice	Boys’	“Symbols	 and	 Salutes”,	 the	 role	 of	 public	 rituals	 in	 converting	material	 culture	into	ideological	signs	is	disguised.	Beneath	the	museum’s	effusive	talk	of	“family	tradition,	 friendship,	 local	 pride	 and	 religious	 faith”,	 lies	 a	 profound	 sense	 of	collective	 insecurity	 in	 a	 city	where	 Protestants	 used	 to	 enjoy	 hegemony.	 The	shift	 in	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 takes	 symbolic	 form	 in	 the	 restored	 statue	 of	George	Walker	 that	 formerly	stood	adjacent	 to	 the	Memorial	Hall	 (photo	5.39).	The	statue,	a	copy	after	the	original	atop	Walker’s	Testimonial,	was	vandalised	in	2010.	Walker’s	Testimonial	was	erected	on	the	city	wall	by	the	Apprentice	Boys	in	1828	to	 indicate	what,	 in	McBride’s	words,	was	“a	change	 in	 the	meaning	of	the	 siege	 myth,	 a	 reversion	 to	 the	 cyclical	 interpretation	 of	 Irish	 history	 as	 a	recurrent	 struggle	 between	 Popery	 and	 Protestantism”	 (1997,	 50).	 A	 spiral	
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staircase	within	 the	 pillar	 could	 be	 ascended	 to	 a	 viewing	 platform	 at	 the	 top.	The	 figure	 of	 Walker	 pointed	 north,	 from	 which	 direction	 the	 city’s	 salvation	arrived	in	the	form	of	the	Mountjoy.	The	Testimonial	was	the	original	site	for	the	annual	burning	of	Lundy’s	effigy.		
	
												Photo	5.39	Statue	of	George	Walker	now	on	display	in	the	Siege	Museum.	
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													Photo	5.40	Head	of	the	statue	that	previously	stood	atop	Walker’s	Testimonial.			Shortly	after	the	“Relief	of	Derry”	commemoration	in	1973,	the	statue	was	blown	up	 by	 the	 Provisional	 IRA.	 The	 bomb	 blast	 left	 only	 the	 plinth	 standing.	 The	disembodied	head	of	the	statue	is	displayed	in	a	glass	case	with	a	statement	that	“it	 is	 the	 desired	wish	 of	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys	 Association	 that	 the	monument	will,	at	some	stage,	be	rebuilt	and	restored	to	its	rightful	place	at	Royal	Bastion	on	the	city	walls,	where	it	can	be	viewed	as	a	permanent	memorial”	(photo	5.40).	The	 object	 symbolises	 the	 aspiration	 of	 returning	 to	 the	 past,	 as	 do	 the	
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Apprentice	Boys’	public	rituals.	Walker’s	head	recalls	the	fragment	of	the	Boyne	obelisk	made	 into	 a	 relic	 by	 the	Orange	Order.	 It	 has	 become	 a	 symbol	 of	 lost	ground,	 but	 also	 of	 an	 indomitable	 will	 to	 regain	 it	 through	 activist	 heritage	strategies.	 The	 Loyal	 Orders’	 museums	 emit	 nostalgia	 for	 surrendered	hegemony,	 whilst	 framing	 contemporary	 political	 agendas	 over	 parading	 and	other	 issues	 as	 cultural	 restitution.	 Having	 adapted	 to	 the	 new	 bicultural	structures	 created	 by	 the	 Belfast	 Agreement,	 they	 now	 actively	 encourage	nostalgia	 by	 promoting	 cultural	 tradition.	 There	 is	 no	 obligation	 to	 admit	 the	mistakes	of	the	past	or	make	any	effort	to	learn	from	them.	This	is	the	politics	of	stone.		
	
Photo	5.41	Plinth	of	Walker’s	Testimonial	on	the	city	wall	spattered	with	paint	(left).			Departing	 the	museum,	 I	 follow	 the	 “Siege	Heroes	Trail”,	 climbing	up	onto	 the	city	wall	where	 the	 plinth	 of	 the	Walker	 Testimonial	 still	 stands	 (photo	 5.41).	
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Flags	are	raised	above	the	plinth	each	year	during	the	siege	commemorations,	in	Walker’s	 absence.	 The	 empty	 plinth	 is	 spattered	 with	 paint	 thrown	 from	 the	direction	of	the	Bogside.	The	statue’s	power	as	an	ideological	sign	is	maintained	through	 ritual	 re-enactivism.	 Walker’s	 pointing	 gesture	 is	 re-enacted	 in	 the	salute	 of	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys’	 governor	 at	 the	 Cenotaph,	 and	 by	 the	 Loyalist	rank-and-file	on	parade.			
	
Photo	5.42	View	from	the	Bishop’s	Gate:	the	Peace	Wall	and	the	Heritage	Tower.		
		Following	 the	wall	 round	 to	 the	 south	 side,	 I	 reach	 the	Bishop’s	 Gate,	where	 I	pass	a	guided	tour	group.	From	the	top	of	the	gate	Derry’s	sectarian	geography	is	materialised	by	the	Peace	Wall	that	runs	along	the	eastern	side	of	Bishop	Street	(photo	5.42).	Jutting	out	above	it	is	the	Heritage	Tower,	a	section	of	the	old	city	gaol	 now	 converted	 into	 a	museum	displaying	militaria	 and	 artefacts	 from	 the	world	wars.	In	the	distance	the	tricolours	of	Lower	Bishop	Street	can	be	seen	on	the	lamp-posts.		
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Photo	5.43	Irish	tricolour	flying	above	a	house	on	the	Catholic	estate	abutting	the	Fountain.			Climbing	down	from	the	walls	I	pass	through	a	metal	gate	into	the	Fountain	and	immediately	encounter	 local	heritage	 interpretation.	Although	endorsed	by	 the	state	through	the	Office	of	 the	First	Minister	and	Deputy	First	Minister	and	the	Northern	 Ireland	 Housing	 Executive,	 the	 heritage	 panel’s	 content	 is	 explicitly	Loyalist.133	Unsurprisingly	 the	 Troubles	 are	 most	 prominent,	 with	 a	 section	explaining	the	need	for	the	Fountain’s	residents	to	feel	a	“sense	of	security”.	The	visitor	learns	about	growing	sectarian	“alienation”	in	1969,	between	“unionists”	living	in	the	Fountain	and	“nationalists”	on	Lower	Bishop	Street.	The	death	of	a	local	resident	in	a	clash	with	nationalists	and	attacks	on	people	and	property	led	to	 the	 erection	 of	 a	 barrier	 around	 the	 area.	 The	 peace	 wall	 was	 built	 in	 the	1990s:	“Whilst	the	residents	prefer	the	wall	to	remain	for	the	foreseeable	future,	
																																																								133	The	heritage	panel	 is	one	of	a	series	in	the	Fountain/Bishop	Street	area	directing	tourists	to	local	 visitor	 attractions	 in	 Catholic	 and	 Protestant	 areas	 of	 the	 Cityside.	 Hocking	 reports	 the	pragmatic	cooperation	between	the	Apprentice	Boys	and	the	Free	Derry	Museum	in	promoting	local	tourism	(2015,	133).	
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they	 retain	 a	 hope	 that	 it	 can	 be	 removed	 at	 some	 stage	 as	 the	 peace	 process	continues	to	develop.”		
	
Photo	5.44	The	Cathedral	Youth	Club,	Fountain	Estate.				In	the	Fountain,	the	kerbstones	and	lamp-posts	are	painted	red,	white	and	blue,	following	 the	 convention	 of	 ethnic	 boundary	 marking	 in	 Loyalist	 areas	 of	Northern	Ireland.	The	proximity	of	Catholics	to	the	Fountain	is	brought	home	by	the	tricolour	flown	provocatively	from	the	roof	of	a	house	just	behind	the	peace	wall	 (photo	 5.43).	 I	 follow	 the	 curve	 of	 the	 road	 to	 reach	 the	 Cathedral	 Youth	Club	(photo	5.44).	Prominent	on	the	wall	 is	a	mural	memorialising	a	 local	UDA	martyr,	Lindsay	Mooney.	There	is	also	a	mural	commemorating	the	centenary	of	the	outbreak	of	World	War	One,	bearing	the	Loyalist	motto	“Lest	we	forget”	and	the	familiar	poppy	motif	alongside	imagery	of	the	Thiepval	Memorial,	the	Ulster	Tower	 and	 Irish	 regimental	 emblems.	 Next	 to	 this	 is	 a	 mural	 of	 Walker’s	Testimonial	 with	 the	 statue	 intact.	 On	 one	 side	 of	 the	 club	 is	 a	 larger	 mural	
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entitled	 “OUR	CITY	OUR	CULTURE”,	which	a	 tiny	blue	plaque	reveals	 to	be	 the	fruit	 of	 an	 EU-funded	 community	 project.	 The	 mural	 depicts	 the	 Walled	 City,	Derry’s	 coat	 of	 arms	 and	 notable	 landmarks.	 There	 is	 an	 image	 of	 the	 bronze	peace	sculpture	Hands	Across	the	Divide	that	stands	at	the	west	end	of	Craigavon	Bridge.	One	of	 the	figures	 is	holding	a	poppy	wreath.	 I	am	left	wondering	what	this	 is	 intended	 to	 symbolise—the	 shared	 history	 of	 war	 service	 or	 the	immutability	of	Loyalist	identity,	or	perhaps	both?		
	
Photo	5.45	Photograph	of	an	old	grocer’s	shop	on	Aubery	Street	displayed	outside	the	Cathedral	Youth	Club.			The	 murals	 adorning	 the	 Cathedral	 Youth	 Club	 contain	 the	 typical	 tropes	 of	Loyalist	visual	culture,	but	also	a	distilled	sense	of	place	that	links	the	Fountain	with	 the	 Walled	 City	 as	 the	 inner	 sanctum	 of	 Protestant	 life	 in	 Derry.	 The	Fountain	 has	 internalised	 Protestant	 feelings	 of	 insecurity	 and	 isolation	 as	 an	“enclave	 culture”.	 Displayed	 on	 the	 railings	 around	 the	 youth	 club	 are	photographs	of	a	vanished	past:	people,	streets	and	shops	(photo	5.45).	One	of	
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the	 heritage	 panels	 describes	 the	 redevelopment	 of	 the	 Fountain	 in	 the	 early	1970s,	 commenting	 that	 although	 the	 demolition	 of	 old	 terraced	 housing	“improved	living	standards	immeasurably,	the	close	knit	nature	of	the	old	streets	is	still	missed	by	many	of	the	older	residents.”	It	also	reflects	on	the	demographic	changes	 that	 occurred	 with	 the	 Troubles,	 referring	 to	 “The	 Exodus”	 from	 the	Fountain.			There	 is	 an	 intense	 climate	 of	 nostalgia	 in	 the	 Fountain,	 reinforced	 by	 an	 all-pervasive	 heritage	 schema	 in	 which	 the	 activist	 and	 state	 realms	 overlap.	Audible	in	the	requiem	for	Ulster	is	a	note	of	defiance.	Continuing	down	Kennedy	Street,	 I	 turn	 left	 up	 Hawkin	 Street	 and	 then	 into	 a	 small	 close	where	 a	 plain	mural	declares:				
	
Photo	5.46	Loyalist	mural	off	Hawkin	Street,	Fountain	Estate.			The	 message	 in	 monochrome	 echoes	 the	 historicised	 analogy	 in	 the	 Siege	Museum	(photo	5.46).	Mirroring	its	Orange	counterpart,	the	museum	is	an	agent	
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of	 sectarian	 conflict	 containment	 and	 not	 resolution.	 The	 museum	 and	 other	local	heritage	projects	represent	a	mechanism	for	managing	sectarianism	in	the	city.	 The	 social	 reality	 of	 this	 becomes	 abundantly	 clear	 in	 perambulating	 the	Fountain,	where	 a	 parallel	 process	 of	 reifying	 communal	 segregation	 is	 taking	place.	Shirlow	and	Murtagh	trace	this	pathology	back	to	the	Belfast	Agreement:		 Northern	Ireland	lacks	a	unified	“lifeworld”,	which	impedes	a	communicative	dimension	 that	means	more	 than	merely	managing	 intercommunal	division.	The	 Agreement	 may	 well	 have	 established	 contact	 between	 oppositional	groups,	 but	 that	 contact	 is	 based	 upon	 managing	 disorder	 as	 opposed	 to	removing	the	meaning	of	communal	mistrust	and	division.	(2006,	48)			Although	 the	 route	 of	 the	 Apprentice	 Boys’	 parades	 may	 have	 changed	 to	accommodate	new	political	 realities	 in	Derry,	 their	meaning	remains	 the	same,	despite	 rebranding	 as	 “cultural	 traditions”.	 By	 enshrining	 the	 “cultural	traditions”	 model,	 the	 Belfast	 Agreement	 has	 legitimised	 identity	 politics	 and,	crucially,	 instituted	a	 framework	 for	publicly	resourcing	 them.	 In	 the	sphere	of	heritage	this	has	become	an	acute	social	problem,	because	the	state	itself	has	no	authoritative	voice.134	The	collapse	of	the	EU-funded	Peace-building	and	Conflict	Resolution	 Centre	 on	 the	 site	 of	 the	 former	Maze	 Prison	 in	 2013	 offers	 a	 case	study	in	state	paralysis.135	So	does	the	Ulster	Museum,	where	the	visitor	listens	to	Terence	O’Neill’s	“Ulster	at	the	crossroads”	speech	from	1968	before	reading	a	series	 of	 sparse	 monochrome	 text	 panels	 in	 a	 gallery	 where	 no	 objects	 are	displayed.			
																																																								134	The	 “cultural	 traditions”	 ethos	 permeates	 the	 state	 heritage	 sector	 in	Northern	 Ireland.	 For	example,	museums	 actively	 encourage	 the	 exploration	 of	 communal	 identity	 to	 promote	 good	community	relations	in	line	with	objectives	in	the	school	curriculum	(see	Crooke	2007,	98-102).	135	The	EU	withdrew	 funding	of	 eighteen	million	euros	 for	 the	project	amid	political	wrangling	between	the	DUP	and	Sinn	Féin	in	the	run-up	to	the	flag	protests.	
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State	 impotence	 has	 encouraged	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 activist	 heritage	 to	 fill	 the	silence.	The	activist	museums	of	the	Loyal	Orders	were	part-financed	by	public	bodies	in	what	amounts	to	formal	state	recognition	of	the	political	legitimacy	of	Northern	 Ireland’s	 “culture	 wars”.	 However,	 a	 bipolarity	 of	 cultural	 identity	represents	an	untenable	social	model.	Cultural	production	has	a	material	basis.	As	 Finlay	 remarks,	 “the	 ideology	 around	 which	 northern	 Protestants	 united	against	Home	Rule	 had	 a	 basis	 in	material	 reality:	 the	 uneven	 development	 of	capitalism	 in	 Ireland”	 (2001,	 14).	 Ulster	 Protestant	 identity	 was	 therefore	shaped	 by	 the	march	 of	 productive	 forces.	 The	 historical	 function	 of	 the	 Loyal	Orders	 was	 to	 cement	 a	 pan-class	 Unionist	 alliance	 that	 granted	 Protestant	workers	privileged	access	to	the	labour	market	and	housing	as	their	reward	for	maintaining	productive	 forces.	With	 these	now	virtually	 exhausted,	 there	 is	no	material	basis	for	the	old	social	group	identity	so	it	is	idealised	through	heritage	as	nostalgia.			Industrial	 decline	 in	 the	 north	 of	 Ireland	 has	 followed	 the	 macro-economic	pattern	of	other	Western	European	and	North	American	societies.	The	post-war	deterioration	 of	 the	 productive	 economy	 not	 only	 undermined	 a	 primary	component	 of	Ulster	Protestant	 identity,	 but	 also	 its	 identification	with	British	modernity.	 This	 explains	 in	 part	 why	 Loyalism	 became	 fissiparous	 from	 the	1960s	onwards,	variously	manifesting	as	irrational	regionalism	and	nationalism.	Ulster	 nationalism	 will	 probably	 remain	 a	 political	 red	 herring	 for	 the	foreseeable	 future.	Loyalism	 is	unlikely	 to	be	 successful	 in	 reinventing	 itself	 as	nationalism	because	it	lacks	a	material	basis	to	do	so.	It	was	only	at	the	point	of	the	 Home	 Rule	 crisis	 that	 Loyalism	 could	 have	 developed	 a	 nationalist	
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complexion.	With	northern	industry	at	its	productive	height,	the	Unionist	ruling	class	 could	 have	 followed	 the	 precedent	 of	 the	 Southern	 Confederacy	 in	 the	United	 States	 by	 pursuing	 separation	 from	 the	 larger	 union	 to	 defend	 its	economic	 interests.	 In	 the	 event,	 they	 settled	 for	 their	 own	 devolved	 state	 in	1920.	Ulster	Vanguard	was	an	attempt	 to	 reconstitute	 the	Protestant	pan-class	alliance	towards	the	same	end,	but	Unionists	could	no	longer	call	Westminster’s	bluff.	 By	 1972,	 the	British	 Empire	was	 a	 fading	memory	 and	Northern	 Ireland	was	 no	 longer	 a	 vital	 node	 in	 the	 UK	 economy.	 A	 small	 section	 of	 Unionism	perceived	this	political	reality	and	adopted	an	integrationist	position	toward	the	UK	in	response	(Wright	1987,	242).			Northern	Ireland’s	post-war	economic	decline	and	the	introduction	of	direct	rule	provoked	 an	 identity	 crisis	 among	Ulster	 Protestants	 that	 remains	 unresolved.	Ironically	this	crisis	is	shared	by	Protestants	of	all	classes,	owing	to	the	decline	of	industrial	capitalism	in	the	UK	as	a	whole.	This	has	 left	the	traditional	Unionist	ruling	 class	 with	 nowhere	 to	 go.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 they	 will	 ultimately	 find	 a	community	of	interest	with	the	new	and	socially	aspirant	Catholic	middle-class.	For	working-class	Protestants,	social	 inequality	 is	a	problem	to	which	Loyalism	can	no	longer	offer	any	political	solution.			For	its	part,	the	neoliberal	state	has	compensated	for	an	inability	to	deliver	social	equality	by	 institutionalising	a	bifurcated	multiculturalism.	 In	 June	2016	a	new	Commission	 on	 Flags,	 Identity,	 Culture	 and	 Tradition	was	 appointed,	 with	 the	brief	of	mapping	a	way	forward	on	the	contentious	issues	of	flags	and	parading.	Among	 its	 members	 are	 the	 Orangeman	 David	 Hume	 and	 an	 assortment	 of	Republican	and	Unionist	politicians	with	a	penchant	for	“cultural	traditions”.	The	
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Commission’s	 appointees	 do	 not	 inspire	 confidence	 in	 its	 potential	 and	 nor	should	its	stated	aim	of	being	guided	by	the	principle	of	“parity	of	esteem”.	The	endless	 pursuit	 of	 cultural	 “parity	 of	 esteem”	 illustrates	 the	 state’s	 deliberate	dislocation	 of	 social	 equality	 from	 political	 economy.	 This	 is	 a	 UK-wide	phenomenon	and	one	common	to	virtually	all	Western	societies.	Europe	is	now	experiencing	a	power	surge	of	 irrational	nationalist	and	regionalist	movements	as	a	direct	consequence.	Under	this	socially	sclerotic	logic	“community	festivals”	can	receive	state	support,	whilst	productive	industry	that	could	provide	a	stable	foundation	 for	 generating	 new	 modes	 of	 non-sectarian	 communal	 life	 in	Northern	 Ireland	 is	 left	 to	 wither.	 Exacerbating	 the	 problem,	 the	 European	Regional	Development	Fund	has	been	a	net	contributor	to	identity-based	activist	heritage	 projects	 with	 the	 contradictory	 goal	 of	 promoting	 “peace	 and	reconciliation”.		The	advent	of	multiculturalism	in	the	UK,	and	the	incorporation	of	its	principles	into	the	Belfast	Agreement,	has	mitigated	the	 loss	of	Unionist	hegemony.	 It	has	also	acted	as	a	 supercharger	 for	an	Ulster	Protestant	 identity	politics	 that	now	finds	 an	 irrational	 symmetry	 with	 its	 Catholic	 counterpart.	 Combined	 with	neoliberal	economics,	this	has	proved	a	socially	toxic	mixture.	Northern	Ireland	was	 largely	 insulated	 from	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 British	 government’s	 neoliberal	policies	during	the	era	of	the	Troubles.	Both	Northern	Ireland’s	internal	security	situation	 and	 its	 economic	 instability	 necessitated	British	 state	 intervention	 to	prevent	society	spinning	out	of	control.	The	cross-border	effects	of	neoliberalism	in	 degrading	 productive	 forces	 across	 the	 island	 of	 Ireland	 have	 nevertheless	rebalanced	 its	 historically	 uneven	 development.	 Ulster	 Protestants	 now	
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represent	a	 “people	without	history”.	The	Protestant	bourgeoisie	 industrialised	the	north	of	Ireland,	but	its	economic	structure	was	inadequate	for	a	viable	state.	The	material	 basis	 for	one	did	not	 exist	when	 Ireland	was	partitioned	 in	1921	and	 this	 remains	 the	 case	 today.	 Amid	 the	 general	 crisis	 of	 British	 and	 Irish	capitalism,	a	new	economic	structure	may	well	come	into	being	on	the	island	of	Ireland.	 Herein	 resides	 a	 kernel	 of	 hope	 for	 the	 future,	 in	 that	 any	 new	 social	relations	formed	must	in	turn	command	new	ideological	vectors.	
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Conclusion			 He	 said	 that	 once	we	 had	 built	 the	 tower,	we	would	 be	 capable	 of	 doing	what	we	wanted,	which	is	why	he	mixed	up	all	the	languages	and	why,	from	then	on,	as	you	see,	we	could	no	 longer	understand	each	other…	It	would	be	 best	 to	 leave	 the	 tower	 as	 a	 reminder,	 there	 will	 come	 a	 time	 when	people	will	travel	from	all	over	to	visit	the	ruins.		 José	Saramago,	Cain			The	 Tower	 of	 Babel	 is	 an	 apt	metaphor	 for	 the	 dilemma	 posed	 by	modernity:	should	humanity	transcend	the	nation	state	as	its	basic	principle	of	political	and	economic	 organisation?	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 nationalism	 is	 the	 political	articulation	 of	 national	 consciousness	 and,	 as	 such,	 may	 take	 rational	 and	irrational	 forms.	Whether	nationalism	 is	 rational	or	 irrational	 is	 revealed	 in	 its	vision	of	the	state,	which	is	ultimately	determined	by	its	conception	of	time	and	space.	 The	 modern	 state	 was	 originally	 a	 bourgeois	 nationalist	 project	 to	rationalise	the	capitalist	mode	of	production	as	a	national	market.	Consolidating	the	 bourgeoisie’s	 political	 ascendancy	 required	 national	 cultural	 regulation	 in	which	a	national	heritage	was	institutionalised.			The	bourgeois	state’s	rational	construction	of	national	heritage	was	historically	flawed	 because	 it	 abstracted	 citizens	 from	 the	 material	 conditions	 of	 their	existence.	Increasingly,	when	ordinary	men	and	women	looked	into	the	mirror	of	the	nation’s	past,	they	could	not	see	their	own	reflection.	They	saw	only	images	of	“great	men”	and	the	affairs	of	state.	Consequently,	in	the	twentieth	century	the	political	left	formulated	its	own	heritage	strategies	to	preserve	cultural	artefacts	signifying	the	collective	experience	and	social	memory	of	ordinary	people.	This	set	a	precedent	for	challenging	state	heritage	representations,	whilst	identifying	
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state	heritage	models	as	a	source	of	cultural	legitimacy.	Above	I	have	advanced	a	new	concept	–	activist	heritage	–	 to	describe	 the	autonomous	appropriation	of	the	external	forms	and	practices	of	state	heritage	by	political	activists.			The	neoliberal	epoch	has	engendered	a	heritage	deluge	as	the	state	increasingly	withdraws	 from	 public	 life	 and	 leaves	 productive	 industries	 to	 expire.	 The	neoliberal	 state’s	 deregulation	 and	 privatisation	 of	 the	 public	 realm	 has	stimulated	a	diffusion	of	heritage	in	the	ensuing	social	vacuum.	I	have	identified	the	 proliferation	 of	 heritage	 under	 neoliberalism	 as	 a	 social	 pathology	 and	connected	 this	 to	 the	 advent	 of	 new	 types	 of	 identity-based	 activist	 heritage.	Western	 neoliberal	 states	 have	 effectively	 abandoned	 national	 cultural	regulation	for	multiculturalist	policies	that	encourage	the	insurgency	of	identity	politics.	 I	 have	 characterised	 this	 as	 a	 crisis	 in	 progressive	modernisation	 that	has	 produced	 parallel	 forms	 of	 irrational	 nationalist	 and	 regionalist	 identity	politics.	 Irrational	nationalists	 and	 regionalists	 are	obsessed	with	 the	purity	of	their	culture	and	therefore	endlessly	preoccupied	with	heritage	as	 its	authentic	representation.			The	 Wewelsburg	 case	 study	 illustrates	 how	 activists	 can	 recuperate	 heritage	from	 state	 institutions.	 Wewelsburg	 demonstrates	 the	 inter-subjectivity	 of	activists	in	the	museum	and	the	authority	of	the	state	within	its	own	institutions.	The	 “voice”	 of	 the	museum	 is	 in	 reality	 that	 of	 the	 state,	which	 in	 the	German	context	 remains	 silent	 over	 the	 causality	 of	 fascism.	 By	muting	 the	museum’s	authoritative	 voice,	 the	 state	 enables	 activism	 within	 its	 social	 space	 and	 the	penetration	 of	 counter-narratives	 that	 have	 wider	 political	 repercussions	 in	Germany	 and	beyond.	Activist	 heritage	 challenges	 state	 control	 of	 the	 national	
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heritage	 through	 the	 state’s	 own	 ideological	 channel.	 Where	 liberal	multiculturalism	deflects	minority	groups’	attention	 from	the	state	as	 the	 locus	of	political	power,	neofascists	have	no	such	illusions.	Neofascist	identity	politics	modifies	 liberal	 themes	 and	 values	 to	 its	 own	 ends.	 This	 is	 possible	 because	liberal	multiculturalism	itself	conceives	culture	in	essentialist	terms	as	a	product	of	 the	 past,	 pure	 and	 unchanging.	 Essentialism	 and	 cultural	 relativism	 in	 the	public	realm	reflect	the	neoliberal	state’s	renunciation	of	the	future	as	a	cohesive	social	project.	Under	these	conditions	polysemic	symbols,	such	as	the	Black	Sun,	may	be	culturally	re-signified	and	politically	re-activated	because	the	neoliberal	state	is	incapable	of	quarantining	them	within	the	past.	The	alienated	neoliberal	subject	is	more	receptive	to	nativist	political	appeals	because	he	or	she	is	already	socially	conditioned	to	define	culture	and	 identity	exclusively	 in	relation	 to	the	past,	 and	 through	 the	 medium	 of	 heritage.	 For	 the	 rootless	 bourgeois	 and	deindustrialised	 worker	 alike,	 the	 cure	 for	 the	 social	 maladies	 of	 neoliberal	society	is	thus	to	be	found	in	irrational	idealisation	of	an	earlier	state	of	being.		Irrational	nationalist	activist	heritage	can	recuperate	state	heritage	to	construct	an	 alternative	 modernity	 on	 a	 separate	 ethical	 plane.	 In	 this	 endeavour,	irrational	nationalism	is	ideologically	compatible	with	religious	fundamentalism.	Fundamentalist	 ideologies	 are	 fertilised	 by	 the	 future-blindness	 of	 neoliberal	societies.	The	resort	to	irrational	explanations	of	the	material	world	is	explained	by	 the	 subject’s	 inability	 to	 perceive	 social	 forces	 at	work.	 This	 syndrome	 is	 a	direct	 consequence	 of	 governmental	 implementation	 of	 neoliberal	 policies,	following	 Hayek’s	 original	 precepts.	 Fundamentalism	 countermands	 the	Enlightenment’s	 assertion	 of	 reason	 over	 faith.	 Reasserting	 faith	 over	 reason	
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explains	 the	 fundamentalist	 belief	 that	 culture	 is	 shaped	 by	 supernatural	 as	opposed	to	social	forces.	In	the	Israeli	context,	Religious	Zionist	settlers	idealise	the	 Land	 of	 Israel,	 believing	 it	 to	 be	 a	 primary	 agent	 in	 Jewish	 culture.	 They	believe	 settling	 the	 land	 is	 by	 divine	 ordination	 and	 that	 this	 confers	supernatural	 powers	 upon	 it.	 In	 this	 ideological	 complex,	 culture	 is	 the	reification	 of	 Hegel’s	 “spirit	 of	 the	 nation”	 activated	 by	 the	 land.	As	 a	 cultural	representation,	heritage	is	a	votive	offering	to	this	spirit—a	paean	to	the	past	as	an	article	of	faith.	It	is	also	catalytic	for	territorial	expansion	in	the	West	Bank	as	Jewish	culture	is	implanted	in	the	land	that	defines	it.		The	 institutionalisation	of	heritage	 indicates	 that	a	society	 is	modern,	or	 in	 the	process	of	modernisation,	and	has	therefore	reached	a	definite	stage	of	scientific	and	 technological	 development.	 Although	 fundamentalists	 may	 be	 hostile	 to	certain	 ethical	 dimensions	 of	 modern	 science,	 they	 are	 seldom	 opposed	 to	technological	advances	made	by	its	lights.	The	attainment	of	scientific	knowledge	is	 valued	 within	 irrational	 ideologies	 when	 decoupled	 from	 any	 notion	 of	progressive	 modernisation.	 Much	 of	 the	 activist	 heritage	 I	 have	 discussed	manipulates	 earlier	 rational	 scientific	 enquiry,	 or	 emulates	 its	 methods,	 to	validate	 irrational	 claims.	 Hence	 the	 Religious	 Zionist	 settlers	 of	 Shiloh	 have	exploited	 the	 scholarship	 of	 professional	 archaeologists	 to	 legitimise	 their	museum	 and	 are	 now	 conducting	 their	 own	 activist	 archaeological	investigations.	Settlers	recognise	the	transnational	cultural	currency	of	heritage	and	 the	 necessity	 of	 digital	 and	 internet-based	 technologies	 in	 a	 globalised	world.	 In	common	with	 the	other	 irrational	 ideologies	 I	have	examined,	 Jewish	fundamentalism’s	 idealisation	 of	 the	 past	 as	 “life	with	 the	 ancestors”	 does	 not	
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make	it	anti-modern	per	se.	Fundamentalists	employ	contemporary	technologies	to	superimpose	their	ethical	universe	onto	the	existing	pattern	of	modernity	 in	order	 to	 transform	 it.	 Technology	 alone	 cannot	 effect	 social	 transformation	because	 it	 merely	 serves	 the	 mode	 of	 production	 as	 determined	 by	 social	relations.	Technology	does	not	generate	 the	mode	of	production,	and	therefore	the	 type	of	 society,	but	 the	 reverse.	 In	other	words,	only	a	modern	society	can	develop	advanced	technology	because	the	economy	requires	it.	Fundamentalism	and	irrational	nationalism	manifest	in	modern	technological	and	aesthetic	terms	because	 they	 are	 ideologically	 forged	 under	 the	 cultural	 conditions	 of	 mass	capitalism.	Modern	technology	may	thus	be	lauded	by	those	irrationally	fixated	with	the	past	as	an	emblem	of	cultural	achievement,	regardless	of	any	ideological	signification	they	attach	to	pre-modern	cultures.			Culture	 is	 generated	 from	 the	 economic	 structure	 of	 society	 as	 the	 material	foundation	of	national	life.	The	cultural	fragmentation	that	arises	from	neoliberal	structural	degradation	generates	 collective	 insecurity	and	 social	 entropy.	Amid	the	superstructural	flux,	heritage	comes	to	the	fore	as	a	medium	of	antagonistic	cultural	 representation.	 By	 fracturing	 the	 economic	 base,	 neoliberalism	simultaneously	encourages	and	undermines	 irrational	attempts	 to	 forge	 “pure”	cultural	 identities.	 Consumerism	 and	 market	 forces	 penetrate	 the	 world	 of	politics	and	influence	the	media	activists	use	to	convey	their	messages.	Sinn	Féin	challenged	 the	 ideological	 hegemony	 of	 the	 Irish	 state	 in	 its	 attempts	 to	recuperate	the	national	heritage	of	the	Easter	Rising	at	the	centenary.	However,	the	 party’s	 activist	 heritage	 exposed	 an	 authenticity	 deficit	 in	 Irish	Republicanism.	Sinn	Féin	succoured	the	idealistic	yearning	for	authenticity	in	an	
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ephemeral	 society,	 but	 offered	 only	 simulacra	 of	 the	 revolutionary	 separatism	that	 fired	 the	 Rising.	 Under	 the	 marked	 influence	 of	 consumerist	 mores	 and	popular	cultural	aestheticisation	of	the	past,	Sinn	Féin	profaned	all	that	is	holy	in	Republican	elegiac	tradition.	In	ideological	terms	Sinn	Féin’s	commemoration	of	1916	 inevitably	 accepted	 the	 cultural	 logic	 of	 neoliberalism,	 having	 already	acquiesced	to	the	underlying	political	economy.			I	have	described	an	irrational	symmetry	between	Irish	Republicanism	and	Ulster	Loyalism	that	was	ratified	by	the	Belfast	Agreement.	Both	camps	have	hotwired	British	 liberal	 multiculturalism	 to	 service	 their	 identity	 politics.	 Loyalism’s	aestheticisation	 of	 the	 past	 mirrors	 that	 of	 Republicanism	 as	 a	 symptom	 of	ideological	myopia.	Neither	 ideology	can	articulate	a	 transformative	 future	and	must	 therefore	 endlessly	 revivify	 the	 past.	 As	 irrational	 regionalism,	 Loyalism	displays	no	 substantive	 ambition	 toward	 the	establishment	of	 an	Ulster	nation	state.	Loyalism	cannot	conceive	of	a	rational	state	because	the	material	basis	for	one	 does	 not	 exist	 in	 the	 north	 of	 Ireland.	Nostalgia	 is	 the	 dominant	 theme	 of	Loyalist	 activist	 heritage	 as	 a	 requiem	 for	 production	 and	 social	 relations	 in	which	 Protestants	 were	 dominant.	 Loyalists	 crave	 the	 revival	 of	 a	 Unionist	political	monolith	to	restore	that	which	they	have	lost.		Loyalism	 and	 Republicanism	 thus	 form	 an	 ideological	 binary	 on	 the	 island	 of	Ireland,	 wherein	 ossified	 “cultural	 traditions”	 obfuscate	 the	 absence	 of	 a	productive	economy	and	a	progressive	social	project.	The	neoliberal	state	funds	activist	museums	because	it	cannot	subsidise	renewed	production	on	ideological	grounds.	European	Union	institutions	have	reinforced	this	degenerative	dynamic	by	 funding	 proxy	 “culture	 wars”	 in	 the	 name	 of	 “regional	 development”.	
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Neoliberalism	 at	 the	 supranational	 level	 fuels	 irrational	 nationalism	 and	regionalism	 by	 decomposing	 national	 economic	 structures,	 thereby	 dissolving	the	 temporal	 and	 linear	 boundaries	 of	 modernity	 that	 give	 definition	 and	meaning	to	communal	life.			
The	Heritage	of	Mutability			Nationalism	and	heritage	are	the	ambivalent	ideological	offspring	of	reason	and	romanticism.	The	maelstrom	of	European	industrialisation	in	the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries	generated	the	collective	need	to	preserve	fragments	of	the	past	with	the	advance	of	capitalist	modernisation.	By	contrast,	neoliberal	society	produces	too	little	and	preserves	too	much.	Romantics	believed	in	allowing	the	past	to	moulder	around	us	undisturbed.	Conversely	museums	were	designed	to	preserve	 cultural	 and	 natural	 phenomena	 as	 the	 rational	 ordering	 of	 time	 and	space.	Accelerated	“time-space	compression”	under	neoliberalism	has	prompted	an	irrational	subversion	of	this	idea	in	both	state	and	activist	heritage	practices.	Remnants	of	the	past	are	now	intrusive	and	no	longer	officially	demarcated	from	the	present	and	the	future.	Moreover,	under	neoliberalism	the	past	is	understood	as	something	to	which	a	social	obligation	is	owed	in	an	abstract	sense.	There	is	no	reciprocal	commitment	to	a	 future-orientated	social	project	 that	 imbues	the	past	with	meaning.			The	past	therefore	takes	on	the	characteristics	of	a	gorgon,	petrifying	the	present	of	those	who	gaze	upon	it.	At	the	same	time	“living	history”	in	heritage	settings	reanimates	past	lives	to	solicit	emotional	responses.	Emoting	the	past	in	this	way	is	intrinsic	to	its	aestheticisation.	I	have	documented	how	this	trend	originated	in	
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the	 world	 of	 amateur	 enthusiasm,	 entered	 the	 state	 heritage	 sector	 and	 has	presently	come	full	circle	as	what	I	term	re-enactivism.	I	have	also	recorded	the	way	 in	 which	 the	 medium	 of	 televisual/cinematic	 costume	 drama	 has	 been	incorporated	into	activist	heritage	centres	and	museums	to	evoke	the	“passions”	of	nationalist	audiences.	The	media	of	 re-enactment	and	costume	drama,	along	with	 interactive	 exhibits	 that	 encourage	 audiences	 to	 “feel”	what	 the	 past	was	like,	 mimic	 contemporary	 practices	 in	 state	 heritage	 organisations.	 Neoliberal	institutional	 retrenchment	 has	 undermined	 rational	 knowledge	 systems	 in	public	museums,	 libraries	 and	 archives.	 Consequently	 the	 neoliberal	 subject	 is	socially	 conditioned	 to	 prioritise	 feeling	 over	 knowing,	 and	 to	 act	 without	recourse	to	rational	thought.			The	 sensory	 stimuli	 I	 have	described	 can	be	 emotive	but	 their	 artificial	 nature	augurs	a	deeper	asocial	melancholia.	In	neoliberal	society	the	past	flashes	before	our	eyes	as	we	are	offered	 fleeting	glimpses	 into	 its	recesses	 through	 idealised	modes	 of	 simulation.	 Synthetic	 images	 of	 the	 past	 disconnected	 from	material	realities	offer	only	transitory	emotional	nourishment	and	ultimately	alienate	the	individual	from	the	collective.	This	produces	an	apparently	paradoxical	scenario	wherein	 emotional	 stimulation	 actually	 desensitises	 the	 subject.	 When	 social	experience	is	idealised,	the	human	capacity	for	genuine	emotional	engagement	is	neutralised.	 The	 material	 connections	 of	 society,	 which	 can	 foster	 genuine	feelings	 of	 empathy	 and	 solidarity,	 become	 invisible,	 compelling	 individuals	 to	retreat	inside	themselves	for	an	instinctive	response.	Neoliberalism	encourages	an	 irrational	 recourse	 to	 instinct	 by	 suggesting	 that	 human	 behaviour	 is	motivated	 by	 forces	 beyond	 our	 control.	 Irrational	 nationalism	 has	 a	 deeper	
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instinctual	 appeal,	 beckoning	 the	 individual	 into	 an	 immortal	 community	 of	feeling	where	love	and	hate	are	equally	exalted.			Only	material	conditions	can	generate	shared	experiences	and	a	collective	desire	to	represent	the	past	in	ways	that	are	socially	beneficial.	Heritage	can	be	a	means	of	 rationalising	 the	 inevitable	 processes	 of	 decay	 and	 obsolescence	 that	accompany	socialised	experience.	When	people	or	things	reach	the	end	of	their	natural	 lives,	sadness	 is	aroused	 in	 those	socially	connected	to	 them,	but	when	forward	motion	 is	perceived	 this	 feeling	 is	mitigated	and	eventually	dissipates.		To	 accept	 that	 things	 come	 into	 being	 and	 pass	 away	 is	 to	 accept	 progressive	modernisation—the	positive	potential	of	the	future	over	the	past	and	modernity	over	 antiquity.	 Preserving	 artefacts	 of	 social	 life	 signifies	 the	 relationships	humans	 have	 with	 one	 another.	 This	 is	 why	 heritage	 industries	 in	 neoliberal	societies	offer	 temporary	 solace	 for	beleaguered	 communities.	Heritage	 cannot	substitute	 for	 the	 productive	 forces	 that	 animate	 human	 existence,	 however.	Western	 governmental	 attempts	 to	 reverse	 the	 noxious	 social	 impact	 of	deindustrialisation	using	 an	 economic	model	 founded	on	heritage	 and	 tourism	are	therefore	doomed	to	failure.		Preserving	 significant	 cultural	 and	 natural	 phenomena	 is	 also	 necessary	 for	 a	society	to	conceive	of	its	origins,	contemporary	values	and	future	designs.	In	the	neoliberal	age	when	rapid,	largely	unplanned	technological	advance	is	plunging	huge	 swathes	of	 humanity	headlong	 into	 an	opaque	 future,	 this	 has	 existential	implications.	 Studying	 natural	 phenomena	 permitted	 the	 enlightened	 to	 grasp	the	 processual	 characteristics	 of	 the	 human	 species,	 but	 also	 its	 capacity	 to	transform	 nature	 by	 subordinating	 it	 to	 reason.	 At	 a	 time	 when	 the	 social	
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boundaries	 between	 human	 and	 non-human	 are	 being	 eroded	 by	 artificial	intelligence,	 automation,	 virtual	 reality	 and	 other	 market-driven	 technological	“leaps”,	 this	 idea	 needs	 an	 intellectual	 renaissance	 if	 humanity	 is	 to	 preserve	itself.			The	erosion	of	rational	differentiation	between	human	and	non-human	is	related	to	 the	 elision	 of	 culture	 and	 nature	 in	 neoliberal	 society.	 Upon	 reaching	modernity,	humans	could	for	the	first	time	grasp	the	precedence	of	culture	over	nature.	 The	 greatest	 ideological	 threat	 yet	 posed	 to	 humanity	 –	 National	Socialism	 –	 inverted	 this	 equation	 by	 inserting	 a	 biological	 determinism	 into	culture.	 At	 the	 apex	 of	 irrational	 nationalism,	 biology	 and	 culture	 were	 inter-fused	in	the	core	belief	that	a	society’s	blood	heritage	must	determine	its	modern	culture.	Neoliberalism	has	replaced	biology	with	the	market	as	the	invisible	force	shaping	the	culture	of	modernity.	In	so	doing,	it	has	similarly	rendered	the	future	an	 event	 horizon	 from	which	 no	 light	 can	 escape.	 If	 culture	 is	 determined	 by	forces	 beyond	 human	 control,	 then	 rational	 thought	 and	 action	 are	 futile.	 The	impossibility	of	changing	 the	past	 in	material	 terms	hence	drives	 the	 irrational	impulse	to	represent	its	culture	as	an	ideal	superior	to	anything	that	might	exist	in	the	future.		Rationally	designed	heritage	reminds	a	society	of	its	past	cultural	achievements	and	potential	to	move	forward	in	time.	In	progressive	modernity,	it	reflects	how	a	culture	can	absorb	new	influences	and	display	characteristics	of	adaptation.	In	the	 contemporary	 social	 context	 of	 globalisation	 and	 regional	 conflict,	 this	 is	critical.	Mass	migration	has	stimulated	the	urgent	need	for	a	return	to	a	rational	assimilatory	paradigm	of	modernity	 in	Western	societies.	The	essentialist	view	
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of	culture	shared	by	liberal	multiculturalism	and	far-right	ideologies	represents	a	 significant	 barrier	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 such	 an	 assimilatory	model	 that	must	 be	 overcome.	 Abandoning	 multiculturalism	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 public	policy	is	not	to	forsake	cultural	heterogeneity	in	society.	When	not	disrupted	by	political	 pathogens,	 cultural	 production	 occurs	 dialectically	 and	 can	 absorb	multifarious	 influences.	 Museums	 and	 other	 state	 heritage	 institutions	 have	 a	potentially	constructive	role	to	play	in	this	process	as	agents	of	modernisation.			Heritage	 also	 reinforces	 a	 rational	 command	 of	 the	 “production	 of	 space”	 in	modernity.	 The	 historical	 tendency	 of	 liberalism	 in	 its	 old	 and	 new	 guises	 has	been	supranational	expansion	through	free	trade.	In	the	nineteenth	century	this	produced	 a	 reversion	 to	 protectionism	 among	 rival	 imperialist	 powers;	 in	 the	early	 twenty-first	 century	 it	will	 probably	 result	 in	 a	 similar	 outcome	globally.	The	 nation	 state	 has	 therefore	 endured	 as	 the	 basic	 unit	 of	 economic	 and	political	 organisation	 in	 the	 world,	 despite	 the	 globalising	 trend	 toward	supranational	 integration.	 The	 summit	 of	 human	 civilisation	 will	 not	 be	 a	modern	 Tower	 of	 Babel.	 Humanity’s	 greatest	 endeavours	 have	 largely	 been	inspired	within	 the	 time-space	of	 the	nation	state.	Such	achievements	were	 for	the	most	part	undertaken	by	those	for	whom	nationality	and	humanity	were	not	mutually	 exclusive	 categories,	 but	 complementary	 ideals.	 Maintaining	 this	interface	 of	 the	national	 and	 the	universal,	which	 is	 vital	 to	 preserving	human	diversity,	 is	 a	 precondition	 of	 progressive	modernisation.	 As	 the	 foundation	 of	progressive	 modernity,	 the	 nation	 state	 remains	 the	 only	 viable	 democratic	mechanism	 for	 its	 continuation.	 At	 the	 dawn	 of	 the	 modern	 world,	 the	 past	ceased	to	be	an	unknowable	quantity.	When	the	past	became	history	it	revealed	
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our	 mutability.	 Within	 the	 nation	 state	 we	 can	 perceive	 this	 mutability	 by	rationalising	 time	 and	 space	 as	 social	 constructs.	 The	 rational	 nationalist	delivered	us	 thus	 from	 the	pure	hands	of	gods	and	 into	our	own.	Our	 freedom	comes	at	the	price	of	a	compact	with	the	past,	either	to	emulate	it	or	to	improve	upon	it.	
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